by Earl J. Hess
Cheatham began to shift his corps to the south at about 10 A.M. and did so in stages rather than in one movement. Once settled in their new position, his men hurried to dig earthworks. The left flank of the corps rested at Jones’ Mill on Clear Creek, and it still faced north. Then the line extended east for one and a half miles before heading south another two miles to reach the Georgia Railroad. Cheatham’s new position was in general well chosen to take advantage of the terrain. It conformed to the high ground east of Lullwater Creek, a tributary of Pea Vine Creek. But some units of Henry D. Clayton’s Division found their line commanded by a high ridge. That afternoon elements of Wood’s Federal division occupied the ridge, set up artillery, and punished the Confederates. Clayton had no artillery immediately available to counter this fire, so his men counted on improving their fortifications to endure it. Clayton also contended with aggressive Union skirmishing that afternoon but managed to hold the blue-coated skirmishers on their side of no-man’s land.52
Cheatham’s stage-by-stage shift of one and a half miles caused a great deal of confusion for Hardee, who was told by army headquarters that all he would have to do was move right the equivalent of half a division. According to Hood’s specific instructions, Hardee posted Maj. Samuel L. Black, one of his staff members, in a good place to superintend this shift. Black stationed himself where Hardee’s left flank was supposed to stop to accomplish the shift and showed one of Stewart’s staff officers the spot so the right flank of the Army of Mississippi could rest there too. But, when Hardee realized that Cheatham was moving much farther away, he had to make a quick decision as to his own course. As Hardee correctly noted in his report, if Hood had been in the field rather than at his headquarters, he could have consulted with the army commander. But there was no time for that. Hardee correctly decided to continue shifting in order to maintain contact with Cheatham’s left flank; considering that the enemy was in heavy force within striking distance, it was safer to keep a connected line.53
Black also was confused when he saw the left flank of Hardee’s line disappear from the spot where it was supposed to stop. He asked the leftmost brigade commander and was told orders had been issued to continue moving. Half an hour later, the right flank of Stewart’s command neared the spot. Black explained the situation to Stewart’s rightmost brigade commander and then rode to consult with Hardee, who told him of his decision to keep touch with Cheatham. “I know that General Hardee expressed his impatience at the delay,” Black recalled after the war, “and his annoyance at the repeated movements to the right.” Expecting to attack, it came as an odd diversion for most members of Hardee’s Corps to suddenly be called on to move so far in line to the right. This also meant that most units that had deployed skirmishers also had to move their skirmish lines to the right as well.54
Stewart was as surprised and annoyed by the continued shifting as Hardee. In fact, when he realized that Hardee was moving farther than the expected half a mile, Stewart stopped his men and sent word to army headquarters suggesting that the shift be canceled so the troops could attack near the 1 P.M. start time for the assault. Stewart implied that Hood mandated he keep contact with Hardee, which actually was the only course of action to take. Hardee and Stewart could not attack without firm connection.55
William W. Loring, who commanded the rightmost division of Stewart’s Army of Mississippi, later reported that Samuel Black informed him Hardee suggested that Stewart rest his right flank where it was originally intended, only half a division front to the right. Skirmishers could fill the gap between Stewart’s and Hardee’s commands. But Loring must have misunderstood, for Black never implied in his postwar letter that he said anything of the kind. Moreover, Hardee never implied it either, and it would make little sense to do this if the intention was to attack as soon as the shift was completed. When Stewart instructed Loring to keep going, the division continued moving east.56
Loring’s subordinates were irritated by the continued shifting. Winfield S. Featherston, whose brigade led Loring’s movement, was astonished to be pushed farther east onto ground that was completely new to him. He had spent hours reconnoitering the lay of the land before his former position one and a half miles to the west on July 19, and all that time and energy was now wasted. Brig. Gen. Thomas M. Scott moved his brigade behind Featherston, followed by the rest of Stewart’s army. In some ways the shift was beneficial for the Confederates. They had massed quite a bit on the far left, nervous about keeping touch with the river near the railroad bridge. Now Stewart thinned out his left wing, but the unexpectedly long shift served to stretch his line almost too thinly. Samuel G. French’s small division, which held the far left, had to cover most of the Fourteenth Corps front.57
Fighting his new command for the first time, Stewart was extremely careful to convey exact instructions to his subordinates. He not only fully explained the attack plan early that morning, but he repeated the instructions by personally talking with his division commanders after the shift ended. His thoroughness paid off in that no one in the corps was confused about what to do. Division level staff officers spoke to brigade commanders, who in turn conveyed the exact meaning and spirit of the attack orders to their regimental officers. As Featherston put it three days later, “The fight was to be a general one along our lines, and the victory to be made as decisive as possible.” Stewart also gave an impromptu speech to Scott’s Brigade after the shift, explaining the battle plan to them. In his instructions to division commanders, Stewart emphasized a point Hood made; if the men encountered earthworks, they were to attack vigorously and carry the fortifications. There is no evidence that Hardee exerted himself to explain the battle plan or encourage his men as did Stewart.58
Hood believed he had done everything to set the army in motion for the first Confederate attack of the campaign that approached the nature of a general assault. Late that morning, he spoke to Felix G. De Fontaine, a newspaper correspondent of the Savannah Republican, while leaning on a crutch in the doorway of his headquarters house. “At one I attack the . . . enemy. He has pressed our lines until he is within a short distance of Atlanta, and I must fight or evacuate. I am going to fight. The odds are against us, but I leave the issue with the God of Battles.” Then Hood and his staff rode to Stewart’s headquarters to observe the fight.59
Three p.m., July 20
Did the unplanned shift of one and a half miles to the right seriously affect Hood’s plans? It is true that the attack, instead of starting at 1 P.M., was delayed at least two hours and perhaps three, depending on whose testimony one relies on to pinpoint the exact time of starting. It is also true that virtually all attacking units now occupied new ground, unfamiliar to their officers. But in many ways the shift had little effect on Confederate prospects. It placed Hardee’s Corps in a position where it could have exploited the gap in Sherman’s line that existed between Newton’s division and the rest of the Fourth Corps. Stewart’s strongest division, commanded by Loring, now was in position opposite Hooker’s Twentieth Corps, which was ill-prepared to receive an attack compared to Palmer’s command.60
But Gustavus W. Smith, commander of the Georgia Militia, argued after the war that the two-or-three-hour delay hurt Hood’s plans. He believed that Thomas was still in the process of crossing Peach Tree Creek at that time and could have suffered a “serious disaster before the forces of Schofield or McPherson could have reached him.” Thomas Connelly has echoed this assessment in recent decades. But the truth is that Thomas had completed his crossings well before 1 P.M. His troop positions were almost the same at midafternoon as they had been three hours before. There really would have been little if any advantage to the Confederates to strike at the planned time as far as Thomas’s movements and dispositions were concerned. Moreover, as Albert Castel has pointed out, Hood never really intended to hit Thomas while the Federals were crossing. His battle plan, for better or for worse, called for a movement to trap the Army of the Cumberland on the south side of the stream. It might
have been more effective to hit exactly when the crossings were taking place, but the plan did not call for it.61
Another serious breakdown of intelligence at Army of Tennessee headquarters lay in the fact that no one was aware of the significant gap in Sherman’s position between Newton’s division and the rest of the Fourth Corps. Howard estimated that gap as two miles wide. Cheatham and Hardee both were in a position to exploit that break in the enemy line if they had known of it. Cox pointed out that the angle where the two Confederate corps lines joined “would interpose between the two wings of Sherman’s army” as the Federals advanced. Hardee could have moved his right and Cheatham his left into the gap. Such an assault probably represented Hood’s best chance of dealing a serious blow to Sherman’s grand plan; it certainly would have called on all the resources of grit and stamina the Federals possessed, even though the rugged, brush-engulfed terrain would have posed a difficult problem for the Confederates.62
Sherman did not worry about the gap. While visiting Howard’s headquarters at 2 P.M. on July 20, he expressed the conviction that Hood would strike Schofield and McPherson because the left wing of his army group was tearing up a vital line of communications into Atlanta. The lack of apparent concern for the gap among Federal generals would have accentuated the effect of a major Confederate assault into that area.63
But the Army of Tennessee would not conduct a surgical strike into the gap. It would move straight ahead and to the left in an effort to beat, trap, and demolish the Army of the Cumberland, its most common opponent on the battlefields of the Western Theater. Estimating the number of men on the opposing sides depends on which source one uses. Abstracts of returns dated July 10, 1864, place the strength of the Army of Tennessee at 45,500 men. Albert Castel believes Hood inherited 55,000 troops from Johnston on July 18, but Johnston claimed the number was 51,000. It is certain that not all of them would take part in the battle of Peach Tree Creek; only Hardee and Stewart were slated to conduct that assault. Henry Stone, one of Thomas’s staff officers, estimated the opposing forces on July 20 at 30,000 Confederates and 20,000 Federals, and the abstracts of returns dated July 10 support Stone’s estimate of Rebel strength that day. Richard McMurry believes the number of troops Hood threw at Thomas was closer to 23,000 men, divided into five divisions with two more divisions as support. McMurry accepts Stone’s estimate of 20,000 Federals divided into four divisions, with a brigade of Fourteenth Corps men involved as well. Stone also estimated Sherman’s overall strength as 45,000 men in the left wing of the army group and 30,000 men in the right wing.64
Whichever way one tilts the numbers, Hood managed to create a flawed but viable scenario for his first attack as army commander. “By a mixture of boldness and good luck,” Richard McMurry has concluded, “Hood had brought a superior force to the point of battle.” The numerical superiority was by no means overwhelming, but the Rebel commander at least had some justification for hope as his troops finished their shifting and turned their faces northward toward the enemy.65
5: Hardee versus Newton
Here they come, boys! By God, a million of them. —unidentified Federal skirmisher
Never was I under a heavier fire than there. . . . I thought I would certainly see my ‘Valhalla’ that day.—J. Cooper Nisbet
I gave them 75 rounds for Chickamauga.—Day Elmore
According to Hood’s plan, Hardee was to lead off the Confederate attack on Thomas’s army that afternoon with an assault by divisions en echelon. By the end of his shift to the right, Hardee found that the right flank of his corps ended up near the valley of Clear Creek. This placed his entire command squarely opposite the position of Newton’s Fourth Corps division. Maj. Gen. William B. Bate’s Division held the right and was opposite the sector east of Newton’s men; in other words, Bate faced the gap between Newton and Wood. W. H. T. Walker’s Division held Hardee’s center and confronted Newton’s left wing. Cheatham’s Division, now led by Brig. Gen. George E. Maney, occupied Hardee’s left and confronted Newton’s right wing, extending a bit beyond it toward the west. Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne’s Division was held in reserve behind Walker and Maney.1
The strength of the opposing forces on this part of the battlefield has been variously estimated. According to historians, Hardee had perhaps 15,000 men on the field. Abstracts of returns dated July 10 indicate that his corps contained 16,567 men present for duty that day, but the number undoubtedly dropped by July 20. Newton initially reported that he had 3,200 men in his division but later downgraded that number to 2,700 troops. One thing is certain; Hardee brought overwhelming strength to the field compared to his opponent. Never before and never since would the Army of Tennessee enjoy such an astounding advantage of numbers (as much as five to one) against an opponent.2
The exact time at which the battle began is debatable. While Sherman and latter day historians have generally agreed that it started at 4 P.M., a careful screening of the many reports by Union and Confederate participants provide different times for the beginning of the battle. More observers cited 3 P.M. as the actual start of the fight than any other time.3
John Newton was ready for anything that afternoon. Like Thomas a Virginian by birth and a graduate of West Point, he served as an engineer before the war and participated as a brigade, division, or corps commander in all the major campaigns of the East from the Peninsula to Gettysburg. He was one of several officers transferred to the West in time for the Atlanta campaign, and Sherman found room for them in his large Military Division of the Mississippi. Newton took over Philip Sheridan’s division, one of the best in the Western Federal armies. It suffered enormously in the failed June 27 attack on Johnston’s line at Kennesaw Mountain. Though reduced in numbers, the survivors of that attack were tough fighters who could not easily be cowed, and their commander was vigilant and resourceful. “John Newton could never be surprised,” Howard proudly wrote of his subordinate.4
Observers noted with interest that Newton’s formation consisted of a capital T, with two brigades in line at the front forming the cross bar and a third in column to the rear forming the stem. Kimball’s brigade deployed to the right of the Buck Head and Atlanta Road, except that the 88th Illinois lay east of the thoroughfare, and Scovill placed four guns of his Ohio battery in the roadway. Blake’s brigade deployed east of the road and to the left of the 88th Illinois. Bradley’s brigade formed a column of regiments along the road to the rear of this line. “I call this whole formation ‘Newton’s Cross,’” wrote Howard after the war.5
Newton’s men had just begun to construct breastworks a few minutes before the Confederates attacked. Some units put together fairly substantial works, while others had little if any shelter. Several observers noted that the breastworks were “half finished,” but even a slight barricade offered some degree of safety and emotional security in battle. There were no trenches, no head logs, no abatis to trip up an attacker. Hardee’s men had the comparatively rare advantage of avoiding the kind of serious impediments to an assault that had become common features on battlefields of the Atlanta campaign.6
Whether the Confederates could capitalize on their many advantages in this sector depended on management by officers on all levels, from Hardee down to regimental commanders. Bate’s Division was in the best position to capitalize, but it was led by a career politician from Tennessee who, according to many critics, had failed to learn how to be a general. William B. Bate had served in the Mexican War and had gained extensive experience in Civil War engagements in the West, but his record as a battlefield commander was at best spotty. A newspaper editor and state legislator, Bate was far from a thorough soldier. He had mismanaged an attack by his division at Dallas on May 28.7
John Newton, whose Fourth Corps division anchored the stout Union defense on the afternoon of July 20. (Library of Congress, LC-DIG-cwpb-05201)
Hardee versus Newton
No one in the division filed a report of the action on July 20, and personal accounts from the rank and fil
e are few and far between. But we know that Bate moved forward in a way to take him across Clear Creek, which angled toward the northwest at this point before flowing into Peach Tree Creek. His division continued toward the gap between Newton’s division and Wood’s division, but that gap was shrouded by thick woods and underbrush, and neither Bate nor Hardee knew it existed. The division formed in one line with Brig. Gen. Joseph H. Lewis’s Brigade of Kentucky regiments on the left, Col. Thomas B. Smith’s Brigade of Georgia and Tennessee regiments in the center, and Brig. Gen. Jesse J. Finley’s Brigade of Florida troops on the right. The division had a line of skirmishers to lead the way. Hardee instructed Bate “to find, and, if practicable, to turn” Newton’s flank, and Bate tried hard to do so. But he had no real information about what lay ahead and shoved his division forward in a reconnaissance in force to find out.8
For about two hours Bate’s men floundered away in the thickets near the junction of Clear Creek and Peach Tree Creek without finding the enemy. An entire division of Confederate troops lost its way and was unable to contribute to the fulfillment of Hood’s battle plan. Nothing but a contingent of the 57th Indiana was located east of Clear Creek on the Federal side of the field, and that small group quickly retired at the onset of the enemy advance. Moreover, Bate lost contact with Hardee and failed to send messages to corps headquarters concerning his lack of progress. Hardee was as ignorant of what that division was doing as he was of the large gap that Bate failed to find, even though it lay directly in front of his struggling command.9
The next Rebel division to go forward, commanded by W. H. T. Walker, was positioned to the left of Bate and just to the east of the Buck Head and Atlanta Road. Walker was one of the most experienced officers in the Army of Tennessee, having served in the Second Seminole War and in Mexico. For most of the sectional conflict combat had eluded him, but now his division occupied the center of Hardee’s line in Hood’s first strike to defend Atlanta. He advanced after Bate began to move forward through the brush to his right and before Maney’s Division started to his left. As far as the Federals were concerned, the sudden appearance of Walker’s troops signaled a surprise attack by the enemy. “With lightning-like speed,” wrote a newspaper correspondent, “heavy columns of rebels appeared in front of, or rather tumbled out of, the forests, their columns seeming to be endless.” A Federal skirmisher who scampered back to Newton’s main position graphically alerted his comrades by shouting “Here they come, boys! By God, a million of them.”10