The Battle of Peach Tree Creek
Page 12
William J. Hardee, whose corps enjoyed an enormous numerical superiority over Newton’s embattled division but failed to capitalize on it. (Library of Congress, LC-USZC4–7972)
Walker arrayed his division in one line with Brig. Gen. Clement H. Stevens’s Brigade on the left, its left flank touching the Buck Head and Atlanta Road. Brig. Gen. States R. Gist’s Brigade held the center of the division formation, and Brig. Gen. Hugh W. Mercer’s Brigade anchored the right. The division was nestled in the largely open area between the Buck Head and Atlanta Road on the west and the winding course of Clear Creek on the east. In fact, Mercer’s men crossed that shallow, meandering stream at least twice as they advanced, slowing their progress until Gist to their left lost touch with Mercer’s flank and surged ahead.11
The two brigades constituting Walker’s center and right advanced into the gap between Newton and Clear Creek. Gist and Mercer were opposed in this assault only by the 57th Indiana, which formed a skirmish line linking Blake’s brigade with Clear Creek, and the 100th Illinois, which occupied ground near the junction of Clear Creek and Peach Tree Creek. Just before Gist and Mercer appeared, Lieut. Col. Willis Blanch detailed ten men to go south of his skirmish line and find out what lay ahead. Blanch led them personally. The group had proceeded a few hundred yards and captured a Confederate picket who refused to divulge any information. Just then, Rebel troops could be clearly seen moving forward. Blanch and the scouts ran back to the regiment, and the 57th Indiana conducted a fighting retreat northward. The Indianans stopped now and then to fire at the approaching Rebels, taking cover in the abandoned Confederate rifle pits held prior to Wood’s crossing of the creek on July 19. They had to give up those pits as well and found themselves in the area where Clear Creek joined Peach Tree Creek. There was no recourse but to wade the deep stream as best they could, although a sharp bend in the creek prevented one wing of the regiment from crossing. As Blanch reported, half of his men rallied on the north bank while the rest stayed in a comparatively secure spot on the south side. Both wings continued to deliver fire on the approaching Rebel troops.12
Maj. Charles M. Hammond’s 100th Illinois was caught up in this unexpected rush. Hammond also ordered his men to cross to the north side of Peach Tree and most of them were able to do so. The Federals who escaped to the north side did good service. Later, when small groups of Confederates tried to move over Peach Tree Creek, they were able to repel them and protect the rear area of Thomas’s line.13
The rapid advance of Gist’s and Mercer’s Brigades inspired a corresponding rush of noncombatants from Newton’s division. Hundreds of ambulance drivers, handlers of pack mules, and personal servants took fright and ran north along the Buck Head and Atlanta Road toward the bridge over Peach Tree Creek. Armed guards were quickly placed at the bridge to stop any combatants from rushing to the rear, but observers proudly reported that there were none in the crowd. Members of Bradley’s brigade had the best view of these stragglers. They saw “a road full of fugitives fleeing as though their lives depended on their haste.” Bradley and other officers tried to calm them but had no luck. The armed guards at the bridge allowed these men to pass by and clear the way for battle.14
Gist’s and Mercer’s sudden appearance disconcerted some of the fighting men in Newton’s division, at least initially. A few Federals assumed the Confederates had been lying in wait for some time and intended to ambush Newton’s division if it continued to advance. When it stopped to dig in, in their view, Hardee now opted for a sudden attack. The enemy “came down upon us like a thunderbolt,” wrote Maj. Frederick A. Atwater of the 42nd Illinois. Bradley told his sister that “the rebels burst upon us in a perfect storm, . . . expecting to carry our position with a rush.”15
As the Confederates bypassed the left flank of Newton’s line, pushing back the 57th Indiana along the way, Blake held his position firmly. It was up to Bradley to do something about the Confederates who threatened to engulf Newton’s left flank. Bradley reacted quickly by putting Col. Emerson Opdycke in charge of four of his regiments (the 3rd Kentucky, 64th Ohio, 65th Ohio, and 125th Ohio), and telling him to screen the road and bridge. Opdycke formed a line obliquely toward the east and north (facing southeast) only a few minutes before the Confederates came near. But Bradley soon thought better of the position and ordered Opdycke to fall back. The men did so hastily and, Opdycke admitted, “in not very good order.” He now formed the four regiments in line facing due east. The left flank reached almost to the bridge over Peach Tree Creek. The four regiments were in a good spot to fire into Gist’s and Mercer’s flanks as soon as the Confederates came within close range.16
Opdycke took up this position just in time, for the enemy neared within minutes. The Federals waited until the Rebels were within 100 yards before opening fire. The Confederates staggered and hesitated; Opdycke could see that their officers “exerted themselves to rally and charge again, but did not succeed.” As the Federals fired at least five volleys, it seemed to Ralsa C. Rice of the 125th Ohio that a massacre was taking place in the Confederate line. “We were evening up matters with June 27 in mind,” Rice later boasted.17
As Opdycke acknowledged, Federal artillery came into play to help him stop the enemy. Newton had positioned two guns of Scovill’s Battery A, 1st Ohio Light Artillery on the Buck Head and Atlanta Road where Wood had constructed his first line of works the day before. This placed the guns about a quarter of a mile south of Peach Tree Creek. The rest of Scovill’s pieces were on Newton’s line three-quarters of a mile south of the creek. The two detached guns at Wood’s old line were in a good position to pound Gist’s and Mercer’s men as they neared the bridge.18
But Thomas also became personally involved in saving the bridge. An artilleryman in the prewar U.S. Army, he rounded up guns to fire on the gray-clad infantrymen. A heavy-set man with a stoic, ponderous manner, Thomas “could move quickly enough when duty demanded it,” as Howard gently put it. Thomas ordered Capt. Marco B. Gary’s Battery C, 1st Ohio Light Artillery and Capt. Luther R. Smith’s Battery I, 1st Michigan Light Artillery from the Twentieth Corps artillery reserve to move to a point near the bridge. Members of Wood’s brigade, Ward’s division, saw Thomas riding about in unusual haste and then slapping the artillery horse’s flank with his sword to speed them on the way. The two batteries hurried across the bridge and took position next to the two guns Scovill had posted at Wood’s July 19 fortifications. Capt. George W. Spencer’s Battery M, 1st Illinois Light Artillery, a Fourth Corps unit, also added its guns to this concentration. All told the Federals used twenty pieces to pound Gist and Mercer, and those guns contributed greatly to the repulse of the Confederates. As Howard recalled Thomas’s words after the battle, “It relieved the hitch.”19
The effect of the combined fire of Opdycke’s infantry and the artillery was too much for the Rebels. William D. Hynes of the 42nd Illinois may have exaggerated a bit when he described the “terrible hail of canister, literally mowing them down.” From Hynes’s perspective, the Confederates halted “a few minutes” and then, seized by panic, “fled like a flock of sheep.”20
Bradley reported that the repulse of Gist and Mercer consumed little more than half an hour’s time. He characterized it as “a sharp fight” and could have added that it was a close call as well.21 The Confederates had come close to reaching the bridge over Peach Tree Creek that Newton depended upon as his lifeline to the north. But the combined weight of Opdycke’s infantry fire and Thomas’s artillery fire, both delivered into the Confederates’ left flank and front, stopped their attack.
As Gist and Mercer plowed into the open space east of Newton’s division, Brig. Gen. Clement H. Stevens’s Brigade advanced on the left of Walker’s formation. He directly confronted Blake’s brigade on Newton’s left. Born in Connecticut, Stevens was living in South Carolina when the war broke out and sided with the Confederacy. After recovering from a wound received at First Manassas, Stevens was elected colonel of the 24th South Carolina but saw relatively
little combat before the Atlanta campaign.22
George H. Thomas, who temporarily set aside his stolid demeanor to rush artillery units into a position from which the guns could play an important role in repelling Hardee’s attack. (Library of Congress, LC-DIG-cwpb-00679)
Blake’s men had just begun fortifying when the Confederates appeared. Many members of the 40th Indiana were to the rear collecting material for breastworks. Blake rushed forward his reserve regiment, the 28th Kentucky, as quickly as possible. Brigade pioneers dropped their tools and formed a skirmish line extending south from Blake’s left flank. The brigade barely was ready for Walker when the Confederates began closing in on its position.23
Col. J. Cooper Nisbet’s 66th Georgia was the leftmost regiment in Stevens’s Brigade, with its left flank resting at the Buck Head and Atlanta Road. “We were told that the enemy had just crossed Peachtree Creek that morning,” recalled Nisbet after the war, “and were unfortified.” But Nisbet was worried that he had no connection with George Maney’s Division to the left. “I protested against advancing until this gap was filled, but the order was given—and the line went in with a rush.” In the ranks of the 88th Illinois, positioned just east of the Buck Head and Atlanta Road, Richard Realf saw Stevens’s men approach. “With muskets at a right-shoulder shift they moved in the confidence of expected triumph, hoping to find our lines unformed.”24
As Stevens’s men moved forward, the Union skirmishers commanded by Joseph Conrad gave way. Most of the Federals turned and fired as they retreated amid shouts from the Confederates to surrender. Half of the 15th Missouri fell back to Blake’s line, and the other half moved through the Union position along the Buck Head and Atlanta Road, allowing the four guns of Scovill’s Ohio battery to open fire as soon as it passed by. The 73rd Illinois with the 24th Wisconsin fell back to the right flank of Newton’s division line.25
After pushing Conrad’s men away, Stevens halted at the captured Union skirmish line. The fire coming from the front was heavy, and Nisbet reported slightly enfilading fire from the left where Kimball’s brigade was located. Kimball could deliver this fire because, according to Hood’s instructions to advance in echelon by divisions, Maney had not yet come forward to support Stevens’s left flank. Nisbet and Stevens acted as if they had no idea that Maney was supposed to delay his advance, for the brigade leader rode his horse to Nisbet’s location and began to order him to fall back. The volume of fire coming from the front was increased by the fact that the 40th Indiana and 28th Kentucky of Blake’s brigade were armed with Spencer repeating rifles. One observer indicated that the men fired from 80 to 100 rounds during the course of the battle at Peach Tree Creek, taking full advantage of the rapid-firing capabilities of this advanced weapon. The four guns of Battery A, 1st Ohio Light Artillery that Scovill placed on the road within Kimball’s left wing also pounded the Confederates with both canister and shell. Stevens’s men returned the fire as best they could, inflicting some casualties on Blake’s command.26
At the height of this firefight Stevens became a victim. His horse was shot and killed, compelling him to rapidly dismount. Just as he turned his side to the Federals a bullet smashed into his head behind the right ear. He was still alive as his aides carried him off the field; two of them were wounded along the way. The front and enfilade fire increased in intensity, striking Nisbet as unusually severe. “Never was I under a heavier fire than there—for a brief time.” He lost one-fourth of his men to it and fully expected to be numbered among the slain. “I thought I would certainly see my ‘Valhalla’ that day,” Nisbet later wrote.27
Nisbet survived this fire, but Stevens did not. Surgeons removed the bullet, and his staff arranged to transport him to Vineville, near Macon, but the general died there on July 25. His body was shipped to Charleston for burial. Stevens’s death caused widespread regret. Members of his command “severely felt” his loss, and Arthur M. Manigault, who led a brigade in Brown’s Division of Hood’s old corps, called Stevens “one of the best officers in our army.” After the battle, soldiers of the 40th Indiana took the saddle and holsters from his dead horse on the field.28
The Federals opposing Stevens’s Brigade were concerned about the security of Blake’s left flank. Bradley therefore sent the 42nd Illinois to bolster that flank and support Col. John Q. Lane’s 97th Ohio at the left end of Blake’s line. Lane also commanded the brigade pioneers who had strung out in a skirmish line eastward from his flank. The added weight enabled Blake’s left wing to hold firmly in place.29
With their leader down and faced with furious fire from Newton’s immovable line, the troops of Stevens’s Brigade held for a while at the captured Federal skirmish position before retiring. “Well we saw a hot time yesterday you may be shore,” reported a solder of the 29th Georgia to his father. Other members of the 29th as well as of the 1st Georgia (Confederate) reported that their regiments received less fire and suffered fewer casualties than other units, such as Nisbet’s 66th Georgia.30
Lieut. Col. Morgan Rawls detailed three companies from his 54th Georgia in Mercer’s Brigade to deploy as skirmishers. Lieut. Hamilton Branch of the 54th Georgia was among them. Branch saw some men building breastworks forward of the main Union position and accompanied a few scouts to see who they were. He was surprised to discover they were Federals reestablishing a skirmish line. In fact, Branch stared at a Yankee who was just as surprised as he was at a distance of no more than fifty yards. The staring contest lasted “for a full minute,” he told his mother. “I then jumped behind a tree” and started for the Confederate line before it was too late. Confederate and Union skirmishers continued to fire at each other for most of the evening. Mercer’s Brigade suffered a loss of twenty-three men that day; losses in Gist’s Brigade and Stevens’s command were not reported.31
Clement H. Stevens, who pushed his brigade forward just east of the Buck Head and Atlanta Road only to become the highest-ranking Confederate casualty at Peach Tree Creek. (Library of Congress, LC-USZ62–113171)
Walker failed to press his considerable weight in numbers on Blake’s brigade. Col. Charles H. Olmstead of the 1st Georgia (Volunteer) in Mercer’s Brigade accurately evaluated the performance in his memoirs. “Indeed we never got fairly into action as the attack had failed in other parts of the field and the Division was withdrawn before it reached a point of close touch with the enemy.” It seemed to B. Benjamin Smith, one of Gist’s staff officers, as if Stevens conducted “a feeble attack.” Mercer’s son, who served on his brigade staff, also concluded that “nothing important was accomplished” by Walker’s command that day.32
Blake’s brigade stood like a rock, even though two Confederate brigades completely outflanked its left and a third approached its front. While Blake never filed a report of the battle, Brig. Gen. George D. Wagner, the usual commander of the brigade who was on sick leave in late July, praised his men for their accomplishments on July 20. Each one “stood nobly to his work” in that trying hour. Their steadiness was a key factor in Newton’s ability to hold his position; indeed, Blake’s men were literally the left anchor of Thomas’s entire line along Peach Tree Creek. With the aid of the brigade pioneers, the 42nd Illinois from Bradley’s brigade, the support of the rest of Bradley’s regiments, and Thomas’s artillery concentration, the Union left flank held firm and prevented Walker from achieving a battle-winning victory.33
Blake’s brigade suffered only thirty-eight casualties in the battle of Peach Tree Creek. The 26th Ohio lost but three men wounded. Such a short list of killed and wounded was remarkable considering the weight of enemy power brought against the command and the significance of its stout defense of Newton’s position. Whenever possible during the fight, Blake’s men continued to work on their breastworks and by evening they had ample protection.34
To the left of Walker, George Maney led Cheatham’s old division against Kimball’s brigade west of the Buck Head and Atlanta Road. A Tennessee native with experience in the Mexican War, Maney was a lawyer who became
colonel of the 1st Tennessee before taking control of a brigade in the main western army of the Confederacy. Maney organized his division in two lines. He placed Vaughan’s Brigade, now under Col. Michael Magevney Jr. on the left and Col. John C. Carter’s Brigade on the right of the first line; his old brigade under Col. Francis M. Walker on the left and Brig. Gen. Otho F. Strahl’s Brigade on the right in the second line. Three companies of the 5th Tennessee from Strahl’s Brigade deployed as skirmishers to front the division.35
Maney waited a few minutes following the start of Walker’s advance to conform to Hood’s echelon plan. Then the division set out. “The boys at first did not like the idea of going outside the breastworks,” admitted Martin Van Buren Oldham of the 9th Tennessee, “but few failed to go.” Lieut. J. W. Howard led one of the skirmishing companies with spirit, waving his cap in the air to encourage the men. Conrad’s Federal skirmishers had already evacuated their position by that time, having fallen back when Walker first advanced, and the Rebel skirmishers took possession of the Union skirmish line.36
Maney did not stop at the Federal position but pressed forward. His small force of Tennessee skirmishers advanced under heavy artillery and rifle fire until it reached a shallow ravine a bit less than 100 yards short of Newton’s line. Here they took shelter behind the scattered trees and waited for Maney’s main line to approach. When the division reached the slight shelter of the ravine, it halted and took cover behind trees, the lay of the land, and any other natural feature that offered itself. Here the division stayed for some time, trading shots with the Federals. Edwin Rennolds of the 5th Tennessee in Strahl’s Brigade later commented that “all the efforts of their officers failed to induce them to go farther.” This static firefight produced significant casualties in Magevney’s Brigade. Col. William M. Watkins’s consolidated 12th and 47th Tennessee suffered fifty-two casualties on July 20; Company A of the 12th lost twelve men. Lieut. Col. John M. Dawson’s 154th Tennessee suffered forty-five losses.37