Falaise: The Flawed Victory
Anthony Tucker-Jones
The destruction of the trapped German forces in the Falaise pocket in August 1944 is one of the most famous episodes of the Normandy campaign. But myths have grown up around accounts of the battle, and its impact on the course of the war is sometimes misunderstood. In this meticulously researched and perceptive study Anthony Tucker-Jones dispels misconceptions about the battle, describes the combat in graphic detail and reassesses the outcome in the context of the campaign to liberate Europe.
He takes a broad view of the sequence of operations that culminated in the battle at Falaise, tracing the course of the campaign mainly from the German viewpoint. For two bloody months the Germans held the Allies at bay following the D-Day landings, but then they were blocked in at Falaise and the area became a killing ground.
Some liken the event to Hitler’s defeat at Stalingrad, while others argue the victory was flawed because so many German troops escaped.
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Anthony Tucker-Jones
FALAISE
THE FLAWED VICTORY
The Destruction of Panzergruppe West
August 1944
Preface and acknowledgements
In the hot, dusty summer of 1944 Hitler’s panzers fought desperately, first to throw the Allies back into the sea and then to extricate themselves from encirclement in the Normandy countryside. For two and a half bloody months the Germans held the Allies at bay following Operation Overlord and the D-Day landings, but when they were finally trapped in the Falaise pocket it became a corridor of death.
General Dwight Eisenhower, Allied Supreme Commander, conjuring an image of Dante’s Inferno, remarked:
The battlefield of Falaise was unquestionably one of the greatest ‘killing grounds’ of any of the war areas. Roads, highways and fields were so choked with destroyed equipment and dead men and animals that passage through the area was extremely difficult. Forty-eight hours after the closing of the gap I was conducted through it on foot, to encounter scenes that could be described only by Dante. It was literally possible to walk for hundreds of yards at a time, stepping on nothing but dead and decaying flesh.
The final defeat of the German Army in the Falaise pocket on 20 August 1944 is rightly seen as the culmination of the hard-fought Normandy campaign. The destruction of the Wehrmacht, especially the vital panzer divisions in the West, seemed assured. Some likened it to Hitler’s crushing defeats at Stalingrad and in Tunisia.
Eisenhower’s view of Falaise though was tainted with an air of regret:
In the wider sweep directed against the crossings of the Seine behind the German Army, the rapidly advancing Americans were also forced to halt to avoid overrunning their objectives and firing into friendly troops. The Germans again seized the opportunity to escape with a greater portion of his strength than would have been the case if the exact situation could have been completely foreseen.
Respected American military historian Steven Zaloga is on record as saying: ‘Controversy over the Falaise Gap has been a staple of popular histories of the war, many of the accounts being sensationalist clap-trap’. That the Battle for Normandy did not go exactly to plan and that the pinching off of the Falaise pocket was not achieved with the finesse that the Allies may have liked should not detract from the fact that the desired result was achieved.
That the victory was subsequently seen as flawed is not so much a result of the numbers of Germans escaping the trap, after all they left all their heavy equipment behind, but due to their quite remarkable recovery abilities. The escape of small, experienced cadres from each of the panzer divisions seemed to matter little at the time, especially with the Germans retreating pell-mell back across the River Seine. What equipment they did salvage from the chaos of the Normandy countryside lay discarded on the dockside at Rouen and elsewhere.
Nonetheless, it was not long before the shortcomings of Falaise and the failure to conduct a wider encirclement of the Germans up against the Seine became apparent. The reconstituted panzer divisions were soon to cause havoc in Alsace, the Ardennes, the Eifel, the Low Countries, the Hurtgen Forest, the Saar, the Rhineland and the Rhur; more specifically at Aachen, Arnhem, Arnswalde, Balaton, Bastogne, Celles, Cologne, Geilenkirchen, Hunxe, Metz, Nijmegen, Oosterbeek, Remagen, Rimlingen and St Vith. Essentially they were involved everywhere that the Germans sought to impede the Allies slow but steady advance across Western Europe toward Hitler’s crumbling Reich.
In particular the escape of II SS Panzer Corps was to have dire consequences. Just three weeks after the liquidation of the Falaise pocket on 17 September 1944 Montgomery launched Operation Market Garden, intended to take the Allies over the Rhine and into the Nazi industrial heartland of the Ruhr. Tragically, this operation was to be thwarted in spectacular fashion, especially as the British airborne spearhead landed amidst the recuperating 9th SS and 10th SS Panzer Divisions at Arnhem. Although the SS were extremely under strength, when the Allied ground forces were unable to reach the paras the outcome was inevitable.
Yet worse was to come. All those panzer divisions destroyed in the Falaise pocket were rebuilt and, remarkably, just four months later took part in Hitler’s audacious Ardennes counteroffensive. This was launched on 16 December 1944, spearheaded by the 1st SS and 12th SS Panzer Divisions, both veterans of Normandy. Although the offensive was stopped in its tracks, it showed how the defeat at Falaise had singularly failed to completely crush the panzers on the Western Front.
Just two months before the end of the war, the severely-mauled panzer units of the 6th SS Panzer Army then took part in Hitler’s final massive counter-offensive on the Eastern Front. Although the Soviets’ Operation Bagration, timed to coincide with D-Day, had torn the heart out of the panzers on the Eastern Front, following the Ardennes offensive 6th SS Panzer Army was still able to move east to take part in this major counteroffensive in Hungary. The few panzer units left in the West even launched a small counterattack eastwards from the Ruhr pocket in March 1945, in a desperate attempt to escape the encircling Allies.
What shines out, irrespective of the rights or wrongs of Nazi Germany, is the sheer professionalism exhibited by the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS even when continued resistance seemed a futile exercise. The genesis of this book occurred in 1984 following writing an article to mark the 40th anniversary of D-Day and interviewing one of the directors of the then brand new Portsmouth D-Day Museum.
Of the plethora of books that were published that year, one in particular, Max Hastings’ Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy, caused a storm of controversy for lauding the Germans’ feat of arms. ‘The glory of German arms in Normandy – and it was glory,’ he wrote, ‘in however evil a cause – was won by the officers and men at divisional level and below who held the line against the Allies under intolerable conditions for more than two months’. Over twenty years on Hastings’ reputation as a military historian remains untarnished and he remains unrepentant: ‘In Overlord, I argued that Hitler’s army was the outstanding fighting force of the Second World War…Since I wrote Overlord, however, my own thinking has changed – not about the battlefield performance of the combatants, but about its significance. Moral and social issues are at stake, more important than any narrow military judgement’. Indeed German military professionalism is one thing, but the Nazi regime passed beyond the pale.
I remember walking Gold and Omaha beaches thinking how had the Allies gained and then enlarged such a precarious toehold. The American cemetery behind Omaha provides stark testimony to the bloody battle for Normandy. Driving west through Arromanches, Bayeux and Carentan then north up the Cotentin Peninsula, I wo
ndered why the Germans had allowed their forces to become trapped in Cherbourg and then outflanked at St Lô despite clinging on so resolutely in the Caen area. How had they got it so wrong in Normandy but bounced back, dragging the war on for another eight months.
Much heated debate has raged about the effectiveness and employment of the panzer divisions in Normandy, though it was the numerically superior German infantry divisions that bore the brunt of the fighting. The failure of the panzers to launch a decisive counterstroke has been blamed on a muddled chain of command, inertia, Hitler’s intransigence and the Allies superiority on the ground and in the air.
The reality is that from the very start there were insufficient German armoured formations in Normandy and although they rose to almost a dozen they were largely committed in a piecemeal manner, trying to plug an increasingly leaking dam. Remarkably, never once did they waver despite losing all strategic initiative in the face of Hitler’s stubborn refusal to yield ground until it was too late.
In the intervening years much has been written about Overlord and the liberation of France. This particular volume is designed to examine the individual experiences and fate of each of the panzer divisions that fought there under the direction of both Panzergruppe West and 7th Army. In terms of narrative it follows each unit chronologically as it joined the battle, before coming together in the Falaise salient. It is notable that no single volume provides an overview of the subsequent fate of those panzer divisions involved in Normandy and this study also offers to rectify this in some small way.
Many organisations and people were kind enough to assist me during the researching of this book, notably Barnstaple Library and Record Office. Individuals who offered me their time and wisdom were many, but in particular I would like to single out John Blackman, for assistance with the photographic research; David Fletcher, for his sage guidance on the merits of Allied armour; Rupert Harding, who above and beyond the call of duty helped with reference material and had faith in the broad scope of this project; Tim Newark and Pat Ware, who kindly encouraged and supported the initial research on Falaise and Villers-Bocage; and lastly, Philip Sidnell for his sterling editorial work with both the text and photographs. Special thanks are due to Leo Cooper and Pen and Sword Books for assistance with key maps.
Finally, I must thank my wife Amelia and daughter Henrietta, who have endured with such patience and fortitude my passion for military history and the necessary solitude of a writer. For their unfailing indulgence I dedicate this book to them with my heartfelt thanks and love.
Anthony Tucker-Jones
Barnstaple, Devon
2007
Dramatis Personae – Senior German Commanders
Adolf Hitler
Commander-in-Chief, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW – the Armed Forces High Command)
Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel
Chief of Staff OKW
Generaloberst Alfred Jodl
Chief of Operations Staff OKW
Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt
Commander-in-Chief West or Oberbefelshaber West (OB West) (until 2 July 1944)
Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge
Replaced von Rundstedt, as C-in-C West and Rommel as commander Army Group B (until 18 August 1944)
Generalfeldmarschall Walther Model
Replaced von Kluge as C-in-C West and commander Army Group B
General Günther Blumentritt
Chief of Staff to C-in-C West
Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel
Commander Army Group B (until 17 July 1944 when wounded)
General Friedrich Dollmann
Commander 7th Army (until 28 June suicide/heart attack)
General Geyr von Schweppenburg
Commander Panzergruppe West (until 6 July 1944)
General der Panzertruppen Heinrich Eberbach
Replaced Schweppenburg as commander Panzergruppe West/5th Panzer Army (until 9 August) then Panzergruppe Eberbach, also succeeded Hausser as commander 7th Army (until 31 August when captured)
SS-Obergruppenführer Josef ‘Sepp’ Dietrich
Commander I SS Panzer Corps, replaced Eberbach as commander Panzergruppe West/5th Panzer Army
SS-Obergruppenführer Hermann Priess
Replaced Dietrich as commander I SS Panzer Corps
SS-Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser
Commander II SS Panzer Corps, then succeeded Dollmann as commander 7th Army (until 20 August 1944 when wounded)
SS-Obergruppenführer Wilhelm ‘Willi’ Bittrich
Replaced Hausser as commander II SS Panzer Corps
General der Fallschfirmtruppen Eugen Meindl
Commander II Parachute Corps
General der Flakartillerie Wolfgang Pickert
Commander III Flak Corps
General der Artillerie Wilhelm Fahrmbacher
Commander XXV (25th) Corps in Brittany, interim commander (12–18 June 1944) LXXXIV (84th) Corps following Marcks’ demise
General der Panzertruppen Hans von Funck
Commander XLVII (47th) Panzer Corps
General der Panzertruppen Walter Krüger
Commander LVIII (58th) Panzer Corps
General der Infanterie Erich Straube
Commander LXXIV (74th) Corps
General der Panzertruppen Adolf Kuntzen
Commander LXXXI (81st) Corps
General der Artillerie Erich Marcks
Commander LXXXIV (84th) Corps (until 12 June 1944 killed in action)
Generalleutenant Dietrich von Choltitz
Replaced Marcks as commander LXXXIV Corps (until 28 July) then Commandant Paris (until 25 August 1944 when captured)
Generalleutenant Otto Elfeldt
Replaced von Choltitz as commander LXXXIV Corps (until 20 August 1944 when captured)
General der Infanterie Hans von Obstfelder
Commander LXXXVI (86th) Corps
Principal German Armoured Fighting Vehicles Deployed in Normandy
Tanks
PzKpfw IV Ausf H and Ausf J Medium Tank
PzKpfw V Panther Ausf A and Ausf G Heavy Medium Tank
PzKpfw VI Tiger I Ausf E Heavy Tank
PzKpfw VI Tiger II Ausf B Heavy Tank
Assault Guns
Sturmgeschütz III Ausf G Assault Gun
Jagdpanzer IV Tank Destroyer
Jagdpanther Heavy Tank Destroyer
Self-propelled Guns
Hummel Heavy Howitzer
Wespe Light Field Howitzer
Marder III Anti-tank Gun
Principal Allied Armoured Fighting Vehicles deployed in Normandy
Tanks
M4 Sherman Medium Tank
Sherman Firely Medium Tank
M5 Light Tank
Cromwell Cruiser Tank
Churchill Infantry Tank
Tank Destroyers
M10 Wolverine Gun Motor Carriage
M18 Gun Motor Carriage
M36 Gun Motor Carriage
Self-propelled Guns
M7B1 Howitzer Motor Carriage
Sexton 25pdr Tracked
For comparative analysis of the merits of German and Allied armour see pp. 16–19.
Maps
German Army Groups B & G areas of responsibility, June 1944.
German Panzer, Infantry and Airborne Divisional dispositions as of 6 June 1944.
The Battle for Caen, 6 June–24 July 1944.
Containing Epson, 24–29 June 1944.
Charnwood, 7–9 July 1944.
Stopped Goodwood, 18–20 July 1944.
The Falaise Pocket, 16-20 August 1944.
The Allied Breakout and race the Seine, 1–20 August 1944.
Chapter 1
Panzergruppe West’s Dilemma
Just four days after the monumental D-Day landings in northern France, RAF Typhoons swooped down out of the skies onto a chateau and neighbouring orchard, followed by Mitchell light bombers of the 2nd Tactical Air Force. Surprised German radio operators and staff
officers caught in the open scattered in all directions as the ground shook beneath them. When the prolonged raid was finally over a German general lay dead, along with twelve fellow officers; in one fell swoop Hitler’s panzer forces in Normandy had been successfully decapitated.
Intent on resisting the D-Day landings, Panzergruppe West became an operational combat command on 8 June 1944 at Chateau La Caine; within two days it had sealed its own fate. Allied signal intercepts from four large radio trucks parked in nearby trees were its undoing, tipping off the Allies’ fighter-bombers to its exact location. On the eve of the crucial Battle for Normandy, Panzergruppe West ceased to function.
Invasion where?
In the summer of 1944 the battle-hardened German Heer, or Army, and Waffen-SS stood poised to inflict a bloody reverse on the long-anticipated Allied landings in Northern France. That invasion was imminent was beyond doubt following the Allied landings in the Mediterranean the previous year. The failure of Operation Jubilee, the British and Canadian raid on Dieppe on 19 August 1942, had firmly convinced the Germans that they could contain and defeat an Allied amphibious assault on French soil.
However, the German armed forces, or Wehrmacht, stationed in Northern France, much to the advantage of the Allies, were blighted by strategic indecision, a cumbersome chain of command and a succession of commanders, not to mention the meddling hand of Adolf Hitler. The Allied landings in French Northwest Africa in 1942 and the subsequent defeat of the Germans in Tunisia the following year, led Hitler to believe that the Allies might land in the south of France and in the Bay of Biscay.
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