On the ground, the French resistance also coordinated their efforts with the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to hinder the German movement of reinforcements by road and rail toward Normandy once the Allied invasion was underway. In February 1944 General Charles de Gaulle created the French Forces of the Interior (FFI) under General Koenig to unite all the various resistance groups, which would bravely harass German troop movements.
Colonel Passy (Captain André Charles Lucien Dewavrin) headed de Gaulle’s Free French Intelligence Service and established a network of spies watching developments along the defences of Hitler’s so called Atlantic Wall. Dewavrin, ironically a former Assistant Professor of Fortifications at Saint-Cyr, was not particularly interested in the concrete of the German defences but rather their radar installations. The French resistance set up a transmitter network throughout Normandy, particularly the Caen area, Bayeux, Grandcamp and Ste Mére-Èglise.
Lost opportunity
Just two days before D-Day Rommel, reassured that the tides would not be suitable for an invasion, departed from his HQ at the Chateau Roche Guyon outside Paris for his home near Ulm on the Danube, leaving his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Hans Speidel, in charge. General Dollmann was in Rennes hosting a wargame and Sepp Deitrich was in Brussels.
Sometime after 0100 on 6 June 1944, a bleary-eyed Admiral Hoffman was roused from his bed at the HQ of Chief of Operations Naval Group West in the Bois de Boulogne, Paris. Chief of Staff Hoffman found himself leafing through a series of reports from the remaining naval radar stations. Despite the Allies’ best efforts there could be no hiding the vast fleet approaching the Normandy coast and Hoffman turned to his men: ‘this can only be the invasion fleet. Signal to the Führer’s headquarters the invasion is on’.
Rundstedt recalled:
At four o’clock in the morning, three hours after I received the first reports of the invasion, I decided that these landings in Normandy had to be dealt with. I asked the Supreme Command in Berlin for authority to commit these two divisions into the battle.
Although Panzer Lehr and the 12th SS Panzer Divisions were under my command, I could not move them until I had received permission from Berlin. Berlin replied that it was still uncertain as to whether or not these first assaults were the main Allied efforts or merely a diversion.
The 1st SS, 12th SS and Panzer Lehr Panzer Divisions and the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division could not be released without Hitler’s express permission. By 0600 von Rundstedt was convinced that the invasion was the real thing and his Chief of Staff, General Blumentritt, requested that the panzer reserves be released to C-in-C West.
Rather surprisingly, the German High Command were not unduly alarmed by all this activity. Most incoming information was to a large extent ignored. Berlin dithered, still half expecting an attack across the Pas de Calais. Jodl was more concerned about the situation in Italy, where Rome had just fallen to the Allies, and the anticipated summer Soviet offensive on the Eastern Front; vague reports from Normandy did not seem that serious.
On hearing the news, Rommel dutifully sped back but did not arrive until the afternoon of D-Day and was unable to exert any influence on the swift commitment of the panzers. It was not until the end of 6 June that the Germans finally began to move their panzer reserves toward the Allied bridgehead. The 2nd Panzer Division moved west from Amiens, while the 9th SS and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, part of the powerful II SS Panzer Corps, would be summoned from the Eastern Front five days later.
Rundstedt later noted with regret:
I have been criticized because it was said that I delayed too long in committing my Panzer Divisions against the bridgehead. Although Panzer Lehr and the 12th SS Panzer Divisions were under my command I could not move them until I had received permission from Berlin… They hesitated all that night and the next morning were unable to make up their minds. Finally, at four o’clock in the afternoon on 6 June, twelve hours after I had made my request, I was told that I could use these Panzer Divisions. This meant that a counterattack could not be organised until the morning of 7 June. By then the bridgehead was over thirty hours old and it was too late.
Bitterly commenting on this inertia after the war Rundstedt, perhaps trying to salvage his own reputation, told his captors:
I was not allowed to use them without getting permission from the Führer in his headquarters on the Eastern Front. What did he know of the battle in Normandy? We rang up every few hours, but he refused until it was too late, until, in fact, you had your anti-tank guns and many tanks ashore. I practically had to ask him whether I was to put a sentry at the front or back of my headquarters.
At 1400 on the 6th Hitler released the 12th SS (allowed to move to Lisieux but not committed) and Panzer Lehr to von Rundstedt. General Dollmann, like Rundstedt, did not hear of this decision until 1600 either. It mattered little, as neither division would be able to intervene on D-Day.
Hauptmann Helmut Ritgen of the Panzer Lehr Division knew a golden opportunity had been lost:
From 6 June onwards, 21st Panzer had been thrown piecemeal into battle to counter the British airborne landings. This armoured attack towards the shore was halted prematurely when the British paratroopers landed in our rear. On D-Day night the British I Corps had captured a coastal strip six miles [10km] long though not yet very deep. In vain the exhausted German defenders looked for reinforcements but all local reserves had been used up.
C-in-C West had ordered increased readiness to move forward Panzergruppe West, which included 12th SS, Panzer Lehr, and the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division. 12th SS Panzer was put under command of Army Group B and Kurt Meyer [commander 12th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment 25] led them towards a sector of the 711th Infantry Division east of the Orne. Movement was difficult because of air strikes and too many failures of radio sets.
Panzergruppe West was directed to become a combat command, but not under Rommel’s direct authority. When Schweppenburg finally got the order, he claimed he was dismayed at the muddled arrangements:
The chain of command from Panzergruppe West up was most unfortunate. Panzergruppe West was still under 7th Army. The decision to interpose another staff between Rommel and von Geyr may have been made by OB West because it was aware of the friendly relation between Panzergruppe West and the staff of 7th Army–the latter acting as a ‘buffer state’. At a moment when everything depended on rapid action, orders were issued to just two and three-quarters Panzer Divisions by the following headquarters: I SS Panzer Corps, Panzergruppe West, 7th Army at Le Mans, Army Group B, OB West, and OKW.
Clearly the situation was a complete mess and the Germans were to tie themselves in dreadful knots. Schweppenburg’s Panzergruppe West staff immediately found themselves involved in resisting the Allied invasion. He recalled:
On the morning of 7 June I was ordered to take over, with my staff, the sector on both sides of the Orne up to Tilly-sur-Suelles. I moved out immediately. After reaching Argentan, two conditions became evident, both of primary importance to the movement of Panzer forces. Enemy air action had thoroughly and skilfully destroyed those points along the main arteries where the roads narrowed within the defiles of villages and towns. Owing to the road net and the terrain, it was difficult even in daylight to find a bypass, and then only with considerable delay.
Rommel must have felt equally frustrated that the chain of command for his panzers ran via Schweppenburg to von Rundstedt. He exercised direct control for barely three days.
Pending the arrival of Panzergruppe West, as of 0400 on the 7th June, I SS Panzer Corps assumed command of 12th SS, 21st and Panzer Lehr. Dietrich became responsible for 7th Army’s armoured counterattack and was well aware that the burden of this operation would fall on the teenagers of the 12th SS.
Unfortunately the staff of I SS Panzer Corps did nothing to clarify the situation for the divisional commanders. Although the Corps ordered an attack toward Courseulles-sur-Mer, in the event Panz
er Lehr drifted toward Bayeux and the 12th SS moved northwest of Caen. At the time the I SS Panzer Corps was just starting its 438-mile (700km) journey from Belgium. Schweppenburg lamented I SS Panzer Corps’ dithering:
It is not known why I SS Panzer Corps wavered, but probably the divergent influence of higher staffs must share the blame. If one has to pass final judgment on the conduct of this Corps, it should be stated that it has missed the psychological moment – and the bus. It was still possible in the morning of 8 June to deal the British a severe blow in the vicinity of Courseulles-sur-Mer. On 10 June enemy concentration along the entire beachhead had progressed so rapidly that the German forces were no longer permitted the same freedom of action that existed forty-eight hours earlier.
Counterattack
On 8 June Schweppenburg found himself in command of the three Panzer Divisions, he was also given the coastal 716th Infantry Division, which he discovered (numbering just 300 men) only existed in the imagination of the higher staffs, as the rest had been swept away during the invasion. The general knew that time was of the essence:
I had been anxious not to interfere before. After visiting the combat divisions, I made a verbal report by telephone to the commander 7th Army. I informed him that I was prepared to attack at the earliest possible moment and requested a free hand as to the time and place.
The plan was to counterattack along the Caen-Lion-sur-Mer road.
However, 21st Panzer was tied up on the left bank of the Orne and could not be deployed as a divisional formation. The damaged bridge at Thury-Harcourt delayed Panzer Lehr and 12th SS was lacking its panzers.
In the meantime, the Germans’ coastal defence had been pierced and the way south was clear for the Allies; during the night of 7 June the British 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division took Bayeux and the following day the American 1st Infantry Division captured Tour-en-Bessin and Le Coudrai on the Bayeux–Isigny road.
Schweppenburg and his staff assessed that, despite the success at Bayeux, the British and Canadians would not launch a large-scale attack until thorough preparations had been made. In contrast it was felt the Americans were less likely to be so cautious and therefore possibly constituted a greater threat, especially if they were to push into the gap between Panzergruppe West and 7th Army.
Schweppenburg was dismissive of Rommel’s urge to strike the Allies on the beaches with the panzers. This would expose them to concentrated naval gunfire and fighter-bombers; in addition, the existing forces were insufficient for such a task and vital fuel and ammunition stocks lay too far to the rear to assist rapid deployment.
Panzergruppe West’s fears were realised at 1000 hours when the attack was launched. The 12th SS struggled to get south of Creully in the face of heavy naval bombardment; Panzer Lehr, lacking fuel, could only commit a kampfgruppe (battle group), while 21st Panzer could offer little help. Air support from the Luftwaffe was non-existent. Crucially, despite this the Germans were able to hold onto the vital roads leading to Caen.
Rommel pitched up at I SS Panzer Corps on 10 June to inform them that XLVII Panzer Corps with two panzer divisions would be committed to their left and that Panzergruppe West would assume control between the Orne and the Vire rivers. Then in the afternoon he visited Schweppenburg’s command post. Allied intelligence knew that this HQ had moved northwest of Thury-Harcourt to the Chateau at La Caine about 12 miles (20km) southwest of Caen on the 8th. Rommel narrowly missed the Allied air attack, which Schweppenburg recalls:
About a half hour later the command post of Panzergruppe West was subjected for several hours to severe bombing and strafing. All personnel of the operations section as well as most of the Officers of the forward echelon were killed. The bulk of the vehicles and almost all the technical equipment of the signal battalion were destroyed, in spite of their thorough dispersion. Thus the staff could no longer function. Although I myself was slightly wounded, I was ordered to assemble and re-form the staff. Since this mission entailed working in Paris, I drove to Rommel and requested a new assignment at the front.
The irony was that Luftwaffe representatives had attended the meeting and not only could they not promise support for the proposed panzer attack toward Creully, they could not even protect Schweppenburg’s HQ from air attack. About forty Officers and men were killed in the raid, including General major Ritter von Dawans, Schweppenburg’s Chief of Staff. The I SS Panzer Corps was placed under the direct control of Dollmann’s 7th Army.
With Schweppenburg wounded and Panzergruppe West’s communications severed, the survivors were withdrawn to act as a provisional HQ and at the end of June took over the front from the River Orne to Vire. General Heinrich Eberbach claimed that there was no friction between Panzergruppe West and 7th Army, but this is difficult to believe when both formations were competing for control of the same resources.
It had not taken long for Schweppenburg to realise just how vulnerable the German Army was to Allied combined armed forces; naval gunfire, artillery and aircraft were causing excessive casualties and were a drain on morale. In particular, the panzer divisions were threatened with rapid attrition, especially as replacement units were insufficient. Schweppenburg knew that a readjustment of tactics was needed:
Our intention was to concentrate the Panzer force beyond the range of naval guns, to disregard any temporary loss of ground, and to hit the enemy with the strongest possible concentration of tanks. These attacks were to be repeated after every gain in elbow-room produced by strategic mobility of the Panzer forces.
Such tactics were to prove highly difficult to implement in the weeks that followed.
Chapter 2
The Road to Falaise – Goodwood, Cobra and Mortain
Like a punch-drunk boxer the Germans for the next two months would successfully block the blows of the Allies without being able to hit back effectively. British and Canadian efforts to barge past Caen would come to nought in the face of the massed panzers, but when the Americans attacked in the west after securing Cherbourg, a weak panzer counterattack simply hastened the unravelling of the Germans’ weakening defences.
Strategic ground
At the Wolf’s Lair, Rastenburg, East Prussia, Adolf Hitler was convinced that Normandy was not the main invasion. He was aided in this delusion by the Allies’ major deception plans, the bombing of Calais and the ongoing disruption of the northern French rail system. The bogus activities of Lieutenant General George S Patton’s fictitious forces convinced the Germans that he was going to land north of the Seine and as a result numerous German divisions, especially armoured, remained beyond the river for up to a week after D-Day. The Germans were only to have eight panzer divisions engaged during the first six weeks of the battle, whereas the Allies were expecting at least twice as many.
Following the D-Day landings both the Allies and the Germans knew the strategic ground lay in the east, where the British 2nd Army was fighting around the city of Caen. Just to the southeast lay the open tank country that could facilitate an Allied break-out. Rommel and Schweppenburg appreciated only too well that the strategic ground lay in the Caen–Falaise area.
The geography on the left wing of Panzergruppe West consisted of the restrictive Normandy hedgerow terrain known as the bocage. East of the Orne in the Caen–Falaise sector it was largely open and therefore more suited to fluid tank operations. Rommel understood the Allies had to be stopped from reaching this ground at all costs. A series of prominent geographical features south of Caen provided the Germans with an ideal stop line, here the panzers could make a stand.
While the German Navy was in no position to contest control of the English Channel and the Luftwaffe was distracted by the Eastern Front and defence of the Reich, Hitler’s panzer forces constituted a very real threat to the mainly-inexperienced American Army and the weary British Army once they were ashore. The smug benefit of hindsight has made the Battle for Normandy appear ultimately a one-sided affair – with the Allies numerical dominance of land, air and sea, how could they
possibly lose?
In 1944 no one really knew how things would play out, or indeed could anticipate the unforeseen consequences of the Allied victory at Falaise. In the first few crucial weeks following D-Day the German generals had every reason to believe they could drive the Allies back into the sea if they acted swiftly and decisively.
Qualitative edge
The one major advantage Panzergruppe West had over the Allies was the qualitative edge of its panzers. The Germans realised they could never match the Allied numbers but they ensured that they could outshoot them. The Germans were to deploy in total ten panzer divisions and one panzergrenadier division, numbering approximately160,000 men equipped with just over 1,800 panzers, in Normandy. In addition to this there were another dozen or so General Headquarters Panzer Formations, mainly of battalion strength with about 460 panzers. This gave an accumulated strength for 7th Army, Panzergruppe West and the various Panzer Corps commands of around 2,260 tanks.
The Americans, British, French, Canadians and Poles were to commit thirteen armoured divisions and numerous independent armoured brigades to the battle. Their accumulated total for the campaign amounted to almost 8,700 tanks. On D-Day alone nearly 1,500 Allied tanks were put ashore. By the time of Operation Goodwood on 18 July, Allied tank strength stood at almost 5,900 and continued to rise, reaching almost 6,760 a week later when Operation Cobra was launched. By the time the Germans commenced their Avranches/Mortain counterattack against the Americans in early August, the American Army could muster almost 4,000 tanks.
Falaise: The Flawed Victory Page 3