This shift in opinion was too late. Rommel may be partly to blame; his experiences fighting Montgomery in North Africa meant that Army Group B would naturally place emphasis on the British Army as a known quantity. The Americans’ initial lacklustre performance in Tunisia had also helped to cloud German perceptions of their fighting abilities.
In early July Panzer Lehr had transferred out of Panzergruppe West’s area of responsibility to 7th Army’s and joined General Dietrich von Choltitz’s LXXXIV Corps west of St Lô. On its left flank were the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division and the 2nd SS Panzer Division respectively, covering the area east of Périers. Beyond them were three infantry divisions. South of St Lô lay the weakened II Parachute Corps consisting of the 3rd Parachute Division and the 352nd Infantry Division, the latter having few of its complement of self-propelled guns and assault guns combat ready. Hausser’s 7th Army numbered less than 35,000 men and about eighty armoured vehicles.
By late July, OB West, Army Group B and Panzergruppe West continued to assess a British breakthrough at Caen with a thrust toward Paris as the greatest threat. The Germans reorganised and the panzer divisions of Panzergruppe West were gathered in the Caen area as the key defensive sector. The Allies’ airpower negated most German daytime movements and in turn prevented any large-scale counteroffensives. This effectively meant that the Panzergruppe’s mission remained a defensive one designed to prevent a British breakthrough in the direction of Falaise and Paris.
Of the three Panzer Corps, I SS, II SS and XLVII, the latter two were to be relieved by the LXXIV Infantry Corps which was in Brittany. The plan was that Panzergruppe West would have two panzer corps, with the two panzer divisions acting as strategic reserves. Predictably things did not go according to plan. To try and free up the panzers, a total of five additional infantry divisions were attached to the Panzergruppe, but, frustratingly, the panzers were only ever able to achieve local offensive success.
After nearly two months of almost continuous combat the 21st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions had been seriously mauled. Although the 1st SS, 9th SS, 10th SS and 2nd Panzer Divisions had suffered losses they still retained about 75 per cent of their fighting power and the 116th remained fresh. Only the 21st, 1st SS, 10th SS and 12th SS remained committed, with the 2nd, 116th and 9th SS held in reserve, the 116th having only just completed its reorganisation. Similarly the 2nd and 9th SS had been pulled out to complete this process.
The fighting power of Panzergruppe West comprised about six panzer divisions and four infantry divisions, while three other infantry divisions (the 89th, 271st and 272nd) were in the process of being transferred over. The 271st and 272nd Infantry Divisions were supposed to relieve the 10th SS and the 21st Panzer, respectively, on the left wing of the LXXXVI Infantry Corps. Both these infantry formations, though, were held up by Allied air attack, especially crossing the Seine, and only their leading elements had reached the front by 24 July. The process was not completed until the end of the month. In addition, on the 28th the 331st Infantry Division was ordered to join Panzergruppe West and by 11 August a kampfgruppe was operating in the L’Aigle-Gracé area about 12–30 miles (20–50kms) east of Argentan.
On their western flank the Germans were now roughly outnumbered in tanks by a ratio of ten-to-one. General Omar N Bradley’s US 1st Army, at the start of Operation Cobra, mustered 1,269 M4 Shermans and 694 M5A1 light tanks, supported by 324 M10 and M18 tank destroyers. Eventually launched on the 25th, Cobra signalled the beginning of the end for 7th Army and Panzergruppe West. General Bradley threw six divisions, numbering about 70,000 men, over 660 tanks, 3,000 aircraft and forty-three battalions of artillery, at the Germans.
The Americans had good intelligence on LXXXIV Corps’ and II Parachute Corps’ main components, though over estimated their reserves. In fact LXXXIV Corps’ reserve consisted of one infantry division supported by a single battalion of armour; II Parachute Corps had none and Hausser’s only reserve was part of an infantry division behind LXXXIV Corps. In contrast, Hausser’s intelligence on the American order of battle was faulty and underestimated the Americans’ strength, in particular Major General J Lawton Collins’ VII Corps.
On the Germans eastern flank, the Canadians launched a simultaneous attack to assist the American momentum by slowing the redeployment of I and II SS Panzer Corps. Conducted from 24–27 July, Operation Spring was designed to capture the strategic Bourguébus and Verrières Ridges south of Caen and open up the Falaise road. The 1st SS, 9th SS, 12th SS and 21st Panzer Divisions easily killed the Canadian offensive, but LVIII Panzer Corps had to be despatched from Toulouse so that 2nd and 116th Panzer of XLVII Panzer Corps could shift from the British sector to help counter Cobra.
To the west things began to unravel very quickly. The very day that Spring came to a stop, German troops, lacking reserves, began to withdraw in the face of the American onslaught. In the meantime the British maintained the unrelenting pressure round Caen by drawing in German forces and capturing Mont Pinçon with Operation Bluecoat, which ran from 30 July to 7 August.
The arrival of 116th Panzer Division on the 30th slowed the American advance eastward, but did nothing to arrest their progress south. Similarly 2nd Panzer was unable to stop the Americans crossing the Vire. Within a week and a half the Americans had broken through and, having overrun Coutances and Avranches, were sweeping west into Brittany and east toward Vire and Mortain. Elements of Panzer Lehr, 2nd Panzer, 2nd SS and 17th SS were swept away. Hausser lost 20,000 men captured and LXXXIV Corps and II Parachute Corps were effectively destroyed.
Hausser was reduced to plugging holes by 1 August, with whatever units were available. Facing the American forces were the 2nd, 2nd SS, 17th SS and 116th, along with the remains of Panzer Lehr. All that remained of the local infantry divisions were the 243rd and 353rd. West of Caen, 21st Panzer had been moved south of Caumont, the junction between the British 2nd Army and the US 1st Army. The 1st SS, 9th SS, 10th SS and 12th SS Panzer Divisions, along with the 271st, 272nd, 277th and 346th Infantry Divisions, were deployed south of Caen, fending off the British and Canadians.
Mortain: the panzers strike back
Panzergruppe West was renamed 5th Panzer Army on 5 August, with responsibility for 7th Army’s right flank. Inauspiciously, in its first incarnation 5th Panzer Army fought in North Africa as a part of Army Group Afrika, surrendering on 9 May1943 in Tunisia. In early August, Eberbach was visited by Lieutenant Generals Walter Warlimont and Buhle from OKW acting as Hitler’s eyes and ears. They were far from pleased with Eberbach’s prognosis; he advocated an orderly withdrawal covered by the exhausted panzer divisions. This was not what Warlimont wanted to hear and he questioned Eberbach on the proposed counterattack toward Avranches.
Eberbach considered this a hopeless cause; their forces were too weak; Allied air power too strong; any success would be short-lived as it would be impossible to fend off the Americans once they caught their breath. In addition, supplying the four panzer divisions earmarked for the attack would have to be conducted at night. Warlimont accused Eberbach of being a pessimist, but if anyone appreciated the reality of the situation it was Eberbach. The attack on Avranches would ultimately sound the death knell of 5th Panzer Army.
For this operation, conducted between 6 and 11 August, 2nd, 116th, 1st SS and 2nd SS (including a kampfgruppe from 17th SS Panzergrenadier Divisions) Panzer Divisions were committed. Although the Germans captured Mortain, RAF Typhoons pounced on some 300 armoured vehicles, destroying eight, and other squadrons followed up to take their share of the kills. On 8 August at 2115, 7th Army received orders from von Kluge to postpone the attack, following a British breakthrough south of Caen which had shaken 5th Panzer Army.
Hitler demanded the counterattack in the American sector be renewed and instructed Eberbach to assume command of the newly-activated Panzergruppe Eberbach on 10 August, while Sepp Dietrich took command of 5th Panzer Army. Eberbach saw this for what it was, a demotion, perhaps prompted by the failed assassination
attempt on Hitler. The message was clear: replaced by an SS Officer and subordinated to an SS Officer. Despite these musical chairs with the senior German commanders in Normandy, time was rapidly running out. The Allied pressure on both the American and British sectors was such that, despite the panzers best efforts, the dam was about to burst in a very spectacular fashion. Eberbach recalls:
On 8 or 9 August, Field Marshal von Kluge gave me, over the phone, the order to give 5th Panzer Army over to General of the SS Sepp Dietrich. The attack on Avranches, according to an order from Hitler, would be repeated. With an emergency Staff, I have to take over the command of the Panzer Divisions provided for this attack, and will be subordinated to C-in-C of 7th Army, SS-Gen. Hausser.
I again immediately say that I consider the attack hopeless, and again that my assignments to this post would therefore be very unpleasant to me. It did not help; the order stood. I had to go to 7th Army on the same day.
Seventh Army was obviously not very pleased with my turning up there. The insertion of my Staff between the Army Staff and the Corp Staff was unnecessary, and meant, in the prevailing situation, a very unpleasant lengthening of the command channel.
Captain Harry C Butcher, USNR, Naval Aide to General Dwight D Eisenhower, Allied Supreme Commander, recalled that the renewal of the Germans’ Avranches/Mortain attack was anticipated with glee, observing on 11 August:
We have a good chance of catching the Germans in a giant trap if Patton’s forces manage to get around to Argentan, the British-Canadians close in from the north to Falaise, and the remaining gap of some 15 or 16 miles (24–25km) is sealed off. At the moment the Germans are expected again to counterattack near Mortain, where they had amassed five and a half of their seven Panzer Divisions, the remaining one and a half still being opposite the British-Canadians. Some 475 to 500 German tanks were thought to be against us in the Mortain area. The weather was to continue good and Bradley [Lieutenant General commanding the US 12th Army Group comprising Lieutenant General Courtney H Hodges’ US 1st and Lieutenant General George S Patton’s US 3rd Armies] and his staff were optimistic as to the result. Hoped to ‘suck in’ more Germans.
There was, though, some concern that the panzers might find one of the weak spots in Patton’s extended US 3rd Army. The following day Butcher noted: ‘I mentioned to Ike last night that the Germans had about 500 tanks against us in the Mortain area, and he said, “We’ve got 3,500; what are we scared of?”’
In reality, for the renewed attack Eberbach could only gather 124 tanks, seventy-seven Panzer Mark IVs and forty-seven Panthers, roughly the same inadequate numbers that had been launched in the initial attack. His efforts, though, were stillborn once the Americans were south of Argentan. All thoughts of counterattack were abandoned in favour of trying to extricate as many units as possible from the American, British, Canadian and Polish pincer movement now coming to fruition.
Eberbach blamed the failure of the German attack on Avranches squarely on the German High Command. Referring to the transfer of Panzergruppe West’s armour to 7th Army for the operation, he commented:
These forces might have sufficed to stop the American advance if they had been transferred to 7th Army in time. This was never the case. The failure was caused by the fact that the Panzer Divisions of Panzergruppe West (5th Panzer Army), committed at the front, were not relieved by infantry divisions in due time. The Armed Forces High Command is to blame for this. It did not authorise C-in-C West to act freely, and delayed the transfer of the divisions.
After Avranches, Panzergruppe West became responsible for the supply of 7th Army, which controlled the 12th SS Panzer and 17th SS Panzergrenadier Divisions, a role it was singularly ill-suited to do.
The British, Canadian and Polish armour attacked along the Caen-Falaise Road on 7–13 August in Operation Totalise, an effort to capture Falaise. This then developed into Operation Tractable, designed to close the neck of the Falaise salient containing 5th Panzer Army, Panzergruppe Eberbach and 7th Army.
The German position in Normandy became completely untenable on 15 August when 94,000 Allied troops landed in the South of France in Operation Dragoon. Winston Churchill had wanted the operation launched into Brittany, which would have piled the pressure on the Germans in Northern France, but there was a lack of satisfactory ports as the Germans resolutely clung onto them. Churchill even threatened to resign but Eisenhower and the American Chiefs of Staff would not be moved.
In strategic terms Dragoon was largely nugatory, as it had not been conducted in parallel with Overlord due to shortages of amphibious transport. Moreover, if Overlord succeeded, Army Group G would be forced to withdraw from southern France to avoid being cut off. Additionally the Germans had very few panzers remaining in Southern France. All of Army Group G’s panzer divisions, 2nd SS, 9th and 17th SS Panzergrenadier along with elements of the 271st, 272nd, 276th and 708th Infantry Divisions had already been drawn north to the fighting in Normandy. Only 11th Panzer remained in the south, which was refitting after being mauled on the Eastern Front.
By the end of the month, Free French Forces had liberated Toulon and Marseilles, driving Blaskowitz’s dazed Army Group G northeastward. It was only a matter of days before Germans were facing final defeat in Normandy in the Falaise pocket. The fate of the panzer divisions was to vary greatly-but the ultimate outcome after all the bloodletting was to have very serious consequences for the Allies.
Chapter 3
Throw them back into the Sea – 21st Panzer Division
The preliminary stages of Operation Overlord commenced late on 5 June 1944 with the steady drone of hundreds of Allied aircraft making their way across the English Channel towards the French coast. The first formations consisted of over 1,000 aircraft of Bomber Command, directed at the ten strongest German coastal batteries along the Normandy coastline. Their task had to be completed by 2300 hours D-1, in order to clear the area ready for the incoming airborne troops. In their way stood the 21st Panzer Division. Gefreiter Werner Kortenhaus, Panzer Regiment 22, 21st Panzer recalled:
Our panzers were very well prepared; that was one thing we did not have to worry about. We had spent months and months previously getting them ready. We knew our panzers, we had full command of them…. we assumed we would be able to push back a sea landing. Indeed, we took it for granted. You know, people are amazed by this but we were young panzer men burning at the thought we were perhaps going to be involved in some action. Of course, we had no idea what that would mean. No idea at all.
Generalleutnant Edgar Feuchtinger, commander of 21st Panzer, designated one of the reserve units, did not start moving northwards until 1600 hours on the 6th. His counterattack towards Bieville failed and his troops were driven eastwards. By the end of the day Feuchtinger had lost twenty panzers and the British were only just halted at Lebisey, a mere two miles (1.2km) north of Caen. From then on the division’s performance was to be decidedly lacklustre, its greatest contribution to the defence of Normandy was helping to halt Operation Goodwood.
Combat experience
Created from the 5th Light Division, the 21st Panzer Division came into being in August 1941, commanded by General Karl Böttcher. Erwin Rommel’s Panzergruppe Afrika was formed in North Africa in July1941 and included the newly re-designated 21st Panzer, where it fought under a series of commanders.
After the decisive Battle of El Alamein the division was down to just four panzers and, in covering the retreat into Tunisia, was only able to operate as a series of kampfgruppen; its last major action was against the Americans at Kasserine Pass. The remains of the division under Heinrich-Hermann von Hulsen surrendered on 13 May 1943, along with the rest of the German and Italian forces in North Africa.
Rising from the ashes, the division was reformed in Normandy in July 1943 under Generalleutnant Edgar Feuchtinger, largely from scratch, and remained in France on occupation duty. Between January 1944 and May 1944 Generalmajor Oswin Grolig and Generalleutenant Franz Westhoven commanded the division r
espectively, until Feuchtinger resumed responsibility again on 8 May.
Considering 21st Panzer’s key role in the early stages of the Battle for Normandy, Feuchtinger seems to have been a decidedly uninspiring individual. He began his military career in the artillery, so was not strictly a panzer leader, but by early 1943 was in charge of Schnellen Brigade 931, which formed the cadre for the new 21st Panzer. The former was an occupation unit, bulked out with transferees to bring it up to divisional strength. One unit specially formed for the new division was Flak Abteilung 305, equipped with 8.8cm and 2cm flak guns. However, by far the best tank-killers were the dedicated 8.8cm Pak 43 anti-tank guns of Panzerjäger Battalion 200.
Oberst Hans von Luck, commander of Panzergrenadier Regiment 125, had a fairly dim view of the capabilities of his divisional commander, particularly his lack of recent combat experience or knowledge of armoured warfare. Paris seemed to hold a greater attraction for Feuchtinger than the responsibilities of his division.
Fortunately for Feuchtinger, the Officer in charge of the division’s Panzer Regiment 22 was a very able man. The forty-five year-old Oberst Hermann von Oppeln-Bronikowski was a veteran of the First World War and the invasions of Poland, France and Russia. On the Eastern Front he had served with 4th Panzer Division’s Panzer Regiment 5, assuming command from Oberst Heinrich Eberbach (later commander 5th Panzer Army and 7th Army in Normandy) in January1942. He subsequently commanded Panzer Regiments 204 and 11 and, wounded at Kursk, eventually found himself in France
Falaise: The Flawed Victory Page 5