Hauptmann Helmut Ritgen also experienced first hand the division’s difficulties trying to reach the enemy:
Marching at night turned out to be reasonably safe and Panzer Lehr made their way to the Flers-Vire area on previously reconnoitred routes.
My battalion was attacked by aircraft during a supply halt near Alençon. Bomb and gun bursts set tanks and POL [Petrol, Oil and Lubricant] trucks on fire, soldiers were killed and wounded. Similar incidents happened to all the columns. Some mushroom clouds of smoke were guiding the fighter-bombers to their targets. In spite of increased vehicle distance and dispersion to small groups, marching in daylight under repeated air attack was a risky venture, costing time and losses.
The pilots of the Allied fighter-bombers attempted to wreak havoc on the division, though there is some dispute as to the exact numbers; losses of over 200 armoured fighting and wheeled vehicles were reported. While the columns of Panzer Lehr struggled toward their objectives under rolling air interdiction, General Bayerlein was severely cut up when his car was attacked; his aide and his driver were both killed. He himself got away, slightly wounded but violently shaken.
Like Bayerlein, his ordnance Officer, Hauptmann Alexander Hartdegen, was demoralised by the constant air attacks, recalling:
Unless a man has been through these fighter-bomber attacks he cannot know what the invasion meant. You lie there, helpless, in a roadside ditch, in a furrow on a field, or under a hedge, pressed to the ground, your face in the dirt – and then it comes towards you, roaring. There it is. Diving at you. Now you hear the whine of the bullets. Now you are for it.
Our staff car was a gutted heap of metal on the road; it was smouldering and smoking. Corporal Kartheus lay dead in a ditch. As if by a miracle General Bayerlein got away with a few cuts and shrapnel wounds. As for me, I was saved by the culvert.
Just as crucial were the delays. The Panzer IVs of Panzer Regiment 130 did not reach the woods to the north of Alençon until early on 7 June. The result was that the Panzergrenadier Regiments 901 and 902 and Panzerjçger Abteilung 130 were committed in a piecemeal fashion over the next three days. The Panthers did not arrive until the 10th.
Major Peter Selerie, Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry, came into contact with the Panzer Lehr on 7 June:
We now pressed on to capture the St Léger feature southeast of Bayeux. It was here that we caught our first glimpse of German tanks since the end of the war in Africa. There were about three or four of them and they with drew southwards before we could engage them. Subsequently we learned that the enemy had thrown together a series of veteran training cadres to form the crack Panzer Lehr Division. In addition the 12th SS (Hitlerjugend) Division was moving up on our front. Our old desert adversaries – the 21st Panzer Division – were also reported near Caen…
It became increasingly obvious that our 75mm guns would not penetrate the frontal armour of the German Mark VI (Tiger) or the Mark V (Panther) tanks. It was exceedingly difficult to get on their flank and fire on the side armour.
Into action
Coming up from Lisieux on the 7th, Bayerlein remembered what a bizarre spectacle his division must have seemed:
Every vehicle was covered with tree branches and moved along hedges and the edges of woods. Road junctions were bombed, and a bridge knocked out at Conde. This did not stop my tanks, but it hampered other vehicles. By the end of the day I had lost forty tank trucks carrying fuel, and ninety others. Five of my tanks were knocked out and eighty-four half-tracks, prime-movers and self-propelled guns…
These were serious losses for a division not yet in action. I was just east of Tillyon 7 June and ready to attack. My attack took Ellon [on the 9th], and I could have gone straight to the sea down the corridor between the American and British forces, splitting them apart. I was ordered to hold Ellon because units on my right flank had been delayed. I was a day behind my schedule, because of air harassment.
At Lingèvres Panzer Lehr was thrown into the fray as Leutnant Ernst recalled:
We reached Lingèvres [on 11 June] and straightaway joined in the counterattack. In the narrow streets the noise of the tracks and engines of our tanks was deafening. Our tracks screeched as we turned just in front of the church, where we came across the hulk of a British signals tank that had been knocked out. Along a stony track, we headed for a small wood about 300 metres away.
‘Battle stations! Close hatches!’ came the order from Hauptmann Ritgen. Inside ‘Zitrone’ there was tension in the air… Ahead of ‘Zitrone’ three other tanks were moving in single file up the narrow track.’
Turning westward, Ernst and the others skirted a small wood. Suddenly they found themselves in the midst of a fire-fight with British tanks. He remembered the fierce action:
Suddenly, the gun-layers heard the tank commanders shout: ‘Take aim, enemy tank at 11 o’clock – fire!
I shouted to my gun-layer: ‘Feuer!’ and our round grazed the top of the Cromwell’s cupola and flew past it… The enemy disappeared behind the hedge; then we came under fire from the other side. ‘To the left!’ I shouted, and the PzKpfw IV heaved round with a jolt. The shape of the enemy tank grew larger in the gun sight. The recoil jarred the tank backwards as the round flew towards the thicket. It sounded like a direct hit. Smoke rose up in the sky. Nothing further moved. Evidently they must have been as surprised as we were, and got out of the tank on impact and thus escaped being killed.
Carrying their wounded, Ernst and the other tanks of Panzer Lehr withdrew from Lingèvres.
Although only three days into the Allied invasion, Werner Kortenhaus was already full of doom and gloom:
Hitler should have ended the war on 9 June at the latest because, after all, he had said that if we weren’t successful in pushing back the Allied landing, we would have lost the war. We had three fronts – Poland, Italy and the West. It would have been impossible to win.
After some difficulty, the bulk of Panzer Lehr came into the line to the left of the 12th SS on 9 June, having driven 90 miles (144km) from Chartres. By this stage the frequent air attacks were causing unwelcome shortages with those troops now engaged in the fighting. The division needed 8,000 rounds of 8.8cm and 60,000 rounds of 2cm ammunition, much of it probably expended shooting at aircraft, but while the quartermaster was sympathetic, petrol shortages meant nothing was reaching him. Even more alarming for Panzer Lehr’s panzertruppen, there was no tank ammunition to be had.
They first went into action opposite the Canadians, but then side-stepped to attack up the road towards Bayeux. The battle of Le Mesnil-Patry resulted in them halting just three miles (5km) from the city on 11 June. Panzer Lehr then went onto the defensive around Tilly-sur-Seulles and, as the rest of its units arrived, British XXX Corps’ advance was blocked. By the 11th the division had lost about twenty-five per cent of its manpower, twenty per cent of its tanks and ten per cent of its guns. In total about sixty Mark IV and V tanks remained serviceable.
This forced the British to shift their efforts west of Caen to the flank of Panzer Lehr and the high ground beyond Villers-Bocage. The idea of a right hook was Major-General G W Erskine’s, commander of the 7th Armoured Division, and was first discussed at XXX Corps HQ on 10 June. It was hoped the move would break up the resistance in front of Major General D A H Graham’s 50th (Northumbrian) Division; it was also hoped to encircle the now-troublesome Panzer Lehr.
When 50th Division drove against Panzer Lehr, 7th Armoured Division swung to the west, driving three quarters of a circle into the American sector, then south through the gap in the German line and eastwards behind Lehr at Villers-Bocage. There, on 13 June, they ran into Tiger tanks of Schwere SS-Panzer Abteilung 101. The British were stopped dead in their tracks.
Oberstleutnant Kurt Kauffman, Operations Officer Panzer Lehr, assembled three field guns, two 8.8cm and some rear echelon troops, which he led in a successful attack against Villers-Bocage, while panzergrenadiers of the 2nd Panzer Division began pushing up from the south. By 1600 hours the Ger
man attacks had been beaten off, with Bayerlein reporting the loss of six precious Tigers and several PzKpfw IVs. On 14 June Panzer Lehr was transferred to General von Funck’s XLVII Panzer Corps control.
That day the British XXX Corps launched a series of attacks using 50th Division against Tilly and Panzer Lehr’s Panzergrenadier Regiment 901, in the hope of forcing Lehr back to enable 7th Armoured Division to continue its own ill-fated offensive. 50th Division’s failure to get forward, the arrival of 2nd Panzer (which fanned out northwest of Caumont, north of Livry and northeast of Villers-Bocage), plus the two-day delay in the British build-up, meant the 7th Armoured was in danger of being crushed.
The division formed a defensive box of about 1,000 by 700 yards, which was attacked on three sides by German armoured forces on 14 June. Colin Thomson of the 11th Hussars recalled:
The 3rd and 5th Royal Horse Artillery were firing over open sights into the woods 300 yards away…. The result was unbelievable carnage. This battle lasted until 10.30 pm when Jerry decided to retire and presumably regroup.
Lieutenant General G. C. Bucknall, Commander of XXX Corps, failed to ask 2nd Army for direct infantry support for 7th Armoured’s beleaguered tanks. In consequence, when Bucknall was visiting 7th Armoured’s Tactical HQ he had both his escort tanks knocked out by lurking Tigers, and on returning to his own HQ concluded Erskine’s communications were in danger of being severed.
By 18–19 June, however, Panzer Lehr had lost about 100 of its 240 tanks in the bitter fighting in the Villers-Bocage area. Bayerlein claimed this had weakened his division to such an extent that it was no longer capable of launching an armoured thrust towards the sea. Between 26 June and 5 July the 276th Infantry Division, previously deployed in southwestern France, relieved Panzer Lehr, moving into position on its right flank. By this stage the division had lost almost 3,000 killed, wounded and missing. Panzer Kompanie 316 (Funklenk) still had seven operational StuG on 1 July and was pulled out of the front later in July to join the newly-formed Panzer Abteilung 302 (Funklenk).
Cobra strikes
Panzer Lehr was placed in reserve and sent just nineteen replacement panzers. However, the rest was brief and within five days it was committed against the Americans in General Dietrich von Choltitz’s LXXXIV Corps sector. On 11 July, Panzer Lehr counterattacked the Americans at Le Désert and made some ground. The attack, launched in the early hours, caused the American 30th Infantry Division problems, though the initial success of the panzers was due to a gap between the American 39th and 47th Infantry Divisions southwest of Le Désert. The Americans rushed in reinforcements, but to the west a column of ten panzers reached south of la Scellerie before losing three Panthers and being driven off.
By 1600 it was clear that Panzer Lehr had failed to break the American lines. American ground forces claimed about fifty panzers and the air force claimed another twenty-two, fighter-bombers reportedly destroying thirteen out of fourteen panzers near le Hommet-de-Arthenay. In reality, Panzer Lehr lost just twenty-two tanks to all causes during 1–15 July. Nevertheless, by 2100 on the 11th the Americans had reoccupied their old positions and the net result of Panzer Lehr’s attack was simply to delay the American 9th Infantry Division by a day. By this stage the division had lost 3,140 casualties.
While Panzergruppe West was given the lion’s share of the resources to fend off the British, General Hausser’s 7th Army facing the Americans was starved of troops. It only had 30–35,000 men divided into two corps, though the Americans estimated its strength as 17,000, with 375 tanks and assault guns. When General Montgomery launched Goodwood on 18 July it convinced Field Marshal von Kluge that the main threat remained in the British sector.
Panzer Lehr now formed the main striking force of von Choltitz’s LXXXIV Corps, which was guarding the front from St Lô westward to the coast. Scathingly, Rundstedt’s verdict of Choltitz was ‘decent but stupid’. Choltitz was a veteran of the Eastern Front, having initially fought as a regimental commander at Sebastopol. Promoted to lieutenant general, he also served in Italy before moving to Normandy. His experience directing panzer forces was patchy.
Although an infantry general, in Russia he commanded 11th Panzer for two months in early 1943, followed by the XLVIII Panzer Corps, which included the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions, for about five months. The latter suffered heavy losses during the battle of Kursk and, notably, General der Panzertruppen Heinrich Eberbach replaced him. In Italy he had briefly commanded General Traugott Herr’s LXXVI Panzer Corps, consisting of the 26th Panzer and 29th Panzergrenadier Divisions, from 1 March-15 April 1944. He assumed command of LXXXIV Corps in mid-June after his predecessor, Erich Marcks, was killed in action.
Choltitz’s command also included the only other armoured formations on the American front, the 2nd SS Panzer Division and the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division. Kluge advised Hausser to use two reserve infantry divisions to replace Panzer Lehr and 2nd SS, but Hausser was reluctant to do so. The II Parachute Corps, under General Eugen Meindl, had its 3rd Parachute Division and 352nd Infantry Division deployed east and south of St Lô, respectively.
Choltitz’s infantry formations consisted of the 243rd, 275th and 353rd Infantry Divisions and the 91st Air landing Division. Following the battles in the Cotentin Peninsula these units were completely depleted. The 275th, which had arrived in Normandy piecemeal as Kampfgruppe Heintz, was divided amongst Panzer Lehr, 2nd SS and LXXXIV Corps. The remains of the 91st were largely attached to the 2nd SS and 243rd.
Similarly, the 353rd was split amongst the 91st, 243rd and II Parachute Corps. The 243rd had just four weak infantry battalions, nine artillery batteries and eight anti-tank guns. Panzerjäger Abteilung 243 had just three Sturmgeschütz remaining from a complement of ten, plus fourteen Marder self-propelled guns. These formations along with Panzer Lehr would bear the brunt of Operation Cobra.
By 20 July, Panzer Lehr had been redeployed west of St Lô, still facing the Americans, though the exhausted reconnaissance abteilung and II Abteilung Panzergrenadier Regiment 902 were withdrawn to the Percy area for refit. Word of the failed assassination attempt on Hitler quickly reached Panzer Lehr as Hauptmann Ritgen recalled, with dismay at the possible outcome:
My command post was in a farm house in a village and it was under attack. Normally we never wore steel helmets, but this time my adjutant told me to put mine on. It was much too small for me – it perched on top of my head. Well, we had no idea what was happening in Berlin…. Although I loathed Hitler, his death would have been a disaster at that time and have caused such confusion that the enemy would have been confirmed in his goal – the destruction of Germany.
Hitler’s mistrust of his generals became even more marked, further hampering the direction of the Normandy campaign. Otto Henning of Panzer Lehr felt ‘the worst thing for us was that we were no longer allowed to salute in a normal military fashion with our hand raised to our caps. We had to have our arms raised in the Hitler [Nazi Party] salute’.
Just prior to Operation Cobra, Panzer Lehr had eighty tanks, of which only fifteen Panzer IVs and sixteen Panthers were operational, and was rated suitable only for defensive missions. When the Americans launched Cobra it was the Panther tanks that were at the front. Luckily Bayerlein’s Panzer IVs had been withdrawn to form a reserve and in fact only a few Panthers and tank destroyers were lost to the preliminary bombing.
The division was also reinforced with elements of the 5th Parachute Division, in the form of Fallschfirmjäger Regiment 14 that had recently moved up from Brittany. Its arrival was a mixed blessing; the unit was under strength and under-equipped and did not bring any supporting artillery or flak guns with it. Panzer Lehr also had under its command a battalion of infantry from the 275th Infantry Division, which were the remains of Kampfgruppe Heintz, along with Kampfgruppe Brosow from the 2nd SS.
During the night of 23/24, von Choltitz reported to Hausser’s 7th Army that there was evidence of American armour concentrating north of the St Lô-Périers road; ‘nonsens
e’, replied 7th Army, ‘The Allies will hit in the Caen sector’. In the prelude to Cobra on 24 and 25 July, Panzer Lehr’s positions were heavily bombed. Bayerlein got a warning phone call at his command post at the chateau at Canisy at about 1100. It was a battalion commander from his Panzergrenadier Regiment 901, stationed along the St Lô-Périers road: ‘American infantry [across the road] are abandoning their positions. They are withdrawing everywhere’. In fact they were pulling back out of the way of the imminent bombardment that would herald Cobra.
Cobra’s opening aerial attack fell squarely on Panzer Lehr and Bayerlein chronicled the destruction of his division:
Units holding the front were almost completely wiped out, despite, in many cases, the best possible equipment of tanks, anti-tank guns and self-propelled guns. Back and forth the bomb carpets were laid, artillery positions were wiped out, tanks overturned and buried, infantry positions flattened and all roads and tracks destroyed. By midday the entire area resembled a moon landscape, with the bomb craters touching rim to rim, and there was no longer any hope of getting out any of our weapons. All signal communications had been cut and no command was possible. The shock effect on the troops was indescribable. Several men went mad and rushed dementedly round in the open until they were cut down by splinters. Simultaneously with the storm from the air, innumerable guns of the American artillery poured drumfire into our field positions.
Initially, von Kluge at La Roche-Guyon assumed Panzergruppe West had been bombed and phoned General Eberbach for a situation report. When the latter informed him Caen was quiet the penny dropped, it was Bayerlein who was on the receiving end of things. Calling Hausser, von Kluge was still unsure what all the air activity actually meant. Panzer Lehr weathered the first attack on the 24th losing just 350 men and ten vehicles.
Falaise: The Flawed Victory Page 8