The 10th SS suffered the same problem as the 9th SS, whose Panther battalion was still being worked up at Mailly-le-Camp. Both divisions experienced problems with tank deliveries. Although SS-Panzer Regiment 10’s I Abteilung was already at Mailly-le-Camp, it only had training vehicles available and was unable to join its parent unit until 1945. Therefore, this battalion was not destined to see action in Normandy. The ten Panthers it did receive had to be handed over to Panzer Lehr and, by 1 August, I Abteilung had been assigned to Panzer Brigade 10, which out of an authorised strength of seventy-three Panthers only had seven. Similarly, the division’s Panzerjüger abteilung was still forming and did not receive any Jagdpanzer IV tank destroyers until the end of August.
Containing Epsom
On the night of 25/26 June, just as the British were renewing their efforts, II SS Panzer Corps HQ and the 10th SS were instructed to move to the St Remy Rousamps-La Bigne-St Symphorien-Les Buttes-Campeaux-Vire-Tinchebray area. The 10th SS was soon thrown into action against the British 2nd Army’s Operation Epsom; enduring heavy fighting around the strategic Hill 112. Epsom launched on the 25/26th was a preventative strike to help tie down the newly-arrived II SS Panzer Corps west of Caen and stop it moving to the American sector.
Montgomery’s intention was to push south over the Caen-Bayeux road on to the Fosse de l’Odon, before turning southeast to Bretteville-sur-Laize, 10 miles (16km) south of Caen. On the 29th, the 9th SS, now formally assigned to II SS Panzer Corps, deployed facing Hill 112 along the Odon River, between von Funck’s XLVII Panzer Corps and Sepp Dietrich’s I SS Panzer Corps. Harmel’s forces were deployed between Caen and Villers-Bocage.
The British XXX Corps had, by the 30th, reached Rauray and Tessel, but in the face of determined resistance from 2nd SS could not maintain its momentum and failed to reach the Odon. In contrast, VIII Corps forced its way over the river, creating a narrow bridgehead between Gavrus to the west and Baron to the east.
In countering Epsom, the 10th SS attacked the Gavrus bridgehead on the flank of the British 11th Armoured Division on Hill 112. The usual problem, shortages of fuel, greatly limited the number of panzers the division could initially throw at the British. Paetsch’s and Reinhold’s tanks and assault guns were committed to the fighting on the 29th, along with the 9th SS, when they attacked along the Odon. The two assault gun companies supporting SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 22 took Gavrus, but could not reach Baron-sur-Odon. Near Evrecy the panzers took Point 113 and the division claimed twenty-eight enemy tanks for the loss of just two Panzer IVs.
Flanking fire from Avenay and St Martin hampered the push to Hill 112 and Esquay-Notre-Dame, that night the panzers and panzer grenadiers crossed the Guigne River between Avenay and Vieux, which enabled them to climb the southern slopes of Hill 112. The 12th SS attacked Hill 112 from the east and by midday on the 30th were on the summit. Hill 113 was attacked at the same time. During the period 30 June-1 July, elements of the 10th SS lost 571 casualties resisting Epsom and the division suffered badly from air strikes on 1 July, three miles (5km) south of Villers-Bocage.
Battle for Hill 112
On 3 July, the British counterattacked and the tanks of the 10th SS were moved up the hill. On the 10th the British, under the guise of Operation Jupiter, tried to wrest back control of the high ground around Hill 112. Major General G I Thomas’ 43rd (Wessex) Division, consisting of the 129th, 130th and 214th brigades, were to attack positions held by the 10th SS, which were supported by Tiger tanks from Schwere SS-Abteilung 101, in what was to prove an extremely fierce battle.
The German defenders survived naval bombardment, air attack and artillery fire. The British then launched frontal attacks on Hill 112 and the village of Maltot on its northern slope, against the SS panzer troops, supported by dug-in and concealed Tiger tanks, holding an almost impregnable position. The British made some initial progress before being driven back by Tigers from the II SS Panzer Corps’ heavy tank battalion, Schwere SS-Panzer Abteilung 102.
At the moment that it appeared twenty-five Churchill tanks were going to take the summit of Hill 112, I Abteilung arrived from its reserve position and knocked out almost all of them. In particular, the concealed Panzer IVs of the V Kompanie were confronted by twenty-five British tanks and were forced to attack a section at a time to avoid the Allied fighter-bombers. The British advance came to a halt to return fire, knocking out two panzers and killing two platoon leaders, SS-Hauptscharführer Borrekott and SS-Oberscharführer Leven. In the meantime, the remaining Panzer IVs and the StuGs advanced between Hills 112 and 113, catching the Allied spearhead in the lank, but the British had already reached the top.
The British attack on Maltot did not go well either, as the Tigers on Hill 112 opened up on the British left lank, while the 12th SS Panzer Division’s Panzer IVs and Panthers were to the attackers’ front and elements of the 1st SS kampfgruppe were on the right. The British threw in a further attack and took the summit once again, but at nightfall the British tanks withdrew, leaving the infantry unsupported, to be thrown back yet again by a German counterattack under cover of darkness.
The 43rd Division alone lost more than 2,000 men in the first thirty-six hours of Operation Jupiter and it was reported that the Odon River was dammed with corpses. On 15 July the British launched Operation Greenline, holding the division west of Caen. When the 9th SS was withdrawn into reserve on the 15th, the 10th SS were left to cover the entire sector, and were driven off part of Hill 113, just north of Evrecy, by Major General G H A MacMillan’s 15th (Scottish) Division.
Despite the commitment of Tiger tanks and the return of the 9th SS, the Scots held on to their gains, though the SS remained in possession of the lunar surface of Hill 112 until finally relieved by the 271st Infantry Division. The 10th SS, having now lost well over 2,200 men since the beginning of July, was withdrawn for a brief period of rest. The division had also lost a quantity of self-propelled guns and anti-tank weapons, including four Grille self-propelled guns, eight 7.5cm Leichtes Infanteriegeschütz 18s, six 7.5cm anti-tank guns and eighteen 8cm mortars as well as nearly a hundred machineguns.
In the face of such determined SS resistance, British casualties during 10-22 July amounted to approximately 25,000 men and 500 tanks. In particular, the 43rd Wessex suffered a total of 7,000 casualties. By the end of the month the 10th SS had lost seven Panzer IVs and three StuG IIIs, plus 168 other vehicles.
The 10th SS continued to fight southwest of Caen. In early August they halted the British 43rd Division, which, attacking from Dois du Homme, had driven 21st Panzer from Jurques and seized Hill 301. They also drove the British 7th Armoured Division almost back to Breuil.
On 1 August a kampfgruppe under Otto Paetsch headed for Aunay-sur-Odon about 18 miles (29km) southwest of Caen. The next Day the kampfgruppe – with seven Panzer IVs and eighteen Panthers – entered the fray and successfully held most of Hill 188, claiming responsibility for destroying twenty British tanks. The remainder of the division arrived on the 3rd, threw back the British units that had established a foothold on Hill 188, and took nearby Hill 301 to form a defence line between the two high points.
This and other SS attacks brought British tank losses since the start of Operation Bluecoat on 30 July to a massive 200 vehicles. Bittrich’s tired troops kept pressing forward until the battle reached a climax on 6 August. The 10th SS were switched from Aunay-sur-Odon to attack the British positions on the Périers ridge. They were then ordered to disengage, and on 6 August the division was committed to an attack on British units north of Chônedollé. They seized two prominent high points, Hills 242 and 224, only to be driven back by shellfire and air attacks. Having brought Bluecoat to a halt, Bittrich established a strong defensive line around Vire.
Mortain counterattack
For the German counterattack on Avranches on the American front, Field Marshal von Kluge had instructed that the 10th SS be available by 5 August in the Vassy area. However, 5th Panzer Army could not comply due to the tactical situat
ion with II SS Panzer Corps. Army Group B informed 7th Army that 10th SS and 12th SS were to be brought up on 8 August under the direction of General Walter Krüger’s LVIII Panzer Corps. The latter had only just assumed control of the sector southwest of Caen from Bittrich’s II SS Panzer Corps.
Moving toward Mortain, Harmel’s 10th SS became the Corps reserve for General von Funck’s XLVII Panzer Corps. The division deployed to the Beauchene area, east of Mortain, to relieve elements of the 275th Infantry Division. During the night of 8/9 August the 10th SS found its extended frontline compromised when the enemy penetrated both sides of Barenton.
The SS launched a counterattack on the 9th along the road from Barenton to Ger, reaching the hill two and a half miles (4km) northeast of Barenton. The 10th SS was then committed to recapture Barenton, although they could only muster twelve panzers. Elements had to be committed to action near Barenton almost immediately, however, to block constantly probing American attacks.
The 10th SS launched their counterattack against the American penetration north of Barenton on 10 August and made some ground, although they could not reach the town. Heavy losses soon forced the division over to the defensive. Instead of being committed to the renewed Avranches/Mortain counter-offensive, the division was pushed eastwards, via Dom front and Frementel, as the Germans pulled back to defend Argentan.
Final days
By the 14th the division was in danger of being encircled and Domfort had fallen to the Americans. Its fighting strength stood at just 4,136 men. In stark contrast to all the British tanks it had accounted for, the division had only lost twelve Panzer IV and eight Sturmgeschütz since arriving in Normandy. SS-Brigadeführer Harmel mustered eight Panzer IVs and some panzer grenadiers in the hills to the north of Domfort and, with the assistance of the 2nd SS and 17th SS, prepared to attack the American forces.
They drove them back but this localised victory meant nothing. During the night, the remains of the division withdrew east on St-Bomer-les-Forges and then north of Argentan. Harmel and his men now faced the gauntlet of the Trun-Chambois bottleneck. Elements of the 10th SS, along with the 1st SS and 2nd Panzer, were trapped in the Falaise pocket.
Chapter 12
The Road to St Lô – 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich
The 2nd SS Panzer division arrived in southwest France in the spring of 1944 and was stationed near Toulouse; when the time came the French resistance harried it as it moved north toward Normandy. Das Reich fought both the British and Americans round Caen and St Lo respectively. It successfully recaptured Mortain during Operation Lüttich but had to withdraw. Then, along with the 9th SS, it was instrumental in helping large numbers of German troops escape from the Falaise pocket.
Combat experience
Formed in October 1939 from the Deutschland, Germania and Der Führer Regiments, the SS-VT-Division Reich was placed under the command of SS-Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser. It was involved in the campaign in the West in 1940 and after guarding the border with Vichy France was transferred to the Netherlands. The division then took part in the campaign in the Balkans, where a small detachment led by SS-Hauptsturmführer Klingenberg managed to get the Mayor of Belgrade to surrender the city without a fight.
Still under the command of Hausser, the unit took part in the invasion of the USSR and fought on the frontlines until August 1941, when it was withdrawn for refitting. It was sent back to the front in September and a few months later, now commanded by SS-Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Bittrich, it took part in the failed offensive against Moscow.
The division was sent to France in March 1942, with the exception of a small kampfgruppe, where it was upgraded to become SS-Panzergrenadier Division Das Reich. It was sent back to the Eastern Front in January 1943, where, under the leadership of SS-Obergruppenführer George Keppler, it took part in the capture and recapture of Kharkov, as well as fighting at Kursk.
In April 1944, under SS-Gruppenführer Heinz Lammerding, some 2,500 men from Das Reich were transferred back to France to the Bordeaux area, this time to be upgraded to a full panzer division designated 2nd SS. Lammerding had served as an infantry officer and was involved in anti-partisan operations on the Eastern Front. The subsequent actions of his division during its march through France maybe partly attributed to Lammerding’s experiences in the East.
In late 1943 he took command of those 2nd SS units on anti-partisan duties and assumed full command of the division on 25 January1944. There were whisperings that he had been over promoted. It has been argued that he owed his appointment to his relationship with SS-Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler, indeed it was felt that Lammerding’s position had more to do with his political allegiance to the Nazi Party rather than any real military aptitude.
Based around Montauban, one of the division’s first priorities was to absorb about 9,000 new recruits as well as replenishing its vehicle stocks. The division took receipt of fifty-five Panzer IVs and thirty-seven Panthers toward a compliment of sixty-two of each, to supplement the existing thirty Sturmgeschütz, on 16 May. General Heinz Guderian arrived for an inspection tour and watched their exercises, particularly night movements. Lammerding and his men had already been warned that they would not enjoy the same level of freedom of movement that they had experienced in Russia, where the Russian air force was little more than a nuisance.
SS-Obersturmbannführer Christian Tychsen commanded the division’s SS-Panzer Regiment 2. By the beginning of June he had fifty-four Panzer IVs, of which ten were in the workshops, thirty-nine Panthers and forty-one Sturmgeschütz III. Further deliveries of armour meant that the 2nd SS was to field a total of eighty-three Panzer IVs, eighty Panthers and forty-five StuG IIIs during the fighting in Normandy. Divisional self-propelled artillery consisted of five Hummels and six Wespe, along with the usual towed artillery batteries.
The SS-Panzergrenadier regiments also had 249 armoured personnel carriers, of which fourteen were undergoing maintenance. Despite this impressive inventory, spares and ammunition were a major problem for Lammerding, especially parts for the motor transport. The division had less than half the required number of trucks and out of the 1,821 it did have only 617 were operational. It was obvious that the division would have problems getting anywhere in a hurry. In May, SS-Obersturmführer Fritz Langanke was ordered to survey the local railways to assess their suitability for moving the panzer regiment.
While Lammerding grappled with getting his division up to strength and carrying out its training, in the run up to D-Day the French Maquis or Resistance, began to make its presence increasingly felt. By June Colonel René Vaujour claimed to have 5,000 men under his command. Three months earlier he had ordered his men, in the event of an Allied invasion, to cover the bridges over the Dordogne in south Corrèze and northern Lot. Vajour correctly assessed that the 2nd SS would move north to reinforce a German counter-offensive and it would fall to him and his men to obstruct it. The British SAS were also to conduct Operation Bulbasket with the same goal.
Lammerding’s response to the Resistance was to treat them as a partisan army, with predictably brutal results. Throughout May the division conducted anti-resistance operations with units visiting Montpezat-de-Quercy, St Céré and Bagnac, Cardaillac and Lauze. This culminated on 2 June, when, following a Maquis attack, the village of Terrou was burned along with twenty-nine surrounding farms. When the SS discovered a resistance arms dump at Ggeac, a thousand townspeople were arrested and deported.
On 7 June, just a day after the start of the Allied landings in Normandy, Lammerding received the order to be ready to march. The 2nd SS, though, remained distracted by its own war against the local irregular French fighters. The following day some units were sent to the Limoges–Tulle area to conduct anti-partisan operations. The division was assigned to Army Group B on the 11th and the following day ordered to move to Normandy. Five days later, elements had reached the town of Mortain.
Troubled march north
Lacking equipment and with deficient training, the di
vision’s progress was not good. By 10 June Lammerding found his command scattered across the Lot, Corrèze and Haute-Vienne with broken-down panzers and StuGs stretching from Tulle to Montauban. Frustratingly for Lammerding and his men, the actions of the French Maquis ensured that what should have been a three-day journey for the 2nd SS took a fortnight.
On the 10th the situation boiled over at Oradour-sur-Glane, 12 miles (19km) northwest of Limoges. The male villagers were herded into the church and the village torched; in the mayhem 646 people were killed by members of Panzergrenadier Regiment Der Führer under Sturmbannführer Otto Diekmann (he was killed in action on 30 June). The actions of the 2nd SS at Oradour-sur-Glane, and elsewhere during the march north, have been hotly debated ever since. What is clear is that the division acted heavy-handedly and the distraction of fighting the French Resistance was time consuming and clearly a tactical error.
Lammerding signalled General der Panzertruppen Walter Krüger’s LVIII Reserve Panzer Corps in Toulouse with his catalogue of woes; he was under-stand ably annoyed that his panzer division was wasting its valuable time fighting the Maquis, which was a role that should be handled by the local security divisions. Large areas were under the Resistance’s control, leaving local German forces surrounded and cut off.
Falaise: The Flawed Victory Page 18