According to subsequent British analysis, two of the main causes for the defeat of the Panther tank were abandonment and self-destruction by the panzertruppen. These two categories accounted for nearly half the Panthers left on the battlefield during August and constituted eighty per cent of all the Panthers lost. Air power only accounted for about six per cent of all the lost Panthers investigated.
Rockets and free-fall bombs were highly inaccurate when trying to hit vehicles and the Germans were masters of camouflage. The Allied air forces’ real contribution was the sense of panic their attacks caused, with vehicle crews quickly taking to the fields at the onset of an air strike.
One of the divisions that appeared to have suffered the most was the 2nd Panzer. On 24 August it assembled fifteen tanks near Meaux, east of Paris, four days later less than 1,200 men and five tanks managed to cross the Seine. At the end of August Panzer Lehr, which had also suffered heavy casualties, mustered barely 6,000 men near Fontainbleu and the repair units were able to provide just twenty tanks. The 9th Panzer Division was not encircled at Falaise and was able to muster about 11,000 men, though few, if any, tanks. The 21st Panzer Division was also one of those that suffered heavy losses in Normandy and by late August had just ten combat ready tanks, but also had about 11,000 men available. Similarly about 10,600 men of the 116th escaped along with fifteen tanks, three assault guns and three self-propelled guns.
The 1st SS lost about twenty-five per cent of its manpower and had no combat-ready tanks. Parts of the 10th SS were encircled along with the 1st SS and 2nd Panzer and lost all their armour. The 2nd SS had just six tanks, but it was not surrounded and by the end of September had mustered 12,357 men. Likewise, the 9th SS escaped the trap and was able to muster twenty to twenty-five tanks, though in early September ten of these were handed over to the 11th Panzer Division.
A major element of the 12th SS was outside the Falaise pocket and was able to gather 12,000 men and possibly a handful of tanks. The division received twelve Panzer IVs on 5 September, which had been despatched to it in Normandy but had not arrived in time. Kurt Meyer, their highly-capable commander, having escaped Falaise, was captured at Amiens on 6 September. Likewise the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division had a strength of 16,832 by mid-September.
Remarkable recovery
The panzer divisions’ manpower totalled about 160,000 men during the campaign and they had lost almost 62,000; yet, crucially, 98,000 men were still available to rebuild these formations – all they needed were replacement tanks. The Allies strategic bomber campaign may have severely hampered German armaments production, but it had not brought it to a standstill, nor was it able to completely prevent equipment being shipped to the front.
German industry pulled out all the stops and in August a record number of 869 tanks and 744 assault guns came off the assembly lines. Most notably, in the first week of September the German tank factories churned out sixty Tigers, which were delivered to Field Marshal Model on the morning of 24 September. These were to cause the Allies real problems during Operation Market Garden. The panzer divisions, once fleshed out by new recruits and transferees led by veteran officers and NCOs, were to obstruct the Allies at every turn right until the very end of the war.
Most of the survivors of Panzergruppe West, XLVII and LVIII Panzer Corps and the I SS and II SS Panzer Corps were withdrawn to Germany behind the relative safety of the long-neglected Siegfried Line. The latter had been built in the late 1930s along the pre-war border formed by the Saar River. Some units, however, had to remain behind to help stabilise the front and buy Rundstedt much-needed time.
The tattered remnants of 2nd and 116th Panzer were reformed in Germany, ready for operations on the Western Front. The 9th withdrew to the Aachen area for refit and became embroiled in the attempts to halt the American advance there. Conducting a fighting retreat, the 21st Panzer was engaged in the Saar and Alsace before being shipped to Germany for refit; the division was destined for the Eastern Front. The Panzer Lehr was also sent to the Saar and then on to Paderborn in Germany for rebuilding.
The Waffen-SS panzer divisions were also moved out of harms way for refit. The 1st SS, 2nd SS and 12th SS fell back to the Eifel region in Germany, and in November the 1st SS were refitted in Westphalia and the 12th SS refitted in Bremen. Both the 1st SS and 2nd SS went into reserve near Aachen. The 9th SS and 10th SS were withdrawn to the Netherlands to a place called Arnhem. In September the 12th SS was posted to the Aachen area and the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division withdrew to the Metz area.
Panzergruppe West’s smaller armoured formations suffered varying fates. The 503 Schwere Panzer Battalion was refitted and eventually sent to Hungary. The 101 SS and 102 SS Schwere Panzer battalions were re-equipped with Tiger IIs in September and re-designated the 501 and 502 respectively; both were also to end up on the Eastern Front. In contrast, the 506, which had been fighting with Army Group Centre on the Eastern Front, was sent to the West in August for refit.
Panzer Abteilung (Funklenk) 301 suffered heavy casualties during June and July 1944 and was withdrawn for rebuilding. On 19 August it was ordered to reorganize and re-equip as Schwere Panzer Abteilung (Tiger/Fkl) 301. Each of the three companies was to have ten Tiger Is and the HQ was to have two Tiger Is. Ten of these Tiger Is were acquired from an SS-Panzer abteilung. Some thirty-six Borgward IV remote-controllable demolition vehicles were issued to each company. The 301 were swiftly brought back up to strength and received twenty-one Tigers between 25 August and 15 September and another ten from Abteilung 103. The unit reported to LXXXI Corps in November with thirty-one Tigers (four were inoperable) and sixty-six BIV (five of which were inoperable).
The independent Panzer Abteilung 100 and 206, equipped with French tanks lost in the chaos of Normandy, were not rebuilt. Similarly, the majority of Panzerjäger Abteilung 657, armed with a mixture of inadequate French and Czech equipment, was lost in the St Lô area and the survivors were disbanded in mid-October.
In contrast, the assault gun units remained in a salvagable condition. By early October, Sturmgeschütz Brigade 341 had twenty-three assault guns, about half of which were in short-term repair. Sturmgeschütz Brigade 394 lost all but one of its assault guns in the Falaise pocket, but by early September had been despatched to the Aachen area to pick up thirty-one new vehicles. It was soon assisting 9th and 116th Panzer, resisting the Americans.
Sturmgeschütz Abteilung 902 in early September was with 19th Army and had ten assault guns; this number had doubled by the beginning of the following month. Sturmpanzer Abteilung 217, which variously served with the 89th Infantry Division, 12th SS Panzer Division and the 271st Infantry Division during the Normandy campaign, received twenty-four replacement Sturmpanzer IVs in September; however, by 1 October the battalion only had fourteen combat ready with another five in repair.
Not all the panzerjäger battalions of the mauled Infantry Divisions could be retrieved, for example Panzerjüger Abteilung 243’s parent division was disbanded on 12 September. Similarly Panzerjäger Abteilung 352 saw the remnants of its parent division merged with the 581st Volksgrenadier Division in late September to create the 352nd Volksgrenadier Division. The 346th Infantry Division escaped southeast of Falaise and over the Seine with just three of its ten assault guns. Although the 353rd Infantry Division broke out of the Falaise pocket, it is unlikely that it was able to save any of its Marder self-propelled guns or Sturmgeschütz assault guns.
Fighting withdrawal
On 7 September, Rundstedt sent a situation report to Keitel spelling out just how grim the situation was:
All our forces are all involved in battle, badly bruised, partly burned out. They lack artillery and anti-tank weapons. No reserves worthy of the term are available. The numerical superiority of enemy tanks compared to ours is indisputable. At this time, about 100 tanks are combat ready in Army Group B. Enemy air force dominates the battle area and the lines of communication deep into the rear echelon. The pressure of the enemy toward Lüttich (Meu
se Valley) with a clear direction of advance via Aachen toward the industrial region of Rhineland-Westphalia has developed into a serious danger. The immediate addition of strong forces (five to ten divisions), as requested several times, seems an urgent necessity to me…. In agreement with Generalfeldmarschall Model, I recognise (near Aachen) the acute danger to the rear of the Westwall connecting toward the south…. Our task is to fight with available forces to gain time, to make the western positions and the Westwall completely capable for defence…. A time period of six weeks is forecast for completion of the western positions. This time has to be won through combat.
The ramifications of the failure to entirely destroy the panzer forces in the west soon became apparent. The 9th and 116th Panzer Divisions remained constant thorns in the side of the advancing Allies’ sides. By 4 September the 116th was northwest of Namur, with orders to enter Charleroi, but American tanks were already there. It had a combat strength of just 600 panzer grenadiers, twelve tanks and ten pieces of artillery. Four days later Count Schwerin reported:
116th Panzer Division and Group Fiebig execute exchange of river banks on 8 September until dawn. The Division takes up position on the east bank of the Meuse at the southern edge of Argenteau-southern edge of St Remy-southern edge of Trembleu, in such a way that expected attack out of Lüttich (Liege) along east bank of Meuse can be repelled.
On 3 September, the 9th SS and 116th Panzer Divisions were ordered to pick up thirty Panzer IVs each from the Luttich area, but in the event the 116th only received fifteen tanks. The 9th and 116th Panzer attempted to fend off an enemy attack at Limbourg on 11 September but were thrown back toward Henri Chapelle. At this stage the 116th only had three battle-worthy tanks, but Henri Chapelle was secured by Sturmgeschütz Brigade 394.
The Americans though were able to exploit a gap between 116th and 9th Panzer forcing them back. On 12 September elements of the French II Corps pushing up from the south of France met the French 2nd Armoured from Patton’s US 3rd Army at Châtillon-sur-Seine thereby linking up the southern and northern invasion forces.
In mid-September the 9th and 116th Panzer Divisions were given responsibility for the defence of Aachen. The 9th, which was bolstered by Sturmgeschütz Brigade 394, destroyed twenty-six American tanks on 13 September, and the following day a penetration south of Aachen was countered by the 116th. By 17/18 September the American 2nd Armored Division had reached the Siegfried Line north of Aachen. However, the attack on the line was postponed because during the Arnhem operation a gap had developed between the British and American Armies. In October, the Tigers of Abteilung 506 took part in the defence of Aachen, having fought at Arnhem.
The 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division was to play a key role in denying Metz to the Americans. Elements of the division arrived in the city with just ten assault guns on 1 September. SS-Panzergrenadier Brigades 49 and 51, which had arrived from Denmark and SS-Panzer Brigade ‘Merzig’, reinforced the 17th SS Panzer grenadiers, refitting west of Metz along the Abbeville-Mars La Tour road.
Eight days later the division was engaging French Sherman tanks and the US 5th Infantry Division. The Americans crossed the Mosselle River at Dornot on 8 September and came under immediate counterattack by SS-Panzer grenadiers. The following day American crossings between Noveant and Arnville received a similar reception. Heavy fighting continued throughout October and into November as the 17th SS helped hold up the American advance.
It was not long before the 2nd SS made its presence felt at Wittlich. Both the 2nd SS and Panzer Lehr were to be instrumental in halting Allied thrusts into the Eifel region west of the Rhine. On 14 September the US 4th Infantry Division, attacking the ‘Black Man’ ridge and the hamlet of Brandscheid, which had been incorporated into the Siegfried Line, came up against Kampfgruppe Kuehne. This consisted of young recruits rushed to the front from Wittlich in half-tracks of the 2nd SS.
The Americans were brought to a halt with 800 casualties. To the south, the US 28th Infantry Division attacking out of Luxembourg also came up against elements of the 2nd SS. Although they broke through the Siegfried Line it was at the cost of 1,500 casualties and losses for both divisions were such that the offensive was called off.
At Wallendorf the US 5th Armored Division, crossing the Our and Sauer Rivers, pushed aside a weak company of Panzer IVs from Panzer Lehr and pierced German defences to a depth of six miles (10km). Field Marshal von Rundstedt counterattacked with two Infantry Divisions and the remaining twenty-five tanks of Panzer Lehr. The Americans were driven back with the loss of sixty Sherman tanks, though the last of Panzer Lehr’s tanks were also knocked out. The shaken US 5th Armored withdrew back over the Sauer on 22 September. Thanks to the assistance of the 2nd SS and Panzer Lehr, an entire US Corps had been successfully thrown out of their positions on the Siegfried Line.
To the north, to stop the Allies push across Holland and Belgium, were 80,000 men of General Gustav-Adolf von Zangen’s 15th Army, which lacked tanks, and the 18,000 men of Colonel-General Kurt Student’s 1st Parachute Army, equipped with just twenty-five panzers. Once the British were in Antwerp the 15th Army fell back to a bridgehead at the mouth of the Scheldt estuary, thereby blocking the approach to Antwerp. It would take the Allies almost two months of heavy fighting to secure it and the Scheldt estuary, in the meantime much-needed supplies had to rumble across Europe from the French ports.
Although the 2nd, 116th, 9th SS and 10th SS were ordered to replenish in the area of Eindhoven, the combat-worthy elements of these divisions were to remain in continual contact with the enemy. The 1st SS, 2nd SS and 12th SS were to return to Germany for a complete refit. Understandably these plans did not run smoothly.
Chapter 17
The Reckoning in the West
The escape of II SS Panzer Corps was to have dire consequences. Just three weeks after the liquidation of the Falaise pocket Montgomery launched Operation Market Garden, intended to take the Allies across the mighty Rhine and into the Ruhr. Designed to swiftly bring Germany to her knees, Montgomery’s plan was ill-conceived, especially as the British 1st Airborne spearhead came up against the recuperating 9th SS and 10th SS Panzer Divisions at Arnhem. Although the SS were extremely under strength, the outcome of pitting lightly-armed paratroops against the panzers was inevitable.
Three months later, all the panzer divisions, now fully recovered, would be thrown into a surprise offensive against the Allies in the Ardennes, designed to cut them off from Antwerp. This was to fail and most of the panzer divisions were to end their final days trapped in the Rhur pocket.
Victory at Arnhem
Following Falaise and the liberation of Paris, Montgomery reasoned:
The Germans are now completely disorganised as a result of their defeat in Normandy. If we can prevent their recovery, there is a good chance of the war being won in the autumn of 1944. We should, therefore, stage a powerful thrust, preferably up the coastal plain, which must keep on and on without pause, so that the Germans never get time to draw breath. We shall then be able to bounce a crossing of the Rhine before they get their defences organised. We can encircle the Ruhr from the north, cut it off from Germany, and the war will then be over.
Montgomery’s logic was sound but failed to take account of two very depleted SS panzer divisions that had escaped the chaos of Normandy. After II SS Panzer Corps’ failed counterattack at Falaise, it had withdrawn eastward through Evreux and Soissons. On 4 September Bittrich and his staff were directed north to Eindhoven in the Netherlands to oversee the refit of the 9th SS along with the 2nd and 116th Panzer Divisions. The latter and the 10th SS were ordered to the Venlo-Arnhem-Hertogenbosch area, also in the Netherlands, and began moving the following day.
The 9th SS, under SS-Obersturmbannführer Walter Harzer, numbered about 6,000 men with just twenty Panther tanks, though not all were serviceable; however, it did have a large number of other armoured fighting vehicles such as self-propelled guns and armoured cars, along with forty armoured personnel carriers. Its
sister division, still under SS-Gruppenführer Heinz Harmel, could muster barely 3,500 men and hardly any tanks.
According to Bittrich, his instructions from Model were verbal and he only ordered the 9th SS and 10th SS north. The 2nd Panzer Division, in fact, withdrew to the Wittlich area in September; the 116th Panzer was sent to Aachen or Dusseldorf for refitting and was transferred to the Cologne sector two months later, where it resisted the Allied Rhine crossings.
Major Winrich Behr serving General Krebs, Model’s Chief of Staff, recalled on 17 September:
All round Arnhem the Germans had set up a series of field workshops and transit camps where the stragglers and survivors of the long retreat could be collected together. Many divisions had been reduced to a fraction of their original strength and were now being regrouped into operational units. Everyday specialised freight trains brought back the battered tanks and mobile guns which had stubbornly held back the Allied advance, allowing the infantry and other troops to fall back towards Germany. Here in relative peace the fitters and engineers worked on urgent repairs and refitting: the weapons were repaired or replaced and crews re-equipped and retrained. Then, as soon as the tanks, self-propelled guns and fighting vehicles were ready for action, they were sent eastwards without delay to help in the defence of Germany.
There was an enormous concentration of heavy armour in all stages of preparation, from cannibalised wrecks to fully battle-ready Tigers. Some of these were the updated Royal Tigers, with much thicker armour plating and larger guns, which had proved a match for the Russian T-34s. Among its armament was the 8.8cm gun (originally an anti-aircraft weapon) that had wrought such havoc among the British tanks in North Africa.
Falaise: The Flawed Victory Page 26