III
Japan’s leaders took their second fateful step toward a larger war when the liaison conference and the Konoe cabinet reached full consensus on a military alliance with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. To insure the legitimacy of their decision, an imperial conference—Hirohito’s third—convened on September 19 and shortly afterward he sanctioned the treaty. When Kido saw him on September 24, Hirohito remarked that he wanted “to worship in person at the kashikodokoro [Place of Awe]” in the palace, and ask for the protection of the gods since “in this case we are not simply celebrating as at the time of the Japan-British treaty; we are going to face a serious crisis depending on how the situation develops.”51 Later the treaty was forwarded to the Privy Council which completed its purely formalistic deliberations in just one day.
On September 27, 1940, Japanese representatives in Berlin signed the Tripartite Pact with the dictatorships of Germany and Italy. The affiliation of fascist Rumania and Hungary followed. By the terms of the pact, Japan recognized the leadership of Germany and Italy in “the new order in Europe” while they recognized Japan’s dominance in “Greater East Asia.” The three powers pledged “to assist one another with all political, economic, and military means” if “attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese conflict.”52 This last article was intended to check Britain and keep the United States out of the war.
The deliberations leading to this key event had gone on for three years. Hirohito had had ample opportunities to ponder its implications, including the near certainty that it would deprive Japan of diplomatic flexibility and end forever its chance for cooperation with the United States and Britain. Although he did not trust Nazi Germany, his opposition had never been to a military alliance with the Nazis that countered Soviet pressure on Manchukuo, but only to one that took Britain, France, and the United States as the main enemies.53
Thus, when Konoe was hinting he would resign, at the very end of 1938 and the beginning of 1939, Hirohito reportedly said to his new Chief Aide-de-Camp Hata: “If [the army] doesn’t want Prime Minister Konoe to resign that much, instead of persuading him to remain, go along with the decision of the Five Ministers Conference, made earlier, to strengthen the defense against Communism, and…make this anti-Communist alliance just against the Soviet Union. Go tell this to the General Staff.”54 Hirohito was then clearly not against the Tripartite Pact itself; he was only opposed to including Britain and France among its targets.
A year and a half later, at the very moment President Roosevelt had increased his support for the hard-pressed British by making his Lend-Lease destroyers-for-bases deal, Hirohito, despite misgivings, abandoned his opposition and assented to the treaty. It was an opportunistic and dangerous move, certain to deepen Japan’s difficulties with the Anglo-Americans once Germany renewed its conquests in Europe. More than that, it was a very self-conscious break with the Meiji legacy of Anglo-American friendship in foreign policy, and Hirohito knew it, which is another reason he vacillated so long before making it.
In the lead-up to his personal conversion to the military’s line on foreign policy, Hirohito likened himself to his grandfather Meiji on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, when It Hirobumi had pledged Meiji his loyalty unto death if Japan should lose the war. “When matters have come this far, Konoe should really share the joy and suffering with me,” he told Kido on September 15, echoing It’s pledge to Meiji.55 Later Konoe told Harada: “When I went to the Palace the next day [September 16], the emperor said that, ‘Under the present circumstances this military agreement with Germany can’t be helped. If there is no other way to handle America, then it can’t be helped.’” Konoe added that the emperor also asked him, “What will happen if Japan should be defeated? Will you, prime minister, bear the burden with me?”56
Hirohito passively assented to the treaty, then rationalized his action as personal submission to an inexorable historical process. The conflicts of the different bureaucratic forces, he implied, had driven him into sanctioning the most fundamental shift in the monarchy’s stance on foreign relations since his grandfather sanctioned Japan’s alliance with Britain in 1902. Yet at the time Hirohito was fully aware that his flip-flop on the Tripartite Pact was a major turning point that carried the possibility of war with the United States.57 Later, he blamed it mainly on Matsuoka, but also faulted his brothers—Chichibu and Takamatsu—and never reflected on his own mistaken judgement in sanctioning the Pact.58
Around this time a subtle shift occurred in the internal ranking of the imperial family. Hirohito’s most outspoken critic and next in line to the throne, Prince Chichibu, had become seriously ill with tuberculosis. Chichibu’s retirement from an active public life meant that Prince Takamatsu stood to become regent in an emergency. Henceforth he would be reading more official documents and gratuitously proffering advice that Hirohito usually did not consider helpful.59 Rather than line up firmly with Hirohito in Japan’s foreign policy crisis, Takamatsu drew closer to Chichibu. The brothers approved of the Tripartite Pact as the best hope in the circumstances, and continued to find Hirohito’s performance lacking.
As for Kido, he later insisted that he and the emperor “had to adopt a balance-of-power policy in order to avoid becoming isolated and, at the same time, not be drawn into [the European war]. There was no way to negotiate with the United States without having the power of the alliance in the background. The explanations of Konoe and Matsuoka persuaded us. We didn’t like it but couldn’t help signing it.”60 Kido, unlike the emperor, held the army mainly responsible for the Tripartite Pact but never admitted the navy’s decisive role.
On September 27, 1940, Hirohito issued an imperial rescript to the nation in which, contrary to his usual practice, he apparently chose to let stand the wording that had been prepared for him by others. The rescript declared:
The great principle of the eight corners of the world under one roof [hakk ichi’u] is the teaching of Our imperial ancestors. We think about it day and night. Today, however, the world is deeply troubled everywhere and disorder seems endless. As the disasters that humankind may suffer are immeasurable, We sincerely hope to bring about a cessation of hostilities and a restoration of peace, and have therefore ordered the government to ally with Germany and Italy, nations which share the same intentions as ourselves…. 61
Soon after the release of the rescript, the Tripartite Pact was signed, and on October 4, Prime Minister Konoe issued a belligerent statement at a press conference in Kyoto declaring that, “If the United States does not understand the positions of Japan, Germany, and Italy, and regards our pact as a provocative action directed against it, and if it constantly adopts a confrontational attitude, then the three countries will fight resolutely.”62 Few Japanese leaders at the time understood the tremendous ideological significance of the Tripartite Pact for the United States, or how the Roosevelt administration would now use it to deepen anti-Japanese feeling. Meanwhile the emperor, accompanied by Kido, observed special grand naval maneuvers off Yokohama. A week later, still uncertain about his break with Britain, he reported in prayers to the gods that he had made an alliance with Germany and Italy, and asked for their protection.63
The following month the entire nation celebrated the 2,600th anniversary of the founding of the state by the mythical Emperor Jimmu. Preparations for this kigensetsu had been underway since 1935. One day before the start of the official commemorative events, on November 9, a government regulation established an “Office of Shinto Deities” within the Home Ministry to further the “spiritual mobilization” of the nation in preparation for total war. Started by the first Konoe cabinet at the beginning of the China war, the campaign sought the participation of youth about to be sent to war, exhorting them to “respect the Shinto deities,” “serve the state,” and rush forward to victory in the war against China.
For this event government agencies launched fifteen thousand new projects and festivities of various kinds, costing 1.63
billion yen.64 At the peak of the celebrations, on November 10 and 11, an estimated five million people attended banquets. Food prepared as military field rations, in remembrance of the troops on the front lines, was consumed by celebrants in the palace plaza. Amid these reminders of the war, and of the new direction in foreign policy, the Tokyo Asahi shinbun on November 10 ran a column entitled “Questions and Answers About the New Order,” which emphasized the important role that youth would play in the new world order.65 On the eleventh, pictures of Emperor Hirohito and Empress Nagako spread across the pages of the leading newspapers. His imperial rescript of that date reminded readers of “the violent upheavals in today’s world” and enjoined them “to promote at home and abroad the grand principle of the Way of the Gods, thus contributing to the welfare of humankind.”66 Any doubts that Hirohito had allowed himself to become not only the symbol and legitimizer of the “New Order,” but also the mouthpiece for its rhetoric were put to rest. At 11:25 A.M. some fifty thousand representatives from all over Japan and the world, including members of the Hitlerjugend, shouted in unison, “Banzai!”; warships anchored in Tokyo Bay fired salutes; and radio coverage of the joyous event continued throughout the day.
Britain’s response to the Axis military alliance was to reopen the Burma Road, which earlier it had agreed to close, and to look for ways “to cause inconvenience to the Japanese without ceasing to be polite.”67 President Roosevelt’s response was to make another small loan to Chiang Kai-shek, and give assurances of further American support to keep China in the war. In November, Roosevelt assented to Adm. Harold Stark’s “Dog” plan for the recasting of America’s defense strategy on the premise that Germany was the main enemy. Henceforth the United States would follow a defeat-Germany-first strategy, focusing on the European front and aid to Britain. If war should come in the Pacific, the United States would initially wage a defensive campaign but not turn its full weight against Japan until after Germany’s downfall.68 In China, Chiang Kai-shek resolved to continue fighting Japan alone, without benefit of full-scale Anglo-American aid, but confident that war in the Pacific was only a matter of time.
11
PROLOGUE TO PEARL HARBOR
Following the outbreak of the German-Soviet war in the summer of 1941, the Japanese army and navy chiefs of staff, together with the emperor’s other main advisers, began to spend more and more of their workdays at court.1 Hirohito’s command prerogatives were changing quickly, and he was about to become a commander in chief in every sense of the word. The liaison conference, which had been formed in November 1937 and suspended two months later until July 1940, was revived, convened with greater frequency, and gradually strengthened. The president of the Planning Board and the home minister became permanent constituent members of the liaison conference, and in the course of a year, it developed into the most important regularly convened body for deciding national policies and guidelines for policies.
The liaison conference also moved its deliberations from the prime minister’s official mansion to the palace.2 It eclipsed the cabinet, usurped its decision-making function, and became, in effect, a forum for debates and arguments that had to be resolved, ultimately, by the emperor himself. Between September 27, 1940, and November 1941, there were scores of liaison conference meetings. Many more followed thereafter until early August 1944, when the liaison conference was replaced by the Supreme War Leadership Council.3
Final decisions of the liaison conference continued to be formally disclosed through imperial conferences, which now began to convene more frequently. The Imperial Headquarters was also reorganized, and new agencies or sections added until 1945 to deal with such matters as intelligence, transportation, science and technology, occupied areas, and so forth. By May 1945 the headquarters staff, some working within the palace compound but the overwhelming majority outside, had grown to more than 1,792.4
Certain key features of the high command structure, and Hirohito’s way of working within it, remained unchanged, however. The independent bureaucratic interests of the emperor’s military and civil advisory organs continued to shape policy. Guidelines for the conduct of the war continued to be drafted far down the military chain of command and moved upward through a process of negotiation and consensus building. And the ever-wary Hirohito continued to search out contradictions and discrepancies in whatever was reported to him. Thus, whenever the army and navy chiefs of staff or top cabinet ministers made formal reports that were in conflict, and sometimes when they were quite consistent or nearly identical, if Hirohito was not convinced by the argument put forward, he would reject them.
As the danger of war with the United States and Britain drew nearer, and as senior general staff officers (like the often-chastised General Sugiyama) acquired a better understanding of Hirohito’s character and the breadth of his military knowledge, the middle-echelon officers who prepared his briefing and background materials learned how their immediate superiors could avoid his scoldings and inconvenient questions. One cannot dismiss altogether the possibility that at least some materials intended for the emperor’s study in ratifying (or rejecting) command decisions may have been shaped if not distorted by interservice maneuverings.5 Complex systems of decision making often invite manipulation, if only as a means to prioritize and simplify.
On the other hand Hirohito understood very well how the policy deliberation process worked. He knew the names and careers of the most important bureau, department, and section chiefs of the Army, Navy, and Foreign Ministries, and their tendencies. His chief aide-de-camp’s office in the palace was connected by a hot-line telephone to the offices of the Army and Navy Operations Sections and their First Departments so that his aides could immediately convey imperial questions or raise queries of their own.6 Hirohito knew who headed the First Department of the Imperial Headquarters–Army, charged with the development of operations plans and troop deployments; and who within the First Department was in charge of the Twentieth Group (grand strategic planning) and the Second Section (operations). More important, he was familiar with the step-by-step bureaucratic procedures that led directly to the drafting of the “national policy” documents deliberated at the liaison conferences and studied by him.
From 1941 onward, the high-command machinery steadily became more elaborate. The emperor widened and deepened his access to include just about all military intelligence. Detailed question-and-answer materials were compiled by staff officers in the Operations Sections, and war situation reports reached him on a weekly, daily, and sometimes twice-daily basis. Monthly and annual state-of-the-war evaluations were also compiled for the emperor’s perusal; and, as historian Yamada Akira documented, Hirohito routinely received drafts of developing war plans and full explanations of operations, accompanied by detailed maps, informing him why an operation should be mounted and the units that would be carrying it out.
Battle reports and situation reports were delivered to the palace daily and, after the Pacific war started, shown to the emperor at any time of the day or night. These included itemization of combat losses and their causes, places where Japanese troops were doing well or not so well, and even such details as where cargo ships had been sunk and what matériel had been lost with them. Sometimes “even telegrams coming into the Imperial Headquarters from the front lines” were shown to Hirohito by his three army and five navy aides-de-camp, serving around the clock on rotating shifts.7 Among the many duties of these aides was the regular updating of Hirohito’s operations maps.8 In addition, throughout the Pacific war the chief of the Navy General Staff sent the emperor formal written reports, titled “Explanatory Materials for the Emperor Concerning the War Situation.” These, added to his other sources of information, kept the emperor extraordinarily well informed. But a flaw in this intelligence system was that the army and navy prepared and presented their secret information to him separately, so that only the emperor himself ever knew the entire picture, especially in respect to losses.9
When the “facts”
reported from the front lines were inaccurate, Hirohito’s “information” was misinformation. Still, Yamada observes, the emperor’s briefers “believed in what they reported.” Certainly their intentions were not to deceive him but to present accurate figures on the losses in personnel and armaments sustained by Japanese forces, as well as the damage inflicted by them. The materials he received were timely, detailed, and of high quality—as indeed they had to be, for the emperor was not only directing the grand strategic unfolding of the war, but pressing for solutions to the inevitable mishaps and miscalculations of his staff and field commands.10
In addition, to check on the accuracy of the reports he was receiving, Hirohito would often send his army and navy aides, as well as his own brothers, on inspection tours to various fronts to gather information outside routine channels. According to Ogata Kenichi, Hirohito’s army aide-de-camp from March 1942 to November 1945, the emperor “sent his aides as close to the front lines as possible and chose the seasons when the troops were sufferring most. When they returned, the emperor received them as though he valued their reports more than anything else.” When questioning his ministers of state and the chiefs of the general staffs, Hirohito frequently quoted from these reports.11 In this way too, he kept his imperial eye constantly on his commanders.
Finally Hirohito continued his practice of viewing domestic and foreign newsreels and movies, screened for him at the palace, usually two or three times a week. He continued to read the censored Japanese press daily, and often pointedly questioned his military leaders about the news he found there.12 Thus he not only knew the truth about the war, he was also aware of the slanted versions or even outright “brainwashing” the Japanese people were receiving.
Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan Page 40