The last step in the countdown phase to war took place on the afternoon of December 1. Nineteen somber leaders, including the entire cabinet, assembled; the emperor entered, took his customary raised seat at the dais end of the room in front of a gold screen; and the meeting began.
An hour later, after everyone at the two long facing tables, at either side of and at right angles to the emperor, had completed his presentation, Privy Council President Hara questioned the cabinet and the military high command, presumably on the emperor’s behalf. Hara’s very first comment misrepresented Hull’s statement by claiming that “the United States…has demanded that we withdraw troops from all of China [emphasis added],” when, in fact, Hull had used only the word “China.” “I would like to know,” said Hara, “whether Manchukuo is included in the term ‘China’? Did our two ambassadors confirm this point?”99
Tg replied that the two ambassadors had not clarified the American meaning of “China” in their meeting with Hull on the 26th.
However…the American proposal [early in the negotiations on] April 16 stated that they would recognize the state of Manchukuo, so Manchukuo would not be part of China…. On the other hand…there has been a change in their position…they look upon Chungking as the one and only legitimate regime, and…they want to destroy the Nanking regime, [so] they may retract what they have said previously.100
Tg’s answer was astonishingly evasive and illogical. Throughout the Japan–U.S. negotiations, the Manchurian problem had been a low priority for Hull; never once had he raised the issue of troop withdrawal from Manchuria. Nor had Nomura included Manchuria in his talks with Hull when discussing “China.” Both men always separated Manchuria from the rest of China. Moreover, as historian Sud Shinji recently pointed out, if Hull had wanted to change the status quo in Manchuria, “he would have brought the Manchurian problem forward on its own in the course of negotiations.”101 Tg knew this but chose to emphasize that the secretary of state was demanding withdrawal from Manchuria because the United States had refused to recognize the Nanking government—a position that Roosevelt and Hull had never altered. After Tg’s irrelevant reply, no one at the conference pursued the issue of Manchukuo because they all shared the same misperception that the United States was attempting to change the status quo in that area as well as China proper.
Hara concluded his brief questions to the high commanders by setting the war decision in a broad historical context leading from the war of 1894–95 to the Manchurian Incident of 1931. In Hara’s opinion war was preferable to accepting Hull’s proposal because:
If we were to give in [to the United States], then we would not only give up the fruits of the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, but also abandon the results of the Manchurian Incident. There is no way we could endure this…. [I]t is clear that the existence of our empire is threatened, that the great achievements of the emperor Meiji would all come to naught, and that there is nothing else we can do.102
Hara finished speaking, the emperor remained silent, whereupon Tj spoke: “Once His Majesty decides to commence hostilities, we will all strive to meet our obligations to him, bring the government and the military ever closer together, resolve that the nation united will go on to victory, make an all-out effort to achieve our war aims, and set his majesty’s mind at ease. I now adjourn the meeting.”103
At the end of these “minutes” Sugiyama noted that “[t]he emperor nodded in agreement to each explanation that was made and displayed not the slightest anxiety. He seemed to be in a good mood. We were filled with awe.”104
Meanwhile, in another part of the palace, General Sugiyama met with the emperor and briefed him on the plans for the December 8 attacks.105
Between December 2 and December 8, or “X Day,” while the Japanese people remained completely unaware, Emperor Hirohito met repeatedly with his chiefs of staff, questioned his aides about the country’s air defenses, reviewed the organization of the fleet, examined war plans and maps, and received reports on the status of all the units moving into position on the various invasion fronts.
VI
In virtually everything he had done since becoming emperor, Hirohito had departed from the precedent set by his grandfather, the Meiji emperor. The drafting of his war rescript, starting in late October, was no exception.
Previous war rescripts had contained cautionary phrases such as “insofar as it is not contrary to international law” and “within the sphere of international law.” Hirohito’s contained no such limitations since it had to mesh with the operations plans for two simultaneous surprise attacks: an air assault on the American fleet and naval facilities at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, and a ground landing at Kota Bharu in British Malaya.
From Kota Bharu, Japanese troops were to strike southward down the Malayan west coast, largely avoiding the rain forests and mountains, to seize Singapore—at the tip of the Malayan Peninsula—linchpin of the British Empire in Southeast Asia and gateway to the resources of the Netherlands East Indies. Japanese forces headed for Singapore needed to violate Thailand’s neutrality at Singora (Songkhla), a strategic port north of Kota Bharu on the Gulf of Siam, in the Kra Isthmus area of southern Thailand. The entire southern operation was thus premised on the violation of international law with respect to two major powers—the United States and Britain—and a minor but diplomatically active third power, Thailand. Fully aware of these operational imperatives, and uncertain if Thailand would enter the war on Japan’s side rather than Britain’s, the emperor and Foreign Minister Tg removed from the draft rescript the clause on respect for international law.106
Also omitted was any reference to the “Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere” as an official war aim. The “Essentials for Implementing Administration in the Occupied Southern Area,” a document prepared by the Foreign Ministry and adopted at the liaison conference of November 20 (that is, prior to the “Hull note” and the final imperial decision for war), stated that if Japan were to advocate “the liberation of the peoples of East Asia” from white supremacy and colonial rule, its war aims would “become altruistic and have little persuasive force on the nation…the world might regard it as a racial struggle. However, it might be all right to advocate this unofficially.”107
The emperor’s active role in composing and fussily checking the war rescript at all stages was in keeping with his character. Foreign Ministry officials, assisted by cabinet secretary Inada Shichi, journalist Tokutomi Soh, and court official Yoshida Masuz, a scholar of the Chinese classics, did the actual drafting.108 Officers in the Military Affairs Bureaus of both branches, as well as civilian bureaucrats in the prime minister’s office, participated in polishing it. The emperor and Kido then read through the various drafts. The analysis by the historian Okabe Makio of three surviving versions—one unnumbered, another numbered 4, and a third numbered 6—suggests that the rescript may have gone through as many as ten or eleven different versions.109 Kido, Tj, Tg, and the emperor played active roles throughout this process; and at Hirohito’s insistence several significant changes were inserted into the text.
The desire for peace had been a consistent element in the public personas of his father and grandfather, and had also been embodied in important instructional texts of his youth. Hirohito now carefully reiterated the peace theme in his only declaration of war. Thus, before the words “Our empire has been brought to cross swords with America and Britain,” he ordered the insertion of formulaic expressions stating that the emperor did not want war (“It has been truly unavoidable and far from our wishes that…”). Such phrases underscored his supposed desire for peace—in the sense of global peace among the world’s great regional spheres rather than among particular nations.
Second, the last line of the war rescript originally contained the phrase “Advocate the principles of the Imperial Way throughout the world [kd no taigi o chgai ni senysen koto o kisu].” To the emperor it was unobjectionable for the Field Service Code (senjinkun) of the Imperial Army to use
the amuletic term “Imperial Way” (kd); virtually every act of Japanese territorial aggrandizement since 1931 had been done under that name. But he did not want ideas of imperial expansion in his war rescript, crafted for everyone in Japan and the world to see.110 On his instruction, therefore, Kido had this line changed to “preserve the glory of our empire” [teikoku no kei o hozen semu koto o kisu]. Needless to say, none of these changes detracted from the overall message that Japan, “for its existence and self-defense,” was setting out to eliminate the hand of Anglo-American imperialism in Asia.
The last step was the countersigning of the war rescript by the ministers of state so as to maintain the fiction that Emperor Hirohito, a genuine and truly constitutional monarch, sanctioned great policy changes only in accordance with the advice of his cabinet ministers. Thus was the finishing touch applied to the Japanese system of irresponsibility designed under Meiji.
Before dawn on December 8, Tokyo time, the Imperial Navy and Army launched nearly coordinated surprise attacks at Singora and Kota Bharu. More than an hour later, they struck at the well-defended American naval base at Pearl Harbor, and several hours later at Clark Air Base in central Luzon, thus hitting the main supports of the rising American empire in Asia. President Roosevelt now had the war he did not want, with the country he regarded as a secondary threat to American security.
The diaries of Privy Seal Kido and Hirohito’s naval aide, J, allow us to follow the emperor hour by hour on that first day of the “War of Greater East Asia.” According to J, “[T]he forces heading for Malaya started landing at Singora at 1:30 A.M. and completed the landing at 4:30 A.M. At 2:30 A.M. the foreign minister [Tg] presented the emperor with a message from President Roosevelt,” which (according to the recollection of a chamberlain) seemed to annoy him.111 And J continued:
4 A.M. (Japan time): Japan issued a final ultimatum to the United States. 3:30 A.M.: the Hawaiian surprise attack was successful. 5:30 A.M.: Singapore bombed. Great results. Air attacks on Davao, Guam, Wake. 7:10 A.M.: All the above was reported to the emperor. The American gunboat Wake was captured on the Shanghai front. The British gunboat Petrel was sunk. From 7:15 to 7:30 the chief of the Navy General Staff reported on the war situation. At 7:30 the prime minister informally reported to the emperor on the imperial rescript declaring war. (Cabinet meeting from 7 A.M.). At 7:35 the chief of the Army General Staff reported on the war situation. At 10:45 the emperor attended an emergency meeting of the privy council. At 11:00 A.M. the imperial rescript declaring war was promulgated. [At 11:40 A.M. Hirohito conferred with Kido for about twenty minutes.] At 2:00 P.M. the emperor summoned the army and navy ministers and bestowed an imperial rescript on them. The army minister, representing both services, replied to the emperor. [At 3:05 P.M. the emperor had a second meeting with Kido, lasting for about twenty minutes.] At 4:30 P.M. the chiefs of staff formally reported on the draft of the Tripartite (Germany-Italy-Japan) Military Pact. At 8:30 P.M. the chief of the Navy General Staff reported on the achievements of the Hawaii air attack…. Throughout the day the emperor wore his naval uniform and seemed to be in a splendid mood.112
12
THE ORDEAL OF SUPREME COMMAND
Confronted with military strangulation by oil embargoes and the choice of admitting defeat in China, thereby abandoning a large part of his continental empire and probably destabilizing the monarchy he had inherited, Hirohito opted for his third alternative: war against the United States and Britain. Like most of his top commanders he believed that Germany would triumph over Britain as it already had over all of Europe. If certain strategic schedules were quickly achieved, Japan would be able to counter superior American productive capacity and force at least a standoff with the United States.1 Having made his choice, Hirohito dedicated himself totally to presiding over and guiding the war to victory at all costs. It was a most demanding and absolutely vital role.
Yet Hirohito was rarely adequate when exceptionally strong personal leadership was needed to coordinate and control the decentralized power structure and mediate conflicts between the general staffs and their ministries. Too inhibited and slow in producing ideas, he was never able to surmount rivalries between the military services and thereby maintain their unity of purpose and effort. This proved costly. What Hirohito did was provide his chiefs of staff with continuous oversight based on his strong sense of responsibility for the empire and, ultimately, the interests of the imperial house. He also reinforced their belief in the inherent superiority of offense over defense. Optimistic by nature, he approached difficult military situations with the attitude that the troops could succeed if only they tried harder. On the other hand, before approving campaign plans he was habitually cautious. He not only looked for what could go wrong and expected that it quite likely would, but actually predicted it would unless the high command took some action that he recommended. Hard-won experience had made him a deeply suspicious leader who did not have full confidence in the way his army high command conducted operations. He was pointed, sometimes extremely harsh, in criticizing command errors and rebuking overconfidence.
Although Hirohito never visited the war theaters as did other commanders in chief, he exercised a decisive and controlling influence on theater operations, both in planning and execution, whenever he chose to do so. As during the first four years of the China war, he went on issuing the highest military orders of the Imperial Headquarters, and sometimes audited the conferences that led to the decisions transmitted in his name. He continued to receive in audience generals and admirals returning on duty from the Pacific and China battlefronts. He publicly encouraged and praised front-line units (and, later, home-front organizations). He continued sending messages and messengers to the fronts, and bestowing rescripts (which carried far more honor and prestige than did presidential citations for American commanders) on meritorious officers. He carefully edited his rescripts to be sure exactly what words were used. He visited bases, battleships, and various army and navy headquarters. He inspected military schools, granted audiences to industrial leaders to encourage production, took a keen interest in weapons development, and everywhere drove home the message of sacrifice for the state.
But Hirohito’s greatest strength during the war years may have been his ability to transform his natural reticence and inhibitions into a quality of leadership. His charisma resided in his whole imperial being, as distinct from his rather ordinary human qualities—in the myth of his ancient lineage and the traditions and obligations of emperorship over the centuries, down into the modern period of pure invention and manipulation by image makers. In many ways it was his stubborn persistence and determination not to fail as a monarch that helped him to survive the war.
The architects of the Meiji constitution of 1889 could not have foreseen an emperor with Hirohito’s rigid character yet capacity for tolerating institutional change. Nor could his teachers at the Ogakumonjo have anticipated the great Asia-Pacific war that he would initiate, guide, and—after prolonged vacillation—end. Nevertheless, by empowering the emperor militarily as supreme commander, ultimately and solely responsible for declaring and waging war and making peace, It and his colleagues decades earlier had burdened the yet unborn Shwa emperor with enormous responsibilities from which he could have no escape so long as he ruled.
There were also religious duties—the very essence of his inherited position—which some of his predecessors had found so onerous that they abdicated rather than be bothered with them. Hirohito clung to his religious obligations even in wartime. He also continued to perform ceremonies such as the annual utakai-hajime poetry party, at which he and his officials judged waka submitted by his subjects.
Since he had staked the destiny of the nation and the protection of his throne on war, it was more than ever necessary to invoke the favor of the Shinto deities. Thus, from the diary of Privy Seal Kido Kichi a year and three days after the attack on Pearl Harbor:
December 11, 1942: Today the emperor travels to Ise Shrine to worship in
person [rather than by proxy]….
December 12:…Departed Kyoto Palace at 6:45 A.M…. arrived at Yamada Station at 10:00. The emperor prayed first at the outer shrine. After taking his lunch…he proceeded to the inner shrine, where he worshiped…. It is unprecedented for an emperor to worship in person during wartime. I am moved to awe before his great benevolence and feel profoundly honored as a loyal subject to be able to serve in this grand ceremony.2
From the diary of Lt. Comm. J Eiichir, naval aide-de-camp to the emperor:
February 11, 1942: National Foundation Day…. Night duty. From 9:45 to 10:20 P.M. the emperor worshiped in the palace. I understand that in his Imperial Declaration to the Gods he reported on conditions at the battlefronts.3
December 12, 1942: 1:20 P.M. Emperor prayed at the Inner Shrine [Ktai Jing]. He gave thanks to the gods for victories on various battlefronts and asked for their protection in the future as he leads the nation in this time of extreme national emergency.4
Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan Page 45