A few weeks later, in mid-February, Hirohito put pressure on Nagano for air attacks and a naval bombardment of Guadalcanal from bases on Munda and Koronbangara. “There is no sign of any attacks. Why aren’t you carrying them out?” he asked.64 Imperial Headquarters soon drafted concrete plans for prolonged defense in the central and northern Solomons. American forces landed on New Georgia in early June, and an estimated ten thousand Japanese defenders, heeding their emperor, managed to hold out for nearly three months.65 Thereafter Bougainville remained the last major island in Japanese hands.
As the situation along Japan’s entire defense perimeter in the central and northern Solomons deteriorated steadily, the emperor continued to demand that the navy fight decisive battles, regain the initiative, and provide supplies to the various island garrisons so that they would not be left totally isolated. During a briefing on March 3, at which he was informed that the navy’s attempt to reinforce at Lae had failed, he remarked, “Then why didn’t you change plans immediately and land at Madan? This is a failure, but it can teach us a good lesson and become a source of future success. Do this for me so I can have peace of mind for awhile.”66 “Do this for me” had become the signature message of the fighting generalissimo.
The failure of the navy to fully commit in the sea battles of Guadalcanal, and especially the heavy air losses throughout the Solomons, troubled Hirohito. On March 30, 1943, Kido noted in his diary a morning audience in which “[t]he emperor talked to me for an unusually long time about the prospects for the war, the future, and other matters.”67 What they discussed were the navy’s losses since the defeat at Midway, and the emperor’s fear that if such losses continued, the navy would lose control of the sea-lanes, making it impossible to sustain the far-flung outer defense perimeter.68
Gradually, the emperor’s changed attitude toward the navy became clear. The easy victories were months ago, the current picture one loss and defeat after another. When the 2,500-man garrison on Attu Island in the Aleutians was destroyed on May 29, he dressed down Sugiyama and Nagano, telling them at their separate briefings on the Aleutian front that they should have foreseen what was coming—instead, “after the enemy landed on May 12” they took “a week to devise countermeasures.” Lack of foresight, derived from misjudgement and overconfidence, irritated the emperor. “They’re making excuses about how heavy the fog was,” he told General Hasunuma, but:
[F]og should have been anticipated. They should have known better to start with. I wonder if the army and navy have been holding frank discussions on this matter. Maybe this [defeat] is the result of one service making energetic demands and the other guaranteeing them irresponsibly. What they agree to between them they absolutely must implement. No matter how good an agreement between the army and navy may be, if it isn’t carried out, that’s worse than no promise at all. (The emperor has been complaining about this ever since Guadalcanal.)69
And again Hirohito fumed for a decisive naval victory:
The way we’re waging war now raises the enemy’s morale just as on Guadalcanal. We’re making neutral and third countries feel very uneasy; we’re causing China to puff [its chest] up; and we are undermining all the countries of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere. Isn’t there some way, some place, where we can win a real victory over the Americans?70
To appreciate the significance of Hirohito’s disillusionment with his navy, it should be remembered that from early in the 1930s, he had positioned himself as a relative centrist within the Japanese political milieu. The “liberals” and “moderates” whom he had favored—Prime Ministers (and retired admirals) Sait Makoto and Okada Keisuke and later Yonai Mitsumasa and Suzuki Kantaro—were, in fact, hard-line imperialists. By endorsing them, he had placed himself firmly in support of territorial aggrandizement and aggression in China. Later the leaders of the navy became more passionate than their army counterparts about expanding the fighting in China. Their changed posture influenced his attitude. Now, in the latter half of 1943, though the navy was still quite powerful despite its heavy losses, the army was in the process of taking over the main defensive role along the Pacific perimeter, and Hirohito’s confidence in his admirals had waned.
As the withdrawal through the Solomons proceeded, Hirohito gave that operation close attention but also followed far-off events in Europe and North Africa, where German and Italian forces had also been thrown on the defensive. His first premonition that Germany might lose came when the Allies landed in Sicily on July 10, 1943, and then, several weeks later, on the Italian mainland. Mussolini became the first Axis leader to fall, and be carted off to jail. On September 8 the Italian king, Victor Emmanuel III, and the government of Gen. Pietro Badoglio fled from Rome to the south and surrendered unconditionally to the Allies. German armed forces moved into Rome. Overnight the Axis became bipartite, and the Italian armed forces were transformed from allies to the enemy—in theory at least.
Hirohito had, of course, visited Italy at the age of twenty. But more than twenty years had passed since that European tour, and his initial reaction to Italy’s surrender was mostly concern about the Rumanian oil fields which fueled Germany’s war economy. Would they now come under Allied air attack from bases in southern Italy? Hirohito’s uneasiness about Hitler’s Rumanian oil was probably also a geographically displaced concern about Japan’s own newly won oil resources in the Dutch Indies.71
As the Japanese Pacific defense perimeter slowly contracted, space was traded for time; but traded also were lost warships, transports, and decimated air squadrons with their irreplaceable veteran pilots. This trade-off could not be sustained much longer. In August 1943 the American advance through the Solomons accelerated, bypassing many islands and leaving their garrisons stranded and helpless. On the fifth, Hirohito was informed by General Sugiyama that everything in the Solomons and Bismarck Sea area was in peril. The emperor, always looking for opportunities to attack, attack, attack, responded: “Isn’t there someplace where we can strike the United States?…When and where on earth are you [people] ever going to put up a good fight? And when are you ever going to fight a decisive battle?” Sugiyama apologized for the way the situation had turned out. Hirohito responded angrily, “Well, this time, after suffering all these defeats, why don’t you study how not to let the Americans keep saying ‘We won! We won!’[emphasis added]”72
Hirohito no longer hid his dissatisfaction with Admiral Nagano either. On August 24 he berated the navy chief of staff for the navy’s cowardly performance in the sea battle off Bela Bela Island: “[Admiral,] the other day when the army dispatched a large unit, I heard that four of your destroyers guarding the troopships fled.”73 Hirohito’s complaints were becoming increasingly specific and acerbic, as in this exchange with General Sugiyama on September 11:
Emperor: I understand you’re committing most of the seventeenth Division to Rabaul. Just how do you intend to keep them supplied? I’m not going to tolerate another, “Our men fought bravely, then died of starvation.” I agree with the Meiji emperor, who held that when gentlemen are fighting a war, they must support one another. What sort of agreement have you worked out with the navy? Just what do you people have in mind?
Sugiyama: First supplies, second secure enough shipping to move those supplies. Rabaul is vital to the navy and they have asked us to hold it somehow. If we lose Rabaul, we will lose all mobility [in that area]. They tell us they will make every effort to find supplies and transports. I thought we can somehow manage it because they have this intention, and so we reached agreement.
Emperor: You say you’re sending troops to Rabaul. When and what will you be sending to western New Guinea? Unless you move something there, the military preparation is going to be weak.
Sugiyama: We’ll send in backup units and work them hard. Build airfields and roads, then afterward deploy combat units.
Emperor: Are you going to send [troops] to Truk?
Sugiyama: Yes, the lead units of the Fifty-second Division.
; Emperor: The enemy side has considerable power to counterattack. How are our defenses at Andaman, Nicobar, and Sumatra?
Sugiyama: Well, at Andaman and Nicobar we’re still in the planning process, and we need to move as quickly as we can there. At Palenbang [in Sumatra] we have also taken [preliminary] measures to handle our defenses.74
Hirohito and Prime Minister General Tj had reviewed the entire war thus far and were now thinking of pulling the army out of Rabaul altogether, a move the navy high command strongly opposed for fear it would shut down the entire support setup in the South Pacific. But the emperor and Tj were determined to get Japan back on track strategically. They had reexamined their guidance of the war and agreed on the need to contract all Pacific fronts while at the same time launching a new offensive in the eastern part of New Guinea. The new “absolute defense line” would be established well behind the line of contact with the enemy; there, at strategically selected points in rear areas, the army and navy and their air forces would reorganize, rebuild, concentrate, and prepare to defend aggressively with immediate counterattacks.
On September 15 Nagano and Sugiyama made formal written reports to Hirohito that set forth a conflict between their interpretations of the “absolute defense perimeter” concept. While taking note of the need to strengthen defensive positions in the “rear” around the Caroline Islands, Nagano emphasized that the navy had to go on seeking opportunities in certain areas of the Pacific where the war situation had become “somewhat disadvantageous”—that is, near disasters. Those certain areas for a great naval victory happened to lie some twelve hundred miles outside the “absolute defense line.” The navy, in short, still intended to fight the decisive battle in the Marshall and Gilbert Islands areas. Its concept of the rear line simply meant a foothold where war power would be accumulated, and from which the navy would launch attacks far forward at the line of contact.75 General Sugiyama, on the other hand, stressed an energetic defense of “the presently occupied areas” to gain time in building stronger rear-area defenses—that is, the “absolute line” where supplies and troops would make ready for quick-reaction counterattacks or offensive thrusts—as the emperor had ordered.76
How Hirohito adjudicated this army-navy high command discrepancy is unclear. There is no record that he intervened forcefully to unify the services in their application of the “absolute defense perimeter” concept. It seems more likely that Hirohito tacitly approved the navy’s continued offensive-mindedness, while not rejecting the army’s insistence on contraction of the front lines. Two-track positions were entirely in keeping with his character. Over the next two weeks the liaison conference met on numerous occasions to discuss the shift toward the defense. Finally, on September 30, 1943, a conference of the Imperial Headquarters was convened in Hirohito’s presence.
While the emperor sat silently listening, Privy Council President Hara put questions on his behalf to Tj, Sugiyama, Nagano, the president of the Planning Bureau, and the minister of commerce and industry. Hara’s questions revealed that although the government had planned “to produce 40,000 aircraft” during 1944, the present annual output was, as Tj nonchalantly admitted, only “17,000 to 18,000 planes.” When Hara asked Nagano if he was “confident of securing the absolute defense perimeter” with 40,000 aircraft, the navy chief of staff “stiffened the mood of the conference” by replying, “I cannot assure the future of the war situation.” Tj came to his rescue, saying, “As the imperial rescript stated, this war is essentially for our self defense and very self existence. So whether Germany wins or is beaten, we have to fight on to the end regardless of how the war situation may develop hereafter. Nothing has changed in our resolve to fight until we achieve our aims.”77
A curious exchange followed that showed how, though the huge disparity in national industrial power between Japan and the United States was already painfully manifest at the fronts, the high command had set aside rational calculations and had begun to rely on spiritualism:
Sugiyama: We need 55,000 aircraft to meet operational requirements. But we cannot meet those demands even if we risk all of our national resources. So, we shall try to achieve our goal by compensating for deficiencies through the use of mobile task forces [kidryoku].
Hara: We are not gods. Therefore we cannot avoid mistakes. But now I am relieved. Both of you [high commanders] seem to be on solid ground.78
At the conclusion of the conference, both chiefs of staff agreed, at least on paper, to prevent further depletion of men and matériel by establishing the “absolute defense perimeter,” and to rebuild, regroup, and redeploy to meet the coming Allied general offensive.79
The policy document adopted that day stated:
…we shall establish a strategic posture to cope with the American-British offensive, making mid–1944 our approximate target for full readiness. Whenever the occasion presents, we shall capture and destroy the enemy’s offensive forces. To carry out the Empire’s war, the strategic area in the Pacific and Indian Oceans that must absolutely be secured is a perimeter that includes the Kurile Islands, Ogasawara, the inner South Pacific (the central and western parts), the western part of New Guinea, the Sunda Strait, and Burma.80
Within this “perimeter” lay the Japanese home islands, the Kuriles, the Bonin (Ogasawara) Islands, Iwo Jima, the Marianas, the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, and Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Indian Ocean. Beyond it lay Rabaul, the central Solomons, the eastern part of New Guinea, the Marshall Islands, and Makin and Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands.81 More than 140,000 troops of the Eighth Area Army, mostly on Rabaul, as well as the troops in eastern New Guinea, would no longer be supported but be left to fend for themselves.
During the last three months of 1943 and the first half of 1944, Imperial Headquarters repeatedly drew down units on the continent in order to establish and hold the “absolute defense line.” Entire divisions and parts of divisions from China, the Kwantung Army, and the Korean Army were rushed to the Central Pacific to defend strategic bases and airfields on remote and ultimately doomed islands. But American offensives always developed at a pace that outstripped the ability of the Imperial Army and Navy to consolidate and respond effectively. Unable to read Allied radio messages (as the British and Americans could read theirs), the high command was never sure where to concentrate to meet Allied thrusts.
Despite the mounting losses Hirohito remained as undismayed, rigidly self-disciplined, and aggressive as ever. When naval aide Jo reported to him on September 21, 1943, that “enemy transports have concentrated in the northeastern part of New Guinea and our defenses are on full alert,” Hirohito (aware from briefing materials that the Americans were headed for Finschhaven) replied, “Being ready to defend isn’t enough. We have to do the attacking.”82
By November 1, 1943, Bougainville was the last major Solomon island in Japanese hands, and its airfields were under American attack.83 When, eight days later, Nagano reported good results in the second air battle off Bougainville, the emperor, according to the diary of naval aide Jo, “seemed satisfied and joined toasts with his aides-de-camp in their duty office.”84 An earlier report to the throne from Nagano concerning the first air battle off of Bougainville, on November 5, 1943, had greatly exaggerated the results, claiming that the American aircraft carriers “Independence” and “Bunker Hill” had been sunk when, in fact, only one torpedo boat was destroyed. Although no attempt had been made to deceive the emperor—Nagano and the Imperial Headquarters itself had believed the first front-line data—the incident pointed to the increasing difficulty Hirohito faced in obtaining accurate war reports from the Solomons.85
In late December, following its loss of control of the Vitiaz and Dampier Straits—the body of water between the island of New Britain and the north coast of New Guinea—the Japanese navy withdrew from the Solomons. The overall outlook for the army’s position in New Guinea dimmed further when American and Australian forces under Gen. Robert Eichelberger, MacArthur’s newly appointed field c
ommander, captured Buna on January 2, 1944, and then continued to advance slowly, over several months, on the west along the New Guinea coast, and on the east through the central and northern Solomons. Approximately 50,000 Japanese troops of the Second Army in western New Guinea, and another 55,000 of the Eighteenth Army in the eastern part of the large tropical island, were isolated or bypassed, and went down to defeat, though not before killing or wounding some 11,300 Americans.86 Meanwhile Rabaul had been encircled, and more than 130,000 troops had been left isolated there and on other islands in the Solomons.
American carrier task forces and marine assault troops had also moved into the Central Pacific and in bitter frontal attacks destroyed the Japanese garrisons on Tarawa and Makin in the Gilbert Islands. On February 18, 1944, American planes destroyed the main naval anchorage of the Combined Fleet on Truk Island, forcing the navy to evacuate it, leaving behind many of its tankers and eroding its future ability to maneuver. The dream of fighting one great decisive battle in the Central Pacific was finally over. Imperial Headquarters could do little but watch as the defense line on which they had placed their hopes was driven back to the Marianas. Two entirely separate drives were unfolding against them—one through the Southwest Pacific, the other through the Central Pacific—and there was not much they could do to stop either from accelerating.
Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan Page 48