46. Fujiwara Akira, “‘Tenn no guntai’ no rekishi to honshitsu,” in Kikan sens sekinin kenky 11 (Spring 1996), p. 67. During the China war, Japanese pilots shot down over enemy territory and taken prisoner often committed suicide on their return. Around the time of the Nomonhan Incident in 1939, repatriated noncommissioned officers were frequently court-martialed, and some felt compelled to commit suicide. The reverse side of this battlefield psychology was the organized murder of Chinese prisoners of war.
47. On the glorification of militarism during this period, see Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and The Culture of Wartime Imperialism (University of California Press, 1997); Kinbara Samon, Takemae Eiji., eds., Shwashi, zhoban (Yhikaku Sensho, 1989), pp. 93–97.
48. Kido Kichi nikki, j, p. 167. The naval officers had been influenced by kawa Shmei and Lt. Comm. Fujii Hitoshi, an ultranationalist killed at Shanghai in February 1932. See TN, dai nikan (Ch Kronsha, 1995), May 20, 1933, p. 78.
49. Five days after Inukai’s murder, Army Minister Araki warned divisional commanders that “movements of the emperor’s army are made on irreversible orders from him. The entire imperial army must be held monolithic and never allowed to form free, vertical commands and act like private armies. In short, it…can take action only on the basis of the emperor’s orders.” Cited in Masuda, “Sait Makoto kyokoku itchi naikakuron,” in Shiriizu Nihon kingendaishi, kz to hend, 3 gendai shakai e no tenkai (Iwanami Shoten, 1993), p. 234.
50. Harada nikki, dai nikan, pp. 287–88, Masuda, “Sait Makoto kyokoku itchi naikakuron,” p. 235; Kojima, Tenn, dai nikan, pp. 220–27.
51. Otabe Yji, “Tennsei ideorogii to shin Ei-Bei-ha no keifu: Yasuoka Masahiro o chshin ni,” in Shien 43, no. 1 (May 1983), pp. 26–28. By 1932 Yasuoka had acquired a reputation as the “ideologue of the new bureaucrats.”
52. Masuda, “Sait Makoto kyokoku itchi naikakuron,” p. 238.
53. Otabe, “Kaisetsu: g ten ichig jiken zengo no tenn, kych,” in KYN, dai rokkan, p. 276.
54. NH, p. 60.
55. Masuda, “Sait Makoto kyokoku itchi naikakuron,” pp. 237–38.
56. Miyaji, “Seijishi ni okeru tenn no kin,” p. 99. The army’s famous pamphlet, Kokub no hongi to sono kyka no teisho, issued in Oct. 1934, expounded the idea of a national defense state.
57. On the Meiji political order, see Nagai Kazu, Kindai Nihon no gunbu to seiji (Shibunkaku Shuppan, 1993), p. 260.
58. Masuda, “Sait Makoto kyokoku itchi naikakuron,” p. 256.
59. Yu Shinjun, Manshji henki no Ch-Nichi gaikshi kenky (Th Shoten, 1986), p. 380. Concerned to counter charges of violating the Nine-Power Pact, the Foreign Ministry commissioned Hirohito’s teacher of international law, Tachi Sakutaro, to devise legal justifications for the recognition of Manchukuo.
60. Yu Shinjun, Manshjihenki no Ch-Nichi gaikshi kenky, p. 381.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. James B. Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930–1938 (Princeton University Press, 1966), p. xv.
64. Masuda, “Sait Makoto kyokoku itchi naikakuron,” p. 255.
65. Nakamura Kikuo, Shwa rikugun hishi (Banch Shob, 1968), pp. 41–43.
66. “Nara Takeji jijbukanch nikki (sho),” Nov. 22, 1932, p. 346.
67. Ibid.; MNN, pp. 534–35.
68. “Nara Takeji jijbukanch nikki (sho),” pp. 346–349; Yamada, Dai gensui Shwa tenn, p. 53.
69. MNN, p. 538, Kido Kichi nikki, j, p. 215.
70. Yamada, Dai gensui Shwa tenn pp. 50–51.
71. For the Soviet military buildup in the Far East, its costs and consequences, see Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Threat From the East, 1933–41, pp. 24–39.
72. “Nara Takeji jijbukanch nikki (sho),” p. 348.
73. Joseph C. Grew, Diary No. 17, Feb. 11, 1933, p. 453. In Joseph Grew Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University.
74. “Nara Takeji jijbukanch nikki (sho),” p. 348.
75. Ibid., pp. 348–49; Yamada, Dai gensui Shwa tenn, p. 52.
76. “Nara Takeji jijbukanch nikki (sho),” p. 349.
77. Ibid.; Yamada, Dai gensui Shwa tenn, pp. 51–53.
78. Parks M. Coble, Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931–1937 (Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 94–95.
79. “Nara Takeji jijbukanch nikki (sho),” p. 351, entries of Feb. 21–22, 1933.
80. Kido Kichi nikki, j, p. 216. On the League’s mandate system, see Sharon Korman, The Right of Conquest (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 142–43.
81. Otabe Yji, “Han Ei-Bei datta Konoe shush, ‘dokudansha’ Matsuoka z no shsei mo,” in Shinano Mainichi (June 5, 1995).
82. Although Japan contributed financially to the League on a reduced basis until 1938, Matsuoka’s walkout ended its thirteen-year political relationship with the international body.
83. Harada nikki, dai sankan, p. 46. Honj Shigeru, in his diary entry of Feb. 8, 1934 (pp. 185–86) claims that the emperor told him that “[a]t the time of our withdrawal from the League, groups such as the Imperial Military Reservists Association sent telegrams directly to the League of Nations, or forcefully conveyed their opinions to the chief aide-de-camp and the grand chamberlain. Worried that they were exceeding their spheres of authority, I cautioned that everyone should fulfill their own duties.”
84. Inoue, Tenn no sens sekinin, p. 58; Harada nikki, dai sankan, p. 46.
85. MNN, p. 546.
86. On Sept. 19, 1931, Sasagawa Ryichi, leader of the right-wing Kokusui Taisht [National Essence Mass Party] visited the Osaka Asahi shinbun to complain about the Asahi’s “lukewarm” editorials about the army in Manchuria. A few days later Uchida Ryhei, president of the Kokurykai, threatened the Asahi for not doing a properly patriotic job. Such pressure, applied early, easily turned the major dailies into avid supporters of militarism. See Arai Naoyuki, “Tenn hd no naniga kawari, nani ga kawaranakatta no ka,” in Nihon Jyânarisuto Kaigi, ed., Yameru masu komi to Nihon (Kbunky, 1995), pp. 181–82.
87. The forced conversion to emperor ideology of many imprisoned communist intellectuals—the most dynamic opponents of Japanese militarism—occurred around the same time, paving the way for the destruction of the Left. However, the most privileged group in Japanese society set the precedent of apostasy.
88. During the secret session of the House of Peers, Akaike Atsushi, former superintendent of the Metropolitan Police, raved about a conspiracy against Japan by “the secret society called the Freemasons, or the Jews behind the scene.” Professor Yamamuro Shinichi of Kyoto University criticized the reasoning of his fellow peers who “self-righteously” insisted on believing that Japan alone was correct and the League was “one-sidedly oppressing” it. See Asahi shinbun, June 5, 1995; Shgiin Jimukyoku, ed., Teikoku gikai shgiin himitsukai giji sokkirokush 1 (Sheikai, 1996), pp. 247–55.
89. For a helpful overview, see Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., “1931–1937,” in Ernest R. May and James C. Thomson, Jr., ed., American-East Asian Relations: A Survey (Harvard Univ. Press, 1972).
90. Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East, 1933–41, p. 28. Citing a British military intelligence estimate, Haslam notes that “[by] June [1932]…east of Irkutsk in Siberia Soviet forces had grown to just over 200,000 men, excluding border troops.” The Soviet war preparations to counter the threat from Japan’s Kwantung Army exacerbated food shortages in European Russia.
91. Katsuno, Shwa tenn no sens, p. 59; KYN, dai rokkan, p. 18. Minami’s views on Manchuria were quickly challenged by Prime Minister Inukai, who opposed the creation of Manchukuo. The population of Japan in 1940 had risen to 71.4 million. See Historical Statistics of Japan, vol. 1 (Japan Statistical Association, 1987), p. 168.
92. KYN, dai rokkan, p. 25; Katsuno, Shwa tenn no sens, pp. 59–60. Matsuoka’s court sponser was Privy Seal Makino.
93. Quoted in Shji Junichir, “Konoe Fumimaro z no saikent: taigai ishiki o chshin ni,” in Kindai Gaikshi Kenkykai, ed., Hendki no Nihon gaik to
gunji (Hara Shob, 1987), pp. 101–2.
94. Yabe Teiji, ed., Konoe Fumimaro, j (Kbund, 1952), pp. 239–40.
95. Kido Kichi acknowledged these motivating factors in his Sugamo prison interrogations. See the Kido-Sackett exchanges of Jan. 28 and Feb. 7, 1946. For concise accounts of the Manchurian Incident and the Asia-Pacific war, see Eguchi, Jgonen sens shshi, pp. 11–75, and Okabe Makio, “Ajia-Taiheiy sens,” in Nakamura Masanori et al., eds., Seng Nihon, senry to sengo kaikak, dai ikkan. Sekaishi no naka no 1945 (Iwanami Shoten, 1995), pp. 30–40.
96. Kobayashi Michiko, “Sekai taisen to tairiku seisaku no heny,” in Rekishigaku kenky 656 (Mar. 1994), p. 15.
97. Shji, “Konoe Fumimaro z no saikent”, p. 101; Yoshida Yutaka, “Konoe Fumimaro: ‘kakushin’ ha kyutei seijika no gosan,” in Yoshida Yutaka, Ara Kei, et al., Haisen zengo Showa tenn to gonin no shidosha, pp. 14-15.
98. Quoted in Yoshida, “Konoe Fumimaro: ‘kakushin-ha kytei seijika no gosan,” in Yoshida Yutaka, Ara Kei, et al., Haisen zengo Shwa tenn to gonin no shidsha, p. 15.
99. Masuda, “Sait Makoto kyokoku itchi naikakuron,” p. 258; Yoshida Yutaka, “Tenn to sens sekinin,” in Fujiwara et al., Tenn no Shwa shi (Shin Nihon Shinsho, 1990), p. 61.
100. “Jokan no nichij no aramashi,” in KYN, dai rokkan, pp. 218–20; Koyama Itoko, Kgsama: Nagako Empress of Japan (Suzakusha, 1959), p. 368.
101. Fujiwara, Shwa tenn no jgonen sens, pp. 76–77.
102. From Sept. 1931 through July 1936, Japan’s combatant dead and wounded numbered 3,928, while Chinese (anti-Japan, anti-Manchukuo) forces, fighting mainly a guerrilla war, suffered 41,688 deaths. Kisaka Junichir, “Ajia-Taiheiy sens no rekishiteki seikaku o megutte,” in Nenp: Nihon gendaishi, skan, sengo gojnen no rekishiteki kensh (Azuma Shuppan, 1995), pp. 29–30.
103. Youli Sun, China and the Origins of the Pacific War, 1931–1945 (St. Martin’s Press, 1993), pp. 41–62, discusses the “gradualist” rationale behind Chiang’s policy and the dilemmas it engendered.
104. TN, dai nikan, pp. 89–91; also see pp. 116–17.
105. Ury Tadao, “Ksaku eiga, Nihon nysu shshi,” in Bessatsu ichiokunin no Shwashi: Nihon nysu eiga shi (Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1977), p. 520.
106. The analysis in this and the next few paragraphs is based on the incomplete script of Hijji Nihon and the open-court testimony of Mizuno Yoshiyuki, who in 1933 headed the movie department of the Osaka Mainichi. Both documents are reproduced in GS40.
107. Mizuno in GS40, pp. 253–54.
108. GS40, pp. 242–43.
109. Ibid., p. 248, reel/segment 9.
110. Ibid., pp. 251–52. Meiji’s three poems were: “The bravery of the Yamato spirit always manifests itself in an emergency”; “A man pierces iron with an arrow. Our Yamato spirit carries it through”; “If we gather together the strength of hundreds of thousands of loyal subjects, we can accomplish anything.”
111. Material in this and the following paragraphs, unless otherwise noted, is drawn from Suzaki Shinichi, “Sryokusen rikai o megutte: rikugun chjiku to 2.26 jiken no seinen shk no aida,” in Nenp Nihon gendaishi, No. 3 1997 (Gendai Shiry Shuppan, 1997).
112. Ibid., p. 55.
113. Ibid., p. 56.
114. Tj Hideki, “Shhai no bunkiten wa shissen: senji heiji tomo sunkokumo yudan wa naranu,” in Rikugun, ed., Hijji kokumin zensh (Ch Kronsha, 1934), pp. 54, 65.
115. Suzaki, “Sryokusen rikai o megutte,” p. 63.
CHAPTER 8
RESTORATION AND REPRESSION
1. Emilio Gentile, The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy, trans. Keith Botsford (Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 14.
2. Miwa Yasushi, “Sens to fuashizumu o soshi suru kansei wa nakatta no ka,” in Fujiwara et al., eds., Nihon kindaishi no kyoz to jitsuz 3, Mansh jihen—haisen (tsuki Shoten, 1989), p. 49. Most of those seized by police were Marxists who had dwelt on class exploitation and redefined the emperor as an oppressor.
3. David G. Goodman, Masanori Miyazawa, Jews in the Japanese Mind: The History and Uses of a Cultural Stereotype (Free Press, 1995), pp. 104–5; 106–34.
4. Yasumaru, Kindai tennz no keisei, p. 267.
5. “Senjinkun,” in Bushid Gakukai, ed., Bushid no seizui (Teikoku Shoseki Kykai, 1941), p. 15.
6. Robert J. Smith and Ella Lury Wiswell, The Women of Suye Mura (University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 112–13.
7. Grand Chamberlain Suzuki may have urged Hirohito to change his foreign policy mainly to avoid such criticism. See Otabe, “Kaisetsu: Manshjihen to tenn, kych,” in KYN, dai goken, p. 268.
8. Okabe Nagakage, Okabe Nagakage nikki: Shwa shoki kazoku kanry no kiroku. Shy Kurabu, ed. (Kashiwa Shob, 1993), pp. 77, 356; Harada nikki, dai nikan, p. 47; KYN, dai gokan, p. 198, entry of Nov. 14, 1931; Harada nikki, dai ni kan, p. 47 (entry for Sept. 1931). The word “mediocrity” (bonyo) appears in the phrase “bonyo de komaru” on p. 47.
9. TN, dai nikan, p. 124, entry of Aug. 6, 1933.
10. “Nara Takeji kaisroku,” May 28, 1932, p. 415. Nara notes (p. 416) that the reassignment of Prince Chichibu to the Army General Staff occurred on August 24, 1932, “in response to the emperor’s wish.”
11. Ibid., p. 426.
12. In interrogation documents compiled by the International Prosecution Section but not used at the Tokyo war crimes trial, Kido Kichi identified General Araki as a person who had given approval for assassinations. See Awaya Kentar et al., eds., Tokyo saiban shiry: Kido Kichi jinmonchsho (tsuki Shoten, 1987), p. 547.
13. Kinbara Samon, Takemae Eiji, eds., Shwa shi (zhoban): kokumin no naka no haran to gekid no hanseiki, p. 101.
14. TN, dai nikan, Sept. 26, 1933, pp. 147–48.
15. MNN, p. 636, cited in Matsuzaki Shichi, “saik ‘Umezu-Ho Ying-ch’in kytei’,” in Gunjishi Gakkai, ed., Nitch sens no shos (Menshsha, 1997), p. 45.
16. Foreign Ministry official Amou Eiji had declared Japan responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in East Asia, and opposed in principle to any offers of significant financial or technical assistance to China. For discussion, see Kobayashi Motohiro, “Hirota kki ni sens sekinin wa nakatta ka,” in Fujiwara et al., eds., Nihon kindaishi no kyoz to jitsuz 3, Mansh jihen—haisen, p. 100.
17. Katsuno, Shwa tenn no sens, p. 76.
18. Masuda Tomoko, “Tenn kikansetsu haigeki jiken to kokutai meich und,” in Nagoya daigaku, Hsei ronsh 173 (Mar 1998). My page citations are to the galley proofs of this article, kindly made available to me by the author.
19. On Mazaki’s intervention see Wakatsuki Yasuo, Nihon no sens sekinin: saigo no sens sedai kara, j (Hara Shob, 1995), p. 181; Mazaki Jinzabur nikki, dai nikan (Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1981), p. 64.
20. Katsuno, Shwa tenn no sens, p. 75.
21. The first Okada statement had been drafted entirely by civil officials: namely, his private secretary Sakomizu Hisatsune, the director general of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau Kanamori Tokujiro, chief of the Cabinet Research Bureau Yoshida Shigeru, and Cabinet Secretary Shirane. See Masuda Tomoko, “Tenn kikansetsu haigeki jiken to kokutai meich und,” p. 205.
22. Cited in ibid., pp. 208-9. The Okada cabinet’s second statement on Minobe’s organ theory was issued on Oct. 15.
23. Minobe, Kenp satsuy, cited in Suzuki Masayuki, Kshitsu seido, p. 183.
24. Masuda, “Tenn kikansetsu haigeki jiken to kokutai meich und,” pp. 211-212.
25. Suzuki, Kshitsu seido, p. 185.
26. Miyaji Masato, “Seijishi ni okeru tenn no kin,” in Rekishigaku Kenkykai, ed., Tenn to tennsei o kangaeru, p. 101.
27. Honj Shigeru, Honj nikki (Hara Shob, 1989), Mar. 29, 1935, p. 204.
28. “Shwa tenn no dokuhakuroku hachi jikan” in Bungei shunj (Dec. 1990), p. 104.
29. Masuda, “Tenn kikansetsu haigeki jiken to kokutai meich und,” pp. 210, 213, 215. Although Masuda argues that the emperor defended Minobe indirectly, there seems to be no concrete evidence to support that view.
30. Honj nikki, p. 204; also cited in Katsuno, Shwa tenn no sens, p. 77. Honj kept arguing
with the emperor about the organ theory right through April and May.
31. TN, dai nikan, p. 375.
32. On the connection between the Aizawa trial and the February 26 mutiny, see Crowley, pp. 267–73; Ben-Ami Shillony, Revolt in Japan: The Young Officers and the February 26, 1936, Incident (Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 113–14. On other triggering causes see, Otabe, “Nii ten niiroku jiken, shubsha wa dare ka,” p. 82.
33. Suzuki Kenji, Sens to shinbun (Mainichi Shinbun, 1995), p. 117–18. Intimidation worked. The major urban dailies avoided editorial criticism of the military, leaving discussion of the incident mainly to smaller, local papers.
34. Hata Ikuhiko, Shwa-shi o juso suru (Gurafusha, 1984), p. 70.
35. Otabe, “Nii ten niiroku jiken, shubsha wa dare ka,” pp. 76–77, 93. My analysis of the uprising is based largely on Otabe’s essay. Hata Ikuhiko, Hirohito tenn itsutsu no ketsudan (Kdansha, 1984), Yamada Akira, Daigensui Shwa tenn (Shin Nihon Shuppansha, 1994), Kido Kichi’s dairy, the interrogation of Kido by Henry R. Sackett, plus other sources cited below. One of the few studies in English on the mutiny is Shillony’s Revolt in Japan.
36. Yasumaru, Kindai tennz no keisei, pp. 281–82.
37. Hata, Hirohito tenn itsutsu no ketsudan, p. 25, citing Kido Kichi kankei bunsho, p. 106.
38. Ibid., p. 26.
39. Otabe, “N ten nroku jiken, shubsha wa dare ka,” p. 77.
40. Kido Kichi nikki, j, p. 464. “If I cannot ask your majesty’s opinion directly can I query the lord keeper of the privy seal?” To this question too Hirohito replied no.
41. Cited in Otabe, “Nii ten niiroku jiken, shubsha wa dare ka,” p. 77; also see the discussion of the “army minister’s instruction” in Shillony, Revolt in Japan, pp. 153–54.
42. Hata, Hirohito tenn itsutsu no ketsudan, p. 26.
43. Yamada, Daigensui Shwa tenn, p. 58.
44. Hata, Hirohito tenn itsutsu no ketsudan, pp. 29, 39.
45. Ibid., p. 37.
46. On March 27, 1938, Saionji told Harada, “with a pained expression” that:
Awfully dark facts exist in Japanese history. Emperor Suizei, who followed Emperor Jimmu, was enthroned as emperor only after his brothers were murdered…. Of course, I’m sure no such thing will ever happen of the prince’s own will. But if those who surround him should ever create such a situation, then I don’t know. I cannot believe any member of the imperial family would ever do such a thing today. But we have to bear this possibility in mind and be very careful hereafter.
Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan Page 76