35. Kido Kichi nikki, ge, p. 802.
36. Tanaka, Dokyumento Shwa tenn I, shinryaku, pp. 113–16.
37. Confidential telegram from Grew to Hull, July 21, 1940, in Records of the U.S. Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Japan, Political Affairs: July 1940 to July 1941.
38. Yasuda, Tenn no seijishi: Mutsuhito, Yoshihito, Hirohito no jidai, pp. 4, 8,16.
39. For details of the procedures for enacting the policy document “Main Principles for Dealing with the Situation Accompanying Changes in the World Situation,” see Mori Shigeki, “Kokusaku kettei katei no heny: dainiji, daisanji Konoe naikaku no kokusaku kettei o meguru ‘kokumu’ to ‘tsui,” in Nihonshi kenky 395 (July 1995), pp. 39ff.
40. Jonathan Marshall, To Have and Have Not: Southeast Asian Raw Materials and the Origins of the Pacific War (University of California Press, 1995), pp. 7–32, 36–53.
41. Mori Shigeki, “Kokusaku kettei katei no heny,” p. 34.
42. “Interrogation of (Marquis) Kido Kichi, Feb. 27, 1946,” in Awaya Kentar, Yoshida Yutaka, ed., Kokusai kensatsu kyoku (IPS) jinmonchsho, dai sankan, p. 533; Mori Shigeki, “Sjiku gaik oyobi nanshin seisaku to kaigun,” in Rekishigaku kenky 727 (Sept. 1999), p. 17.
43. Moriyama, Nichi-Bei kaisen no seiji katei, p. 54, citing Senshi ssho 65, pp. 73, 115–19.
44. Sawada Shigeru, Sanb jich Sawada Shigeru kaisroku (Fuy Shob, 1982), pp. 72–73.
45. Ibid., pp. 73–74.
46. Ibid., p. 74.
47. Kido Kichi nikki, ge, p. 812.
48. Yoshizawa Minami, Sens kakudai no kzu: Nihongun no “Futsuin shinch” (Aoki Shoten, 1986), pp. 68, 70, 72.
49. Marshall, To Have and Have Not: Southeast Asian Raw Materials and the Origins of the Pacific War, argues that by 1940, if not earlier, both sides had come to define their national interests in mercantilist terms of control over raw materials.
50. Kido Kichi nikki, ge, p. 821.
51. Ibid., p. 825.
52. For the text of the treaty, see James W. Morley, ed., Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany, and the USSR, 1935–1940 (Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 298–99.
53. Inoue, Tenn no sens sekinin, p. 125.
54. Harada nikki, dai nanakan, p. 280.
55. Kido Kichi nikki, ge, p. 822.
56. Harada nikki, dai hakkan, p. 347.
57. Yasuda, Tenn no seijishi, p. 270.
58. In the “Monologue” Hirohito twice noted that “Prince Chichibu advocated the Tripartite Pact.” He added that “since [Chichibu] later became ill, I did not know his views [at the time]. Prince Takamatsu usually disagreed with the opinions of those in authority…. After the Tripartite Pact he glorified war, but with the coming of the Tj cabinet he changed to an antiwar view.” STD, p. 129.
59. On Oct. 19, 1940, Kido wrote that the emperor had informed Admiral Oikawa that “Prince Chichibu is recuperating from tuberculosis and we might have to ask Prince Takamatsu to become regent should an emergency arise. Do not send him to the front line.” Kido Kichi nikki, ge, p. 830; Chichibu no miya Kinenkai, Yasuhito Shinn jikki (Yoshikawa Kbunkan, 1972), p. 639.
60. Kido nikki—Tokyo saibanki (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1980), p. 460. Although the professed intention of the act’s architects was to prevent a Japan–U.S. war, their true feelings were quite different. See Tanaka, vol. 1, pp. 117–18; Inoue, Tenn no sens sekinin, p. 139.
61. Senda, Tenn to chokugo to Shwashi, pp. 311–13.
62. Mori Shigeki, “Matsuoka gaik ni okeru tai-Bei oyobi tai-Ei saku: Nichi-Doku-I sangoku dmei teiketsu zengo no ks to tenkai,” in Nihonshi kenky, 421 (Sept. 1997), p. 50, citing Asahi shinbun, morning edition, Oct. 5, 1940.
63. Kido Kichi nikki, ge, p. 830, entry of Oct. 17, 1940.
64. Furukawa Takahisa, “Kigensetsu nisen roppyaku nen hshuku kinen jigy o meguru seiji katei,” in Shigaku zasshi 103, no. 9 (Sept. 1994), p. 1 (1573).
65. Matsuo Shichi, Kindai tennsei kokka to minsh, Ajia, ge (Hsei Daigaku Shuppan Kyoku, 1998), p. 183.
66. Tokyo nichi nichi shinbun, ykan rinji (Nov. 11, 1940). For English translations of Hirohito’s messages see The Oriental Economist 7, no. 11 (Nov. 1940), p. 640.
67. Antony Best , Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor: Avoiding War in East Asia, 1936–41 (Routledge, 1995), p. 130.
68. Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: the U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945 (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1991), 269–70. Roosevelt approved the plan’s premise in November 1940, and also “assented to secret talks with the British to cast it into a combined plan for use when the nations became combat allies [p. 270].” Joint Anglo-American war planning began in early 1941.
CHAPTER 11
PROLOGUE TO PEARL HARBOR
1. Moriyama Atsushi, Nichi-Bei kaisen no seiji katei (Yoshikawa Kbunkan, 1998), p. 164.
2. Mori Shigeki, “Kokusaku kettei katei no heny: dainiji, daisanji Konoe naikaku no kokusaku kettei o meguru ‘kokumu’ to ‘tsui.’” Nihonshi kenky 395 (July 1995), pp. 58, 59, 60.
3. Fujiwara, Shwa tenn no jgonen sens, p. 97.
4. Hata Ikuhiko, ed., Rikukaigun sg jiten (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1991), p. 497.
5. Mori Shigeki, “Yamada Akira, Daigensui Shwa tenn,” in Tokyo Rekishi Kagaku Kenkykai, Jinmin no rekishigaku 124 (July 1995), p. 27.
6. Sejima Ryz, “Taiken kara mita Dai T’A sens,” in Gunjishi gakkai, ed., Dai niji sekai taisen (3): shsen (Kinseisha, 1995), p. 400.
7. Yamada Akira, “Shwa tenn no sens shid: jh shka to sakusen kanyo,” in Kikan: sens sekinin kenky 8 (Summer 1995), pp. 17–18.
8. Sejima, “Taiken kara mita Dai T’A sens,” pp. 389–400.
9. See Yamada’s report in Fujiwara Akira, Awaya Kentar et al., Tettei kensh: Shwa tenn ‘dokuhakuroku’ (tsuki Shoten, 1991), p. 101.
10. Yamada, “Shwa tenn no sens shid: jh shka to sakusen kanyo,” p. 18.
11. Morimatsu Toshio, “Shwa tenn o oshinobi tatematsuru: Ogata jijbukan nikki kara,” in Ddai Kurabu Kensh, Shwa gunji hiwa chkan (Ddai Keizai Konwakai kan, 1989), pp. 7–8.
12. Yamada, “Shwa tenn no sens shid: jh shka to sakusen kanyo,” p. 19.
13. Imoto Kumao, Sakusen nisshi de tsuzuru Dai T’A sens (Fuy Shob, 1979), pp. 37–38.
14. Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East, 1933–41, p. 136.
15. At the railway station just before his departure, Hitler is alleged to have forewarned Matsuoka: “When you get back to Japan, you cannot report to your emperor that a conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union is out of the question.” Paul Schmidt, Hitler’s Interpreter (New York: Macmillan, 1951), p. 231.
16. Cited in Borisu Suravinsukii, Ksh Nisso chritsu jyaku: kkaisareta Roshia gaimush kimitsu bunsho (Iwanami Shoten, 1996), pp. 114–16.
17. Ibid., p. 117.
18. Joseph Gordon, “The Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 1941,” in S. H. Jones, Jr., and John E. Lane, eds., Columbia University East Asian Institute Studies 6: Researches in the Social Sciences on Japan 2 (June 1959); Suravinsukii, Ksh Nisso chritsu jyaku: kkai sareta Roshia gaimush kimitsu bunsho.
19. Suravinsukii, Ksh Nisso chritsu jyaku, pp. 129–30, 134–35.
20. Ibid., p. 134.
21. Moriyama Atsushi, Nichi-Bei kaisen no seiji katei. pp. 134–42.
22. Ibid., p. 143, citing the unpublished diary of Fujii Shigeru.
23. Abe Hikota, “Dai T’A sens no keisuteki bunseki,” in Kond Shinji, ed., Kindai Nihon sensshi, Dai T’A sens (Tokyod Shuppan, 1997), p. 824.
24. Yoshida Yutaka, who makes this argument, also identifies the “emergency war funds special account” as the mechanism that allowed the army and navy to accumulate tremendous war power. Both services diverted emergency military appropriations, earmarked for the China war, to build up their basic war power. Both services fought the war in China on the cheap and saved the greater part of their emergency military funds for purposes of stockpiling and arms expansion. Citing the official history of the Finance Ministry (Shwa zaiseishi, dai yonkan [Ty Keizai S
hinpsha, 1955], he estimates that the direct cost of the China war down to 1945 was only one-third of the entire emergency military allocation.
See Yoshida Yutaka, Nihonjin no senskan (Iwanami Shoten, 1995), pp. 17–19; and Captain John Weckerling, “Military Attaché Report No. 9221,” Feb. 3, 1938, p. 4, National Archives, Reel no. 13.
25. Nobutake Ike, ed. and trans., Japan’s Decision for War: Records of the l941 Policy Conferences (Stanford University Press, l967), pp. 78–79. I have altered Ike’s translation in part. See also Sanbhonbu, ed., Sugiyama memo, j (Hara Shob, 1967), p. 251.
26. Awaya Kentar et al., eds., Tokyo saiban shiry: Kido Kichi jinmonchsho (tsuki Shoten, 1987), p. 557.
27. Tanaka Nobumasa, Dokyumento Shwa tenn, dai ikkan, shinryaku (Ryokuf Shuppan, 1984), p. 129; Shimada Toshihiko, Kantgun (Chk Shinsho, 1965), pp. 168, 175.
28. In his “Monologue” Hirohito and his aides tried to pass lightly over the July 2 imperial conference and its decision to move into southern Indochina. For its main effect—the hardening of American policy toward Japan—he blamed the military. “An imperial conference on July 2,” Hirohito says, “put a stop to those advocating war with the Soviet Union and, at the same time, as compensation, I sanctioned an advance into the southern part of French Indochina.” Hirohito (or one of his aides) then added the preposterous statement: “Just around August, when our troops were in the process of gathering at Hainan Island and we still had time to recall them, I had military aide-de-camp Hasunuma [Ban] tell Tj that because of the extremely bad domestic rice crop, the nation would surely starve if rice imports from the south were stopped, and that he should therefore discontinue the advance. But Tj did not obey; thus the Japanese army’s advance into southern Indochina, announced on July 26, resulted finally in dreadful economic sanctions against Japan.” See STD, p. 59.
29. Sanbhonbu, ed., Sugiyama memo, j, p. 284.
30. Moriyama, NichiBei kaisen no seiji katei, p. 171.
31. Ibid., pp. 164–65.
32. Yoshizawa, Sens kakudai no kzu: Nihongun no Futsuin shinch, p. 232.
33. Michael Schaller, “The Debacle in the Philippines,” in Robert Love, Jr., ed., Pearl Harbor Revisited (Macmillan Press Ltd., 1995), pp. 111–29; John E. Costello, “Remember Pearl Harbor,” in U.S. Naval Academy, Proceedings (Sept. 1983), p. 55. According to Brian McAlister Linn, Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902–1940 (University of North Carolina Press, 1997), MacArthur commanded 10,569 American troops and 11,963 Filipino “scouts,” for a total of 22,532. This force was considerably augmented in December. By the time Japan attacked, the “American contingent had increased to almost 19,000 with another 19,000 en route” (pp. 254, 245). In Washington many politicians and military officials familiar with MacArthur’s weak defense setup understood that the Philippines were indefensible.
34. FRUS, Japan 1931–1941, Vol. II (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1943), pp. 266–67.
35. Moriyama, Nichi-Bei kaisen no seiji katei, pp. 166–67, citing unpublished navy records, including the diaries of Vice Navy Minister Sawamoto Yorio and Fujii Shigeru of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry.
36. Sugiyama memo, j, p. 286.
37. Moriyama, Nichi-Bei kaisen no seiji katei, p. 169, citing Sawamoto nikki, n.p., and Kido Kichi nikki, ge, p. 895.
38. Moriyama, Nichi-Bei kaisen no seiji katei, pp. 171–76.
39. Robert J. C. Butow, “The Hull-Nomura Conversations: A Fundamental Misconcep-tion,” in American Historical Review 64, no. 4 (July 1960), pp. 822–36; Butow, “Backdoor Diplomacy in the Pacific: The Proposal for a Konoye-Roosevelt Meeting, 1941,” in Journal of American History 59, no. 1 (June 1972), pp. 48–72.
40. Sud Shinji, Nichi-Bei kaisen gaik no kenky: Nichi-Bei ksh no hattan kara Haru nto made (Kei Tsshin, 1986), p. 184; Kido Kichi nikki, ge, p. 897.
41. Moriyama, Nichi-Bei kaisen no seiji katei, p. 177; Sud, Nichi-Bei kaisen gaik no kenky, p. 184.
42. A recent example of such polemic is Seishir Sugihara, Between Incompetence and Culpability: Assessing the Diplomacy of Japan’s Foreign Ministry from Pearl Harbor to Potsdam, trans. Norman Hu (University Press of America, 1997).
43. Sud, Nichi-Bei kaisen gaik no kenky, p. 186.
44. Kketsu Atsushi, Nihon kaigun no shsen ksaku: Ajia-Taiheiy sens no saikent (Chk Shinsho, 1996), pp. 57–58.
45. Cited in ibid., pp. 58–59.
46. Kido’s reply to Henry R. Sackett, Mar. 4, 1946, Sugamo Prison, p. 603, in case 5, vol. 5, series 81180, National Archives Record Group 331, Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II.
47. TN, dai sankan, pp. 283–84.
48. Yamada Akira, Gunbi kakuch no kindaishi: Nihongun no kakuch to hkai, p. 223, citing Senshi ssho 65, Dai hon’ei rikugunbu, Dai T’A sens kaisen keii (1) p. 368–69.
49. Koketsu, Nihon kaigun no shsen ksaku: Ajia-Taiheiy sens n saikensh, p. 66.
50. Sanbhonbu, ed., Sugiyama memo, j, pp. 303–5, 312.
51. Ibid., p. 310.
52. Kido Kichi nikki, ge, especially entries of August 11 and 28, pp. 900–901, 904. See also Senshi Ssho, Daihon’ei rikugunbu, Dai T’A sens kaisen keii (4) (1974), pp. 543–44, which draws on the diaries of Konoe and Kido.
53. Shigemitsu Mamoru, Zoku Shigemitsu Mamoru shuki (Ch Kronsha, 1988), pp. 104–6.
54. According to Kido’s postwar prison diary, Konoe first spoke with Kido, telling him that “the military had forced the document upon him.” Kido then conferred with Hirohito and recommended that he summon General Sugiyama and Admiral Nagano.
In connection with their replies to the emperor’s questions, the emperor scolded Sugiyama but…Nagano came to his defense, saying…“Sometimes an operation is needed.” His Majesty’s biggest doubt concerned the fact that the first item in the draft document was the decision to decide whether to initiate hostilities while diplomatic negotiations came second.
Kido’s account supports the image of an emperor who exhibited ambiguity because he was reluctant to initiate war with the United States and Britain. General Sugiyama’s notes on the Sept. 5 briefing seem to validate this antiwar image. The notes have Hirohito saying, in a loud voice (and Konoe’s later recollection of the meeting confirms this): “Do you think you can carry out the southern operations as planned?”…“When you were a minister of state, you told me that Chiang Kai-shek would give up right away, but you still can’t beat him even today!”…“You say the interior of China is huge; isn’t the Pacific Ocean even bigger than China?”
Konoe’s question to the emperor, however, is not in the Sugiyama memo. See Kido Kichi nikki—Tokyo saibanki (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1980), part 3, “Kyokut kokusai gunji saiban ni kansuru danwa,” pp. 461–62; Sanbhonbu, hen, Sugiyama memo, j, pp. 310–11; Yabe Teiji, Konoe Fumimaro (Kbund, 1952), p. 361.
55. Takagi Skichi historical documents: “Seikai shojh—Shwa jninen kara,” pp. 589, 591, 592–95. The first ellipsis after “you were army minister” and the second ellipsis after “big difficulties” are in Takagi’s original text; this document, in the Takagi papers at the War History Archives in Tokyo, is also cited in Kketsu, Nihon kaigun no shsen ksaku: Ajia-Taiheiy sens no saikensh, pp. 71–72.
56. Shiina Takeo, ed., Kaigun sens kent kaigi kiroku: Taiheiy sens kaisen no keii (Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1976), p. 28.
57. Domon Shhei, Tatakau tenn (Kdansha, 1989), p. 22.
58. Kido Kichi nikki, ge, p. 905.
59. Sugiyama memo, j, p. 322.
60. Domon, Tatakau tenn, p. 22
61. James W. Morley, ed., David A. Titus, trans., Taiheiyo sens e no michi. English Selections: The Final Confrontation: Japan’s Negotiations with the United States, 1941 (Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 176.
62. Iwai Tadakuma, Meiji tenn “taitei” densetsu (Sanseid, 1997), pp. 150–51.
63. Sugiyama memo, j (Hara Shob, 1967 edition), p. 331, also cited in Domon, Tatakau tenn, p. 20.
64. Ibid.
65. Kketsu, Nihon kaigun no shsen ksaku, pp. 74�
��75.
66. Kido Kichi nikki, ge, p. 909. Writing in prison after Konoe’s suicide, Kido gave this account of his Sept. 26, 1941, meeting with Konoe: “If the army insists on opening hostilities on October 15, then I have no confidence and must think about resigning.” I [Kido] told him, “Since you are the one who made the decision at the imperial conference of September 6, it is irresponsible for you to quit now leaving that decision as it stands.” Kido, “Sens kaihi e no doryoku,” in Kido Kichi kankei bunsho (Iwanami Shoten, 1966), p. 30.
67. Kido Kichi nikki, ge, p. 914; also cited in Tanaka, Dokyumento Shwa tenn, dai ikkan, pp. 141–42.
68. Sugiyama memo, j, pp. 348–349. The day before Konoe’s last cabinet meeting, the emperor had told Kido: “There seems little hope in the present situation for the Japan–U.S. negotiations. This time if hostilities erupt, I might have to issue a declaration of war.” See Kido Kichi nikki, ge, p. 914.
69. Otabe Yji, “Han Ei-Bei datta Konoe Shus, ‘dokudansha’ Matsuoka z no shsei mo” in Shinano Mainichi (June 5, 1995).
70. STD, p. 69.
71. For Konoe’s letter of resignation see Yabe, Konoe Fumimaro, ge, pp. 395–96.
72. Hosaka Masayasu, “Shwa rikugun no kb, dai roku kai, Shwa tenn to Tj Hideki,” Gekkan Asahi 3, no. 2 (Feb. 1991), p. 164, citing Tj’s diary.
73. Kido Kichi nikki, ge, p. 918.
74. TN, dai sankan, p. 307.
75. Fujiwara, Shwa tenn no jgonen sens, p. 126, citing Tomita Kenji, Haisen Nihon no uchigawa (Kdansha, 1962).
76. STD, p, 67.
77. Kaigun chj Hoshina Zenshir Kaiski, Dai T’A sens hishi: ushinawareta wahei ksaku (Hara Shob, 1975), p. 43. Vice Admiral Hoshina, chief of the Navy Ministry’s Weapons Bureau and a planner of the Pearl Harbor attack, attended the seventeen-hour-long liaison conference on Nov. 1 and took notes.
78. Ibid., p. 43.
79. Tanaka, Dokyumento Shwa tenn, dai ikkan, pp. 270–71.
80. Sugiyama memo, j, p. 387.
81. Ibid. Hirohito was referring to “Hitler’s pope,” the anti-Semitic Pius XII.
82. The “Plan for Ending the War with the U.S., Britain, the Netherlands, and Chiang Kai-shek” contained the following lines—the last two inserted at Hirohito’s request:
Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan Page 79