Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography, Volume 2

by Charles Moore

  * According to Bandar, Mitterrand got wind of the British counter-attack and sent his brother, General Robert Mitterrand, to plead with King Fahd. ‘Those French have the gall,’ Fahd said to Bandar. ‘The letter from President Mitterrand his brother was carrying told me to hurry up and sign the Mirage contract because it is important for French interests!’ The King told the General, ‘Last year your country cancelled 50 per cent of our oil contract with the French without informing us, and that was important for our interest. However, we did not object, because it was a sovereign decision just like this is our sovereign decision.’ (Interview with Prince Bandar bin Sultan.)

  * In Jonathan Aitken’s full and revealing account of Al-Yamamah (Aitken, Margaret Thatcher, ch. 25), he asserts that Mrs Thatcher authorized sending these planes to Saudi Arabia, though ‘nuclear-wired’, after extracting a promise from the King not to try to find nuclear bombs for them. This story is adamantly denied, both by James Blyth and by Charles Powell, who say that it would not even have been possible, since such wiring did not exist.

  † It was financed through a carefully negotiated oil-for-aircraft arrangement.

  * It is notable that Al-Yamamah, Tornadoes, Prince Bandar, King Fahd and indeed Saudi Arabia itself do not feature in Geoffrey Howe’s memoirs. This is evidence of discretion, but also of how much Mrs Thatcher excluded the Foreign Office from the subject.

  † In the twenty-first century, it was alleged that Al-Yamamah had been a highly corrupt contract, with large rake-offs for Saudi princes, including Bandar himself. If this was so, it is unlikely that Mrs Thatcher would have known about it, since no such arrangements would have been made with the British government. In those days, unlike today, the rules governing defence sales permitted the payment of agents. Indeed, sales in the Arab world could not be achieved without them.

  * Sheikh Zayed (1918–2004), President of the United Arab Emirates, 1971–2004.

  † Victor Matthews (1919–95), educated Highbury School; chairman, Express Newspapers plc, 1977–85; created Lord Matthews of Southgate, 1980.

  ‡ Qaboos bin Said (1940–), educated Bury St Edmunds and RMA, Sandhurst; overthrew his father as sultan with British support in 1970; Sultan of Oman, 1970–.

  * Mark Thatcher maintained that the purpose of Denis’s signature was to sign cheques in Mark’s frequent absences abroad and that the account was not related to Cementation. (Interview with Sir Mark Thatcher.)

  † Mrs Thatcher took her role in the promotion of British trade extremely seriously. During her visit, Lucas introduced her to staff in the Defence Attaché’s office, explaining that they were responsible for the promotion of arms sales. ‘Oh no, they aren’t,’ she replied loudly; ‘they are so bad at it that I have to do the job for them.’ (Correspondence with Ivor Lucas.)

  * Timothy Landon (1942–2007), educated Eastbourne College and RMA, Sandhurst; soldier and businessman; served in the armed forces of Britain and Oman; holder of Canadian passport; appointed honorary KCVO, 1982.

  * Nigel Wicks (1940–), educated Beckenham and Penge Grammar School and Portsmouth College of Technology, London University and Cambridge University; private secretary to the Prime Minister, 1975–8; Economic Minister, British Embassy, Washington, DC, 1983–5; Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, 1985–8; knighted, 1992.

  * By November 1982, the accumulated cost of Mark’s police protection was officially computed, but not publicly revealed, as having been £113,485.

  * Walter Annenberg (1908–2002), businessman and philanthropist; US Ambassador to Britain, 1969–74.

  * Ross Perot (1930–), who was courting Mark to work for his firm, Electronic Data Systems, was a prominent Texas businessman who later ran twice as independent candidate for the presidency of the United States. In the 1992 contest, he won nearly 20 million votes.

  * One piece of evidence for her lack of ‘feel’ was her failure to master the normal terms of the discussion. She never had clear in her mind the difference between Irish Nationalists (such as the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)) and Republicans (such as Sinn Fein), and she could not pronounce or remember the name of the Irish parliament, the Dáil (pronounced ‘Doil’). She sometimes, in conversation, would refer to the ‘United Kingdom’, when she meant Great Britain without Northern Ireland.

  † Charles Haughey (1925–2006), educated St Joseph’s Christian Brothers’ School, Fairview, Dublin, University College Dublin and King’s Inns, Dublin; Fianna Fáil TD, 1957–92; Minister for Finance, 1966–70 (dismissed from government because of alleged involvement in an attempt to import arms for the IRA); Leader, Fianna Fáil, 1979–92; Taoiseach, 1979–81, March–December 1982 and 1987–92.

  * Garret FitzGerald (1926–2011), educated Coláiste na Rinne, Waterford, Belvedere College, University College and King’s Inns, Dublin; PhD; Fine Gael TD, 1969–92; Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1973–7; Leader, Fine Gael, 1977–87; Taoiseach, June 1981–March 1982, December 1982–March 1987.

  † Pronounced ‘Tee-shock’.

  * Garret FitzGerald believed Mrs Thatcher was not alone in taking this view. ‘All [British] politicians up to and including Margaret Thatcher, who retained a memory of the war … had a problematic attitude to Ireland, which made it difficult [for us]. That included her, but it also included Jim Callaghan.’ (Interview with Garret FitzGerald.)

  † Martin Mansergh, an official who was close to Haughey, felt there was mutual respect between them because ‘despite often sharp differences and considerable distrust, she recognized Haughey as a fellow professional politician. Neither of them always saw Garret in that light’ (Interview with Martin Mansergh).

  ‡ Mrs Thatcher was not alone in this. The Queen was known to complain, ‘I’m glad that Mr FitzGerald isn’t one of my prime ministers. I can’t understand a word he says’ (Private information).

  § When he noticed that Mrs Thatcher was asleep, FitzGerald paused. ‘Just keep talking,’ said Charles Powell encouragingly. ‘I’ll write it all down.’ (Interview with Lord Powell of Bayswater.)

  ¶ In spite of this motherly instinct, Mrs Thatcher often confused FitzGerald’s name and called him ‘Gareth’ (Interview with Michael Lillis).

  * John Hume (1937–), educated St Columb’s College, Derry and St Patrick’s College, Maynooth; Leader, SDLP, 1979–2001; MEP for Northern Ireland, 1979–2004; SDLP MP for Foyle, 1983–2005; joint winner, Nobel Peace Prize, 1998.

  † Sinn Fein did not perform as well as expected in the general election – it received 13.4 per cent of the overall vote, coming in fourth place behind the SDLP (17.9 per cent). The election of Gerry Adams as MP for Belfast West, however, was seen as a vindication of the ‘Armalite and ballot box’ strategy associated with the younger generation of Republicans (see Volume I, p. 616). Adams became president of Sinn Fein later in the year.

  ‡ James Molyneaux (1920–2015), educated Aldergrove School, Co. Antrim; Ulster Unionist MP for Antrim South, 1970–83; for Lagan Valley, 1983–5 and 1986–97 (resigned seat in protest over Anglo-Irish Agreement, December 1985; re-elected, January 1986); Leader, Ulster Unionist Party in House of Commons, 1974–9, and Leader of the party, 1979–95; created Lord Molyneaux of Killead, 1997.

  § Ian Paisley (1926–2014), educated Ballymena Technical High School, South Wales Bible College and Reformed Presbyterian Theological College, Belfast; ordained, 1946; moderator, Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster, 1951–2008; Democratic Unionist MP for Antrim North, 1974–2010 (resigned seat in protest at Anglo-Irish Agreement in December 1985; re-elected January 1986); MEP for Northern Ireland, 1979–2004; Leader, Democratic Unionist Party, 1972–2011; Member, Northern Ireland Assembly, 1998–2011; First Minister, Northern Ireland, 2007–8; created Lord Bannside, 2010.

  * David Goodall (1931–), educated Ampleforth and Trinity College, Oxford; diplomat; head of Western European Department, FCO, 1975–9; Cabinet Office, 1982–4; Deputy Under-Secretary, FCO, 1984–7; High Commissioner to India, 1987–91; knighted, 1987.

&
nbsp; † Dermot Nally (1927–2009), Deputy Secretary to the Department of the Taoiseach, and head of Northern Ireland Affairs, 1973–80; Secretary-General to the Department of the Taoiseach (and Cabinet Secretary), 1980–93.

  ‡ Contrary to what some accounts suggest, Armstrong had not been at the talks at Sunningdale but, in December 1973, he was at a dinner at 10 Downing Street for the participants in the talks, and he met and talked with Nally then (Correspondence with Lord Armstrong of Ilminster).

  § The two sides of ‘Armstrong–Nally’ were so close that the Irish side even invented two ties, dark green for the Irish, maroon for the British, with the letters ‘NA’ (reflecting the Irish order of the two names) on them, and gave both to each side. Members of this unofficial club would wear them for reunions.

  * Michael Lillis (1946–), educated University College Dublin; Irish diplomat; head of Anglo-Irish Relations, Department of Foreign Affairs, 1982–5; Irish head of the Anglo-Irish Secretariat, Maryfield, Belfast, 1985–6; Ambassador to the UN in Geneva, 1986–8.

  † The Irish records of these meetings show that it was Goodall who raised the question of constitutional change (Note by Michael Lillis, 29 September 1983, NAI: DFA/2013/27/1589).

  * All three Forum possibilities were unwelcome to Mrs Thatcher. FitzGerald recalled that she was particularly cautious about joint sovereignty because she wanted to be able to say truthfully afterwards that it had not been discussed (Garret FitzGerald, All in a Life: Garret FitzGerald, an Autobiography, Gill & Macmillan, 1991, pp. 476–7).

  * There was some precedent for the idea of redrawing the Irish border. It seems likely that Mrs Thatcher was actually thinking of the Boundary Commission which was established after the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 to determine whether areas with large Catholic population should be transferred to the Free State. In the end no changes were made. ‘Mrs Thatcher was conscious of the Boundary Commission initiated by Lloyd George, which came to nothing … she seems to have thought it was a mistake not to allow troublesome townlands to be exchanged. She didn’t understand what dynamic that would have set off’ (Interview with Martin Mansergh). (For a discussion of the role of the border in Irish politics, see Henry Patterson, Ireland’s Violent Frontier: The Border and Anglo-Irish Relations during the Troubles, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.)

  † Quintin Hogg (1907–2001) (succeeded his father as 2nd Viscount Hailsham and 2nd Baron Hailsham, 1950, but disclaimed his peerages for life in 1963); educated Eton and Christ Church, Oxford; Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, 1931–8; Conservative MP for Oxford City, 1938–50; for St Marylebone, December 1963–70; First Lord of the Admiralty, 1956–7; Chairman of the Conservative Party, 1957–9; Leader of the House of Lords, 1960–63; Lord Privy Seal, 1959–60; Secretary of State for Education and Science, April–October 1964; Lord Chancellor, 1970–74 and 1979–87; created Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone, 1970; Knight of the Garter, 1988.

  * At this stage, the negotiations with China over the future of Hong Kong were reaching a critical stage (see Chapter 4). Mrs Thatcher was therefore unlikely to be well disposed to any concessions on ‘joint sovereignty’ or ‘joint authority’ over Northern Ireland.

  * Magee was given a life sentence for murder in 1986, but was released under the provisions of the Belfast Agreement, in 1999.

  * It was just outside this house, in July 1990, that Ian Gow would be blown up and killed by an IRA car bomb.

  † The saving of the speech much impressed Mrs Thatcher. She later wrote to Amanda Colvin’s father, recalling that ‘Amanda was absolutely marvellous throughout – cool, calm and very good-humoured. And, she & Tessa remembered to bring out the speech. You can be very proud of her.’ (Thatcher to Colvin, 30 October 1984, CAC: THCR 1/2/23 (http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/136349).)

  ‡ Peter Morrison (1944–95), educated Eton and Keble College, Oxford; Conservative MP for Chester, February 1974–92; Minister of State, Department of Employment, 1983–5; of Energy, 1987–90; Deputy Chairman, Conservative Party, 1986–9; PPS to the Prime Minister, 1990; knighted, 1990.

  * The police received a bomb warning just before the service was about to start, but Gummer, as chairman, decided not to evacuate the building and not to tell Mrs Thatcher. The alarm was, as he suspected, a hoax. (Interview with Lord Deben.)

  † For a full discussion, see Chapter 6.

  * Sir Anthony Berry MP, Eric Taylor, Lady (Jeanne) Shattock, Lady (Muriel) Maclean and Roberta Wakeham.

  † Peter Walker, the Energy Secretary, was not at Brighton that night because he had decided to stay in London to deal with the NACODS dispute. He gave his room in the Grand Hotel over to Sir Anthony Berry, the MP for Enfield Southgate, who was killed in that room by the blast (see Francis Beckett and David Hencke, Marching to the Fault Line: The 1984 Miners’ Strike and the Death of Industrial Britain, Constable, 2009, p. 140), so it could be said that the miners’ strike saved Walker’s life.

  * At the end of October a MORI poll gave Mrs Thatcher a popularity lead over Neil Kinnock of 18 per cent. This was put down to admiration for Mrs Thatcher’s courage during the Brighton bombing. (‘Press Digest’, Ingham to Thatcher, 31 October 1984, THCR 3/5/59.)

  * Arguing for the change of venue, Mrs Thatcher said: ‘The IRA will probably get me in the end, but I don’t see why I should offer myself on a plate’ (Sir David Goodall, unpublished manuscript).

  * Mrs Thatcher was making a deliberately provocative comparison with the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia in the 1930s, whose nationalism was supported by Hitler.

  † She referred to Goodall affectionately as ‘my favourite churchman’ (Goodall, unpublished manuscript).

  * Although the Northern Ireland Office was brought into the negotiations, officials from the Belfast-based Northern Ireland Civil Service were entirely excluded from the process for fear that they might offer ‘inconvenient advice’ (see Kenneth Bloomfield, A Tragedy of Errors: The Government and Misgovernment of Northern Ireland, Liverpool University Press, 2007, p. 60).

  † Mrs Thatcher disapproved of the sectarian nature of the Northern Ireland party system, and she was sympathetic to those in Ulster who saw themselves as Conservative. Since 1972, Ulster Unionist MPs no longer took the Conservative whip at Westminster, though formal links remained until the late 1980s. Mrs Thatcher was reluctant to sever these links and expressed the hope that the two parties could be reconciled. (Whittingdale to Thatcher, 14 February 1990, CAC: THCR 2/6/4/68.)

  * The Unionists had a permanent majority. Those who disliked this called it a veto.

  * Richard Ryan (1946–), educated Oatlands College and University College Dublin; Counsellor, Irish Embassy, London, 1983–8; Minister-Counsellor, 1988–9; Ambassador to Korea, Spain, the UN, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic in later years.

  * In Britain the press strongly defended Mrs Thatcher, especially the Sun. Bernard Ingham summarized its position: ‘The sooner Dr FitzGerald accepts reality the better for all of us’ (‘Press Digest’, Ingham to Thatcher, 23 November 1984, CAC: THCR 3/5/40).

  * The Irish notes on the meeting record a slightly different response from Mrs Thatcher: ‘I am frightened to death of saying anything about Nationalists in Northern Ireland’ (‘Taoiseach’s Meeting with Mrs Thatcher’, European Council, NAI: DFA/2014/32/2059).

  * In his biography of Mrs Thatcher, John Campbell quotes a letter drafted for Reagan which expressed anxiety that American perceptions of the Chequers summit were ‘not favorable’ and asked Mrs Thatcher to assure the American public that progress was being made, as evidence of the strength of the pressure brought to bear (see Campbell, Margaret Thatcher: The Iron Lady, p. 434). In fact, this letter was never sent. The briefings on the subject which Reagan received before Camp David from George Shultz and others were much more judicious.

  * The UDR was a regiment of the British army which was recruited locally during the Troubles in Northern Ireland. Its membership was overwhelmingly Protestant and failed to attract cross-community support. In 1992 it was
merged into the newly formed Royal Irish Regiment.

  * ‘Privy Council terms’ mean that those briefed – member of the Queen’s Privy Council, denoted by bearing the title ‘the Right Honourable’ – are briefed only in confidence. Opposition parties therefore sometimes refuse such briefings on the grounds that they tie their hands when they need to criticize later.

  * The ECST sought to limit the number of terrorists escaping extradition on the grounds that they had committed a ‘political offence’.

  * The only serious doubts about the Agreement in Cabinet were expressed by John Biffen, the Lord Privy Seal. Although Biffen was liked by colleagues, he was discounted by Mrs Thatcher.

  * Like Jim Prior’s previously, King’s move from Employment to the NIO was regarded as a demotion.

  * Powell had a masterful ability to capture the mood of the moment. In 1982, just after the Falklands War, he had praised Mrs Thatcher’s leadership abilities, saying that she was made of ‘ferrous matter of the highest quality’ (playing on her reputation as the ‘iron lady’) (see Vol.1, pp. 750–5). These words had given Mrs Thatcher great pleasure, a fact that made Powell’s later accusation of treachery all the more insulting.