THE THIRD WORLD WAR;
The Untold Story
Sir John Hackett
First published by Sidgwick and Jackson Limited in 1982 in Great Britain
Copyright © 1982 by Sir John Hackett
ISBN 0-283-98863-0
Abbreviations
AAFCE Central Europe
AAM Air to Air Missile(s)
ABM anti-Ballistic Missile
ACLANT Allied Command Atlantic
AEW airborne early warning
AFCENT Allied Forces Central Europe
AFNORTH Allied Forces Northern Europe
AFSOUTH Allied Forces Southern Europe
AFV armoured fighting vehicle(s)
AI Air Intercept
AIRCENT Allied Air Forces Central Europe
AIRSOUTH Southern Europe
ALCM air-launched cruise missile(s)
ANC African National Congress
ANG Atlantique nouvelle generation (French ASW aircraft)
APC armoured personnel-carrier(s)
ARM anti-radiation missile
ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations
ASW anti-submarine warfare
ATAF Allied Tactical Air Force
ATFS automatic terrain following system
ATGW anti-tank guided weapon(s)
AWACS airborne warning and control system
BATES battlefield artillery target engagement system
BMP boevaya mashina pekhoty (Soviet infantry combat vehicle)
BTR bronetransporter (Soviet APC)
CAFDA Commandement Air de Forces de Defence Aeriennes
CAP combat air patrol(s)
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CENTAG Central Army Group
CEP circular error probable
CINCEASTLANT Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Atlantic
CINCENT Commander-in-Chief, Central Region
CINCHAN Commander-in-Chief, Channel
CINCNORTH Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Northern Europe
CINCSOUTH Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe
CINCUKAIR Commander-in-Chief, United Kingdom Air Forces
CINCUSNAVEUR Commander-in-Chief, US Navy Europe
CINCWESTLANT Commander-in-Chief, Western Atlantic
CMP counter-military potential
COB co-located base(s)
COMAAFCE Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe
COMBALTAP Commander Allied Forces Baltic Approaches
COMECON Council for Mutual and Economic Aid
CPA Czechoslovak People’s Army
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CW Chemical Warfare
DIA Defence Intelligence Agency
DIVADS divisional air defence system
EASTLANT Eastern Atlantic
ECM electronic counter-measures
ECCM electronic counter-counter- measures
ELINT electronic intelligence
EMP electro-magnetic pulse
ENG electronic newsgathering
ESM electronic support measure(s)
EWO electronic warfare officer(s)
FBS forward based systems
FEBA forward edge of the battle area
FNLA Angolan National Liberation Front
FRELIMO Mozambique Liberation Front
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
FROG free-range over ground (SSM)
FY fiscal year
GAF German Air Force
GDR (DDR) German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik)
GLCM ground-launched cruise missile(s)
GNP gross national product
GRU Glavnoye Razedivatelnoe Upravlenie (Soviet Military Intelligence)
GSFG Group of Soviet Forces in Germany Group
HARM high speed anti-radiation missile
HAS hardened aircraft shelter
HAWK homing killer all the way (SAM)
HE high-explosive
HOT high-subsonic optically teleguided (ATM)
ICBM inter-continental ballistic missile(s)
I/D interceptor/destroyer
IFF identification friend or foe
IGB inner German border
INLA Irish National Liberation Army
IONA Isles of the North Atlantic
IR infra-red
JACWA Joint Allied Command Western Approaches
JTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
KGB Komitet Gosudarstrennoi Bezaposnosti (Soviet secret police)
LAW light-armour weapon
LRMP long-range maritime patrol(s)
MAD mutual assured destruction
MCM mine counter-measures
MIDS multi-functional information distribution system
MIRV multiple individually targeted re-entry vehicle(s)
MLRS multiple-launch rocket system
MNR Mozambique National Resistance
MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MRCA multiple role combat aircraft
MRUSTAS medium-range unmanned aerial surveillance & targeting system
NAAFI Navy, Army & Air Force Institutes
NADGE NATO air-defence ground environment
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO non-commissioned officer
NORTHAG Northern Army Group
NPA National People’s Army
OAS Organization of American States
OAU Organization for African Unity
ODCA Organization Democratica Cristiana de America
PACAF Pacific Air Force
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PLSS precision location strike system
RAAMS remote anti-armour mine system
RDM remotely delivered mine(s)
REMBAS remotely monitored battlefield sensor system
RPV remotely-piloted vehicle(s)
RWR radar warning receiver
SAC Strategic Air Command
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SADARM seek and destroy armour (ATGW)
SAF Soviet Air Force
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM surface-to-air missile(s)
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe
SHQ squadron headquarters
Sitrep situation report
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile(s)
SLCM submarine-launched cruise missile(s)
SLEP service life extension programme
SNAF Soviet Naval Air Force
SOTAS stand-off target acquisition system
SOUTHAG Southern Army Group
SP self-propelled
SRF Strategic Rocket Forces (Soviet)
SSBN submarine(s), strategic ballistic nuclear
SSGN submarine(s), guided missile nuclear
SSM surface-to-surface missile(s)
SSN submarine(s), nuclear
START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
SURTASS surface-towed array sensor system
SWAPO South-west Africa People’s Organization
TACEVAL tactical evaluation
TACFIRE tactical fire direction
TACTASS tactical towed array sonar system
TAWDS target acquisition and weapon delivery system
TERCOM terrain contour matching (guidance system)
TNF theatre nuclear force(s)
TOW tube launched optically tracked wire guided (ATGW)
UKAD United Kingdom Air Defence
UNIFIL United Nations Force in Lebanon
UNFISMATRECO United Nations Fissile Materials Recovery Organization
UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
USAF United States Air Force
USAFE United States Air Force Europe
USAREUR United States Army in Europe
VELA velocity and angle of attack
V/STOL vertical/short take-off and landing
WESTLANT Western Atlantic
ZANLA Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZIPRA Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army
Foreword
Earlier this year, at Eastertide in 1987, we, a group of Britons deeply aware of how narrowly such freedoms as the Western world enjoys had been able to survive the onslaught upon them of the enemies of freedom in August 1985, completed a book about the causes, course and outcome of the Third World War. In the prologue to that book (a short piece of writing of which every word stands as firmly today, six months later, as it did then, and perhaps deserves re-reading) we wrote: ‘Much will be said and written about these events in years to come, as further sources come to light and further thought is given to this momentous passage in the history of our world.’* A good deal more information has indeed become available since then.
* The Third World War: August 1985 (Sidgwick and Jackson, London, and Macmillan, New York, 1978)
The belligerent involvement of Sweden and Ireland, for example, was passed over in our first book, not through unawareness of its importance but through uncertainty about the political implications of some aspects of it which suggested an approach like that of Agag, who trod delicately. The same was true of the neutrality of Israel, under joint guarantees from the USSR and the USA. We could do little more than state this at that time as an end-product, since here too there were uncertainties in issues where precipitate judgment could have been prejudicial. We are now able to go more fully into the process which led to the establishment of an autonomous Palestinian state and the stabilization of Israeli frontiers under guarantee, though the reader will note that the great powers came very near to such conflict over this issue as could have caused the Third World War to break out at least a year before it did.
In Central America and the Caribbean there was also danger of a premature explosion. There has now been developing a Latin-American community (in which a non-communist Cuba plays a critically important role), with the interest and support of the United States but with no intent on its part of total dominance. These matters were at a delicate stage when we last wrote. We can now report more freely on the development of this regional entity as it grows in robustness. It emerged in circumstances so dangerous that the USSR was almost able to secure the defeat of NATO before a shot was fired on the Central Front. We can now examine why.
In the Middle East, in North Africa (where the extinction of over-ambition in Libya was received with almost worldwide acclamation), in southern Africa, and in the Far East we are also now able to take the story further.
In the strictly military sphere, we have been able, with more information, to make some adjustment to the record. This is particularly important where the course of events is considered from the Soviet side. There is now quite an abundance of additional source material available - political, social and military - and we have made use of this as far as we could. The Scandinavian situation has already been mentioned. Operations in northern Europe have been looked at again in the light of it and operations at sea, much influenced by the participation of a belligerent Ireland. On the Central Front we have been able to give more attention to air operations. Those in the Krefeld salient in the critical battle of Venlo on 15 August, the relatively small but vitally important air attack on Polish rail communications to impede the advance just then of a tank army group from Belorussia in the western Soviet Union, the importance of equipment which, however costly, could not safely be foregone -these and other aspects of war in the air receive more attention.
As we said in the Prologue to the first book, ‘The narrative now set out in only the broadest outline and, of our deliberate choice, in popular form, will be greatly amplified and here and there, no doubt, corrected.’ To contribute to this process is our present purpose.
We are still very far from attempting any final comment on the war that shook the world but did not quite destroy it. The intention is largely to fill in some gaps and amplify various aspects of the tale. The lesson, which is a simple one, remains the same. It is worth restating.
We had to avoid the extinction of our open society and the subjugation of its members to the grim totalitarian system whose extension worldwide was the openly avowed intention of its creators. We had at the same time to avoid nuclear war if we possibly could. We could best do so by being fully prepared for a conventional one. We were not willing, in the seventies and early eighties, to meet the full cost of building up an adequate level of non-nuclear defence and cut it fine. In the event, we just got by. Some would say this was more by good luck than good management, that we did too little too late and hardly deserved to survive at all. Those who say this could well be right.
London, 5 November 1987
THE WORLD IN FLAMES - Chapter 1: Dies Irae
There could not have been many people in Western Europe or the United States who were greatly surprised when they learned from early TV and radio broadcasts on the morning of 4 August 1985 that the armed forces of the two great power blocs, the United States and her allies on the one hand and Soviet Russia and hers on the other, were at each other’s throats in full and violent conflict. Preparation for war, including the mobilization of national armed forces, had already been proceeding for some two weeks in the West (and for certainly twice as long in the countries of the Warsaw Pact) before the final outbreak. Yet the magnitude of the assault when it was first felt in its full flood and fury was none the less astounding, particularly to those in the Western world (and these were the majority) who had paid little attention in the past to portents for the future. Bombs were bringing death and devastation on the ground, aircraft exploding into fiery fragments in the sky. Ships were being sunk at sea and the men in them hammered into pulp, electrocuted, burned to death, or drowned. Other men, and many of them, were dying dreadfully in the flaming clamour and confusion of the land battle. Yet another world war had burst upon mankind. While the course of life in the short three weeks of the Third World War had no time to be as radically affected as in the five or six years of each of the first two, the consequences of this war were likely to be more far reaching than any before it.
World war had really been inevitable since the Soviet incursion into Yugoslavia on 27 July, the event which had brought about the first-ever direct clash between Soviet and United States troops on a battlefield. Moscow had long sought a favourable opportunity to reintegrate post-Tito Yugoslavia into the Warsaw Pact, in the confidence that the frailty of the union when its creator had gone would in good time furnish a suitable opening for intervention. As the cracks in Yugoslavia began to widen, particularly between Slovenia and the Federal Government in Belgrade, the Soviet sponsored so-called Committee for the Defence of Yugoslavia had most injudiciously staged an unsuccessful punitive raid into Slovenia. The Committee called for Soviet help and the opportunity was seen to be at hand. Within days Soviet units were in action against US forces from Italy. Fearful of the consequences if this crisis should get out of control, Washington had tried hard to cool it down and keep it quiet, but in vain, ENG (electronic newsgathering) film smuggled out by an enterprising Italian cameraman, showing US guided weapons destroying Soviet tanks in Slovenia, was flashed on TV screens across the world. Few viewers in the West even knew where Slovenia was. Fewer still doubted that the two superpowers were sliding with rising momentum towards world war.
There was no question where the focal point of any conflict between the armies of the two great power blocs would lie. It would be in the Federal Republic of Germany, where the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG), largely stationed in what was known as the German Democratic Republic (GDR), faced the considerably
weaker NATO forces of Allied Command Europe (ACE), in what NATO called its Central Region. It was in the GDR that the Warsaw Pact was even now staging manoeuvres of impressive size, so large as to arouse at first strong suspicion in the West, and then to confirm, that this was really mobilization in disguise. The manoeuvres had been notified to other powers, in accordance with the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Some smaller though still considerable manoeuvres of the Southern Group of Soviet Forces in Hungary had not. It was from these that one airborne and two motor rifle divisions had moved into Yugoslavia.
The move into Yugoslavia was very nicely calculated by the Soviet Union. If the West did nothing to oppose it, a quick and easy gain would result, not of critical importance but useful, if only as a rough and timely warning to Warsaw Pact allies. If the West did oppose it with force, this would constitute an attack on a peace-loving socialist country that would justify the full-scale defensive action against NATO, as the aggressive instrument of Western imperialism, for which the Warsaw Pact was already in an advanced state of preparation. The fighting between Soviet and US forces in Yugoslavia could very easily be presented as evidence of imperialist aggression.
The war, which some believed had begun already in Polish shipyards, mines and factories the previous November,* was now a certainty and could not be long delayed. The NATO allies tried strenuously to complete their own mobilization, which had begun in the Federal Republic on 20 July, in the United States on 21 July, in Britain (where the co-operation of the trade unions - led by England’s leading Luddite-was not at first certain) on 23 July, with other allies following suit. In Britain in addition a strong and vigorous Territorial Army was constitutionally embodied and the lately formed but already highly effective volunteer Home Service Force, whose purpose was defence against both invasion by external forces and internal subversion, was activated.
*See General Sir John Hackett and others, op. cit., ‘Unrest in Poland’.
The agreement of governments to evacuate from Germany the dependants of American and British service personnel and other civilian nationals was given, with inevitable reluctance, on 23 July, and they began to move out on 25 July. Reinforcements for the United States Army in Europe (USAREUR) began arriving by air from the United States on the same day, together with the first reservists for the formations in I and II British Corps, the latter, formed in Britain in 1983, having most fortunately been deployed in good (though not full) strength for exercises in Germany at the beginning of the month.
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