43On the failure to renew the Reinsurance Treaty see the documents in Hallmann, Deutsch-russischen Rückversicherungsvertrages. Rich, Holstein I, 307 ff., is the most detailed treatment in English.
44The chief of staff explained himself in detail to, among others, the French deputy chief of staff in July, 1891; and to Giers in May, 1892. Cf. General Raoul de Boisdeffre’s report of July 16, 1891, in France, Ministére des Affaires Étran-géres, Documents Diplomatiques Français (1871–1914), 41 vols. (Paris, 1929–59), 1st Series, VIII, Nr. 424 (hereafter cited as DDF); and Obruchev to Giers, May 19, 1892, reproduced in George F. Kennan, The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia, and the Coming of the First World War (New York, 1984), 264 ff. Giers’s conversation with Alexander is noted in V. N. Lamsdorf, Dnevik, 1891–1892 (Moscow, 1934), 311–312.
45The position of Andreas Hillgruber, “Die deutsch-russischen politischen Beziehungen (1887–1917),” in Deutschland und Russland im Zeitalter des Kapitalismus, 213.
46Rich, Holstein II, 356 ff., presents the evolution of Holstein’s attitudes towards Russia.
47William C. Fuller, Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia, 1881–1914 (Princeton, N.J.: 1985), 52 passim; Edward R. Goldstein, “Military Aspects of Russian Industrialization: The Defense Industries, 1890–1917” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Case/Western Reserve University, 1977).
48G. S. Holzer, “German Electrical Industry in Russia: From Economic Entrepreneurship to Political Activism” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Nebraska, 1970), is a good case study of economic relations between the two states. Cf. also B. Bonwetsch, “Handelspolitik und Industrialisierung. Zur aussenwirt-schaftlichen Abhängigkeit Russlands,” in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im vorrevolutionären Russland, ed. D. Geyer (Koln, 1975), 277–299.
49Holstein to Radolin, July 2, 1895, Holstein Papers III, Nr. 541.
50Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860–1914 (London, 1980). Gregor Schollgen, Imperialisms und Gleichgewicht. Deutschland, England und die orientalische Frage 1871–1914 (Munich, 1984); and Peter Winzen, “Die Englandpolitik Friedrich von Holsteins 1895–1901” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Koln, 1975), focus on the English question; Winzen adds a general dimension in Bülows Weltmachtkonzept (Boppard, 1977).
51Cf. inter alia Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan, Great Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895–1905 (Princeton, N.J., 1988); H. W. Koch, “The Anglo-German Alliance Negotiations: Missed Opportunity or Myth?” History LIV (1969), 378–392; and Paul M. Kennedy, The Realities behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865–1980 (London, 1981); and “The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy, 1865–1939, in Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870–1945 (London, 1983), 15–39.
52Keith Wilson, “The Invention of Germany,” in The Policy of the Entente. Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy 1904–1914 (Cambridge, 1985), 100–120.
53The German naval threat was almost welcome as the one challenge Britain was on the whole confident of meeting successfully. For the diplomacy of appeasement at the turn of the century, cf. inter alia Christopher Andrew, Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale (New York, 1968); P. J. V. Rolo, Entente Cordiale: The Origins and Negotiations of the Anglo-French Agreements of 8 April, 1904 (London, 1969); F. R. Bridge, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, 1906–1914: A Diplomatic History (London, 1972); Horst Jaeckel, Die Nordwestgrenze in der Verteidigung Indiens 1900–1908 und der Weg Englands zum russischen-britischen Abkommen von 1907 (Köln, 1968); and F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia 1864–1914: A Study in Imperialism (New Haven, Conn., 1968), 447 passim.
54Geyer, Der russische Imperialisms, 71 ff., 143 ff., summarizes Russia’s Asian expansion. Otto Hoetzsch, Russland in Asien (Stuttgart, 1966), and A. M. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881–1904 (Berkeley, 1958), provide the details. Ian Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War (London, 1985), stresses that conflict’s “Russian dimension,” as opposed to external factors.
55Bülow to Holstein, 16.1.04, in GP XIX, 1, Nr. 5943; and Holstein Papers IV, Nr. 818. Winzen, Bülows Weltmachtkonzept, argues strongly and convincingly for the primacy of foreign policy in determining the chancellor’s approach to international relations. Barbara Vogel, Deutsche Russlandpolitik. Das Scheitern des deutschen Weltpolitik unter Bülow 1900–1906 (Düsseldorf, 1973), stresses economic factors. For German policies toward France cf. H. Raulff, Zwischen Machtpolitik und Imperialisms. Die deutsche Frankreichpolitik 1904–05 (Düsseldorf, 1976); and P. Guillen, Uallemagne et le Maroc 1870–1905 (Paris, 1967).
56James W. Long, “The Economics of the Franco-Russian Alliance, 1904–06” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1968) is a mine of information on the financial underpinning of Russian diplomacy in this period. For Russia’s behavior at Algeciras see Bernard F. Oppel, “The Waning of a Traditional Alliance. Russia and Germany after the Portsmouth Peace Conference,” Central European History V (1972), 318–329. For Austria’s, see F. Fellner, “Die Haltung Oesterreich-Ungarns während der Konferenz von Algeciras 1906,” Mitteilung des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung LXXI (1963), 462–477.
57On the process of decision making in 1905, Albrecht Moritz, Das Problem des Präventivkrieges in der deutschen Politik während der ersten Marokkokrise (Bern, 1974); and Raulff, Machtpolitik, 127 ff., are the most recent treatments. For German military thought cf. inter alia Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision-Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984), pp. 107 passim; and more generally Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” International Security IX (1984), 58–107.
58The evolution of German military intentions towards the Low Countries can be traced in Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, RM 5/1666, “Angriffspläne gegen Holland und Belgien von 19.Juni 1885 bis Jan. 1902,” and RM 5/1667, “Angriffspläne gegen Holland und Belgien vom Mai 1905 bis Dez. 1912.” For Schlieffen’s concern with Belgium as an invasion route see his memoranda of May 1 and June 7, 1905, RM 5/1667. The general staff request of Nov. 27, 1909, is in ibid. General accounts include Ivo N. Lambi, The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862–1914 (Boston, 1984), esp. 90 passim; Folkert Krieger, “Deutsch-dänische Beziehungen 1901–1914” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Bonn, 1974), 157 passim; and Horst Lademacher, Die belgische Neutralität als Problem der europäischen Politik 1830–1914 (Bonn, 1971), esp. 427 ff.
59“Der Aufmarsch gegen Russland,” Jan., 1894, Mohs, Waldersee II, 343 ff.
60Lothar Höbelt, “Schlieffen, Beck, Potiorek und das Ende der gemeinsa-men deutsch-österreichischen-ungarischen Aufmarschpläne im Osten,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen XXXVI (1984), 7–30, demonstrates that this anxiety was shared by the Austrians, and was a major factor in their ready acceptance of the revised German strategy.
61Gerhard Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth, tr. E. Wilson (London, 1958); and Jehuda Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation (Westport Conn.: 1986). Both minimize Schlieffen’s concern for the east as a factor in his planning. Cf. L. C. F. Turner, “The Significance of the Schlieffen Plan,” Australian Journal of Politics and History XIII (1967), 49–66.
62Allan Mitchell, Victors and Vanquished: The German Influence on Army and Church in France after 1870 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1984), presents this process in detail.
63The Anglo-French entente of 1904 also generated the “hostage theory,” by which in case of war with England, decisive pressure was to be exerted on an otherwise inaccessible enemy by overrunning France, and arguably the Low Countries as well. Cf. Einem to Bülow, Oct. 17, 1904, with Schlieffen’s enclosure of Oct. 7, in PAAA, Deutschland 138, Geheim/6; and Bülow to Holstein, Dec. 15, 1904, in Holstein Papers IV, Nr. 869.
64Schlieffen to his sister Marie, November 13, 1892, in Eberhard Kessel, ed., Generalfeldmarschall Graf Alfred Schlieffen. Briefe (Göttingen, 1958), 295–298.
65The evolution of Schlieffen’s thought
can be traced in the Aufgaben for 1903 and 1904 in Generalstab des Heeres, Kriegswissenschaftliche Abteilung (ed.), Dienstschriften des Chefs des Generalstabes der Armee Generalfeldmarschalls Graf von Schlieffen, Vol. I, Die taktisch-strategischen Aufgaben aus den jahren 1891–1905 (Berlin, 1937), 103 passim; and the “Staff Rides East” for 1901 and 1903, in ibid., Vol. II, Die Grossen Generalstabsreisen-Ost aus den jahren 1891–1905 (Berlin, 1937), 222 ff. and 300 ff.
66“Operationsstudie gegen Russland,” Mar. 1898, Mohs, Waldersee II, 348 ff.
67Cf. in particular Aufgaben of 1891, 1898, 1899 and 1904; and the Staff Rides East for 1897, 1899, 1901, and 1903, in Dienstschriften I and II. The anecdote is from Hermann von François, Marneschlacht und Tannenberg (Berlin, 1920), 126.
68Schlieffen’s growing pessimism is described in Gerhard Ritter, Sword and Scepter, tr. Heinz Norden, 4 vols. (Coral Gables, Fla., 1969–73), II, 199 ff. Hans Delbrück’s 1896 critique of Bloch, “Zukunftskriege und Zukunftsfriede,” is reprinted in Erinnerungen, Aufsätze und Reden (Berlin, 1902), 498–525. Cf. for purposes of comparison T. E. H. Travers, “Technology, Tactics, and Morale: Jean de Bloch, the Boer War, and British Military Theory 1900–1914,” Journal of Modern History LI (1979) 264–286.
69John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York, 1982), 273.
70Holstein to Brauer, Dec. 23, 1905, Holstein Papers IV, 376 ff.
71For the entente see particularly J. J. Williams, “The Strategic Background to the Anglo-Russian Entente of August, 1907,” Historical Journal IX (1966), 360–373; and G. Monge, Ursachen und Entstehung der englisch-französischen-russischen Entente 1900–1907 (Seeheim, 1969). Barbara Jelavich, “British Means of Offense against Russia in the Nineteenth Century,” Russian History I (1974), 119–135, legitimates Russia’s strategic concerns. Keith Neilson, “Wishful Thinking: The Foreign Office and Russia, 1907–1917,” in Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy 1895–1939. Memorial Essays Honouring C. V. Lowe (Edmonton, Alberta, 1984), 151–180, stresses Britain’s need for an arrangement with Russia.
72Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 2, 1907 and Jan. 29, 1908, British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Series A, Russia, 1859–1914, ed. D. Lieven, 6 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1983), IV, Nr. 187; V, Nr. 20.
73Immanuel Geiss, German Foreign Policy, 1871–1914 (London, Boston, 1976), 107; Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions, tr. M. Jackson (New York, 1975), 51.
2. THE CENTER FAILS TO HOLD
1Wilhelm M. Carlgren, Iswolsky und Aehrenthal vor der bosnischen Annexion-skrise: Russische und österreichisch-ungarische Balkanpolitik 1906–1908 (Uppsala, 1955), presents the background of the annexation. Bernadotte Schmitt, The Annexation of Bosnia, 1908–1909 (Cambridge, 1937), and M. Nintchitch, La Crise bosniaque et les puissances européenes, 2 vols. (Paris, 1937), cover the annexation itself. For the developing role and belligerent nature of public opinion in Russia cf. Manfred Hagen, Die Entfaltung politischer Öffentlichkeit in Russland 1906–1914 (Wiesbaden, 1982); and Caspar Ferenczi, Aussenpolitik und Öffentlichkeit in Russland, 1906–1912 (Husum, 1982). For the Central Powers cf. H. A. Gemeinhardt, Deutsche und österreichische Pressepolitik während der Bosnischen Krise 1908/09 (Husum, 1980).
2For tension between Austria and Germany at this period see Michael Belinen, Rüstung-Bündnis-Sicherheit. Dreibund und informeller Imperialisms 1900–1908 (Tübingen, 1985).
3Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and a World without War (Princeton, 1975); Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “The Topos of Inevitable War in Germany in the Decade before 1914,” in Germany in the Age of Total War, ed. V. R. Berghahn and M. Kitchen (London, 1981), 23–45.
4Holstein to Bülow, Oct. 13, 1908, in The Holstein Papers, 4 vols., ed. Norman Rich (Cambridge, 1959–63), IV, Nr. 1142; Bülow to Holstein, Dec. 27, 1908, ibid., Nr. 1173; Szögeny to foreign office, Dec. 16, 1908, in Ludwig Bittner, et al., Oesterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914 , 8 vols. (Vienna, 1930), I, Nr. 752. Hintze to William, Oct. 23, 1908; Monts to Bülow, Oct. 25, 1908; Pourtalés to Bülow, Oct. 30, 1908, in Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Deutschland 121/30 (hereafter cited as PAAA).
5Bülow’s memorandum of Oct. 27, 1908, ibid.; Bülow to Aehrenthal, Jan. 8, 1909, in J. Lepsius, A. Mendelsohn-Bartholdy, F. Thimme, eds., Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette 1871–1914, 40 vols. (Berlin, 1922–27), XXV, Nr. 9173 (hereafter cited as GP).
6Aehrenthal to Bülow, Feb. 20, 1909; and Kaegenich’s report of Feb. 23, 1909, in GP XXVI, 2, Nrs. 9386, 9390; Cartwright to Grey, Mar. 6, 1909, in British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1878–1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and H. W. V. Temperley, 11 vols. (London, 1926–1938), V, Nr. 657 (hereafter cited as BD).
7Miquel to Bülow, Nov. 27, 1908; Pourtalés to Bülow, Dec. 11, 1908 and Jan. 30, 1909; Moscow Consulate to Bülow, Dec. 4, 1908; PAAA, Deutschland 131/30.
8Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 8, 1909, British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Series A, Russia, 1859–1914, ed. D. Lieven, 6 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1983), V, Nr. 61 (hereafter cited as BDFA).
9Hintze to William, Feb. 24, 1909, PAAA, Russland 98, Geheim.
10Bülow to Pourtalés, Mar. 14 and 29, 1909, GP XXVI, 2, Nrs. 9437, 9460; Hintze to Bülow, Mar. 20, 1909, PAAA, Deutschland 131/30; Pourtalés to foreign office, Mar. 22, 1909; GP, XXVI, 2, Nr. 9464.
11Nicolson to Grey, May 1, 1909, BDFA V, Nr. 67. Detailed analyses sympathetic to the German position are Heinz-Günther Sasse, War das deutsche Eingreifen in die Bosnische Krise im März 1909 ein Ultimatum? (Stuttgart, 1936); and Heinz Gerhardt, War in der bosnischen Annexationskrise die deutsche Demarche vom 22.Marz ein Ultimatum? (Berlin, 1965).
12Nicolson to Grey, May 7, 1909, BDFA V, Nr. 70.
13D. W. Sweet, “The Bosnian Crisis,” in British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey, ed. F. R. Hinsley (Cambridge, 1977), 190 ff.
14A good overview of this process is Peter F. Sugar, “External and Domestic Roots of Eastern European Nationalism,” in Nationalism in Eastern Europe, ed. P. F. Sugar, I. J. Lederer (Seattle, London, 1969), 3–54.
15Pourtalés to Bülow, Mar. 19 and Apr. 1, 1909, PAAA, Deutschland 131/30. Hintze to William, Apr. 3 and May 29, 1909; GP, XXVI, 2, 9505, 9545; and Mar. 24, 1910, PAAA, Russland 98, Geheim.
16Pourtalés to Bethmann, Feb. 9, 1910, PAAA, Deutschland 131/32; Posadowsky-Wehner to war ministry, Aug. 12, 1910, GP XXVI, 2, Nr. 9950; Hintze to William, Aug. 19, 1910, PAAA, Russland 98, Geheim. For anti-German attitudes in Russia at this period Cf. D. C. B. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War (New York, 1983), p. 37; and Uwe Liszkowski, “Zur Aktualisi-erung der Stereotype ‘Die Deutsche Gefahr’ im russischen Neoslawismus,” in Russland und Deutschland. Festschrift für G. v. Ranch, ed. U. Liszkowski (Stuttgart, 1974), 278–294.
17The outlines of Moltke’s approach can be found in Moltke to Bülow, Jan. 19, 1909, “Militärische Leistungsfähigkeit der wichtigsten Staaten Europas zu Beginn dieses Jahren,” PAAA, Deutschland 121/31, Geheim; Adolf Tappen’s comments on strategic planning for a two-front war of Oct. 22, 1919, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Nachlass Tappen, N56/4; and the Immediatvortrag of Nov. 4, 1909, in BA-MA, RM 5/1607.
18Immediatvortrag to William, Oct. 24, 1908, ibid.; memorandum from the chief of the admiralty staff, Mar. 19, 1909, and report of a conference between the chief of the admiralty staff and Moltke on March 18, 1909, ibid., RM5/1633.
19Colonel Wyndham to Nicolson, Nov. 19, 1908, BDFA V, Nr. 53.
20A report of the Schlussaufgabe for 1907 is in BA-MA, Nachlass Groener, N46/111. Moltke’s comment to the navy is in his reply of Apr. 2, 1909, to an admiralty questionnaire in BA-MA, RM5/1633.
21Moltke’s general reasoning on the prospects of an offensive against Russia is developed in his 1909 correspondence with Conrad, most of it reprinted in Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, Aus meiner Dienstzeit, 5 vols. (Vienna
, 1921–25), II, 633 passim. Cf. also the analyses by Norman Stone, “Moltke-Conrad: Relations between the Austro-Hungarian and German General Staffs, 1909–1914,” Historical Journal IX (1966), 201–228; and “Die Mobilmachung der österreichischen-ungarischen Armee 1914,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen XVI (1974), 67–95 and Dennis E. Showalter, “The Eastern Front and German Military Planning, 1871–1914: Some Observations,” East European Quarterly XV (1981), 163–180.
22Bethmann made his intentions plain in his conferences of Oct. 14 and Nov. 4, 1909, with the British Ambassador. Cf. Yale University, Kiderlin-Wächter Papers, Box 16, Folder 173; with Goschen to Grey, Oct. 15 and Nov. 4, 1909, in BD VI, Nrs. 200, 204. Fritz Fischer, “Die Neutralität Englands als Ziel deutscher Politik 1908/09–1914,” in Von der freien Gemeinde zum foderalistischen Europa, ed. F. Esterbauer et al. (Berlin, 1983), pp. 261–282, insists this was no more than an effort to clear the ground for a general war. For more balanced interpretations of Bethmann’s policies cf. Oswald Hauser, Deutschland und der englisch-russische Gegensatz, 1900–1914 (Göttingen, 1958); Hansjoachim Henning, Deutschlands Verhaltnis zu England in Bethmann-Hollwegs Aussenpolitik 1909–1914 (Köln, 1962), and more generally and very perceptively, Konrad Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor. Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven, Conn., 1973), pp. 108 ff.
23Bethmann to Metternich, Nov. 10, 1909, Kiderlin Papers 10/173.
24Bethmann’s memorandum of Feb. 20, 1910, PAAA, Orientalia Generalia 5/17.
25Mirbach to Bethmann, Oct. 4 and Oct. 20, 1910, PAAA, Deutschland 131/32; Pourtalés to Bethmann, Apr. 22, 1910, ibid., 30; Hugh O’Bierne to Grey, Oct. 5, 1910, BDFA VI, Nr. 40.
26A useful recent treatment of the Potsdam Conference is Robert E. Simmons, “German Balkan Diplomacy, 1906–1913. The Genesis and Implementation of a War-Risk Policy” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Auburn University, 1982), 320 ff. Key documents include Bethmann to William, Nov. 1 and Nov. 6, 1910, GP XXVI, 2, Nrs. 10152, 10153; Bethmann to Pourtalès, Nov. 8 and Nov. 15, 1910, ibid., Nrs. 10155 and 10159; Bethmann to Aehrenthal, Nov. 14, 1910, PAAA, Orientalia Generalia 5/17; and Tschirsky to Bethmann, Nov. 6 and Nov. 20, 1910, PAAA, Deutschland 131/32. Germany’s problem in generating investment capital is described in Raymond Poidevin, “Weltpolitik allemand et capitaux frangais 1898–1914,” in Deutschland in der Weltpolitik des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. I. Geiss, B-J Wendt (Düsseldorf, 1973), 237–249.
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