57To the seemingly endless literature on Germany’s behavior in the July Crisis have recently been added Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, “Germany and the Coming of War,” in The Coming of the First World War, ed. R. J. W. Evans and H. Pogge von Strandmann, (Oxford, 1988), 87–123; Fritz Fischer, Juli 1914: Wir sind nicht hineingeschlittert (Hamburg, 1983); Egmont Zechlin, “Julikrise und Kriegsausbruch 1914,” in Politik und Geschichte: Europa 1914: Krieg oder Frieden, ed. Landeszentrale für politische Bildung (Kiel, 1985), 49–96; and Klaus Hilde-brand, “Julikrise 1914. Das europäische Sicherheitsdilemma,” Geschichte in Wis-senschaft und Unterricht, XXXVI (1985), 469–502.
58Leichenfeld to Hertling, June 4, 1914, in Bayerische Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch und zum Versailler Schuldspruch, ed. Pius Dirr (Munich, 1928), 110 ff.
59A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918 (Oxford, 1954), 518 ff.
60Wilhelm Groener, Der Weltkrieg und seine Probleme (Berlin, 1920), 51.
61Germany’s preparations, or lack of them, are discussed in Lothar Bur-chardt, Friedenswirtschaft und Kriegsvorsorge. Deutschlands wirtschaftliche Bestrebungen vor 1914 (Boppard, 1968), and Gerhard Hehr, Walther Rathenau und sein Verhaltnis zu Militär und Krieg (Boppard, 1983), 146 passim.
62For Moltke cf. especially Correlli Barnett, The Swordbearers (London, 1963), 15 ff.; and Isabel Hull, The Entourage of Kaiser Wilhelm II, 1888–1918 (Cambridge, 1982), 239 ff.
63Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “Détente and Deterrence: Anglo-German Relations, 1911–1914,” International Security XI (Fall, 1986), 121–150.
64Cf. Manfred Rauh, “Die ‘deutsche Frage’ von 1914: Weltmachtstreben und Obrigkeitsstaat?” in Die Deutsche Frage im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, ed. J. Becker, A. Hillgruber (Munich, 1983), 109–166; James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York, 1988) 272 n.78; and Richard N. Current, Lincoln and the First Shot (Philadelphia, 1963).
65E. G. Tschirsky to Bethmann, July 2, 1914, and Berchtold’s note of a July 2 conversation with Tschirsky in Geiss, Julikrise I, Nrs. 11, 14. Cf. also F. Fellner, “Die ‘Mission Hoyos’” in Deutschlands Sonderung von Europa, 1862–1945 (Frankfurt, 1984), 283–316.
66For Sazonov’s Serbian dilemma cf. in particular Strandtmann to Sazonov and Sazonov to Strandtmann, July 24, 1914, Int. Bez I, 5, Nrs. 22, 36. The protocol of the Crown Council is most readily available in Geiss I, Nr. 286. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War, 141 ff., includes a summary, based on the unpublished memoirs of Finance Minister P. A. Bark, that modifies details without altering substance.
67Cf. Friedrich Graf Pourtalés, Meine letzten Verhandlungen in St. Petersburg, ende Juli 1914 (Berlin, 1927), 22–23; Pourtalés to Jagow, July 26, 1914, DD I, 217; Pourtalés to Bethmann July 25 (sent July 26, 12:20 a.m.), July 26, 3:25 p.m., and July 27, 1:00 p.m., in PAAA, Russland 72/97. and Szapary to Berchtold, July 26, 1914, Oe-U VIII, 10835. The assigned date of the latter document, July 27, is corrected following Geiss, Julikrise II, Nr. 397.
68Leichardt to Carlowitz, July 3, 1914, in ibid., I, Nr. 15.
69“Die Wachsende Macht Russland,” PAAA, Deutschland 121/31, Geheim 2.1 am indebted to Ivo Lambi for sharing his detailed notes on this document.
70Entry of July 7, 1914 in Riezler, Tagebücher. The damage done by the Riezler diaries to the more extreme assertions of German responsibility for the war’s outbreak is best attested to by the recent attempts to deny their authenticity. The most extreme of these is Bernd F. Schulte, Die Verfälschung der Riezler Tagebücher (Frankfurt, 1985). Their failure is documented in Agnes A. Blänsdorf, “Der Weg der Riezler-Tagebücher. Zur Kontroverse über die Echtheit der Tagebücher Kurt Riezlers,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht XXXV (1984), 651–684.
71Entries of July 20 and 23, 1914, in Riezler, Tagebücher, 186 ff: and Bethman’s conversations of Feb. 9 and July 30, 1915, with journalist Theodor Wolff in Theodor Wolff: Tagebücher 1914–1919, ed. B. Sösemann, 2 vols. (Boppard, 1984), I, 156–157, 265 ff. Cf. D. W. Sweet, “The Baltic in British Diplomacy before the First World War,” Historical Journal XIII (1970), 451–490; Manfred Rauh, “Die britisch-russische Marinekonvention von 1914 und der Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkrieges, MGM, XLI (1987), 37–62.
72Sazonov to Beneckendorff, June 28, 1914, Int. Bez. I, 5, Nr. 164; entry of July 23, 1914, in Riezler, Tagebücher, 190.
73Lichnowsky’s January, 1915 memorandum and Eulenberg’s 1919 correspondence with Professor Kurt Breysig are reprinted in 1914: Delusion or Design? ed. with intro. by John Röhl (New York, 1973).
74Goschen to Grey, July 29, 1914, BD XI, Nr. 293. Cf. Volker Ullrich, “Das deutsche Kalkül in der Julikrise 1914 und die Frage der Englischen Neutralität,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht XXXIV (1983), 73–97.
75Waldersee to Jagow, July 8, 1914, DD I, Nr. 74.
76Ulrich Trumpener, “War Premeditated? German Intelligence Operations in July 1914,” Central European History IX (1976), 58–85, based heavily on Fritz Gempp, “Geheimer Nachrichtendienst und Spionageabwehr des Heeres,” National Archives T-77, Rolls 1,438–1,440, 1,422, 1,507–1,509, accurately stresses the lack of urgency in the German military response. Cf. particularly Gempp, “Nachrichtendienst” II, 1, 2 ff. For the French-Russian radio link see Luntinen, French Information on Russian War Plans, 167 ff.
77Sazonov’s comments on Austria’s behavior are in Szapary to Berchtold, July 24, 1914, Oe-U VIII, Nr. 10616; and in the Russian foreign ministry’s memorandum of July 18, 1914 in Int. Bez. I, 4, Nr. 272. The most detailed secondary reconstruction in a Western language of Sazonov’s decision to order partial mobilization remains Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 3 Vols., tr. and ed. I. M. Massey (London, 1952–57), II, 528 ff. Cf. Serge Doborolski, Die Mobilmachung der russischen Armee 1914 (Berlin, 1922), for the specifically military aspects.
78L. C. F. Turner, “The Russian Mobilization in 1914,” Journal of Contemporary History I (1968), 65–88, is significantly modified by Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War, 148 ff.
79Cf. Paléologue’s dispatch of July 26, 1914, in DDF, 3rd Series, XI, Nr. 80; Messimy’s statement in Raymond Recouly, Les Heures Tragiques d’avant-guerre (Paris, 1922), pp. 61 ff.; Joffre’s account in his Memories, 2 vols., tr. T. B. Mott (London, 1932), I, 117–118; and Krumeich, Armaments and Politics, 215 ff.
80Gempp, “Nachrichtendienst” II, 1, 18 ff., 70 ff.
81Moltke to Bethmann, July 29, 1914, DD II, Nr. 349.
82Gempp, “Nachrichtendienst” II, 1, 31–32. The report is in DD II, Nr. 372.
83Bethmann to Wilhelm, July 26, PAAA, Preussen, la/23. Egmont Zechlin, “Bethmann-Hollweg, Kriegsrisiko und SPD/1914,” in Krieg und Kriegsrisiko, 64–93, stresses the importance in Bethmann’s mind of maximizing domestic support by waiting as long as possible to order mobilization.
84Sazonov’s itinerary and behavior are reconstructed primarily from the “daily report” of the Russian foreign ministry for July 29, 1914, in Int. Bez. I, 5, Nr. 224; and Pourtalés’s dispatches of 4:30 and 9:30 a.m. and 1:01 p.m. July 30, to Jagow in DD II, Nrs. 401, 412, and 421. Albertini, Origins II, 563–564, analyzes the discrepancies between the two accounts. I have followed the Russian version in placing Sazonov’s final proposal during the night, rather than on the morning of the 30th, as described by Pourtalés.
85Buchanan to Grey, July 30, BD XI, Nr. 302. Sazonov had used the same comparison to Pourtalés the previous day. DD II, Nr. 412.
86Cf. the daily report of July 30, 1914, in Int. Bez. I, 5, Nr. 284; and Sazonov’s own memoir, Fateful Years, 1909–1916 (London, 1928), 201 ff.
87Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space, 1880–1918 (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), 259 ff.
88Entry of July 25, 1914, in Wolff, Tagebücher I, 63 ff; entry of Aug. 15, 1914, in Riezler, Tagebücher, 194.
89Bethmann to Tschirsky, 3:00 a.m., 9:00 p.m., July 30, 1914, DD II, Nrs. 396, 441.
90Berchtold to Szapary, July 30, 1914; Berchtold to Szogyeni, July 31, 1914, in Oe-U VIII,
Nrs. 11092, 11155.
91Albertini, Origins III, 24 ff., remains the best analysis of the still-controversial issue of exactly when the German leaders first learned of Russia’s mobilization.
92First Lieutenant Hermann Hoth, who was to become one of the Wehrmacht’s most distinguished panzer commanders, was the duty officer in Berlin that morning. His account is in Gempp, “Nachrichtendienst” III, 2, 34 ff. For the phone call to XX Corps see F. von Notz, General von Scholtz: Ein deutsches Soldatenleben in Grosser Zeit (Berlin, 1937), 37.
93Nicolai observed that the advantages of Jewish agents were their “unscrupulous greed, slyness, and persistence.” Disadvantages were insolence, cowardice, vengefulness, and excessive imagination. He graciously commented, however, that the better elements among Russia’s oppressed Jews repaid decent treatment with gratitude and loyalty. Gempp, “Nachrichtendienst,” I, 149.
94Gert Buchheit, Der deutsche Geheimdienst (Munich, 1966), 22.
95Bethmann to Pourtalès, 3:30 p.m., July 31, 1914, DD III, Nr. 490.
4. THE VIRGIN SOLDIERS
1For military life in Germany’s eastern provinces, regimental histories are a mine of direct and indirect information. I found particularly useful Erich Balla’s history of the 1st Jäger, Im Yorkschen Geist: Der Deutsche Frontsoldat und seine Seele (Berlin, 1926), 1 ff.; Kurt Hennig, Das Infanterie-Regiment (8.Ostpreussisches) Nr. 45 (Oldenburg, Berlin, 1928), 15 ff.; Alfred Dieterich, Geschichte des Grenadierregiments König Friedrich der Grosse (3.Ostpreussischen) Nr. 4 (Berlin, 1928), 590 ff. (hereafter cited as 4 .Grenadiere); and Konrad Marschall, “Die 5.Grenadiere in Danzig,” Zeitschrift für Heeresführung und Truppenkunde XXXII (1968), 64–75. Economic conditions are best summarized in Frank B. Tipton, Jr., Regional Variations in the Economic Development of Germany during the Nineteenth Century (Middletown, Conn., 1976), 112 ff.; and Heinz Rogmann, Die Bevölkerungsen-twicktung im preussischen Osten in den letzten hundert Jahren (Berlin, 1937).
2Geoff Eley, “German Politics and Polish Nationality: The Dialectic of Nation-Forming in the East of Prussia,” East European Quarterly XVIII (1984), 335–364, is at once an excellent analysis of the question and a perceptive survey of the relevant literature. Eric A. Johnson, “The Roots of Crime in Imperial Germany,” Central European History XV (1982), 351–376, presents the relationship between ethnic makeup and criminal activity in the Kreise mentioned. For the emergence of ethnic politics in the east see Stanley Suval, Electoral Politics in Wilhelmine Germany (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1985), 180 ff.
3Quoted in Daniel Hughes, “The Social Composition of the Prussian Generalcy, 1871–1914” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1979), 215.
4Martin Kitchen, The German Officer Corps, 1890–1914 (Oxford, 1968), especially 99 ff., 115 ff., is a familiar summary of the case against the officers. For the Bilse scandal, the 1904 translation of Aus einer kleinen Garnison, published by John Lane, incorporates a summary of the court-martial. Cf. also Ernst Arnold, Aus allerlei Garnisonen . . . Zugleich Lehren und Forderungen des Falles Bilse (Leipzig, 1904), passim.
5The anecdotes are from Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Nachlass Below, N87/44, 572, 626. The problems of balancing professional and social requirements are presented in such contemporary works as Rudolf Krafft, Glänzendes Elend (Stuttgart, 1895); Das moderne Landsknechtsthum. Streiflichter über die sociale Stellung der Officiercorps (Leipzig, 1898); and Eduard Preuss, Die höheren Aufgaben desjungen Offiziers für Armee und Volk (Munich, 1906).
6The changed living conditions are described in Traugott Hoffmann and Ernst Hahn, Geschichte des Infanterie-Regiments Graf Dönhoff (7.Ostpreussischen) Nr. 44 1860–1918 (Berlin, 1930), 72 ff.; and Dieterich, 4.Grenadiere, 622. The anecdote of the major is from BA-MA, Nachlass Below, N87/45, 573.
7Balla, Yorkschen Geist, 2–3.
8For justifications and explanations of the negatives cf. Ann Taylor Allen, Satire and Society in Wilhelmine Germany. Kladderadatsch and Simplicissimus 1890–1914 (Lexington, Ky., 1984), 103 ff.; and Alex Hall, Scandal, Sensation, and Social Democracy; The SPD Press and Wilhelmine Germany, 1890–1914 (Cambridge, 1977), 116 ff.
9Jürgen Kocka, Facing Total War. German Society 1914–1918, tr. B. Weinberger (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), supports this interpretation against the intention of its author.
10Cf. particularly Manfred Messerschmidt, “Die Armee in Staat und Gesells-chaft,” Das kaiserliche Deutschland, ed. M. Stürmer (Düsseldorf, 1970), 89–118; and Wilhelm Deist, “Die Armee in Staat und Gesellschaft, 1890–1914,” ibid., 312–329.
11As in most recently Hartmut John, Das Reserveoffizierkorps im Deutschen Kaiserreich 1890–1914. Ein sozialgeschichtlicher Beitrag zur Untersuchung der gesellschaftlichen Militärisierung im Wilhelminischen Deutschland (Frankfurt, 1981).
12Günther Martin, Die bürgerlichen Exellenzen. Zur Sozialgeschichte der preussischen Generalität 1812–1918 (Düsseldorf, 1979). Hughes, “Prussian Generalcy,” challenges the concept of an open-access elite, but nevertheless stresses government service, as opposed to birth, as the primary social matrix of even general officers.
13Gerhard Hecker, Walther Rathenau und sein Verhältnis zu Militär und Krieg (Boppard, 1983), 32 passim.
14Hoffmann and Hahn, Infanterie-Regiment 44, 16–11.
15Paul Frh. v. Schoenaich, Mein Damaskus. Erlebnisse und Bekenntnisse (Berlin, 1926), 48–49.
16Nicolaus Sombart, “The Kaiser in His Epoch: Some Reflections on Wilhelmine Society, Sexuality, and Culture,” in Kaiser Wilhelm II. New Interpretations, ed. J. G. C. Röhl (Cambridge, 1982), 287–311.
17Hartmut Kaelble, Industrialization and Social Inequality in 19th-century Europe, tr. B. Little (New York, 1986) is a sound recent overview.
18Nachlass Below MA-BA, N87/44, 581–582.
19Dennis E. Showalter, “Army and Society in Imperial Germany: The Pains of Modernization,” Journal of Contemporary History XVIII (1983), 583–618.
20“Wie man als Reservist behandelt wird,” Dresdner Volkszeitung, Aug. 8, 1911, in Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Deutschland 121/16 (hereafter cited as PAAA). The same file includes a number of clippings from other Socialist papers on the theme of mistreatment. Hans Rau, Der Sadismus in der Armee (Berlin, 1904), incorporates a cross-section of contemporary case studies in a psychological framework.
21Karl von Einem to the Lübeck prosecutor, Oct. 8, 1908, in PAAA, Deutschland 121/14. Representative public admonitions include “Soldatenmis-shandlungen und öffentüches Gerichtsverfahren,” Militär-Wochenblatt 1892, 6; von Kessling, “Massnahmen für Hintanhaltung von Misshandlungen sowie vor-schriftswidriger Behandlungen überhaupt,” Jahrbücher für die deutsche Armee und Marine 125 (1903), 623–630; Pelet-Narbonne, “Die Einfluss von Offizierinspekti-onen bzw. Offizierberichte auf die Misshandlungen,” ibid. 130 (1906), 188–191.
22The most extreme statement of this thesis remains Bernd F. Schulte, Die deutsche Armee 1900–1914. Zwischen Beharren und Verändern (Düsseldorf, 1977). But cf. Manfred Messerschmidt, “Preussens Militär in seinem gesellschaftlichen Umfeld,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft, Sonderheft 6, Preussen im Rückblick, ed. H-J Pühle, H-U Wehler (Göttingen, 1980), 43–88.
23Von Tschischwitz, “Die dreigliedrige Division ais taktischer Körper,” E. V. Eisenhardt-Rothe, Deutsche Infanterie. Das Ehrenmal der vordestern Front (Zeulenroda, 1929), 200–201, is a good summary. But cf. W. Balck, Development of Tactics—World War, tr. M. H. Bell (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans., 1922), 21–22. Details of the German organization in 1914 can be found in Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918. Kriegsrüstung und Kriegswirtschaft, Anlageband, ed. Reichsarchiv (Berlin, 1930).
24Jenö von Egon-Krieger, Die deutsche Kavallerie im Krieg und Frieden (Karlsruhe, 1928), surveys prewar doctrine and training. Cf. inter alia Friedrich von Bernhardi, Reiterdienst (Berlin, 1910); G. von Pelet-Narbonne, “Die Massen-attacken der Kavallerie bei unseren grossen Uebungen gegen die anderen Waffen,” JAM 123 (1902), 476–483; and “Mehr Kavallerie,” ibid., 124 (1903), 137–164.
25For a mor
e detailed treatment see Dennis E. Showalter, “Prussia, Technology and War: Artillery from 1815 to 1918,” Men, Machines and War, ed. R. Haycock, K. Nelson (Waterloo, Ontario, 1988), 113–151.
26Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914–1918 (New York, 1989).
27Cf. inter alia “Prüfungsschiessen und Königsabzeichen,” MW 1896, 102–103; and Reisner Frh. v. Lilienstern, “Kriegsmassiges Schiessen,” JAM 125 (1903), 325–338.
28Cf. Beckmann, “Zur Maschinengewehrfrage,” JAM 134 (1908), 384–407, 463–473, 571–587; “Zur Frage der Verteilung und Verwendung der Maschinengewehr,” Kriegstechnische Zeitschrift VIII (1905), 26–35; “Die Notwendigkeit der Maschinengewehre,” ibid., VII (1904), 530–537; A. Fleck, Maschinengewehre, ihre Technik und Taktik (Berlin, 1914); and Krieger, Das Gefecht der Maschinengewehr-Kompagnien (Oldenburg, 1913).
29Cf. Steven T. Ross, From Flintlock to Rifle: Infantry Tactics 1740–1866 (Rutherford, N.J., 1979); and Dennis E. Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology and the Unification of Germany (Hamden, Conn., 1975).
30Peter Stearns, Lives of Labor: Work in a Maturing Industrial Society (New York: 1975), is a useful survey of this development. His Be a Man! Males in Modern Society (New York, 1979), 59 ff., focusses more sharply on the development of new male bonding and coping patterns in industrial Europe.
31Hermann Müller, Die Erziehung der Truppe zum moralischen Wert in Deutschland, Russland und Japan (Berlin, n.d.); “Zum Infanterieangriff,” JAM 130 (1906), 170–188; Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie von 29 Mai 1906, rev. ed. Berlin (1909), esp. pars. 265, 327, 347; Balck, “Das Exerzierreglement für die Infanterie von 29. May 1906,” JAM 131 (1906), 111–135; Wold, “Die Infanterie der Zukunft,” ibid., 136 (1909), 35–38.
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