This was exactly the reason why we used to advocate the necessity of separating air and ground duties, and if only this policy had been in place before the completion of their mother ships, the Zuikaku and Shokaku, the air squadron of Carrier Division 5 could have participated in the combined group practice together with air squadrons of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2 and achieved the same high degree of proficiency.
Anyway, nothing could be done at this stage, and I talked to Genda to decide how to annihilate the capital ships of the US Pacific Fleet relying on the highly skilled air squadrons of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. We opted to have Carrier Division 5’s air squadron carry out attacks on the enemy air bases, where their lower proficiency would be less of a major problem.
However, the Pearl Harbor air-raid was scheduled as a dawn attack, piercing through the early morning darkness. For this reason, our plan called for dispatch and flight at night. But because of the uncertainty of the capability of Carrier Division 5’s air squadron to perform night action, we were obliged to change our plans—takeoff at dawn and flight during daylight—which meant that the Pearl Harbor air-raid would be a day-light attack. This made us feel uncertain as to whether it would be a surprise attack.
While we were struggling with these various problems and breaking our necks during fierce practice drills, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Saburo Kurusu flew to the United States via Hong Kong on November 5th. His role as envoy was to restore peace to the Pacific, assisting Japan’s Ambassador to the United States, Kichisaburo Nomura.
But ironically, on that same day, November 5th, Daikairei Dai-Ichi-Go [Order No. 1 of the Naval Department, Imperial Headquarters] was issued in absolute secrecy. The entire text was as follows.
Daikairei Dai-Ichi-Go
November 5, 1941
On Behalf of His Majesty, From Chief of the General Staff Osami Nagano
Order to the Commander of the Combined Fleet Yamamoto
The Empire has decided to complete various preparations of operations aiming at early December in view of substantial fears that it will become unavoidable to commence war with the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands for the sake of self-existence and self-defense.
Commander of the Combined Fleet will implement required preparations for operations.
Regarding the detailed items, I will have Commander of General Staff provide instructions.
Based on this Daikairei No. 1, Yamamoto issued an order on the same day to Admiral Nagumo, the Commander of the Task Force Fleet, as follows:
Task Force Fleet will assemble and implement fuel supply in Hitokappu Bay by November 22nd in utmost confidentiality of its activities.
Accordingly, Nagumo mobilized the six carriers of the First Air Fleet—namely the Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Zuikaku and Shokaku—to the coast of Hyuga [Miyazaki Prefecture] on November 10th in order to accommodate the air squadrons that had been engaged in practice at their bases in southern Kyushu.
There was a drill the next day, November 11th. The six aircraft carriers of the First Air Fleet dispatched all their planes at dawn according to the Pearl Harbor attack plan while heading to the north off the coast of Hyuga. The planes performed the attack drill on the Combined Fleet, which was anchored in Saeki Bay, as the practice targets. On that day, I assumed my role as General Commander of the Air Attack Squadron, and I could see the beautiful results of the past two months of combined group practice, with flawless communication between leaders and followers and smooth coordination among the groups.
Later, I learned from Lieutenant Commander Akira Sasaki, Aviation Staff Officer of the Combined Fleet, that Admiral Yamamoto himself was watching the attack drill from the flagship Nagato and was very pleased. I myself was very happy to know that Commander Yamamoto, the very person who originated the idea of the air-raid, was content.
After the drill, the First Air Fleet entered and anchored at Saeki Bay. On the next day, November 12th, commanders of each level of the Nagumo Task Force Fleet gathered on the flagship Akagi, and Commander Yamamoto visited Akagi with his staff. It was a farewell to mark the start of the expedition to Hawaii. I was present as the General Commander of the Air Attack Squadron. Yamamoto delivered a cautionary farewell speech addressed to the Task Force commanders.
“The daring attempt of today’s Task Force is intended to destroy the Pacific Fleet of the United States at their home base at the very beginning of the start of war—making a long journey to Hawaii to attack—in the event that war against the United States should become unavoidable. Under the circumstances, the destiny of all operations that will follow depends on the success or failure of this operation. From the beginning, we aimed at a surprise attack to take advantage of their lack of expectation and preparedness, taking them by surprise, overcoming all possible difficulties. But what I have heard is that Admiral Kimmel, Commander of the US Pacific Fleet, is an admiral with keen insight and judgment, and I would guess that he has taken all possible precautionary measures against all contingencies, making thorough preparations. Therefore, I want you to be prepared so you will not suffer an unforeseen upset, but with the anticipation that it will be a surprise assault.”
As Yamamoto was leaving, he noticed that I was watching him from the corner of the room. He came straight up to me, extending his hand. There were no words, but it was a firm handshake. And his eyes, staring at me, were full of confidence in me. In return, my eyes should have reflected my burning will to fully accomplish my duty.
After the air squadrons of Carrier Division 1 withdrew from their bases in southern Kyushu, the troops of the 12th Combined Training Air Squadron positioned in northern Kyushu moved in immediately the next day. This was a cover action to prevent espionage leaks. If close to 400 planes flying all day and all night until only yesterday should disappear suddenly, people might suspect—“Where have they gone?”—and it is not possible to seal their mouths. Therefore, the pilots of the training squadron were dispatched to start flying their planes from the next day, without any interruption. Needless to say, the nature of practice was different but appeared the same. They also attended carefully to the prevention of espionage regarding communications, and, in order not to change the volume of communications from the previous day, the bases exchanged messages with the pilots in training using the same call codes. As such, maximum efforts were made to ensure the success of a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor.
Next, each ship of the Task Force left its inland berth, having prepared for the mission in a quiet manner. There was nobody around to send them off amidst loud cheers. The measures to prevent espionage were taken so seriously that all letters sent by crew members to their families before the mission were put in sacks and released for delivery only after confirmation of the success of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. For this reason, it was rumored that a newly-wed bride who used to receive letters with the regularity of her morning and evening newspapers got so upset by the abrupt interruption of the flow of letters from her husband that she insisted on a divorce.
In this setting, one by one, each ship of the Task Force headed to Hitokappu Bay, making its individual course and avoiding sea lanes normally used by merchant ships in order to remain unseen. Even stronger precautions were taken to avoid US submarines that might have been deployed for surveillance in the seas off Japan. Some ships took detours in the Pacific Ocean, and others by-passed the Sea of Japan. By sealing all telegraph keys, transmission of electrical waves was strictly controlled with the highest degree of caution.
15
Hitokappu Bay
From the east edge of Hokkaido, the Chishima Islands extend to the northeast across the Nemuro Straits. The first island is Kunashiri, and the second one is Etorofu. At almost the center of the south coast, there is a bay called Hitokappu. It was a desolate port rarely visited except by fishing boats that gathered, then left during fishing season.
Winter in Chishima comes early. Snow is already seen in November. On November 21, 1941, w
hen the peaceful quietness of winter drifted in with the snow, an abrupt incident surprised the islanders. It was the entry of a naval fleet. Increasing their numbers one by one, amidst the puzzled rumors of islanders, the assembly of the Task Force Fleet was completed with the entry of the aircraft carrier Kaga, which anchored on November 22nd. The assembled force size was 31 ships in total, consisting of six aircraft carriers, two battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, nine destroyers, three submarines and eight oil tankers. It was a grand fleet.
As soon as the ships began arriving, Etorofu Island was completely blocked off from the outside world, including all transport and communications. Patrol boats dispatched from the Ominato Security Department kept a close eye on everything on the island, conducting round-the-clock operations. The islanders’ confinement continued until December 8th, the day of the Pearl Harbor attack, and ended only when the news of the attack’s success was confirmed. During this time, daily necessities for the islanders were secured by a supply ship dispatched from the Ominato Security Department.
On November 22nd, when there was no longer major concern about a possible leak of the operation’s secret, Commander Nagumo revealed to all members of the Task Force that our objective was an air attack on Pearl Harbor. With this, the flurry of speculation among our crew members was blown away, and everyone welcomed the news with great cheers.
The next day, on November 23rd, there were two meetings held on the flagship, Akagi. One was a meeting of commanders of each level of the Task Force, and the other a meeting among the squadron officers. At the commanders’ meeting, the final detailed briefing of operational actions for the 3,000 nautical mile expedition was given; at the air squadron officers’ meeting, the final detailed confirmation of the Pearl Harbor air attack plan was explained.
The number of carrier-based planes of Carrier Division 1 was 60 planes each for the Akagi and Kaga, 50 planes each for the Soryu and Hiryu, and 70 planes each for the Zuikaku and Shokaku for a total of 360 planes.3 However, because of the constraints of the carriers’ flight decks, it would not be possible to dispatch all the planes at the same time, so they would take off in two stages. As a consequence, the air squadron of 360 planes was separated into two attack waves, the first wave with 189 planes and the second wave with 171 planes.
Accordingly, takeoff time was fixed at 30 minutes before sunrise. Sunrise in Hawaii in early December is about 6:30 AM (local time); that means takeoff would be at 6:00 AM. This time corresponds to 1:30 AM in Tokyo. According to plan, after the first wave takes off, the second wave will take off 45 minutes later. The takeoff position is 230 miles to the north of Oahu Island, and the flying speed will be 250 knots. It will take almost two hours, more or less, to reach our destination.
Our destination is Pearl Harbor, and our operational objective is to annihilate the US Pacific Fleet. The main targets for our attack will be their aircraft carriers and battleships.
At that time, the main force of the US Pacific Fleet which was assumed to be in the Hawaii area were four carriers—the Lexington, Yorktown, Hornet and Enterprise. According to our intelligence reports, the Saratoga was under repair at the San Diego Naval Port, and it would take at least a month for the ship to appear in Hawaii. As for the battleships, our information said it was certain that eight ships—namely the West Virginia, Maryland, California, Tennessee, Arizona, Pennsylvania, Nevada and Oklahoma—were present in the Hawaii area.
Therefore, our main targets were four aircraft carriers and eight battleships; the cruisers, destroyers, submarines and other auxiliary ships like refueling vessels and repair ships were secondary targets. The planes which would concentrate their attack on these main targets were the 49 planes of the level bomber squadron—the main force of the attack squadron under my command—40 torpedo bombers led by Lieutenant Commander Murata, and 78 dive bombers led by Lieutenant Commander Egusa during the second wave of the attack.
However, in order to attack our main targets, first of all, we would have to force out the enemy’s air power based in Hawaii. This was the biggest decisive point in achieving a surprise attack. For this purpose, the Fifth Air Squadron would be deployed—54 planes of the level bombing squadron led by Lieutenant Commander Shimazaki and 51 planes of the dive bombing squadron led by Lieutenant Commander Takahashi during the second wave of attack.
As far as enemy air bases in Hawaii were concerned, we knew of the existence of six bases: three Navy air bases located at Ford Island, Kaneohe and Barbers Point and three Army air bases located at Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows.
Based on our information, we knew that Ford Island was the reception base for berthing aircraft carriers, and it also served as the base for seaplanes and flying-boats. While Kaneohe was primarily the base for large flying-boats, they were also building a base for fighter planes. Barbers Point was nothing but an airfield that was used as a practice area for carrier-based air squadrons. Hickam Air Base was used for land-based bombers, and small planes like fighters were positioned at Wheeler. However, details of their numeric strength were not known.
Coincidentally or incidentally, however, Lieutenant Commander Suguru Suzuki visited Hitokappu Bay on November 23rd. He attended the meeting of aviation officers and provided us with information on the deployment of US Army and Navy air power on Oahu Island. He was a nephew of Admiral Kantaro Suzuki and was serving at the Personnel Department of the Ministry of the Navy. Earlier, the Lieutenant Commander had been ordered to visit the United States. He headed for Honolulu on board the Taiyo Maru of the NYK shipping company along with some 800 Americans who had been residing in Japan and were being sent back home. Suzuki traveled under the fictitious title of assistant purser. It was November 1st when he arrived in Honolulu, and he got to work on his special assignment right away. During the five days he was there—until the night of November 5th when he left Honolulu—he conscientiously checked the deployment conditions of the American’s air power, both Army and Navy, on Oahu Island. It was obviously a dangerous act of espionage. As soon as he arrived at Yokohama on the morning of November 17th, he reported his findings at Imperial Headquarters. The next day, he boarded the Hiei, the flagship of Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, off the coast of Kisarazu, and came straight to Hitokappu Bay.
The information he delivered was of enormous value to us. To sum it up, Ford Island was a base that accommodated approximately 120 carrier-based planes; that corresponded to two carriers while they were berthed. And about 20 PBY [Patrol Bomber Y] flying-boats were deployed at the seaplane base. These planes were on patrol duty twice every day, leaving for the first patrol at 7:00 AM and returning at 11:00 AM. The second patrol left at 1:00 PM and returned at 5:00 PM. They used several planes on each mission, and the patrol zone was about 300 nautical miles judging from their average speed. They did not seem to be making full-scale long distance patrols at this time. About 10 fighters remained constantly at Kaneohe, where the fighter base under construction was almost completed. Besides the fighters, about 20 PBY Catalina flying-boats stood by for the patrol.
Bellows Field, the Army base, was the only airfield without a hangar, and every once in a while, several dozen carrier-based planes would fly in for training. At Wheeler, about 200 small planes, mostly fighters, were stationed. Hickam Base had mostly large planes, about 40 four-engine heavy bombers and approximately 100 twin-engine heavy bombers; the four-engine ones were Boeings, and the twin-engine ones were made by Douglas and Martin. About 30 two-seater biplane trainers were assigned to Bellows Base, which seemed to be mainly a training base.
According to the information delivered by Suzuki, the enemy’s air power on Oahu Island amounted to 500 planes in total. Our aim was to force them out of action on the ground to prevent them from taking off to launch a preemptive assault against our planes. The information provided by Suzuki was most timely and helped us with our operational planning.
That day, Hitokappu Bay became stormy. After the meeting was completed, the flight officers tried to return to thei
r mother ships, but it was not possible to prepare any boats for their return. I went to the upper deck to see them off and found the weather had turned ghastly. The accommodation ladder had already been lifted up, and angry waves were blowing spray up to the deck.
I told the Kaga’s head of aviation, Lieutenant Commander Takashi Hashiguchi, “It’s not possible to get back. You should stay here on the Akagi tonight.”
Hashiguchi said, “Well, if you say so. The fierce storm here in the north sea is beyond imagination. At this rate, I don’t know what it’s going to be like in turbulent waters every day.”
Then, the commander of the Akagi’s fighter squadron, Lieutenant Commander Shigeru Itaya, came up to me and began talking. “General Commander, we cannot launch any boats because of the storm; and it has been decided that all flight officers will stay on the Akagi tonight. So we are going to have a kickoff party from now, and your presence will honor us greatly. The party will be held in the officers’ mess.”
I responded, “That’s a good idea,” and went down to the officers’ mess accompanied by Hashiguchi.
16
Mission to the Rough Seas
The next day, November 24th, the weather improved. On each aircraft carrier, the commander of each squadron explained the details to his crew members of what had been discussed at the flight officers’ meeting the previous day. Then, the crew members of each carrier’s air squadrons came to the flagship Akagi. It was to have them see the miniature of Oahu Island.
I asked that the miniature model of Oahu Island that had been kept in secret in the Staff Officer’s Room be brought to the flight deck. Pointing with a whip, I explained to those crew members, who came one by one, their duties and action guidelines for the upcoming operations. The miniature was extremely well made, and they all seemed to understand my explanation of what to expect as they remembered their practice drills at Kagoshima Bay. Later, on the day of the attack, one of the crew members who returned from the air-raid told me, “General Commander, Oahu Island was exactly like the miniature.”
For That One Day: The Memoirs of Mitsuo Fuchida, Commander of the Attack on Pearl Harbor Page 8