As Commander of the Combined Fleet’s Aviation Staff, I regarded them as a very suitable force to annihilate the enemy. Consequently, Combined Fleet Headquarters designated them as the First Mobile Force and assigned Kurita to take command.
Taking his name, the fleet was also called the Kurita Fleet. By order of the Combined Fleet, the Kurita Fleet’s roles in the Sho-Ichi-Go Operation were to storm into Leyte Gulf and destroy the enemy convoy.
However, we all knew that the enemy convoy would not come naked but would arrive with the backup of the Halsey Task Force Fleet—17 carriers. If our naked Kurita Fleet should confront the Halsey Fleet exposing our air squadrons to their air force, it was a foregone conclusion that we would be completely destroyed. Therefore, we racked our brains to find an answer to the question of how to annihilate the Halsey Fleet when strength was not on our side. We thought we might be able to lure the Halsey Fleet to the north to allow the Kurita Fleet to storm into Leyte Gulf, taking advantage of the enemy’s temporary absence. This was the concept of the decoy operation I talked about earlier. However, in order to lure the Halsey Fleet up to the north, we needed alluring bait. We decided to assign this role to the Ozawa Task Force Fleet. It was certainly an outrageous idea, but in the midst of our desperate situation which was bordering on catastrophe, everything came to have suicide-attack characteristics.
Following discussions, Combined Fleet Headquarters ordered the Kurita Fleet to prepare to storm into Leyte Gulf. However, the Kurita Fleet complained about the order. At that time, I was the Group Commander of the Combined Fleet’s Aviation Staff, and assignments regarding surface vessels were the responsibility of Operations Staff Officer, Commander Sakuo Mikami, and I did not hear about the complaint. After the war, I found a book titled, The Kurita Fleet, written by Kurita’s Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Tomiji Koyanagi, which describes the incident:
From the start, Admiral Kurita mentioned the traditional historical theory of sea power, emphasizing that a fleet battle on the seas should be a decisive battle. He even cited the Battle of Jutland between the British and German fleets in World War I. He went further and stated that major fleet battles are decided by the exchange between guns and torpedoes. Then, in light of accepted military principles, he criticized the operations target which was given to the Kurita Fleet as unreasonable. He stated:
“Now, if we should succeed in annihilating the enemy convoy that we will face, so long as the enemy fleet remains, the enemy may repeat the landing operation as many times as they want. That is, if we look at the broader implications, we may cause some delay in the overall schedule of their offense, but it will not smash the enemy’s intention to invade. On the other hand, if we annihilate the enemy task force, the enemy will be forced to abandon their offense completely, thus opening the possibility for us to change the terms of battle. That is to say, that the first course of action is only a temporary stopgap measure; the latter is a measure for a radical solution. It is the attitude of the entire Kurita Fleet that the Combined Fleet’s operations plan is putting the cart before the horse.”
Certainly, Kurita’s argument was a fundamental rule of the principles of war, and the Combined Fleet was fully aware of this. However, the point was that we did not have the military capacity or capability to annihilate the enemy task force fleet. For the Combined Fleet, it was not a matter of trying to put the cart before the horse; there was no longer a horse—only the cart remained—and they intended to make the best of a very bad situation.
The Kurita Fleet consisted of a traditional main force—a group of battleships—and their advance force—a group of cruisers. Since they were the main force in previous fleet battles, they had not awakened from their delusional dream. They were, as a result, eager to attack the enemy with guns and torpedoes, never thinking about their true situation at this late stage. And as a consequence, the Kurita Fleet was offended—their feelings hurt and pride wounded—to be assigned the operations target to destroy the enemy convoy.
However, as this phase of the operation was unfolding, the nature of warfare had changed drastically, and the age of battleships and heavy cruisers was over. While Headquarters claimed that this would be a decisive battle between the major powers, there was no chance that our fleet of surface vessels could match the enemy’s task force fleet. I knew perfectly well that, if exposed to fierce attacks by the enemy’s air squadrons, our fleets were no more than floating targets, waiting to be sunk. It was a fact that I myself proved during Stage One Operations with our attack on Pearl Harbor.
Hence, by reading The Kurita Fleet after the war, I came to know the underlying reason why the Sho-Ichi-Go Operation ended up in defeat despite achieving the objectives of the decoy operation with substantial sacrifices.
In any event, on October 17, 1944, in response to an urgent situation, Combined Fleet Headquarters issued an order to the Kurita Fleet in Lingga Anchorage to advance immediately to Brunei Bay at Borneo Island. The Kurita Fleet was made up of the Kurita Center Force and the Nishimura Southern Force. The Kurita Center Force was made up of five battleships as the core—the Yamato, Musashi, Nagato, Kongo and Haruna—10 heavy cruisers of the Second Fleet—the Atago, Takao, Chokai, Maya, Myoko, Haguro, Kumano, Suzuya, Tone and Chikuma—and their escort groups of destroyers including the light cruisers, Noshiro and Yahagi. And the Nishimura Southern Force, commanded by Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura, consisted of two battleships—Yamashiro and Fuso—one heavy cruiser—Mogami—and four destroyers.
Upon receiving the order from Combined Fleet Headquarters, the Kurita Fleet sailed from Lingga Anchorage in secrecy. At the start of the mission, it was reported that Commander Kurita instructed his fleet as follows:
“While our exercise at Lingga Anchorage lasted less than three months, we have achieved the equivalent of more than a year of peacetime activity thanks to the dedicated efforts of all of our crews and abundant fuel. Our proficiency has been enhanced to a level where we cannot expect more. Our fleet will soon storm into Leyte Gulf, and if we should encounter any opportunity to annihilate the enemy’s 10 major fleets, we will force a decisive battle with them, risking everything in battle. Unfortunately, our air power is weak, and it is not going to be an easy battle. However, I want you all bear in mind that this battle will be the final battle that will determine the fate of our nation, and each one of you must do your very best with unflinching perseverance, fighting to the limit.”
It was really an admirable exhortation. However, what can be inferred by reading this instruction is that, at the time, it was likely that Commander Kurita understood that he was more likely to engage the enemy fleets risking everything and less likely to annihilate the enemy convoys.
Meanwhile, on October 17th, there were indications that enemy advance ships had entered Leyte Gulf in preparation for the major landing force, and the Combined Fleet issued an order: “Sho-Ichi-Go Operation on alert.” Following this, some ships of the enemy convoy entered Leyte Gulf on October 19th as well, and the Combined Fleet issued an order, “Sho-Ichi-Go Operation in motion.”
According to information released by the US later, it was reported that General MacArthur landed at Leyte with his staff on October 20th. However, he actually landed with the advance convoy group, and it was very likely that the main body of the convoy, led by Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, would enter Leyte Gulf at dawn, October 25th. Our intelligence indicated that he would be escorted by a group of carriers commanded by Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid. In response, on October 21st, the Combined Fleet radioed an order to the Kurita Fleet to storm into Leyte Gulf at dawn on October 25th.
Consequently, the Kurita Fleet entered Brunei Bay at noon, October 20th. However, because of the delayed arrival of supply ships, replenishment took place the following day. That day, they received the radio order from the Combined Fleet, and the next day, at 0800 on October 22nd, the Kurita Fleet moved from Brunei Bay and headed to the north toward Palawan Strait. Kurita was on board his flagship, the Atago. The Palawan S
trait is located to the west of Palawan Island and is approximately 300 nautical miles long and 30-50 nautical miles wide. That made it a likely area for enemy submarines to wait in hiding. The Kurita Center Force passed through this dangerous sea at a low speed of 16 knots.
I heard that the reason they did not dash through the straits at a higher speed, say at around 24 knots, was their concern over fuel consumption for this operation. I was used to hearing our naval officers make a fuss about “fuel, fuel, fuel” since the previous operation.
Of course, everyone understood that, without fuel, ships would lose their mobility, but mobility is required to achieve operational objectives. My opinion was that our operation was a desperate one; the enemy had us cornered. If they used up all their fuel for the sake of attaining their operational objectives, once they had accomplished their mission, they could drift until the resupply division arrived. And if any critical situation developed, they could even scuttle the ships. However, such an unbridled and radical opinion was unacceptable to our sailors. As a consequence, the operational behavior of our fleet was largely constrained due to considerations over fuel.
At 0600 on October 23rd, just as I had feared, the fleet was ambushed by two enemy submarines. The flagship Atago was hit by four torpedoes and sunk. The second ship, Takao, was crippled by two torpedo hits, and she was towed to Brunei. In short order, the Kurita Center Force was dealt a severe blow with the loss of or damage to three heavy cruisers.
Following this, Kurita, Chief of Staff Tomiji Koyanagi and the Command Center Staff of the Second Fleet were transferred to the destroyer, Kishinami, and then moved to the Yamato along with Kurita’s admiral’s flag. As the Yamato was the First Division’s flagship, the admiral’s flag of Rear Admiral Ugaki was hoisted on the mast. Now, two admiral’s flags were unfurled side-by-side. Before long, the Kurita Center Force continued to sail with the Yamato at the head, advancing into the Sibuyan Sea on the following day, October 24th. Then, from early in the morning that day, they were subjected to relentless attacks by the enemy air attack squadrons. From around 0800, a few search planes appeared, and, at 1025, 30 dive and torpedo bombers descended like an avalanche.
During this first-wave attack, the Musashi was hit by two torpedoes in the rear, and she fell behind. Shortly after noon, 30 planes of the enemy’s second wave concentrated their attack on the Musashi and hit her with four torpedoes and four bombs. Given this situation, the escort division tried to tow the ship to Brunei, but things did not proceed smoothly.
Meanwhile, at 1330, the Kurita Center Force was attacked for about 30 minutes by roughly 80 planes of the enemy’s third wave. The heavy cruiser Myoko fell behind. At 1425, there was a fourth wave attack by 25 planes, followed by a fifth wave of more than 100 planes. More than a dozen bombs hit the ships of the Kurita Center Force, causing the Nagato of the First Division to be left behind.
As a result of these attacks, the Musashi was totally incapable of moving under her own power and was left adrift.
Reaching the limit of their endurance, the Kurita Center Force turned around frantically and telegraphed the Ozawa Task Force Fleet and air squadrons based in Taiwan and Luzon asking them to report on their battle results against the enemy task force. They probably wanted to assist the isolated and unprotected Musashi, but they were also inclined to return to Brunei.
As I was monitoring the developments at Combined Fleet Headquarters, I thought, “This cannot be happening.” Then, Captain Karasumori Mikami, Chief Staff Officer of Surface Operations, wrote a radio order on the telegraph draft sheet, and showed it to me. It said, “Believe in the grace of heaven and attack.” I nodded smiling. This radio order was immediately passed to Chief Staff Officer Shigenori Kami, Deputy Chief Staff Officer Toshitane Takada and Chief of Staff Kusaka, and approved by Commander-in-Chief Toyoda to be transmitted. Having received the radioed order, the Kurita Center Force turned around, perhaps reluctantly, and headed for the San Bernardino Straits. Chief of Staff Koyanagi wrote later that, strangely, the enemy’s air assault stopped suddenly after the fifth wave attack. According to him, Kurita Center Force Headquarters took it as heaven’s grace.
In reality, it was because the decoy operation carried out by the Ozawa Fleet had achieved its intended effect. However, since Combined Fleet Headquarters did not mention a word about this decoy operation, the Kurita Center Force could not understand why the enemy attacked stopped. After the war, the US side started to call this a decoy operation and ever since, it has been known throughout the world by this name.
On October 20th, the Ozawa Fleet made a sortie from the Inland Sea of Seto. Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa led four carriers in total—the regular carrier Zuikaku and light carriers Chiyoda, Chitose and Zuiho—as well as two battleships—Ise and Hyuga—three light cruisers—Oyodo, Tama and Isuzu—and eight destroyers.
However, the Ozawa Fleet had suffered significant losses in the Air Battle of the Taiwan Seas and carried approximately 20 search planes on the Zuikaku, but the rest were empty ships. After the war, some amateur historians claimed that the Ozawa Fleet counter-attacked with more than 100 planes, but even if there had been that many planes, such a limited number would have been no match for the enemy.7 In this manner, the Ozawa Fleet launched 20 search planes to scout the area ahead and had them return to the air bases in Taiwan and Luzon. The Ozawa Fleet continued to sail south. From its appearance, it was a majestic task force fleet, although without any planes on board.
In the meantime, the Halsey Task Force discovered that the Ozawa Fleet was heading south, but they had no way of knowing that it was a fleet of empty carriers. They immediately rushed towards the north from San Bernardino to intercept the enemy task force. Thus, from early morning on October 25th, the Battle off Cape Engano commenced.
Air attack squadrons totaling close to 1,000 planes took off from the 17 carriers of Halsey’s Task Force Fleet, rushed to meet the Ozawa Fleet and sank four carriers, the Zuikaku, Chiyoda, Chitose and Zuiho. The light cruiser, Tama, which was on escort, was also sunk. While the crews of these ship were rescued by escort destroyers, Captain Eiichiro Jyo, the Commander of the Chiyoda, died in action.
Meanwhile, Admiral Halsey advanced toward the north more than it turned out was necessary, as if he wanted to show his crews that he was going to put an end to the miserable Japanese task force fleet. Later, this became known as Halsey’s Blunder. Seeing what was happening, MacArthur, who was in Leyte, was screaming over the radio, shouting, “Halsey! Halsey!” In his book, Douglas MacArthur: Reminiscences, he describes it as the worst day in his life. In essence, Halsey’s action had opened the way for us to annihilate the enemy convoy.
On the other hand, the Kurita Center Force barely passed through the San Bernardino Strait at 0100, October 25th, heading southwards along the eastern coast of Samar Island. The remaining force was down to 23 ships in total, running at 20 knots. However, because of problems resulting from the submarine attacks in Palawan Strait and attack by enemy planes in the Sibuyan Sea, the scheduled dash into Leyte Gulf, originally planned at dawn, was delayed by six hours, forcing them to reschedule it to 1100.
In light of this situation, Kurita Center Force Headquarters sent a message to the Nishimura Southern Force, but they remained silent. In the meantime, in spite of all possible emergency measures taken, the isolated Musashi went to the bottom of the Sibuyan Sea. It was reportedly at 7:35 PM, October 24th.
At 7:20 PM, the commander of the Musashi, Captain Rikihei Inoguchi, ordered all crew members to leave the ship, and they were transferred to an escort destroyer, while he himself remained on the bridge to share his ship’s destiny. Captain Inoguchi was a respected authority and a great asset in the Japanese world of naval gunnery. He believed in the Big Gun-Big-Ship theory. Therefore, while he might have been satisfied to share his destiny with the sinking Musashi, nevertheless the world’s biggest ship—with a dead-weight displacement of 72,000 tons, mounting nine 18-inch guns and proclaimed as unsinkable—was sunk pathetical
ly by the enemy’s air attack squadron. According to survivors, more than 20 torpedoes hit the ship.
Elsewhere, the Nishimura Southern Force headed out from Brunei Bay on October 22nd and was scheduled to pass through the Sulu Sea and the Surigao Strait before joining the Kurita Center Force at dawn on October 25th for their joint dash into Leyte Gulf. While the distance for the Southern Force from Brunei Bay to Leyte Gulf was 800 nautical miles, it was 1,200 nautical miles for the Kurita Center Force.
Frequent air attacks were also made on the Nishimura Southern Force in the Sulu Sea by a limited number of planes, but no damage was inflicted on the fleet.
However, in the predawn dawn hours of October 25th, the Southern Force was scheduled to dash through Surigao Strait, but it was never heard from again. According to later US information, the US surface vessel fleet—comprised of battleships, destroyers and torpedo boats—under the command of Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf, staged an ambush behind the islands of the Surigao Strait. As soon as the Nishimura Southern Force appeared, they were showered with radar-guided artillery and concentrated torpedo boat attacks, instantly sinking both the Fuso and Yamashiro. Our heavy cruiser, Mogami, with a brilliant battle record, as well as four destroyers were lost.
At 0645, one hour after the sun rose, the Kurita Center Force suddenly spotted several masts on the horizon to the southeast. They increased their speed, and, as they approached, the flight deck and aircraft on the deck came into sight. Chief of Staff Koyanagi describes that everyone, including Commander-in-Chief Kurita and Commander Ugaki, jumped for joy upon seeing this from the bridge of the Yamato. They believed that finally they had encountered the enemy’s main task force fleet. They began their chase immediately, and from a distance of 32 kilometers, they fired the Yamato’s 18-inch guns. It was the first time since its construction that her main guns had been fired against the enemy.
For That One Day: The Memoirs of Mitsuo Fuchida, Commander of the Attack on Pearl Harbor Page 18