by Roy Jenkins
Grey sent his own account two days later. It conflicted at no point with Haldane’s, but it made more explicit their joint view that an Asquith premiership could not immediately be achieved. Grey had told Rosebery that they should aim only at making Asquith leader of the House of Commons. Otherwise “ it would be urged upon you and your friends that it would be ungenerous and unnecessary to insist upon jumping over Spencer too...k
Asquith’s replies to these letters are not available. They were probably brief and non-committal. He rarely wrote long letters to men, and there is no evidence that he was making the running against Campbell-Bannerman. But neither did he resist the pressure which came from Haldane and Grey, who were, and remained, his closest political friends and associates. There is no reason why he should have done so, particularly in view of the intelligence which he received from Herbert Gladstone at the end of the same month.
There were no further important developments in relation to the leadership until the late summer of 1905. By then the Unionist Government’s hold on life was slender. In July Balfour had persuaded his own supporters that it was right to carry on only by warning them, at a private meeting, that the state of foreign affairs made an immediate change undesirable. In August King Edward coincided with Campbell-Bannerman at Marienbad and greatly improved his relations with the Liberal leader. In June he had been doubtful about dining with him at the house of Lord Carrington, although in the event this encounter had gone well.l Two months later in Bohemia the King’s friendliness and hospitality was such that, as soon as the royal party had departed, Campbell-Bannerman’s doctor ordered him to bed for 48 hours. As a consolation for this strain on his digestion, Bannerman, as he wrote to Herbert Gladstone and to several others, had the King’s assurance that he “ must soon be in office and very high office.”
Whether or not the Chief Whip passed this information on to the Liberal Imperialisms they decided within a week upon concerted action.
Haldane was the instigator. As he described it in his Autobiography: “ I went to Asquith at a country house he and his wife had taken at Glen of Rothes in the north-east of Scotland. Grey had a fishing at Relugas, only about fifteen miles off. After consultation, Asquith and I decided to go over and confer with Grey.”m This meeting, which led to the so-called “Relugas compact,” took place in the first days of September, 1905. The essence of the compact was that unless Campbell-Bannerman took a peerage and left the leadership in the Commons to Asquith none of the three would serve under him. The idea of a Spencer premiership appeared to have been dropped; and within a fortnight it was made still less likely by Spencer’s serious illness.
Haldane, who had the closest relations with the court, was deputed to convey the news of the compact to King Edward, and if possible to secure his support. On September 12th, after his return to his house at Cloan, he accordingly wrote a long letter to Lord Knollys, the King’s secretary. He referred to his having heard that Campbell-Bannerman was “ greatly gratified by the kindly notice taken of him at Marienbad by the King,” as well as to another development which might have precipitated the Relugas meeting. The Liberal Imperialists had hoped for some time that Campbell-Bannerman would agree to go to the Lords on a change of Government. “ But we have within the last few days been made aware that this course will not be acceptable to a certain section of the party. They are not, for the most part, men whose names carry weight with the public. But they are vocal and energetic and have access to Sir H.C.B.” This section of the party had to be combated on policy even more than personal grounds. That would be the object of the triumvirate laying down conditions without which they would not serve:
What is proposed is that Asquith should, in as friendly and tactful a way as possible, and without assuming that Sir H.C.B. is adverse, tell him of the resolution we have come to. We are none of us wedded to prospects of office. To Asquith and me they mean pecuniary sacrifice. This we do not shrink from in the least, but we ought not to make sacrifices uselessly. Grey delights in his new work as Chairman of the North-Eastern Railway. But we are all ready to do our best cheerfully under Sir H.C.B. provided we have sufficient safeguards. What we would try to bring about is that, if the situation arises, and Sir H.C.B. is sent for, he should propose to the King the leadership in the House of Commons with the Exchequer for Asquith, either the Foreign or Colonial Office for Grey, and the Woolsack for myself As to this last I am merely recording for you the wish of the others.n
Even so, this precision about the distribution of offices, as opposed to the question of Bannerman going to the Lords, went further than had been agreed. Grey, for instance, wrote to Asquith on October 2nd, still from Relugas, setting out his views in his usual rather ill-ordered way:
I adhere to the opinion that it is too soon to put a pistol to CB’s head. If he shows himself willing to discuss the formation of the next Govt, he should be told what we think and feel. But we want it to come to him in a friendly way and not as if we were trying to force him in a way which he might think premature and unfriendly. . . . My feeling is quite friendly and loyal to him, but I don’t mean to go into a Govt, unless the spokesman of the Govt, in one House of Parliament is yourself or Rosebery; and the latter alternative is apparently not a possible one under present conditions. I think it is too soon in any case to stipulate for definite offices.0
By this time, however, Haldane was launched on the next stage of the plan. He accepted that Grey was somewhat lukewarm and wrote in his Autobiography: “ Asquith and I were more practical than Grey, who hated having to make any move.” He was equally undiscouraged by the reply he received from Knollys, who wrote only on his own behalf, for the King did not reach Balmoral from his Marienbad expedition until September 25th, but who did not hesitate to advance arguments which ran directly counter to Haldane’s own:
“I venture to ask you, and those whose names I have just mentioned (Asquith and Grey), would not you be better able to advance the interests of those questions, to which you rightly attach so much importance, as well as the welfare of the Country and the Liberal Party, by joining Sir H.C.B’s Government, even if he remained in the House of Commons, than by holding aloof and making yourselves powerless to moderate the dangerous influence which might be brought to bear upon him?p
Haldane’s response to this discouragement was to write to Asquith on September 27th:
What now is essential is 1) that you should see H.C.B. as soon as possible—within hours of his being back if practicable. Balmoral leaks curiously,1 and it would be bad not to get the first word; 2) that this should be kept absolutely from Rosebery until it is communicated fully to H.C.B. His interest would be to wreck it.q
1 Or was it "furiously ” ? The passage is not easy to decipher.
Haldane also arranged to visit Balmoral soon after the King’s return. He arrived there on October 5th and sat next to his host at dinner that evening. On the following day he wrote again to Asquith:
I think that the King will ask C.B. to Sandringham in November and say that he doubts, from recent observation, whether anyone but a young man can be both P.M. and leader in the H. of C.— with the increasing business. This leaves it open to C.B. to think that Ld. S. may be sent for, and later on will enable the King to suggest a peerage to H.C.B.....r
The fear which Haldane had expressed in a previous letter to Asquith that Campbell-Bannerman " might with some semblance of justification allege a Court intrigue ” did not seem entirely misplaced.
After his Balmoral visit, which lasted three days and included another long private talk with the King, Haldane arranged for Asquith to meet him in Edinburgh. As he put it in his Autobiography: "I left the Castle with the feeling that there was no more for me to do, and that the next step must be taken by Asquith when he saw C-B.”s Campbell-Bannerman could never be seen very early in the autumn. Asquith did in fact obey Haldane’s rather excited advice of September 27th—he called at Belgrave Square within hours of his leader’s return to England. But this was not unt
il November 13th, and the interview which then took place was by no means entirely satisfactory to the Liberal Imperialists. The most immediate account of it comes from Mrs. Asquith’s diary:
On Monday . . . Henry came into my bedroom at Cavendish Square, where I was having my hair washed, and told me that he had seen Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman.
Hearing this I could not wait, but tying a shawl round my head ran down to the library, where I sat down on one of the leather armchairs. Henry walked up and down the room and told me all he could remember of his talk with C.B.
He found him in his library in Belgrave Square looking at a newspaper called The Week's Survey, which he asked Henry if he
had ever heard of. Henry replied that he had not. They then proceeded to discuss Russia and Germany. Henry was glad to find him sound on Germany. He dislikes the Kaiser and thinks him a dangerous, restless, mischief-making man.
Suddenly he said that he thought things looked like coming to a head politically, and that any day after Parliament met we might expect a General Election. He gathered that he would probably be the man the King would send for, in which case he would make no phrases but would consent to form a government. Henry said: “ C.B. then looked at me and said: ‘ I do not think that we have ever spoken of the future Liberal Government, Asquith? What would you like? The Exchequer, I suppose? ’— I said nothing—‘ or the Home Office?’ I said, ‘ Certainly not,’ At which he said: ‘ Of course if you want legal promotion what about the Woolsack? No? Well then, it comes back to the Exchequer. I hear that it has been suggested by that ingenious person, Richard Burdon Haldane, that I should go to the House of Lords, a place for which I have neither liking, training nor ambition. In this case you would lead the House of Commons. While Lord Spencer was well and among us, nothing under Heaven would have made me do this! Nothing except at the point of the bayonet I could see that the impression left upon Henry’s mind while he was telling me of this conversation was that it would be with reluctance and even repugnance that Campbell-Bannerman would ever go to the House of Lords.
C.B. then asked my husband who he thought best fitted for the Home Office; to which Henry replied that that depended upon who would have the Woolsack, and added: “ ‘ For that, my dear C.B., there are only two possible people, Haldane or Reid, and went on to say that Reid had told him in past days that he did not fancy leaving the House of Commons: “in which case,” said Henry, “ why not give him the Home Office and Haldane the Woolsack? ” C.B. answered, “ Why not vice versa? ”
When Henry told me this—knowing as I do that Haldane had set his heart on being Lord Chancellor, I was reminded of George Eliot’s remark, “ When a man wants a peach it is no good offering him the largest vegetable marrow,” but I merely said that I hoped Haldane would not stand out if Reid desired the Woolsack. He went on to tell me that C.B. had then said:
“ There are two more delicate offices we’ve not mentioned Asquith—the Colonial and the Foreign Office? ”
Henry said he thought Edward Grey should have the Foreign Office; C. B. answered that he had considered Lord Elgin for this, but Henry was very strong upon Grey. He said that he was the only man, and that it was clear in his mind that Grey’s appointment as Foreign Minister would be popular all over Europe. He expatiated at great length and convincingly on Grey’s peculiar fitness for a post of such delicacy.
C.B. said he wanted him for the War Office, but Henry told me —having been unshakable upon this point—he felt pretty sure he had made an impression, as C.B. ultimately agreed that Lord Elgin would do well in the Colonial Office.
Henry ended our talk by saying to me:
“ I could see that C.B. had never before realised how urgently Grey is needed at the Foreign Office and I feel pretty sure that he will offer it to him.”t
A few days later there was another meeting between Asquith and Campbell-Bannerman, but on the second occasion Grey was also present and it was policy—in relation to Ireland—and not personalities which was discussed.1 At this meeting a compromise approach to Home Rule was worked out, to which Campbell-Bannerman gave expression in a speech at Stirling on November 23 rd. Full self-government for Ireland remained the objective of the Liberal Party, but the Nationalists were given clear notice that in the next Parliament Home Rule would not be given the priority of 1886 and 1892. It would have to wait its turn, and in the meantime the Irish were advised to accept any degree of devolution they could get, “ provided it was consistent with and led up to (the) larger policy.”
1 On November 25th, however, during a Wiltshire week-end, Asquith sent Campbell-Bannerman a letter of exceptional length, almost the whole of which was devoted to a determined advocacy of Haldane’s claims to the Woolsack. (Campbell-Bannerman Papers, 41210, 247-52).
In this way the only likely remaining source of pre-election policy dissension between Campbell-Bannerman and the Liberal Imperialists was disposed of. But Rosebery remained unaware of the agreement which Asquith and Grey had reached with Campbell-Bannerman, and proceeded completely to misinterpret the Stirling speech. In a speech of his own at Bodmin on November 25th he referred to it as “ the hoisting of the flag of Irish Home Rule,” and announced “ emphatically and explicitly and once for all that I cannot serve under that banner.” Rosebery intended the Bodmin speech to mark his “ final separation ” from Campbell-Bannerman. In fact, its greater significance lay in marking his final separation from Asquith and Grey, both of whom reacted with some impatience to such a maladroit performance at that particular time.
The timing was especially unfortunate, because although no one knew whether Balfour would resign or dissolve, or exactly when he would act, he clearly could not much longer avoid doing one thing or the other. His position had been further weakened during November by the National Union of Conservative Associations insisting, against his advice, on passing a “ whole-hog ” tariff reform resolution. But although the Liberals were eager for office many of them were frightened about accepting it before a dissolution. “ I am strongly against our taking office, if Balfour resigns now,” Grey wrote to Asquith on November 24th. “ He ought to be made to carry on till January when a dissolution can take place.”u Herbert Gladstone wrote in the same sense on the same day.
Asquith at first shared these fears. “ The storm signals are flying, and everything points to an early break-up,” he told Campbell-Bannerman in his letter of November 25th. “ It is obviously right that these people should themselves dissolve, and that the Liberal Party should not be compelled to form a Government until the country has given its decision, and the composition of the new Parliament is ascertained.”17 But when Campbell-Bannerman wrote from Scotland a week later saying that he, like Morley and Lord Ripon, was strongly in favour of acceptance, Asquith did not persist in his opposition.
He received this letter on the morning of Saturday, December 2nd. It was by then widely known that Balfour was to resign on the following Monday or Tuesday, and the new situation involved Asquith in a sudden and costly change of plan. He was about to leave for Egypt, where he had been briefed by some members of the family of the ex-Khedive at a fee of 10,000 guineas—by far the biggest he would ever have received. It was clear he could not go. He cancelled his passage, returned his brief, and prepared for the next and most important phase of his life. But what was to happen to the “Relugas compact ”?
THE RADICAL DAWN
1905-6
Campbell-Bannerman left Scotland for London by the night train on Sunday, December 3rd, and arrived only a few hours before Balfour’s Monday afternoon resignation. It had required urgent telegrams from Morley and Herbert Gladstone to bring him south even then. From Euston he went straight to his recently acquired house in Belgrave Square, and passed the day there in a series of interviews. He saw Asquith and Grey together early, and found “ there was no difference worth thinking of between him and them.” This was because they again discussed policy—and mainly Ireland—rather than the allocation of offices and the arr
angements for leadership in the two Houses.
On these latter matters Asquith and Grey were united in wishing the objects of the Relugas compact to be achieved, but divided on the amount of pressure they were prepared to apply to this end. Whatever he may have thought in September, Asquith was clear from the beginning of these December discussions that he could not coerce Campbell-Bannerman by threatening to stand out from the Government. His reasons for this change of position were most firmly set out in a letter which he wrote to Haldane (urging him to accept office) three days later:
The conditions are in one respect fundamentally different from those which we, or at any rate I, contemplated when we talked in the autumn. The election is before and not behind us, and a Free Trade majority, still more an independent majority, is not a fact but at most a probability.
I stand in a peculiar position which is not shared by either of you.
If I refuse to go in, one of two consequences follows either (1) the attempt to form a Govt, is given up (which I don’t believe in the least would now happen) or (2) a weak Govt, would be formed entirely or almost entirely of one colour.