The other consul, L. Junius Pullus, meanwhile was preparing to bring supplies to the troops at Lilybaeum. He sailed from Syracuse with 800 transport ships escorted by 120 warships in two divisions, but fell in with a Punic fleet of 100 vessels commanded by Carthalo, who after attacking the 30 surviving Roman ships at Lilybaeum now came to intercept the reinforcements. Without fighting, Carthalo skilfully forced ashore each of the Roman detachments in turn, one near Phintias (Licata), the other near Camarina; then, anticipating a storm, he doubled Cape Pachynus and left the Roman ships exposed to the fury of the tempest on a lee shore. The entire fleet was wrecked and Rome was left without a navy; some 20 ships alone survived of the 240 with which she had started the year. It was now impossible to continue the blockade of Lilybaeum by sea, but, nothing daunted, Junius, who had escaped with two ships, landed there and marched to Drepana, behind which rises Mount Eryx. Here he surprised the guard and seized both the Temple of Aphrodite, the most splendid of all temples in Sicily (where lies the modern village of Mte San Giuliano), and the old city of Eryx; he thus commanded all the roads to Drepana. It was a shrewd counterblow. Though Rome had lost control at sea, the only two towns still held by Carthage in Sicily were now cut off from the rest of the island.
Once again the position was one of stalemate. Each side required or took a breathing space. Rome faced her recent disasters by appointing a dictator, but she lacked generals of real distinction, and the annual change of magistrates continued to hamper efficiency in the field. The consuls elected for 248 were the cautious consuls of 252, and though no thoughts of peace were entertained, Rome was too exhausted to raise another navy, especially when the dangers of her Junior Service were becoming so obvious; she merely held on for the next six years. Carthage also let sleeping dogs lie. Instead of taking the offensive by sea and attacking Panormus or Syracuse, she concentrated on expeditions in the interior of Africa as far as Theveste. This policy arose partly from the prominence of Hanno the Great, the opponent of the Barcids and representative of the landed interests, partly from the desire to secure internal peace and prosperity before venturing further abroad. Carthage thus let slip a good opportunity of pressing home her success. In fact the only incident of note during 248 was that Rome renewed her treaty with the loyal king of Syracuse on easier terms; any tribute was remitted, his kingdom extended, and the treaty was made for all time.
Fresh life was again infused into the dreary struggle by the emergence of the energetic Hamilcar Barca, who raided the coast of southern Italy in 247. Rome replied by founding protective coastal colonies at Alsium, Fregenae and Brundisium; she abandoned the sea to the enemy, apart from the raids of some privateers on the African coast. In 246 Hamilcar struck at the rear of the Roman armies besieging Drepana and Lilybaeum by landing west of Panormus. He fortified a position on the mountain behind the city, named Heirkte,18 and anchored his fleet at its foot, so that he was in good communication with the two besieged ports. From this mountain eyrie like an eagle he held the Romans at bay for three years and harassed their forces in frequent skirmishes, again raiding the Italian coast as far as Cumae. Still maintaining this guerrilla warfare he advanced in 244 to Mount Eryx in order to relieve pressure from the siege of Drepana. He captured the old town of Eryx on the northern slopes of the mountain, but the Romans retained the Temple of Aphrodite at the top of the mountain together with a lower point between the Temple and the town of Drepana, and so cut him off from interfering with the siege. Details of the two-year tussle are not known, but it was only terminated by the conclusion of the war.
The long years of Hamilcar’s campaigns convinced Rome that the war could only be won at sea. As the treasury was exhausted, a loan was raised repayable only in event of victory. By this patriotic effort a fleet of 200 warships and many transport ships were constructed, the quinqueremes being of light build (without corvi). In the summer of 242 the new fleet sailed under C. Lutatius Catulus to Drepana, where he found no Punic navy to face him, partly perhaps because the home government was leaving the burden of war to Hamilcar, partly because they needed the crews for wars in Africa. An attack on Drepana failed, but provisions were running low in the besieged town. By March 241 the Carthaginians had with difficulty manned 170 to 200 vessels; they intended to land stores in Sicily and then, having embarked Hamilcar and his men in order to compensate for their lack of marines, to face the foe. But off the Aegates Islands they met the Roman fleet. Hampered by their inadequate equipment and heavy freights they were quickly defeated. The Romans sank 50 ships and captured 70 more. Further resistance was out of the question. Carthage had shot her bolt; the war was at an end.
The Carthaginian government gave Hamilcar full powers to negotiate for peace. The following terms were agreed upon by Lutatius, subject to ratification at Rome: Carthage was to evacuate Sicily, not make war on Hiero or his allies, return all prisoners, and pay 2,200 talents in twenty annual instalments. These terms were lenient: the indemnity was trifling in proportion to the wealth of Carthage and the war expenditure of Rome; but then Rome had won control of Sicily. They were flatly rejected by the Roman people. Ten commissioners were sent to consider the question on the spot, and they succeeded in tightening up the terms by adding 1,000 talents (to be paid immediately) to the indemnity and decreasing the time of payment of the rest to ten years; all islands between Sicily and Italy (these would be Lipari and the Aegates) must be evacuated by Carthage; neither side was to attack the allies of the other nor to recruit soldiers in the dominions of the other. Apart from the 1,000 talents the other clauses might seem advantageous to the ignorant populace at Rome, but they were in fact not a very serious addition. However, the alternative was to continue the war, and so the Roman people, doubtless heeding the authority of the Senate, accepted the terms, and peace reigned after twenty-four years.
So ended a struggle which was, wrote Polybius, ‘the longest, most continuous and most severely contested war known to us in history’. Like the coming struggle with Hannibal, it was won by the moral qualities of the Roman people, by the patriotism of a citizen army, by the loyalty of the allies in Italy and of Hiero in Sicily, and by the steadiness of the senatorial government. The men of Rome vanquished the mammon of Carthage. Only in the crisis of the invasion of Africa had the citizens of Carthage drawn a sword in her defence. Her officers might be efficient, her gold might procure reliable mercenaries, but in the last resort she failed. Neither side produced a general of genius except perhaps Hamilcar, but the long years of disciplined warfare in Italy had given Rome an excellent fighting machine. True, she did not adapt it to meet the cavalry and elephants of the enemy and thus suffered defeat near the walls of Carthage; that reform was only achieved during the next struggle. But she did show great adaptability in taking to the sea; it was the old story of the struggle of the elephant and the whale, and she succeeded by determination rather than by technical skill. But the courage of the legions would have proved fruitless had the Italian troops failed them. The war showed clearly what the struggle with Hannibal proved beyond all doubt, that Rome’s allies were bound to her by other ties than those of slave to mistress.19
VIII
THE ENTR’ACTE
1. THE PROVINCE OF SICILY
The most obvious result of the First Punic War was that Rome had gained control of territory lying outside Italy. By driving the Carthaginians from Sicily she had become arbiter of the island’s fate, and her decision opened a new chapter in her history. Two courses were open: either to apply in Sicily the methods that she had used in Italy or else to maintain the forms of administration with which the Sicilians were already conversant from the rule of Carthage and Syracuse.
In Italy the Romans had applied no theory of state ownership to conquered land; apart from the ager publicus, they exacted no tribute in the form either of the products of the earth or their equivalent in cash. Instead, they had demanded military service from the conquered whom they called allies and whom they allowed thereafter to share their vic
tories and spoils. In Sicily they had at first adopted a similar policy, entering into alliances with Messana and Syracuse. Were they then to extend this system to the whole island, many of whose inhabitants differed from themselves in race, language and tradition? There were serious objections. The experience of many of the natives in political life was small, while their military qualifications were doubtful. Further, the Sicilians themselves would have considered it an intolerable burden to be dragged from their villages and farms to fight in wars about which they had no interest or knowledge. It would be easier for them to pay tribute as they had long been accustomed. And the existence of the practice was a strong factor in determining the policy of the Romans, who preferred to assimilate rather than to destroy; within limits, they were ready to adapt their machinery of government to current needs. To impose tribute was the line of least resistance; it was chosen perhaps without much thought of its implications or possible consequences, but in time it revolutionized the whole conception of government and changed the leader of an Italian federation into an imperial power which ultimately dominated the civilized world.
By establishing a new tribute-paying area Rome sowed the seeds from which her whole provincial system was to develop. But some parts of Sicily fell outside this district. The kingdom of Hiero, which comprised about a quarter of the island, was immune from taxation. By the alliance which he had concluded with Rome ‘for ever’ in 248, he was not even obliged to supply troops, though he voluntarily gave loyal support; but after his death in 215, and the revolt of Syracuse from Rome, Syracuse together with several of her subject cities was made tributary. Another ally of Rome was Messana, which, like many of the Greek cities of southern Italy, had to supply one warship; after the fall of Syracuse (212) Tauromenium and Netum were added to this class of civitates foederatae. To certain other cities Rome had promised autonomy and freedom from obligations in return for their help during the war; and she kept her promise. Halaesa, Centuripa, Segesta and Halicyae from the beginning of the war, and Panormus twelve years later, were all free from taxation though not allied to Rome (civitates immunes); this privilege, not confirmed by treaty, was dependent on their good behaviour and did not free them from Roman jurisdiction. At the other extreme from these free cities and allied cities was any land which the sovereign people of Rome might declare public property, ager publicus; the Roman censors then rented it on leasehold to its former holders. Probably, however, no territory apart from certain official Punic residences was disposed of in this way before the fall of Syracuse.
All these districts comprised about one half of the island. On the other half Rome imposed a regular annual tax, such as some cities had paid to Carthage, others to Syracuse. The dominant powers in Sicily had long collected tithes; Syracuse had done so from the days of Gelon. More recently Hiero had reorganized the assessment and administration of the taxes of his kingdom on very capable lines. He drew up a revenue code which in many respects resembled those of the great Hellenistic monarchies, especially Ptolemaic Egypt; yet it was probably his own work rather than a mere copy or adaptation of existing codes. So efficient was this Lex Hieronica that the Roman magistrates who first went out to govern Sicily decreed that the tithe should be collected on the lines laid down by this code, and the succeeding praetors maintained this practice, which was not embodied in law till the Lex Rupilia was passed in 131. But though Rome followed it in practice, she did not accept, nor perhaps realize, the theory on which it and the Oriental codes rested: that conquest involved full ownership of the conquered soil (dominium in solo provinciali). Instead, she regarded the revenue derived from Sicily as a tax paid by the governed to the state, not as rent paid by tenant to owner.1
The main form of taxation was a tithe on harvested crops (decumana). This system was very fair for an agricultural country, especially one that was subject to drought, for the amount of tithe would fluctuate with seasonal variations. Pasture land, which could not be taxed in this way, was liable to an annual monetary tax levied on every head of grazing stock (scriptura). Harbour-dues (portoria) were imposed on all imports and exports at the rate of 5 per cent. The Romans also reserved for themselves prior rights to buy additional wheat for the plebs at Rome (frumentum emptum), or for the Roman governor’s household (frumentum in cellam). Such requisitions were later regulated by legislation (73 BC).
The collection of the tithe, which followed the methods of Hiero, was equitably managed and prevented Sicily from becoming the prey of Roman tax collectors, who later exploited other provinces. It was not farmed out by contracts let at Rome to individuals or companies, as were the harbour-dues; nor was it administered by state officials, which would have involved the creation of a civil service. Instead it was farmed out to the highest bidder in the province, whether native or Roman; agents of Roman companies were not allowed to bid. Local city magistrates were responsible for listing the farmers, their land and produce. On the basis of such schedules the contractor – often the town itself – could bid in the presence of the Roman magistrate with the prospect of ⅖ per cent profit. He then fixed the exact amount of the tithe with the various farmers, who were protected against injustice, and deposited with the city magistrate copies of all agreements made. The local authorities thus became responsible for the correct delivery of the produce due, which was then paid to a Roman official. So efficient was the system that Cicero could write (in Verr., II, iii, 8, 20): ‘The law of Hiero is so carefully framed that neither in the cornfields, nor on the threshing floors, nor in the barns can the cultivator defraud the collector of one single grain without the severest punishment; nor is it possible for more than the tenth to be extorted from the cultivator against his will.’
The necessity of upholding law and order in the island led to the gradual creation of an administrative system. After her conquest of Italy Rome had administered the annexed districts through the central government at Rome, not by installing permanent officials with imperium in the various localities. But it had been found necessary in the fourth century for judicial reasons to send to various districts legates of the urban praetor (praefecti iure dicundo); and in 267 four quaestors (quaestores classici) had been appointed to given districts to protect the financial interests of the state and to guard the coast. After the First Punic War one of these Italic quaestors was apparently sent to Lilybaeum, whence he could direct the administration of the island. But soon it became clear that the duties of such a governor required the possession of full imperium, which was not inherent in the quaestorship. A magistrate, such as the consul or praetor, was needed. And so in about 227, after Rome had gained control of Sardinia as well as Sicily, the annual number of praetors was raised from two to four; two of them continued to serve in Rome, while two went to the islands. From this time the word provincia, which meant the sphere within which a magistrate exercised his imperium, began to be applied more particularly to these foreign spheres outside Italy: her overseas provinces.
The provincial praetor exercised wide powers. He controlled the general administration of the province, the local authorities and all public works; he commanded all the land and sea forces within his province; and he was the supreme judge in civil and criminal cases. He was supported by a large staff, consisting of one subordinate magistrate, the quaestor (there were two in Sicily after 210), one or more senatorial legati, to whom he might delegate any business, and a number of ‘comrades’ (comites), young men whom he initiated in the routine of official life. Theoretically he remained the colleague of the other praetors and exercised less authority than the consuls. In practice, however, being far from the control of these magistrates, unchecked by the principle of collegiality, unhampered by the tribunician veto, with his judgments not subjected to the right of appeal (except in the case of Roman citizens), he wielded almost kingly power. And Verres proved to the unfortunate Sicilians towards the end of the Republic that a provincial praetor could become a local tyrant. But on the other hand his tenure of office was short, so that he could
soon be called to task at Rome; he was checked by the local liberties granted to privileged cities under the official charter of the province (the lex provinciae); while the peaceful condition of a quiet province like Sicily precluded the use or abuse of much military power.
Under the strong hand of Rome, which had crushed the ancient struggle of Greek and Carthaginian in Sicily, the natives prospered. Their cities remained autonomous in local administration and they continued in increasing number to issue their own coinage. Within each city the popular assembly and the council still transacted business. Little attempt was made to adapt the municipal authorities to the Roman form, although the smaller membership of the councils made them easier bodies to deal with than the assemblies, thus giving a slightly anti-democratic bias. It is uncertain how far members of one community were forbidden the right to deal or hold property (commercium) or to marry (conubium) in another; Segesta was not allowed commercium, probably to safeguard her, while Centuripa was granted the somewhat doubtful privilege. The judicial machinery which was gradually created illustrates the fairness of the Roman rule. Cicero records (in Verr., II, ii, 13, 32) that in a suit between citizens of the same state the trial should be held in that state and in accordance with the native code; this would not preclude an appeal to the governor. When a Sicilian sued a member of another state, the praetor chose the judge by lot (he could be a Roman citizen). In suits between an individual and a state not his own, the Senate of a third state became judge. In litigation between natives and Roman citizens, the judge was to be of the nationality of the defendant.
A History of the Roman World Page 25