But one city south of the Ebro still withstood Hannibal: the friend of Rome, Iberian Saguntum perched on its rocky plateau. When it became known that Hannibal intended to demand its surrender in the spring, Roman ambassadors ordered him to respect their ally. Receiving no satisfaction from the general, they proceeded to Carthage where they fared no better. The juridical aspect of their demand will be discussed later, when it will be seen that technically Rome was at fault and that Hannibal was under no obligation to respect their request. Further, he had been provoked by Rome. A quarrel of the Saguntines with the Torboletae, a neighbouring tribe, subject to Carthage, had led to political disturbances in Saguntum, and one party appealed to Rome to arbitrate (c. 221). The Romans, not unnaturally, decided in favour of the appellant party, which was put into power with some loss of life among the Punic faction. Disregarding Rome’s representations, Hannibal advanced against Saguntum and championed the cause of his subjects, the Torboletae (spring 219). Relying on help from Rome the Saguntines refused to surrender; but Rome was busy in Illyria, and Saguntum was left to face Hannibal’s assault unaided. For eight months the blockade continued without thought of surrender, though Hannibal was ready to offer comparatively lenient terms. Finally, after a desperate and heroic resistance, the town fell by assault from the least inaccessible side, the west.14
Hannibal had thrown down the gauntlet. The fall of Saguntum fanned the sparks of rivalry into a blaze and made war inevitable. During the siege the Senate was probably unable to decide what ought to be done, especially as both consuls were absent on the Illyrian campaign – a preoccupation which the wily Hannibal did not overlook. It was only the fall of Saguntum that made action imperative. Had it held out through the winter, as the Romans hoped, the Hannibalic War might have been fought out in Spain (Pol., iii, 15). As it was, they temporized till late in March 218 or even longer, when an ultimatum was sent to Carthage demanding the surrender of Hannibal and his staff; this was virtually a declaration of war.15 After some discussion the leading Roman envoy, the old princeps senatus, M. Fabius Buteo, held up two folds of his toga and cried: ‘Here I bring peace and war; choose you which you will.’ The Carthaginians bade him give them which he pleased; and Fabius dropping the fold of his toga replied: ‘Then I give you war.’ And the deadly gift was accepted.
6. THE CAUSES OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR
The immediate cause of the Second Punic War was the Saguntine affair, which Polybius prefers to regard as the first incident in, rather than a cause of, the war. The question at issue was whether by attacking Saguntum Hannibal violated any treaty with Rome.16 Patriotic Roman annalists (e.g. Livy, xxi, 2, 7; Appian, Iber., 7) hastened to invent fictions to show that he had: for instance, they said that he broke the Ebro treaty by crossing the river to attack Saguntum, whereas the town lies a hundred miles south of the Ebro; or they suggest that a special clause was inserted in the Ebro treaty to the effect that Rome and Carthage should respect the neutrality of Saguntum. But it is not by such means that the blame can be assigned to Carthage.
There were two treaties which Hannibal’s action might have infringed: that of Lutatius in 241 and the Ebro convention of 226. Rome’s alliance with Saguntum was later than the treaty of Lutatius, so that the town was not included in the list of Rome’s allies whom the Carthaginians had promised to respect. The latter, therefore, were quite correct in insisting that Hannibal had not violated this treaty. But what of the Ebro agreement? Unfortunately, it cannot be related chronologically to Rome’s alliance with Saguntum with any degree of certainty; nor are its terms altogether clear. Even its validity has been questioned. It was a convention between Hasdrubal and delegates of the Roman Senate. It was probably ratified in Rome, and the Romans regarded it as legally binding on both parties, since the Carthaginians did not disavow their general who made it or his successor who, according to the Roman claim, transgressed it. The Carthaginians, however, denied that it had been ratified by their government. By its terms Hasdrubal renounced all hostile action north of the Ebro; his quid pro quo is not stated. Some suggest that he received little, others much. For instance, some allege that the treaty was unilateral and that as a member of a conquered nation Hasdrubal had to acquiesce in Rome’s wish; or on the other hand, others hold that the Ebro treaty defined the spheres of influence of the two nations and that it imposed on the Romans, either explicitly or implicitly, the obligation not to interfere south of the river. Probably, however, the concession made by Rome in face of the Gallic peril was to leave Hasdrubal free to extend his Spanish empire up to the river. How this affected Rome’s Saguntine alliance depends on the date assigned to the latter, which Polybius places ‘several years before the time of Hannibal’. If, as seems more probable, the alliance was prior to the treaty, it was then virtually annulled by the spirit of the new covenant, and could not in fairness be used by the Romans as a handle to check Punic expansion in the south. If Rome accepted the alliance after 226, she was deliberately interfering in an area where she had in effect recognized Carthaginian control. Whichever date, then, is correct, Rome had no legal ground to restrain Hannibal from attacking Saguntum; indeed she made no military attempt to do this. However unwise the Carthaginian general may have been, he was within his legal rights and was no treaty-breaker.17
But if Hannibal’s conscience was clear on the legal score, if he was merely returning the compliment for Rome’s interference with the Torboletae, he could not turn a blind eye to the political aspect. He was attacking a town which was under the declared protection of Rome, and he had been warned that its capture would be regarded as a casus belli. Yet he persisted – and from no military necessity. The frontier quarrel between the Saguntines and Torboletae need not involve hostilities, unless Hannibal wished. True, the acquisition of Saguntum would remove an awkward thorn from his side in the event of war with Rome; but its military value was not sufficient to warrant the risk of war. Nor had the Romans thrown a protective garrison into the town, as they had into Messana in 264; such an act would have violated treaty rights, which they were unwilling to disregard till the fall of the town made action imperative. Hannibal therefore persisted for other reasons; because he judged war with Rome was inevitable and because by manoeuvring the Romans into a false position he had forced on them the onus of declaring war, so that he could expect the continued support of his home government. (The view of Fabius Pictor, refuted by Polybius (iii, 8) that Hannibal did not have the backing of the Carthaginian government either at this time or during the war, should be rejected.) His capture of Saguntum may not have been the cause of war, but it undoubtedly caused the outbreak of war at that moment.
The immediate cause of war was thus the action of Hannibal and his government, but what were the underlying causes? Polybius finds three. First, the hatred of Hamilcar towards Rome; after his forced surrender in Sicily he lived for revenge and his spirit survived him. Secondly, the bitterness felt at Carthage when Rome seized Sardinia and renewed the threat of war. Thirdly, resulting from this, Hamilcar’s activity and the Carthaginian success in Spain.18 Did the Second Punic War then owe its origin to the hatred of the house of Barca; was it a war of revenge? The answer must depend on the interpretation given to the motives of the Barcids in Spain. Were they building up resources and an army with which to hurl themselves against Rome or were they merely trying to compensate their country for its loss of Sicily and Sardinia; was the object of their empire-building offensive or defensive?
Hamilcar had gone to Spain immediately after his country had been humiliated by Rome in 237; he cannot have forgotten his enforced capitulation in Sicily; and he made his son swear never to be friends with Rome. These facts establish beyond doubt his hatred of Rome, but they do not prove that he contemplated revenge or that he went to Spain to plan it. Rather, he went with the intention of re-establishing his country’s lost empire. He must have foreseen the possibility of renewed rivalry and he wanted to equip Carthage for the future, whatever that might hold. The fact that he d
id not rebuild a large Punic navy need not signify his pacific intentions (and anyway it would have been an unnecessary annoyance to Rome); it probably meant that in the event of war he planned to fight by land as Hannibal did when the day came. He wished to be prepared rather than to reopen the question. His successor Hasdrubal pursued still more clearly a defensive policy. When Rome was seriously engaged with the Gauls, so far from joining the attack on their side, he deliberately concluded a treaty with Rome which confined his activity to Spain. Hannibal, however, had to face somewhat different circumstances, for the Romans began to interfere in Saguntum. It is not likely that they acted with the desire of bringing a hornets’ nest about their ears. But when they were freed from the Gallic peril, they began to look askance at the growing Punic power in Spain which they themselves had sanctioned; doubtless Massilia brought the situation to their notice. Their action at Saguntum was little more than a gentle hint to Hannibal to walk warily, but it was enough to fan his smouldering wrath to a blaze. He determined to make it a test case to see whether Rome would abide by her treaty; but he must have foreseen the result. The Barcids had remained true to a defensive policy till they feared, whether with good cause or not, a repetition of the Sardinian question. And this time the Carthaginians refused to bow their necks.
Hannibal had cleverly precipitated a crisis in which the Romans were technically at fault, but from which they could not retreat without loss of prestige. He was thus immediately responsible for a war which neither Rome nor Carthage had deliberately engineered. Yet it was improbable that the two Republics could have lived at peace indefinitely. A balance of powers, such as existed in the Hellenistic east, might have been maintained for a time, yet causes of friction would inevitably occur now that Rome had been forced to become a world power. But throughout the years between the first two Punic wars Rome had not followed a deliberately aggressive policy. It has been suggested that there was strong disagreement in the state between an agrarian party under Flaminius, which limited its outlook to Italy, and a capitalistic party which favoured a Weltpolitik. While admitting a real clash of interests, it is unlikely that the latter party formed any deliberate imperialistic policy. The Senate rather met practical difficulties with practical solutions than followed a consistent and carefully conceived scheme.19 The seizure of Sardinia, which was the aggressive act of a nervous bully, represented a passing mood. The Gallic wars were defensive in spirit, though they caused Rome to safeguard her northern frontier. Her early action in Spain was due more to the apprehension of her ally, Massilia, than to a studied western policy. The intervention in Illyria was a necessary piece of police work. True, all these acts involved future responsibility. Once she had set her hand to the plough there could be no turning back. But Rome could hardly be expected to anticipate the ultimate result of each action. She dealt with each situation as it arose and if Hannibal chose to challenge her interference in Spain, she was willing to face the consequences and to determine the lordship of the western Mediterranean.
IX
HANNIBAL’S OFFENSIVE AND ROME’S DEFENSIVE
1. HANNIBAL’S INVASION OF NORTHERN ITALY
When war was declared between Rome and Carthage, Rome’s superiority at sea led her to suppose that she could choose the theatre for the new conflict. And she chose Spain and Africa. One consul, P. Cornelius Scipio, with some 24,000 men and 60 ships, was to conduct the war in Spain, while Ti. Sempronius Longus with about 26,000 troops and 160 vessels was sent to Sicily preparatory to crossing to Africa. The size of the African expeditionary force shows that Rome had no intention of striking immediately at Carthage itself. A demonstration could be made, the native tribes won over, the large estates of the nobles ravaged, and reinforcements for Hannibal intercepted; further support could be sent if events in Europe justified it. Meantime Hannibal must be watched. Naval inferiority would force him to seek the enemy by land either on the defensive in Spain or by an offensive in northern Italy. And because of the fiery spirit of the Barcid house and Hannibal’s intrigues with the Gauls, the Romans might expect him to take the offensive, cross the Ebro, and advance gradually, consolidating his communications en route. So they decided to send an army to check him either in northern Spain or more probably in southern Gaul, since an immediate Roman offensive in Spain with no base and in face of the enemy’s superior numbers would be hazardous. Resistance would be easier near the friendly Massilia and in reach of their base at Pisa, while Hannibal’s strength would be less when he arrived there; after repulsing him at the Rhône, the Romans could launch an offensive in northern Spain. But whether they hoped to meet him in Spain or Gaul, they underestimated one factor – his genius.
Hannibal was not content to meet the enemy in Spain and Africa. He realized that a Roman victory in Africa would mean the loss of the war and that therefore he must strike first, while Carthaginian victories in Africa would not break the power of Rome, which could only be smashed beyond recovery by destroying her Italian confederacy. He determined therefore to cut off her source of strength by fighting in Italy and disintegrating the League. His chances of reaching Italy must have seemed meagre, as Rome guarded the seas and the land route was long and difficult, but he trusted in his ability to overcome the obstacles. Where he miscalculated was by assuming that Rome’s allies were unwilling slaves of a tyrannical mistress. He hoped that they would rise to acclaim him as liberator, while Pyrrhus’ career had shown that an army in Italy could seriously embarrass Rome. Further, he could count on the Gauls in northern Italy rallying to his banner; these traditional enemies of Rome, though recently defeated, were not completely crushed. So he formed the bold scheme of sacrificing his communications with Spain and Carthage and swooping suddenly on to northern Italy, which would form a base in place of Spain. He started with a veteran army of perhaps 35,000 or 40,000 men; for the defence of Africa there were some 20,000 men, while he left 15,000 in southern Spain and another 11,000 north of the Ebro.1 The total forces which Carthage put into the field were about 80,000 soldiers, 100 ships and 25,000 marines; Rome mustered 70,000 men, 220 ships and 50,000–60,000 sailors. The seriousness of the struggle is shown by the numbers raised by the two Republics, although each of them could have doubled these if necessary. But Rome had two decisive factors in her favour: superiority at sea and the superior quality of the reserve troops which she could produce in her hour of need. The best troops of Carthage were already in the field.
At the end of April 218, Hannibal started on his crusade from New Carthage; he crossed the Ebro in early June when the spring flooding of the river had subsided, but he did not reach the Rhône till mid-August. This delay was hardly caused by a serious attempt to subdue the intervening tribes, because he had determined to sacrifice his communications. Possibly he encountered stronger opposition than he had anticipated, or perhaps he marched slowly to deceive the Romans, thinking that if he passed the Pyrenees by the end of July he could then dash forward and get through the Alpine passes before they closed in the autumn. In this way he would lull the enemy’s suspicions and avoid the risk that the four consular legions might concentrate in northern Italy. At the Rhône he would have found P. Scipio waiting to contest his passage, had not the Roman plans miscarried. The Boii and Insubres around the new Latin colonies of Placentia and Cremona (p. 172) rebelled, doubtless at Hannibal’s instigation, and the two legions which Scipio had prepared for Spain had to be directed to suppress the insurrection. However, Scipio raised two new legions and reached the mouth of the Rhône by the middle of August. Little realizing Hannibal’s real intentions he sent out a cavalry detachment to reconnoitre. Meantime Hannibal, who had found his crossing of the Rhône challenged by hostile tribes on the further bank, sent a force under Hanno across the river higher up, and when they were ready to fall on the rear of the Gauls, he crossed over and won a victory. Scipio’s reconnoitring force, after severely handling a Numidian scouting squadron, returned to headquarters to inform him that Hannibal had crossed the Rhône. Three days later
Scipio arrived on the spot and found Hannibal’s camp deserted and that he had crossed the river, elephants and all,2 and was marching to the Alps. He then took a momentous decision. Instead of attempting a wild goose chase after Hannibal, he sent his army under his brother Gnaeus to Spain, where the enemy might be held at bay now that Hannibal’s best troops had gone. Scipio himself returned by sea to northern Italy to assume command of the two legions there, and to await Hannibal’s arrival. Though he has been criticized for neglecting the Italian front by sending his army to Spain, a truer appreciation shows that his cautious farsighted conduct and his energetic initiative laid the strategic foundations by which victory was ultimately won.
Hannibal marched up the Rhône to the ‘Island’, where it is joined by the Isère (Isara), and then along this valley to Grenoble. Where he actually crossed the Alps always has been and presumably always will be a matter of uncertainty. The problem is literary even more than topographical. Polybius gives a graphic description, based partly on personal discussions with survivors and supported by a journey to the Alps to verify the geography. But even so his narrative does not fix the pass with certainty, while Livy’s account, which derives in part from Polybius, introduces further difficulties. The majority of scholars look for the pass between the Little St Bernard and Mt Genèvre. But wherever the exact pass was, Hannibal’s exploit has stirred the imagination of mankind.3 The actual difficulty of crossing into Italy was not severe, for whole Celtic tribes often moved in this way. The real difficulties arose from the extreme hostility of the Alpine tribes and the fact that the descent was steeper than Hannibal had anticipated and was rendered more perilous by the snow and frost of the advancing autumn. If he had arrived somewhat earlier, many of the dangers would have been avoided. But in the circumstances it was a magnificent triumph of will and discipline over hardship and loss. And so he reached the plains of northern Italy, but with only 26,000 men. The Alps and their inhabitants had taken their toll.
A History of the Roman World Page 28