Rhodes sank into obscurity even sooner. The Rhodians had received Lycia and Caria for helping Rome against Antiochus (189), but unfortunately the Senate had not specified the status of the Lycians, who regarded themselves as allies of Rhodes, while Rhodes regarded them as subjects. This resulted in war and Lycia appealed to the Senate, who ruled that the Lycians had been given to Rhodes not as a free gift but as friends and allies (177). The attitude of Rhodes became somewhat frigid, and during the war with Perseus the anti-Roman faction became more prominent, but there was as yet no open breach. In 168 an unfortunate episode occurred: Rhodes sent an embassy to Rome to
MAP III
try to mediate in the quarrel with Perseus. When the ambassadors learnt that news of Perseus’ defeat at Pydna had just arrived they did their best by hastily substituting a congratulatory speech in place of the one they had come to deliver; but it was not convincing. A praetor even proposed that war should be declared, but Cato promptly quashed the idea; the Rhodians in gratitude sent a golden crown and humbly sought alliance with Rome. This was not granted till after a dignified interval (165). Meanwhile the Senate punished Rhodes by declaring that the Lycian and Carian cities assigned to her in 188 should be free and by creating commercial competition at Delos, which was handed over to Athens on condition that no harbour dues should be imposed. Both these measures struck hard at Rhodes’ revenue, and the greatness of the island began to fade. Rome was later hoisted on her own petard when the pirates whom Rhodes had long kept in check became the scourge of the eastern Mediterranean. The chief centre of piracy was Crete, which was distracted by internal dissensions; Rome had intervened to settle these in 189 and 174 with little effect. When in 155 a united Crete fought against Rhodes, Rome failed to help her sister Republic, who could no longer keep the seas clear for her trade.
After the battle of Magnesia the Seleucid monarchy, despite the loss of Asia Minor, Armenia, Parthia and Bactria, gradually revived. More isolated from the western world, it began under Antiochus IV Epiphanes (from 175) to strengthen its authority in the east, to check internal disintegration and nationalistic movements, and finally was ready to break another lance with Egypt for the age-long debated possession of Coele-Syria. Rome’s relations with Egypt were slightly strained: antagonized by the alliance of Egypt with Antiochus III in 196, she had not rewarded Egypt at the settlement of Apamea, although she had originally been anxious to protect Egyptian dependencies. Further, Egypt had made some tactless overtures to the Achaean League in 185 and 183, but native revolts kept the country out of European politics. By 170 Egypt was planning to renew the invasion of Coele-Syria, when Antiochus IV crashed through her frontier defences. The young Ptolemy VI Philometor was captured and the Alexandrines replaced him by his brother Ptolemy VII, Euergetes Physcon. But instead of fighting his way back to the Egyptian throne, as Antiochus hoped, the deposed king came to terms and set up a joint kingship with his brother. Antiochus, who had withdrawn, thereupon re-entered Egypt and seized Cyprus (168). Rome had been too busy in Macedon to assist either of the Ptolemies, although a centenary renewal of the friendship between Rome and Egypt had been effected, but after Pydna the Senate sent a peremptory order to Antiochus to evacuate Egypt and Cyprus. The Roman envoy, Popillius, handed the Senate’s despatch to the king, who asked for time to consider; but Popillius merely drew a circle round Antiochus in the sand and bade him answer before stepping out of it. The king meekly obeyed and withdrew from Egypt.
The two Ptolemies did not reign in amity for long. In 164 Philometor was expelled from Egypt and appealed to Rome, making a theatrical appearance in the Senate-house dressed in a suppliant’s rags; the Senate intervened by diplomacy alone. After another reconciliation between the brothers, Philometor obtained Egypt and Cyprus, Euergetes Cyrene, but when soon afterwards Euergetes appeared in Rome to ask for Cyprus (162), the Senate agreed but took no military action to enforce his claim and merely broke off diplomatic relations with Philometor. Later Euergetes alleged that his brother had tried to murder him, and in 154 he returned to Rome where he supported his accusation by displaying to the Senate some knife-marks on his body. Before leaving Cyrene, however, he had tried to propitiate the Romans and to show his subjects that a revolt during his absence would not lead to freedom or union with Egypt: he set up a public inscription stating that should he die without legitimate heirs he bequeathed to the Roman people his rightful realm, the protection of which he entrusted to them. This document, the earliest known testament of a Hellenistic king in favour of Rome, did not, in fact, become operative, but it illustrates the humility which the Hellenistic world now adopted towards the rising sun of Rome.10 In reply to his friendly gesture and Ptolemy’s personal appeal, the Senate ordered their eastern allies to co-operate in restoring Cyprus to him. But when the promised help did not materialize, it seems that the king attempted to reinstate himself and was captured. He was, however, generously restored to Cyrene by his brother Philometor, who continued to reign in Egypt and Cyprus at peace with Rome, where Cato supported his cause. Though Polybius (xxxi, 10) criticizes Rome’s policy towards Egypt as an example of how she profited by the mistakes of another, it is in fact noticeable that Rome seemed to procrastinate and often did not insist on the immediate execution of her requests. Indeed, her hesitancy towards Egypt may have inspired Carthage and the Achaean League with unwarranted hopes.
Further trouble arose in Syria on the death of Antiochus IV (163). The rightful heir to the throne was his nephew Demetrius, the son of his predecessor Seleucus IV; but Antiochus left his son Antiochus V to succeed him. The Senate ordered commissioners to settle the difficulty. When they proceeded to enforce some disarmament clauses of the Peace of Apamea an insurrection broke out, in which the angry crowd at Laodicea mobbed the embassy and killed its leader (162). Further, Demetrius, who was a hostage at Rome, escaped to Syria without the Senate’s permission, and recovered his father’s kingdom.11 He secured the death of Antiochus V, but had to face a pretender, Timarchus, governor of Babylonia, who had won verbal recognition from the Senate. Perhaps with a view to checking his power the Senate received the overtures of Judas Maccabaeus from Jerusalem and concluded a treaty with the Jews, promising Roman help and friendship if they were attacked (161).12 The next year Demetrius, who had overthrown the rebel Timarchus, at length obtained official recognition from the Senate through the good offices of Tiberius Gracchus. Rome continued to avoid active intervention in Syria. About 150 a pretender, Alexander Balas, gained recognition from the Senate and overthrew Demetrius, who was constantly making trouble and enemies. In 147 a son of Demetrius challenged Balas and was supported by Ptolemy VI. When the people of Antioch offered Ptolemy the Seleucid crown, fear of provoking Rome sufficed to make him decline it, and he withdrew in favour of the young Demetrius, who requited him by seizing Coele-Syria at his death; so ended the long struggle between the Ptolemies and Seleucids (145). Thus in the years which followed the death of Antiochus the Great, Rome often exerted diplomatic pressure against Syria where she liked to see a weak king on the Seleucid throne. But as Syria became weaker and her revival less possible, indifference took the place of that suspicion and fear which had often driven Rome to intervention and once to arms.
4. THE END OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE
The four Macedonian Republics for some time proved a successful experiment, especially considering that the people were not used to self-government. In 158 the Senate reopened the royal mines and allowed the Republics the right of coinage. The first serious trouble arose from a pretender to the Macedonian throne. This adventurer, named Andriscus, who claimed to be a son of Perseus, at first failed to gain support in Macedon or Syria, and even when aided by Thracian troops and money he only climbed to the throne of Macedon after two victories in the field (149). Rome was slow to act, especially in view of the lack of Macedonian enthusiasm for the pretender. But he was soon strong enough to defeat a small Roman force which was sent against him. In 148 Caecilius Metellus arrived with two legio
ns and quickly ended Andriscus’ career. To prevent similar disturbances in the future, Rome took a momentous departure from her old policy of leaving Greece free and ungarrisoned. Macedon was declared a Roman province governed by a Roman magistrate, and Illyricum and Epirus were added to his sphere of administration.13 But it was not intended to alter the conditions of the local communities as fixed by Aemilius Paullus; the tribute probably was not increased, while the restrictions between the now abolished Republics were removed. With her frontiers severely guarded Macedon entered on a period of comparative peace, and before the death of Polybius the Via Egnatia had been completed from Epidamnus on the west coast to Cypsela near the Dardanelles, a length of 535 miles; but her independent history was ended.
In Greece, as in Macedon, permanent changes were at length introduced. The Senate’s refusal to free the thousand deported Achaeans was a bitter pill for the League to swallow; to free them would be to admit that their detention had been unjust. Only after sixteen years was the remnant set free (151/50). Meantime the League had been robbed of its most experienced statesmen and had been at the mercy of the hated pro-Roman Callicrates, whom even the children in the streets called ‘traitor’. The Senate in vain tried to compensate for detaining the prisoners by ensuring that her envoys in Greece were men of character and by allowing the League or its cities to arbitrate in disputes between Sparta and Megalopolis in 164 and between Athens and Oropus in 156. When Callicrates died in 150 the last check on the anti-Roman party was removed and the Achaeans’ anger blazed forth, fanned by the extremist Diaeus. Mistaking Rome’s conciliatory attitude for weakness they saw their opportunity for revenge now that Roman armies were engaged in Spain, Africa and Macedon. The cause of the outbreak was Achaea’s attempt to coerce Sparta, who had seceded from the League. When Sparta complained at Rome the Senate ordered the Achaeans to restore full independence to Sparta, and to Corinth and Argos who did not desire it (148). At Corinth, where anti-Roman feeling ran strong among the proletariat, the Senators bearing the decree were mobbed and the punishment of those responsible was refused. A conciliatory message from the Senate caused a second hostile demonstration at Corinth. Achaea then declared war on Sparta and Heracleiaad-Oetam, and there was a general rally among the masses in Boeotia and Euboea in her favour. But the Achaeans’ action was aimed at Rome, and while their new general and dictator, Critolaus, was busy storming Heracleia instead of organizing his defences, a Roman army under Metellus descended from Macedon and swept him aside (146). A second army, raised by Diaeus, checked Metellus at Corinth, but in vain. His successor, Mummius, arrived with four legions and routed the enemy at the Isthmus; he then entered Corinth.14
For a moment Rome’s patience broke under the strain and she decided to punish Corinth for violating the sanctity of her ambassadors and to make an example of her to all Greece. Mummius was ordered to sell the remaining inhabitants into slavery and to level the city to the ground; her artistic treasures were shipped to Rome, whether or not there is truth in the anecdotes which told how the troops played dice on famous masterpieces and how the matter-of-fact Mummius contracted that any lost on the voyage should be replaced. Details of the Senate’s settlement are obscure. Individuals were punished. The Achaean and at least all hostile leagues were temporarily dissolved. The cities, at any rate those which had remained loyal to Rome, were probably immune from taxation, while the prohibition of commercium between cities was probably only a temporary restriction. Democracies were abolished and timocracies established in those parts of Greece which had been reduced in war. As Greece had no frontiers to be protected, she was not made into a province till a century later. But she was placed under the supervision of the governor of Macedonia who was responsible for settling disputes and maintaining order.
The punishment of Corinth was cruel but effective. There is little evidence to support the view that it was dictated by commercial jealousy. It was a lesson to all Greece that Rome was tired of her quarrels, and the lesson was not in vain. That an oligarchical state should seek to impose an aristocratic form of government on Greece was natural enough, especially as it facilitated the transaction of business; at the same time the Greeks retained considerable local autonomy. Indeed, after some years the commercial barriers between cities were removed and even the leagues were revived on a social and religious basis. The long chapter of Greek independence was ended. But peace did not necessarily bring prosperity or happiness. Hellas had fallen from her high estate. And it is more just to charge Greece herself with slow suicide than to accuse Rome of murder or even homicide.15
XIV
ROME, ITALY AND THE WESTERN MEDTERRANEAN
1. THE NORTHERN FRONTIER
After the Second Punic War Rome had to face the challenge of the barbarian, as well as of the civilized, world. Cisalpine Gaul must be recovered, subdued and secured. In Spain the natives must be driven back to render the Roman occupation safe; having wrested the Peninsula from Carthage, the Romans no more thought of giving it back to the natives than the Allies after the First World War thought of letting German colonial possessions revert to a native administration. Yet Rome had not entered on a systematic career of conquest; perhaps it would have been better for the native populations if she had. Distracted by eastern affairs and exhausted by the Hannibalic War, she only fought as need arose. A systematic conquest, followed up by the spreading of Roman civilization, could have been accomplished in a few years. Instead, slow wars dragged on interminably, often with little plan, under mediocre or ambitious generals; useless cruelty and great losses were endured by both sides, until at length a semblance of order was imposed. Although the final settlement of these barbarian tribes was only completed by Augustus the peacemaker, yet in the fifty years which followed the Hannibalic War Rome had asserted her suzerainty, not only in Corsica, Sardinia and the highlands of central Spain, but also on her northern frontier from near Marseilles, along the sweep of the Alps to Istria and thence down the western coast of the Balkan peninsula.
At Hannibal’s approach many of the Gauls of the valley of the Po who had just bowed the knee to Rome had rallied to his standard. But they had not given him adequate support; not till the end of the war did his agent succeed in fomenting a serious Gallic revolt, and then it was too late; the golden opportunity of 218 BC had been lost. The loyalty of the Veneti and Mantua, Cremona and Placentia gave the Romans an invaluable foothold in the north against Gallic unrest, which only came to a head in 201 when the Boii defeated a Roman detachment (near modern Forli), while the consul Paetus was trying to secure an important pass over the Apennines by the Sapi (Savio) valley. Encouraged by the victory, instigated further by Hamilcar, and supported by the Insubres and Cenomani, they fell on Placentia (200 or 199). The praetor Furius Purpureo arrived too late to save the town, but he parried a Gallic thrust at Cremona where he defeated the Insubres.1
When affairs in Greece began to shape better the Senate decided on more drastic action in the north. The consuls of 197 converged on Cisalpine Gaul from opposite directions. Cornelius Cethegus approached from Venetia and found the Cenomani ready to acknowledge Rome’s suzerainty once more, while he defeated the Insubres on the banks of the Mincio near Mantua. Meantime his colleague Minucius Rufus, who marched from Genoa over the Apennines, burnt Clastidium as punishment for its defection in the Hannibalic War, and mastered the country around Litubio; but the Gauls and Ligurians would not meet him in open battle. In 196 both consuls again took the field. Marcellus, the son of the victor of Syracuse, crossed the Po and finished the war in Transpadane Gaul by defeating the Insubres near Comum. They signed a treaty by which no Insubrian was ever to receive Roman citizenship; soon afterwards the district of Mediolanum (Milan) was occupied by Italian settlers. Although the Boii were thus isolated, they withstood the other consul in Cispadane Gaul and perhaps even attacked Marcellus on his return journey. As their submission was expected shortly, little effort was made; the various battles, recorded by Roman annalists, amount to little, and n
o general won a triumph. In 192 Lucius Flamininus and Domitius Ahenobarbus, the victor of Magnesia, tried in vain to outshine their predecessors. But the next year P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, cousin of Africanus, won a striking and final victory over the Boii, who ceded half their territory and gradually withdrew to Bohemia or else were absorbed by the spread of Roman civilization.
The conquered district was soon organized. In 190 Placentia and Cremona were both reinforced by 6,000 Roman and Latin settlers. The next year Bononia (Bologna; the old Etruscan Felsina) received 3,000 colonists who were given large allotments of 50–70 iugera. In 183 Parma and Mutina were settled as Roman colonies; the large number of settlers, 2,000 at each, and the traditionally small allotments of 5–8 iugera emphasize the military need. Meanwhile the consuls of 187, Aemilius Lepidus and C. Flaminius, were linking up these new districts with roads that bore their names: the Via Aemilia, running from Ariminum through Bononia to Placentia, and the Via Flaminia from Arretium over the Apennines to Bononia. Thus the whole of Cisalpine Gaul in the region of the Po gradually came under Roman influence, from the Adriatic to the Sesia in the west.2 Beyond this river the Romans did not venture; the Salassi of the western Alpine valleys around Aosta long retained their independence.
The Romans then addressed themselves to the problem of the tribes on either side of Cisalpine Gaul: the Ligurians and the Istri. The Ligurians who dwelt in the Apennines from the Arno to Savoy were a hardier race than the Gauls of the northern plain. From their mountain heights they threatened alike the valley of the Po and the plains and ports of Tuscany, and even challenged the commerce of Massilia. Their two chief tribes were the Apuani above Luna (Spezia), and the Ingauni north and west of Genoa. By making peace with the latter in 201 the Romans secured control over the important ports of Luna and Genoa, and were in no hurry to undertake the systematic reduction of the Italian Riviera. Minucius Rufus marched through Ligurian territory in 197, and Minucius Thermus forced back the Apuani, who threatened Pisa in 192, and made a demonstration beyond the Auser.3 The Senate did not take active measures till after the wars with Philip and Antiochus. While constructing a road from Pisa to Genoa in 186 the consul Marcius Philippus ventured with two legions into the mountain fastness of the Apuani and was destroyed in a pass which received his name – Saltus Marcius. The following year one consul proceeded against the Apuani, the other against the Ingauni who had broken their alliance. But the resistance of the Ligurians was slow to weaken. In 181 Aemilius Paullus, the future victor of Pydna, reduced the Ingauni to allegiance; the consuls of 180 defeated the Apuani and transported 40,000 of them to near Beneventum in Samnium. In the vacant territory the Romans probably established a Latin colony at Luca (c. 178) and in 177 Luna received 2,000 Roman citizens.4
A History of the Roman World Page 39