17 SOME LEGENDS OR FACTS. As to the story of the senators, Ogilvie (Livy, 725 f.) is inclined to accept it as a deliberate act of devotio. He also points out that although geese were not sacred to Juno, birds were kept on the Capitol for purposes of divination (hens, used later, may only have been imported in the fourth century). The real reason for the withdrawal of the Gauls was probably a report that the Veneti were attacking Cisalpine Gaul (Polybius, ii, 18, 3), while Livy (v, 48, 1) refers to pestilence among the Gauls. Diodorus (xiv, 117, 7) records that the Gauls were defeated not by the Romans but by the Caeretans in Sabine territory and the gold was thus recovered. Livy, however, had no difficulty in turning Rome’s disaster to Rome’s glory: after Brennus’ insolence, Camillus appeared as a deus ex machina and routed the enemy. Livy puts in his mouth a fine speech (v, 51–4) appealing for the preservation of Rome and its glory; this may reflect fears at the end of the Republic that the capital of the Empire might be transferred from Rome either by Julius Caesar or Mark Antony, fears which Augustus finally allayed. Lastly, we may note that according to one tradition, Hellenic perhaps in origin, the friendly Greeks of Massilia had advanced the ransom money (Justin, xxiv, 4, 3).
18 THE ‘SERVIAN’ WALL. T. Frank (Roman Buildings of the Republic, 1924) had supposed that it was built by the Roman army with Veientane captives serving as quarrymen. But see G. Säflund, Le mura di Roma repubblicana (1932); Nash, Pict. Dict. Anc. Rome, ii, 104 ff. (with bibliography); Roma Medio Repubblicana. Aspetti culturali di Roma e del Lazio nei secoli iv e iii a.C. (1973). However, the quarry-marks on the wall seem now to be archaic Latin and not Greek: see F. Castagnoli, Stud. Rom., 1974, 431, n. 14, J. Reynolds, JRS 1976, 177.
19 THE WARS. Accepted in general by e.g. L. Homo, CAH, vii, ch. xviii; rejected by Beloch (Röm. Gesch., 319).
20 ETRUSCAN CONTACTS. In I rapporti romano-ceriti (1960) M. Sordi, who has tried to distinguish traces of Etruscan historiography in the surviving tradition, finds strong Etruscan influences in Rome in these years, arising from friendship with Caere. This friendship is placed in a wider setting: it helped to counter Rome’s weakness in Latium, to check the expansionist policy of Dionysius of Syracuse into Italy, to contain Gallic threats, to support Rome’s expeditions to Sardinia and Corsica, and to promote friendship with Massilia and the Carthaginian treaty of 348, while internally in Rome a pro-Etruscan plebeian group was strengthened and supported the Licinian reforms. Such a reconstruction, even if the evidence is too weak to give it full support, at least emphasizes the widening horizon that Rome was being forced to face (though Etruscan influence on Roman politics at home is much less likely). But some of the items in Rome’s alleged overseas interest at this time are somewhat suspect: attempts to found colonies in Corsica (attested by Theophrastus, Hist. Plant., v, 8, 2, at some unnamed date, but before he wrote in the late fourth century) and in Sardinia c. 377 BC (Diod., xv, 27, 4), and the treaty of alliance with Massilia which Justin (lxiii, 5, 10) set as early as 386. Rome’s supposed growing Mediterranean interests, arising from her friendship with Etruscan Caere, as expounded by M. Sordi, are taken seriously by J. Heurgon, Rise of R. 183 ff.
21 VOLSCIAN DEFEATS. Beloch (Röm. Gesch., 315 ff.) regards the victory of 389 as a fictitious counterblast to the battle of Allia, and those of 386 and 381 as reduplications of that of 389.
22 CAERE. See A. N. Sherwin-White, Rom. Cit., edn 2, 53 ff.; De Sanctis, SR, ii, 256 ff.; Beloch, Röm. Gesch., 363 ff. For a defence of a grant in 386 see M. Sordi, I rapporti romano-ceriti (1960), 36 ff.; W. V. Harris, Rome in Etruria and Umbria (1971), 45 ff. A. J. Toynbee, Hannibal’s Legacy (1965), i, 410 ff. and P. A. Brunt, Italian Manpower (1971), 515 ff. give full discussions and follow Beloch in dating civitas sine suffragio to 274–273. For the wider implications of Rome’s relations with Caere see n. 20 above.
23 FURTHER GALLIC RAIDS. Polybius (relying on Fabius Pictor) records that in 357 some Gauls reached the Alban Mount unopposed and that in 346 or 345 they returned to the attack but withdrew when challenged by the Roman army; Livy (drawing upon later annalists) attributes a Roman victory to Camillus’ son in 349 when the picturesque incident of the intervention of the raven (corvus) on behalf of M. Valerius Corvus took place. Perhaps the events recorded in 349 and 346 refer to one affair, while Livy’s raid of 360 may be equated with the Polybian incident of 357.
24 SABELLIAN CAMPANIA. For the occupation of Campania by the Sabellians see T. J. Cornell, Museum Helveticum, 1974, 193 ff.
25 RAIDS ON CENTRAL ITALY. In 384 Dionysius I raided Pyrgi and sacked the rich Etruscan temple of Leucothea or Eileithyia (Diodorus, xv, 14). Traces of his raid survive: see Arch. Class 1957, 213. There seems no good reason to doubt Livy’s references (vii, 25, 4; 26, 13) to raids in Latium in 349.
26 THE SAMNITES. On their culture and history see E. T. Salmon’s standard work, Samnium and the Samnites (1967). M. Sordi, Roma e i Sanniti nel IV secolo A.C. (1969) takes full note of the ‘international’ background, but is speculative, not least in chronological reconstruction (cf. J. Pinsent, JRS, 1971, 271 f.).
27 ROMAN VICTORIES? The capture of Sora on the Upper Liris and the victory over the Aurunci attributed to 345 (Livy, vii, 28) are probably anticipations of the events of 314: see De Sanctis, SR, ii, 266.
28 THE FIRST SAMNITE WAR. F. E. Adcock, who rejects the war, writes (CAH, vii, 588) that to accept it one would have to postulate ‘folly in the Romans, blindness in the Latins, a short memory for benefits in the Campanians and a short memory for injuries in the Samnites’. De Sanctis (ii, 269 ff.), however, accepts the war as historical in outline; though rejecting the alleged deditio of the Campanians to Rome, he believes in a Romano-Campanian alliance and in the two Roman victories at Suessula and Mt Gaurus, but he rejects the battle at Saticula as an anticipation of Caudium. If the war is accepted, Rome’s motives may include a desire to get a foothold in the rear of the Volsci, Aurunci and discontented Latins, to win control of one of the wealthiest cities in Italy and to prevent the Samnites from strengthening their position in Campania: so S. W. Spaeth, The Causes of Wars, 343–265 (1926), 20. The historicity of the war is also defended by E. T. Salmon, Samnium and the Samnites (1967), 195 ff. (cf. also A. Bernardi, Athenaeum, 1943, 21 ff.) and E. S. Staveley, Historia, 1959, 419 ff. Staveley believes that behind Rome’s desire to extend her influence southwards into Campania lay a growing interest in trade and industry, and that this Campanian policy was promoted by a group of men who included Q. Publilius Philo, M. Valerius Corvus, Sp. Postumius Albinus, C. Maenius and later the great Appius Claudius. On the other hand Salmon finds the advocates of this southern policy in a group of patricians, though with the support of some plebeian leaders (Samnium, 203 ff.). While it is clear that a group of senators successfully continued to advocate a more active policy towards Campania, the extent to which military motives were reinforced by commercial interests must remain doubtful.
29 CAMPANIAN POLICY. If the First Samnite War and the Roman-Campanian alliance are accepted, this sudden change in the Campanians has to be explained. De Sanctis (SR, ii, 274) suggests that as they were allies of the Roman-Latin alliance they had to choose between the two and chose to support the weaker side because they could thus hope to preserve their independence in the event of being victorious. The relations of Rome and Capua between 343 and 338 are discussed by A. Bernardi, Athenaeum, 1942, 88 ff., 1943, 21 ff. On early Capua see J. Heurgon, Capoue préromaine (1942). (On Republican Capua see M. Frederiksen (PBSR, 1954, 80 ff.), who also discusses the (Greek) origin of the Campanian cavalry, Dialoghi di Archeologia, 1968, 3 ff.)
30 THE LATIN WAR. Livy, viii, 3–14. See F. E. Adcock, CAH, vii, 589 ff. Livy’s account (vii, 42–viii, 1) of how the consul of 341 defeated the Volscians of Privernum who had raided Setia and Norba is probably an anticipation of the incident of 329. Manlius’ route in 340 is uncertain (cf. Salmon, Samnium, 207, n. 3); the route mentioned in the text is supported by Adcock (CAH, vii, 590), but rejected by De Sanctis (SR, ii, 276). The battle of Trifanum (whose
precise site is unknown) was clearly fought not far from Capua. Diodorus (xvi, 90, 2) puts it near Suessa. Livy (vii, 6, 8; 11, 8) gives two battles, which should be reduced to one. Since Trifanum is unknown, perhaps the battle should be called that of Suessa. After the battle in 338 near Antium, the prows (rostra) of the ships of Antium were taken to adorn the Comitium in the Forum at Rome.
V THE UNION OF THE ORDERS AND THE CONSTITUTION
1 ALAND BILL IN 367 ? this is rejected by de sanctis, sr, ii, 216 ff. and Beloch, Röm. Gesch., 344, but defended by Münzer, PW, xiii s.v. Licinius Stolo, by H. Last, CAH, vii, 58 ff., by T. Frank, Econ. Survey, i 27 f. and by De Martino, St. d. cos. rom. 1, 396 ff. A clause limiting the number of sheep and cattle which could be kept on public pastures may have been included. The provision of a certain proportion of free labour is obviously an anticipation. G. Tibiletti in his discussion of possessio of ager publicus (Athenaeum. 1948, 173 ff., 1949, 1 ff., 1950, 245 ff.) accepts a Licinian law de modo agrorum but argues that it admitted plebeians to possessio; it is doubtful, however, whether this right was hitherto restricted by law to patricians. He also believes that a law establishing 500 iugera and limiting pasturage was passed after the Hannibalic War.
2 DEBT REMISSION ? This measure is defended by H. Last, CAH, vii, 543.
3 LEX POETELIA. See Cicero, de rep., ii, 59. E. Pais. Ricerche sulla storia e sul diritto publico di Roma, iv, 44 ff.
4 LICINIAN-SEXTIAN ROGATIONS. On the reorganization of the Roman government in 366 see K. von Fritz, Historia, 1950, 1 ff., who emphasizes the influence of administrative needs.
5 CAMILLUS AND CONCORD. See A. Momigliano, Cl. Qu., 1943, 111 ff. (= Secondo Contrib., 89 ff.). The temple lay in the north-west corner of the Forum. The surviving remains belong to a restoration made by Tiberius and dedicated in AD 10.
6 PLEBEIAN CONSULS. Münzer’s view (Röm. Adelsparteien, 30) that at this time the consul-ship alternated annually between the Orders is improbable. However, possibly the Leges Liciniae-Sextiae had made one plebeian consulship merely permissive and it was not made obligatory until the Lex Genucia in 342.
7 PLEBISCITA. See above, p. 469 n. 20. Possibly it was enacted in 339 that the consul must bring plebiscita before the Comitia Centuriata for confirmation or rejection. It is not very likely that they were ever subject to the auctoritas patrum: cf. CAH, vii, 483.
8 NEWCOMERS. Cicero, pro Plancio, 19. Not all the cases advanced by Münzer (Röm. Adelsparteien, 46 ff.) are acceptable: see CAH, vii, 548; L. R. Taylor, Voting Districts of the Roman Republic (1960), 287 f.; F. Cassola, I Gruppi politici, (1962), 152 ff; A. J. Toynbee, Hannibal’s Legacy; (1965), 340 is more favourable.
9 APPIUS CLAUDIUS. Tradition is weighted against him: it may derive from Fabius Pictor whose clan was hostile to the Claudii. His censorship is dated to 312 by Livy (ix, 29, 6) and to 310 by Diodorus (xx, 36, 1). Livy records that he refused to resign his office; according to some annalists he was still censor when he was elected consul in 308. This hostile tradition may have arisen from doubt about the date of his office. He may also have suffered from the reputation of his tyrannical ancestor, the Decemvir. See A. Garzetti, Athenaeum, 1947, 175 ff.; E. S. Staveley, Historic 1959, 410 ff.; E. Ferenczy, From the Patrician State to the Patricio-Plebeian State (Budapest, 1976), 144–217; on his tribal reforms see also P. Fraccaro, Athenaeum, 1935, 150 ff. (= Opuscula, ii, 1957, 149 ff.) and L. R. Taylor, Voting Districts of the Roman Republic (1960), 11 and 133 ff. (Fraccaro has shown that the landless were enrolled in any tribe). Appius Claudius was a cultured patrician and a legal expert. The motives that led him to champion radical reform have been variously interpreted. Niebuhr regarded him as the leader of the patricians against the new patricio-plebeian nobility. Mommsen went to the other extreme and saw in him a democratic demagogue and would-be Caesar. To Garzetti he was a moderate who by building up his clientela hoped to succeed to the position that Publilius Philo had enjoyed. Staveley sees him as trying to change a basically agricultural community into one in which agriculture and commerce played an equal part. Ferenczy takes an even more radical view of Appius’ tribal reform: all citizens were allotted to their tribes, irrespective of their place of domicile or financial resources, both for political reasons and to strengthen the army.
VI ROME’S CONQUEST AND ORGANIZATION OF ITALY
1 NEAPOLIS. Livy (vii, 22–6) wrongly says that there were two cities in one at Naples. The quarter of the oldest inhabitants, Palaeopolis, corresponds with Pizzofalcone in the modern city (cf. Par. Pass., 1952, 250, 269 f.); on the city in general see M. A. Napoli, Napoli Graeco-romana (1959). Despite difficulties in Livy, it is too radical to reject the siege entirely (as is done by T. Frank, Roman Imperialism (1914), 45). One fact at any rate is above suspicion: the resultant alliance with Rome. On Rome’s relations with Naples see also W. Hoffmann, Rom und die Griechische Welt im vierten Jahrhundert (1934), 21 ff.
2 LUCANIA AND APULIA. Livy (viii, 25, 3; 27, 2) says that Rome concluded alliances with the Lucani and Apuli. The Lucanian alliance should probably be rejected (Livy, viii, 27, 5–10, says the Lucanians later repudiated their treaty), while that with Apulia must remain uncertain (it is rejected by E. T. Salmon, Samnium and the Samnites (1967), 215). But cf. M. W. Frederiksen, JRS, 1968, 226, and R. M. Ogilvie, Cl. Rep., 1968, 331.
3 THE CAUDINE FORKS. The exact site of the disaster is uncertain. See Kromayer, Schlachtfelder, iv, 481 ff. and Atlas, Röm. Abt., col. 2 ff.; P. Sommella, Antichi campi di battaglia in Italia (1967), 49 ff. Three main sites have been suggested: (a) the pass between Arienzo and Arpaia, (b) the more open ground between Arpaia and Montesarchio, and (c) between S. Agata dei Goti (Saticula) and Moiano. (a) is traditional and the most probable (it contains a locality still named Forchia), and is supported by Kromayer and by Salmon (Samnium, 226); cf. D. Adamesteanu, Atti II Conv. di Studi sulla Magna Grecia (1963), 57; for (b) see De Sanctis, SR, ii, 307 ff.; (c) is advocated by F. E. Adcock, CAH, vii, 599.
4 PEACE OR WAR ? Livy’s story of the repudiation of the peace, which is probably based on the Senate’s attitude to the capitulation of Mancinus in Spain in 137 BC (p. 304), should be rejected. E. T. Salmon (JRS, 1929, 13) believes that in 318 the Romans prolonged the pax Caudina by forming a two-years’ truce with Samnium, as alleged by Livy (ix, 20). This truce, however, could have been invented by the annalists who rejected the pax Caudina in order to account for the peacefulness of these years. In any case the Second Samnite War (which was the First if the struggle of 343 is rejected) in practice consisted of two wars, from 326–321 and 310–304.
5 SATRICUM AND ARDEA. Livy (ix, 21) says the Romans attacked Saticula, but this has probably been confused with Satricum: see E. T. Salmon, TAPA, 1957, 99 ff. The raid on Ardea is recorded by Strabo (v, 232): traces of the catastrophe appear to survive: see Bollet. Stud. Mediterr., 1931, 15.
6 THE ETRUSCAN WAR. The accounts of these campaigns in Livy, ix, and Diodorus, xx, 35, 1–5; 44, 8–9, are full of difficulties which have led some historians to extreme scepticism: thus, e.g., Beloch Röm. Gesch. 413 ff.), rejects Fabius’ victory as a reduplication of the events of 295; he limits operations to a fight between Q. Aemilius and the Etruscans at Sutrium (Livy, ix, 37; Diod. xx, 35) and places the alliances with Cortona, etc. in 294 BC, with Camerinum and Ocriculum in 295. Such hypercriticism is unjustified. For a more balanced and moderate assessment, see W. V. Harris, Rome in Etruria and Umbria (1971), 49 ff. Unless the whole campaign of 311 is merely a doublet of that of 310, the Etruscan attack on Sutrium will have started in 311.
7 BOVIANUM. It is generally believed that there were two Samnite towns named Bovianum: B. Vetus and B. Pentrorum. The latter is modern Boiano, while the former has always been identified with Pietrabbondante. However, in the light of recent excavations at Pietrabbondante it has been suggested that this was not the site of Bovianum Vetus, which in fact may not have existed: see Salmon, Samnium, 13, n. Regarding the campaign of 305, Livy says (ix, 44) that the Romans penetrated to Bovianum; if this is accepted the si
te will in any case be that of Boiano. Diodorus on the other hand places the Roman success at Bola (an ancient Latin town of unknown site).
8 ROME AND ALEXANDER. Bruttians, Lucanians and Etruscans visited the court of Alexander the Great at Babylon. The story that the Romans also sent envoys (Pliny, NH, iii, 57) is probably rightly doubted by Arrian (vii, 15, 5–6). Alexander’s alleged idea of sending an expedition to Italy and the west (Diod., xviii, 4, 3) is also doubted by many, but in fact his final plans are simply not known: see E. Badian, Harvard Stud. Cl. Phil., 1967, 204. Later Romans probably believed in this threat and Livy patriotically argues that if he had invaded Italy, Alexander would have met the same fate as Pyrrhus (ix, 17). Strabo (v, 232) alleged that Alexander, and later Demetrius Poliorcetes, protested to Rome about Italian pirates; this may be true.
9 THE PHILINUS TREATY. Polybius (iii, 26, 3 f.) denied the assertion of the pro-Carthaginian historian, Philinus of Sicily, that there was a treaty between Rome and Carthage which forbade the Romans to enter Sicily and the Carthaginians Italy. If Philinus, however, was right (cf. A. J. Toynbee, Hannibal’s Legacy (1965), i, 543 ff.; R. E. Mitchell, Historia, 1971, 633 ff.), the treaty should probably be dated to 306. See further for its place in the context of Romano-Punic treaties pp. 160, 486.)
10 THE THIRD SAMNITE WAR. The theory of Beloch Röm. Gesch., 426 ff.), that the war of 298–290 was mainly fought against the Sabines rather than the Samnites and that the Roman tradition has confused the names, has not met with much support (cf. F. E. Adcock, CAH, vii, 615; Salmon, Samnium, 259). For the war see Salmon, op. cit., 255 ff. and, for Etruscan involvement, W. V. Harris, Rome in Etruria and Umbria (1971), 61 ff. The alleged capture of Bovianum by M. Fulvius in 298 is probably a duplicate of its capture in 305, while his alleged campaign in Etruria may be a duplicate of that in 295. The inscription on the sarcophagus of Scipio Barbatus claims that he ‘subdued all Lucania’ (Dessau, ILS, n. 1). A. La Regina (Dialoghi di Arch., 1968, 173 ff.) suggests that the Lucani conquered by him were a small northern group in the Sango valley in Samnium.
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