10 THE ROMAN INVASION OF ASIA. In spite of the Polybian tradition to the contrary (Polybius, xxi, 15), Antiochus’ decision not to contest the crossing seems to have been wise. Cf. Kromayer, Schlachtfelder, ii, 161 ff. The Scipios sent a letter to Prusias, stating Roman policy to kings: Polybius, xxi, 11.
11 MAGNESIA. On the battle see Kromayer, Schlachtfelder, ii, 163 ff. and Atlas, cols 43–6. The criticism of Delbrück (Geschichte der Kriegskunst, i, edn 3, 426 ff.) is far from convincing.
12 THE PEACE OF APAMEA. See Polybius, xxi, 16–17, 24, 45: Livy, xxxvii, 45. Appian, Syr., 38, includes the surrender of the fleet and elephants in the preliminaries, but Polybius’ silence is preferable. Cf. De Sanctis, SR, IV, i, 205 ff. On the territorial limits imposed on Antiochus by land and sea, see A. H. McDonald, JRS, 1967, 1 ff. (the Taurus frontier to lie along the river Calycadnus in Cilicia Tracheia), and McDonald and Walbank, JRS, 1969, 30 ff. (for the naval clauses and types of ships involved). Contrary to the widely accepted view that Scipio’s terms were more generous than those finally established by the Senate, E. Badian (Foreign Clientelae, 81 ff.) believes (partly because Polybius’ account of Scipio’s terms is incomplete) that ‘the spirit of the Scipios’ armistice is the same as that of the Senate’s peace treaty’. But would Scipio have approved of the handing over to Eumenes of some Greek cities in the final settlement? We do not know, but the friendly letters that he wrote to some cities (see p. 520 n. 15) and his lack of prejudice against kings (as shown in his letter to Prusias, as well as in his personal relations with Philip) may suggest that he would not have liked the Senate’s terms.
XIII ROME AND THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN
1 CALLICRATES. New era: Polybius, xxiv, 10. E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae (1958, 91) assesses Callicrates more favourably.
2 DEMETRIUS. For this judgement see De Sanctis (SR, IV, i, 255) who compares Philip’s fortunes with Hannibal’s. Demetrius was probably used as an unwitting tool by the Senate and Flamininus against the Macedonian royal house: as a future king he would become a pawn of Rome. Flamininus is said to have alleged in a letter to Philip that Demetrius was plotting not only to oust Perseus but also to remove Philip himself: the letter may have been a forgery, as Livy suggests (lx, 23). See Walbank, Philip V, 251, Badian, Foreign Clientelae, 94.
3 PERSEUS. See P. Meloni, Perseo (1953). On the causes of the war see A. Giovannini, Bulletin de correspondence hellénique, 1969, 853 ff.; L. Raditsa, ANRW, I, i, 576 ff. E. S. Gruen (Amer. J. Anc. Hist., 1976, 29 ff.) has argued that Greek attitudes towards Rome or Macedon were not determined by class membership or social status during the Third Macedonian War.
4 EUMENES. His charges against Perseus included the expulsion of a Thracian chief, now Rome’s ally; the harbouring of the murderers of an Illyrian chief; intrigues with Carthage and Byzantium and in Greece, etc. The charges are listed in the accusation of Perseus before the Delphic Amphictiony (Dittenberger, Sylloge, 643; translation in Lewis and Reinhold, Rom. Civ., i. 184 f.).
5 Q. MARCIUS PHILIPPUS. See F. W. Walbank, JRS, 1941, 86 ff., J. Briscoe, JRS, 1964, 66 ff. His diplomatic methods offended some of the more old-fashioned senators. The sources mention four diplomatic contacts between Rome and Macedon after Eumenes’ visit. These are discussed by J. W. Rich, Declaring War in the Roman Republic (1976), 88 ff., who concludes that only two are authentic, namely Philippus’ interview with Perseus at Tempe and the Macedonian embassy to Rome in early 171; he also concludes that at no point did the Romans deliver an ultimatum and discusses the chronological problems involved.
6 THE BATTLE OF PYDNA. This battle presents many difficulties. Polybius’ account (xxix, 15–17) is very fragmentary, while there is a large lacuna in Livy’s (xliv, 33–42). See Kromayer, Schlachtfelder, II, 294 ff.; criticism by E. Meyer, Kleine Schriften, II, 465 ff.; reply by Kromayer, Schlachtfelder, iv, 601 ff., and Atlas, col. 48 ff.; De Sanctis, IV, i, 322 ff.; W. K. Pritchett, Studies in Greek Topography, ii (1969), 145 ff. The date is fixed by an eclipse of the moon on the night of 21 June (cf. De Sanctis, pp. 369–76). This date (rather than the autumn) is confirmed by an inscription, discovered in the Agora at Athens, which contains the earliest known reference to the battle: see Hesperia, 1934, 18 ff.; 1936, p. 389 ff., n. 17. Livy (xliv, 37) dated the eclipse to 3 September; hence it has been argued (cf. De Sanctis) that the calendar was at this time some 2 months out of line with the solar year, i.e that 3 September on the contemporary calendar = 21 June (Julian calendar). This view has been challenged by S. I. Oost, Cl. Phil., 1953, 217 ff., but defended by P. Meloni, Latomus (1954), 553 ff.
Kromayer places Perseus’ camp eight miles south of Pydna between the Pelikas and Mavroneri. He supposes that the Romans as well as the Macedonians withdrew to their camp at midday before the battle, because otherwise their advance guard by the river would be unnecessary. Yet it may have been necessary to protect their right wing from the possibility of being outflanked. Meyer’s view is that the Romans remained in battle array all day and that Perseus succeeded in attacking them suddenly in this position. Even if the first statement is admitted, the second can hardly withstand Kromayer’s criticism; the Romans were not taken by surprise when Perseus attacked. More recently Kromayer has changed his ground by suggesting that the Roman army did not advance from its camp into battle line at all in the morning; and it is certainly easier to support this by absence of reference in our sources than it is to find definite reference to a Roman advance.
7 THE SETTLEMENT OF MACEDONIA. See T. Frank, Roman Imperialism (1914), 208 ff.; A. Aymard, Cl. Ph. 1950, 97 ff.; J. A. O. Larsen, Greek Federal States (1968), 295 ff. E. Badian (Foreign Clientelae, 97) notes that the settlement involved ‘for the first time the dissociation of libertas and immunitas’: the states were free but paid taxes.
8 THE SETTLEMENT OF EPIRUS. See S. I. Oost, Roman Policy in Epirus (1954), 68 ff.; N. G. L. Hammond, Epirus (1967), 629 ff. For the part played by the Epirote traitor Charops see H. H. Scullard, JRS, 1945, 55 ff.
9 ROMAN POLICY. On Roman policy in the east, 168–146 BC, and the factions in the Roman Senate that formulated it see J. Briscoe, Historia, 1969, 49 ff. For a general survey of this period see E. Will, Hist. pol. du monde hellénistique, ii (1967), 301 ff.
10 PTOLEMY’S TESTAMENT. See SEG, ix, 7, with literature cited there and in JHS, 1933, 263 f.
11 DEMETRIUS. Polybius, Demetrius’ friend, helped him to escape and has given a vivid account of the adventure (xxxi, 19 ff.). Perhaps the Senate, or part of it at any rate, turned a blind eye to this escapade; cf. H. Volkmann, Klio, 1925, 382 f.
12 JEWISH TREATY. This treaty, which was granted by the Senate and not ratified by the Comitia, never became operative, but its existence has been doubted without adequate reason. See 1 Maccab. 8; Josephus, Antiqu. xii, 10, 6 (414–19). Cf. E. Schürer, The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ, vol. 1 (revised by G. Vermes and Fergus Millar, 1973), 171 ff.
13 MACEDONIA AS PROVINCE. M. G. Morgan (Historia, 1969, 422 ff.) argues that Macedonia was formally established as a Roman province by Mummius in 146 rather than (as is usually believed) by Metellus Macedonicus.
14 THE ACHAEAN WAR. On its social aspects see A. Fuks, JHS, 1970, 78 ff. The lower classes supported the war effort against Rome, but although various measures taken by the League (e.g regarding payment of debts and freeing of slaves) had serious social and economic implications, the war was essentially a national struggle for independence, irrespective in the main of class differences. Cf. W. W. Tarn, Hellenistic Civilization, edn 3 (1952), 38; when the League voted to go to war with Rome ‘it could do nothing else, unless a small country has no right to fight for its liberties against a big one’. E. S. Gruen (JHS, 1976, 46 ff.) has made a further attempt to disentangle the motives which led to the war, which he believes was caused neither by Roman imperialism nor by Greek mob hysteria: rather it ‘stemmed from understandable miscalculation on both sides. Rome expected that a combination of intimidating demands and generous proposals would prevent conflict i
n the Peloponnese. Achaean leaders assumed that coercion of dissident communities in the League could continue – as it had in the past – with impunity. The peculiar circumstances of 146 undermined those expectations. In the end, Rome would not endure a conflagration in Greece when she was about to establish a stable order in Macedon… The result was calamity, unplanned and unanticipated’ (p. 69).
15 THE SETTLEMENT OF 146. See J. A. O. Larsen, Econ. Survey of Anc. Rome, iv, 306 ff.; Greek Federal States (1968), 498 ff.; S. Accame, Il dominio romano in Grecia dalla guerra acaica ad Augusto (1946).
XIV ROME, ITALY AND THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN
1 CISALPINE GAUL. As ancient historians were more interested in Rome’s expansion in the east, the dreary wars in the north were ill-recorded by authoritative writers: this afforded an open field for the patriotic imagination of the Roman annalists, and some modern writers have not been slow to seek doublets of events. Thus, e.g., Livy’s account of the campaign of 200–199 (xxxi, 10; 21–2; 47–9) is sometimes regarded as merely a doublet of those of 197–196. But while confusion and duplication of many details may have occurred, such radical criticism is scarcely needed: see, e.g., J. Briscoe, Commentary on Livy, xxxi–xxxiii (1973), 82 ff. On these northern campaigns see also A. J. Toynbee, Hannibal’s Legacy (1965), 268 ff. and (for 201–191) A. H. McDonald, Antichthon, 1974, 44 ff.
2 NEW ROADS. This Via Flaminia from Arretium to Bononia is to be distinguished from the old Via Flaminia from Rome to Ariminum (of which the Via Aemilia was a continuation) built by the consul of 223. On the development of Cisalpine Gaul see U. Ewins, PBSR, 1952, 54 ff. and for its population and resources see P. Brunt, Manpower, ch. xiii.
3 MINUCIUS THERMUS. Livy’s account (xxxv, 3, 11, 21; xxxvi, 38) of Thermus’ exploits is confused and untrustworthy.
4 LUCA, LUNA. See E. T. Salmon, Cl. Qu., 1933, 30 ff., JRS, 1936, 47 ff. and A. J. Toynbee, Hannibal’s Legacy (1965), ii, 532 ff. It remains uncertain whether or not references in the sources to a colony at Luca should be emended to Luna, and that thus Luca should be eliminated from the list of colonies; Salmon is against retaining it, Toynbee in favour. See now P. Sommella and C. F. Giuliani, La pianta di Lucca romana (1974), in favour.
5 CENTURIATION. Traces of the division of land into plots have been found in northern Italy. On this centuriation as revealed by aerial photography see J. Bradford, Ancient Landscapes (1957), esp. 157 ff., 261 ff.; P. Fraccaro, Opuscula (1957), III, i, ii.
6 MANLIUS. On the topography, see Veith, Atlas, cols. 49, 50; De Sanctis, SR, IV, i, 431.
7 DALMATIAN CAMPAIGNS. See J. J. Wilkes, Dalmatia (1969), 30 ff.
8 THE SPANISH WARS. The account of these wars, which belong to the Great Age of Conquests, partly exceeds the strict chronological limit of this volume (146 BC). The Lusitanian War lasted from 154 to 138, the First Celtiberian from 181 to 179, the Second from 153 to 151 and the Third (or Numantine War) from 143 to 133; Polybius treats the last two as one twenty years’ war, 153–133. The sources (mainly Polybius, Livy, Appian and Diodorus: Polybius wrote a monograph on the Numantine War, now lost), are collected in Fontes Hispaniae Antiquae, iii (1935), iv (1937), edited by A. Schulten.
9 ROMAN SPAIN. See A. Schulten, CAH, viii, 306 ff., C. H. V. Sutherland, The Romans in Spain (1939). The ancient sources are collected in Fontes Hispaniae Antiquae, ed. A. Schulten, P. Bosch Gimpera and L. Pericot.
10 ROMAN CAMPS. Camps dating from this campaign have been found near Emporiae, Segontia (at Aguilar and Alpanesque) and near Numantia (at Renieblas I).
The survival of many camps, particularly at and around Numantia, throws an interesting light on these wars. Our knowledge of them derives mainly from the work of A. Schulten (see especially his four monumental volumes, Numantia: die Ergebnisse der Ausgraben, and more briefly, Geschichte von Numantia (1933)). Literary information about Republican camps derives chiefly from Polybius’ detailed description (vi, 27 ff.); though the camps of Scipio at Numantia do not quite conform to Polybius’ description, that of Nobilior at Renieblas does. Though the Romans did not excel in certain branches of art, the Roman camp, no less than the Roman constitution in the civil sphere, was a work of art, and as early as 280 BC king Pyrrhus could exclaim in wonder, ‘The camps of the barbarians are not barbarian’, and his remark is now shown to be true.
It may be convenient to list a number of camps which belong to this period:
217 Camp of the Scipios at Almenara, near Saguntum (p. 213).
206 Camp of Scipio at Ilipa (p. 228; cf. H. H. Scullard, JRS, 1936, 19 ff.).
c. 195 Camps of Cato’s campaigns at Emporiae (?. See A. Schulten, Arch. Anzeiger, 1940, 75 ff.), Aguilar, Alpanesque (near Segontia) and Renieblas I and summer camp II.
153 Summer camp of Nobilior at Almazan.
153 Nobilior’s camp at Renieblas III (Camps IV and V belong to the war with Sertorius).
152 Marcellus’ camp at Numantia on Castillejo I.
141–140 Pompeius’ camp at Numantia on Castillejo II.
139 Servilius Caepio’s camp near Caceres: Castra Servilia (later camps near Caceres date from the Sertorian war).
138 Brutus’ camp, the cava di Viriato, at Viseu in Portugal.
134 Scipio’s seven camps around Numantia.
11 SPAIN 154–133 BC. On these wars see H. Simon, Roms Kriege in Spanien, 154–133 v. Chr, (1962); A. E. Astin, Scipio Aemilianus (1967), 35 ff., 137 ff.
12 REVOLT AND NOBILIOR. On the site of Segeda see A. Schulten, Arch. Anzeiger, 1933, 547. A bronze tablet, referring to a treaty between ten Celtiberian towns, belongs either to this period or later (c. 98 BC): see Schulten, Hermes, 1915, 237. In order that the consul might start his campaign early, the beginning of the civil year was altered from 15 March to 1 January. Modern Europe thus owes the beginning of its year to the Celtiberian War. On Nobilior’s camp see n. 10 above.
13 VIRIATHUS. On the war with Viriathus see A. Schulten, Neue Jahrbücher, 1917, 1 ff. and Kromayer, Atlas, col. 56. Little was known of details, topographical and strategical, until Schulten’s researches revealed the main outline.
14 NUMANTIA. Schulten believes that the town wall was partially destroyed when the inhabitants spread beyond it, so that the attacks of Nobilior in 153 and of Scipio in 134 were against an unwalled town. But the archaeological evidence has been interpreted differently by R. G. Collingwood and M. I. Munro (JRS, 1931, 156) who suggest that the town wall was not destroyed.
15 HANNIBAL AS SUFFETE. The date of his office, whether 197, 196 or 195 is uncertain; 196 is the most probable, with 195 as the year of his flight into exile. See E. Groag, Hannibal als Politiker, 114, n. 4, Scullard, Roman Politics, 284; J. Briscoe, Comm. Livy, xxi–xxxiii, 335 at L. xxxiii, 45.
16 MASINISSA. See Polybius’ tribute, xxxvi, 16. On Masinissa’s achievement cf. P. G. Walsh, JRS, 1965, 149 ff.; G. Camps, Massinissa (= Libyca, viii, 1960).
17 THE FOSSA REGIA. The frontier of Carthage at the beginning of the Third Punic War followed the same course as the boundary between the future province of Africa and Numidia, called the fossa regia. The discovery of boundary stones has shown that Carthage only retained the north-east corner of Tunisia and a narrow coastal strip on the east.
18 CAUSES OF THE THIRD PUNIC WAR. Commercial jealousy, the view of Mommsen, has been effectively rejected by Kahrstedt (Gesch. d. Karthager, iii, 616 ff.), T. Frank (Roman Imperialism, 234) and E. Badian (Roman Imperialism in the late Republic (1968), 20). After the war the Romans made no attempt to occupy or exploit the commercial facilities of Carthage, while at xxxvi, 9 Polybius is silent about possible trade rivalry. Badian (Foreign Clientelae, 125 ff., and esp. 133 ff.) underlines Roman fear of Carthaginian strength (in contrast to Kahrstedt’s view of Carthaginian weakness which, it was feared, might tempt Masinissa to attack Carthage and try to dominate North Africa). W. Hoffmann (Historia, 1960, 309 ff.) emphasizes the growth of metus Punicus. On Roman policy see further F. E. Adcock, Cambr. Hist. J., 1946, 117 ff.; A. E. Astin, Scipio Aemilianus (1967), 272 ff; and (on Scipi
o’s policy) H. H. Scullard, JRS, 1960, 59 ff.
19 CARTHAGE: TOPOGRAPHY. See D. B. Harden, Greece and Rome (1939), 1 ff.; C. Picard, Carthage (1951); B. H. Warmington, Carthage, edn 2, (1969), 128 ff. See H. Hurst, Antiquaries J., 1975, 11 ff.; 1976, 117 ff.; 1977, 232 ff.; CEDAC (Centre d’Études… arch. de la Conservation de Carthage) Bulletin I (September 1978, Tunis); S. Lancel, Byrsa, i (Rome, 1974). The general accuracy of Appian’s description (Lib., 96) of the splendid circular naval harbour, with ship-sheds for 220 vessels, has now been confirmed.
XV ROMAN POLICY AND THE GOVERNMENT
1 THE EQUESTRIAN ORDER. Polybius (vi, 17) gives a description of their activities about 150 BC (‘nearly everyone’ had an interest in state contracts). See H. Hill, The Roman Middle Class (1952); C. Nicolet, L’Ordre équestre à l’époque republicaine, i, ii (1966, 1975); (the basic thesis of this book, namely that the ordo equester consisted only of equites equo publico, has not met with widespread acceptance); P. A. Brunt in The Crisis of the Roman Republic (ed. R. Seager, 1969), 83 ff; E. Badian, Publicans and Sinners (1972) and briefly OCD2, s.v. Equites.
2 FREEDMEN. See in general S. Treggiari, Roman Freedmen during the Late Republic (1969) and, for the history of their voting rights, pp. 37 ff.
3 AGRARIAN AND COLONIAL POLICY. See G. Tibiletti, Athenaeum, 1950, 183 ff.; A. J. Toynbee, Hannibal’s Legacy, (1965), ii, 190 ff.
4 COLONIES. Latin colonies: Copia (193), Vibo (192), Placentia and Cremona (190), Bononia (189), Aquileia (181), ?Luca (180). Citizen colonies: Volturnum, Liternum, Puteoli, Salernum, Buxentum, Pyrgi, Sipontum, Tempsa, Croton (194), Potentia, Pisaurum, Auximum (184), Mutina, Parma, Saturnia (183), Graviscae (181), Luna (177). The larger size of citizen colonies founded from 183 BC (pp. 293 ff.) perhaps led to the introduction of the duovirate or dual praetura (p. 147) and hastened the assimilation of such colonies to municipia: cf. A. N. Sherwin-White, Rom. Cit., edn 2, 81 ff. See also E. T. Salmon, Roman Colonisation (1969), eh. vi.
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