Thieu did just the opposite. He went on record in the Saigon press stating that he “resented” Kissinger’s private overtures in Paris on important political matters and claimed that he had not been fully consulted. Sven Kraemer, one of Kissinger’s NSC staff, reported shortly after the September meetings that if Thieu was forced to resign as a result of any negotiated settlement the national security adviser made in Paris, it could only “be interpreted in Vietnam as a betrayal.”25 The Kraemer report further suggested that Thieu’s support in South Vietnam actually improved when “he has tried to beat back manifest US pressure.”26 Kissinger was not negotiating Thieu’s resignation in Paris, but because he did not consult Saigon, there was much speculation about what was being said to Tho among the political elite in South Vietnam. On September 26, Thieu cautioned Bunker that he would defend his views on negotiations in an international press conference if Kissinger went beyond the terms Thieu had outlined during their August meeting.27 Perhaps Thieu had been bolstered by the fact that the ARVN had recaptured Quang Tri City and had performed well throughout the summer. Perhaps, too, he wanted to issue a warning that he was not simply an American puppet.
This time, Nixon weighed in with a warning of his own. Changing his mind yet again, he sent Thieu a note suggesting that the time was right to seek a negotiated settlement. Unbelievably, he threatened Thieu that he had better be on board with an agreement because there may be a coup against his government if he did not support the US position: “I would urge you to take every measure to avoid the development of an atmosphere which could lead to events similar to those which we abhorred in 1963 and which I personally opposed so vehemently in 1968.”28 Meanwhile, in private, Nixon called Thieu and those in Saigon opposed to the peace talks “bastards” and “little assholes.” “I am not going to let the United States be destroyed in this thing,” he assured Kissinger. Whether Saigon liked it or not, the United States had to be “getting out.” The president warned, “We cannot have this cancer eating at us at home, eating on us abroad.”29 He was disturbed that the ARVN had not, in his mind, turned all that American aid into a stable military footing. “We’ve got to remember,” Nixon confided to Kissinger, “we cannot keep this child sucking at the tit when the child is four years old. You know what I mean?”30 Kissinger assured the president that he did. Still, he remained optimistic about his upcoming meetings with Tho, reporting to Nixon that Hanoi’s demands were not entirely inconsistent with the US position.
Finalizing an Agreement
Kissinger met Tho again for two consecutive days at the end of September. He reported to Nixon that the “sessions both narrowed our differences in some areas, and demonstrated how far we have to go in others.”31 He saw “major movement” in the political issues that had been at the heart of disagreements in past sessions. Kissinger believed that Hanoi was finally “stripping away” its control and power over the electoral commission.32 This was something the United States could work with, Kissinger told Nixon. The new commission was just what he wanted, an “irrelevant committee” that would provide a “face-saving cover” to a cease-fire and a divided government in South Vietnam.33 Hanoi seemed to backtrack on Thieu, however. Tho insisted that Thieu resign immediately after an overall agreement was signed, but it now appeared that his South Vietnamese political forces would have a one-third voice in the provisional government and the ability to supervise and sanction all of the commission’s decisions. Kissinger liked that the commission had very limited advisory power as it mediated between the PRG and the exiting South Vietnamese government. But he also thought Thieu and his followers would appreciate that Hanoi still had to consider the former Saigon government when thinking about the political future in the South. Although the proposal was still clearly unacceptable, Kissinger did see less daylight between the United States and North Vietnamese positions on the most fundamental issues. He remained perplexed, however, over Hanoi’s insistence that the agreement be concluded by the October 15 deadline he had established earlier.
He gave Nixon three possible reasons as to why Hanoi wanted a settlement so quickly. The first was that the North Vietnamese were actually presenting their final offer. “They may find it impossible,” Kissinger surmised, “to water down their political position any further after twenty years of struggle.” The second was that Hanoi believed the United States would “cave in at the last moment” to secure a peace before the election. Kissinger hinted to Nixon that the Hanoi Politburo had told Moscow that this was their strategy all along. It would have been a foolish move, Kissinger concluded, given Nixon’s standing in the polls and the American public’s support for increased military operations in North Vietnam. Finally, and probably a bit closer to the reality in Hanoi, Kissinger suggested that the compromises made at the September meetings on political issues were the result of some of Hanoi’s leaders trying “to prove to their hawks” that the United States would not make any further concessions and that North Vietnam had to give a little to get a lot.34
Indeed, this last scenario makes the most sense. At this point in the negotiations, Hanoi had three main military objectives. It wanted a standstill cease-fire that allowed the North Vietnamese who had infiltrated during the Easter Offensive to stay in South Vietnam along with other PAVN units that had already come south. It also insisted on a complete withdrawal of all US troops shortly after signing an agreement. And, finally, it desired the release of all political prisoners. This issue is usually most associated with the US cause, but there were rumors circulating in Hanoi that Saigon’s military police were executing Communist prisoners in South Vietnam.35 If Tho could get Kissinger to commit to an agreement covering these basic requirements, Hanoi concluded that it would quickly change the balance of forces in South Vietnam and then it would be able to meet its political objectives. In other words, it was willing to concede on some political points—in particular, the requirement that the Saigon government be dismantled before Hanoi would sign an agreement—so as to secure its three primary military objectives. If the negotiations produced a coalition government or a three-party electoral commission that recognized Saigon’s role in a postwar south, it really did not matter. That concession would be quickly overrun by the military realities on the ground.36
Reading the transcripts of the meetings makes clear just how far apart on substantial issues Kissinger and Le Duc Tho actually were. They disagreed on the fundamental makeup of the political bodies that would oversee the political transition in Saigon and the development of an interim constitution. These are the basic building blocks of any peace agreement with legal standing and a necessity for transitional justice. The repeated formulations of an oversight committee gained no traction in Hanoi or Washington. Kissinger repeatedly rejected North Vietnam’s proposed political proposals because he claimed they created a de facto coalition government in South Vietnam. Hanoi insisted that the Saigon government would have full participation, but only without Thieu.37 After the September 27 meeting, it was difficult to see how Kissinger and Tho could meet their self-imposed October 15 deadline and just what would happen if they did not come to agreement by then. It was even more difficult to see how Kissinger was going to subdue his recalcitrant ally in Saigon.
Following the September 27 meeting, Kissinger sent Nixon a message outlining the strategy needed to move the discussions in Paris toward a final agreement. “Our immediate task,” he informed the president, “is to convince Thieu of the importance of public solidarity with us as we continue the negotiating process through at least one more round.”38 Kissinger decided to send his deputy, General Al Haig, a longtime admirer of Thieu’s, to Saigon to review the various proposals being put forward in Paris. He told Haig to reemphasize the continuing US commitment to Saigon, “the major efforts we have made in his behalf the last four years,” and to explain the US strategy in Paris in such a way that would move Thieu to show an “understanding of our problems.”39 Privately, Kissinger and Nixon agreed that Thieu needed to help them end
the war now, and then later Hanoi and Saigon could “go after each other”40—a remarkable admission, given all that the Americans and the Vietnamese had sacrificed.
Haig met with Thieu on October 2, reporting that the meeting had gone well and that Thieu seemed to understand what the United States was trying to accomplish in Paris. He wrote Kissinger that Thieu was reassured by their meeting and that he “will be inclined to be more cooperative” now that Haig had explained the US position clearly.41 But the very next day, Thieu canceled his meeting with Haig. He refused to meet with Bunker as well. Instead, he now insisted that he would not support any of the US negotiating positions in Paris. Haig and Thieu did meet again on October 4, just three days before Kissinger was scheduled to begin talks in Paris with Le Duc Tho. Thieu called the US counterproposals in Paris tantamount to surrender, claiming that “he himself has no problem on whether he should remain since his government is wiped out.” Furthermore, he insisted that “Saigon can only assume that everything will disappear” as a result of Kissinger’s compromises in Paris. “The President, the constitution, and the General Assembly” will all be gone as a result of the proposed agreement, “even the government itself” was to be dissolved. For good measure, Thieu’s vice president, Tran Van Huong, added that “the Communists have always wanted to make the US accept their demands,” and that Kissinger seemed content to fulfill Hanoi’s wishes.42
With Haig still in Saigon, Thieu told the South Vietnamese National Assembly that the United States was getting ready to sell Saigon out to the Communists. He warned, “A political solution is a domestic affair of the South. It is a right and responsibility of the southern people to settle it among themselves.”43 He cautioned that there were sinister, outside forces prepared to determine South Vietnam’s future without consultation or appreciation for all that the nation had been through.
Kissinger was outraged. He instructed Haig to tell Thieu that the US president was “extraordinarily disappointed by his reaction to our various proposals and strategy” that his criticisms made it “immensely more difficult” to get a meaningful settlement in Paris, and urged the general to assure Thieu that “a public confrontation with the US would lead to complete disaster.” In addition, Haig was to warn Thieu that if he continued to be insolent (Kissinger constantly called the South Vietnamese leadership “insolent”), the only option left for the United States would “be a unilateral disengagement.” Kissinger concluded with a plea, “The movement toward confrontation between us must end if we are not to throw away ten years of effort and the lives of thousands which have been devoted to securing the future we have both sought.”44
Thieu was not wrong, however; even Kissinger admitted that. In a phone conversation with Nixon shortly after reading Haig’s report from his Saigon meetings with the South Vietnamese president, Kissinger said that Thieu was right, that “our terms will eventually destroy him.”45 Nixon understood clearly that the settlement Kissinger was negotiating was going to end the war, on US terms, “but not theirs [Saigon’s].46 His national security adviser was indeed negotiating away the future of South Vietnam. With each successive proposal from Hanoi, he inched closer to a deal that sealed Saigon’s fate. Thieu was deeply concerned that his government would only be allowed to participate in public life as part of a three-party arrangement that gave political legitimacy to the Communists. Since official recognition of the PRG/NLF had been one of Hanoi’s first principles and deeply embedded in the rationale and justification for the war in South Vietnam in the first place, it was difficult for Thieu to understand how destroying the existing government and constitution was a win.47 He wondered how the United States could agree to allow North Vietnamese troops to remain in South Vietnam. Stopping Hanoi’s war of aggression was what had brought the United States to Vietnam in 1954. Why was Hanoi getting to negotiate the political future of South Vietnam at all? That Kissinger thought Thieu could easily be dealt with after he secured a deal in Paris, was just one of many reckless mistakes he made during the war.
Kissinger headed to Paris on October 7 for what were supposed to be his final meetings with Le Duc Tho. The two met the next morning, Sunday, October 8, to discuss the new proposals both sides were to bring to Paris. Kissinger opened the morning session by summarizing Hanoi’s position on political matters. Hanoi insisted that Thieu resign upon signature of an agreement, that the South Vietnamese constitution be abolished, and that new quasi-governmental organs be established from the national to the local level. Kissinger claimed that “the cumulative impact of these various elements” of the North Vietnamese proposal was clear. “Even if any particular one would not necessarily prove decisive, the combination of them all occurring simultaneously has to give us concern.”48 But he added, “I have been sent here by the President to try for a decisive breakthrough to a negotiated settlement.”49
Kissinger then outlined some of the positive aspects that he saw in Hanoi’s proposals submitted during the September meetings. He was particularly pleased that the principle of unanimity would guide the tripartite body and would guarantee that no single force could dominate that body while it carried out its duties. He then listed a series of remaining concerns for the US side: the provisions for a cease-fire, the stipulations on the replacement of arms, and problems arising from the influence of foreign powers. Kissinger then allowed that the United States accepted Hanoi’s political position that “there are two administrations, two armies, and three political forces in South Vietnam.” He also suggested that the United States was fine with calling the central postwar institution the Provisional Government of National Concord (GNC). To emphasize this point, he repeated to Tho that “we accept the essence of your September 26 position” that the new commission “can serve as mediator and advisor to the two sides which can contribute to the implementation of the signed agreement.”50 Given Saigon’s veto power, it was not likely that there would be much implementation of the peace agreement, and Kissinger must have known this as he met with Tho.
In essence, Kissinger was not offering anything new. He was, however, agreeing with Tho to delay the important political questions on South Vietnam. Supporting Hanoi’s proposal was simply a way for Kissinger to concede to political terms that left the Saigon government holding some political power after an agreement. It would then be up to Thieu to make the best of it against Hanoi. Was this a decent interval? Perhaps, but it also represented Kissinger’s frustration with his Saigon allies and his hope to get the negotiations settled before the 1972 US presidential elections, whether Nixon thought he needed that or not. It was what Kissinger thought was necessary and he told his staff this repeatedly. When John Negroponte, one of Kissinger’s closest NSC advisers on Vietnam, questioned the US acceptance of provisions contained in the DRV proposal regarding the PAVN and the GNC, Kissinger apparently exploded, “You don’t understand, I want to meet their terms. I want to reach an agreement. I want the war to end before the election. It can be done, and it will be done.”51
Throughout the morning conversations, it became clear that the sticking point to the entire agreement was still Saigon. Kissinger confessed that “we have not yet succeeded in gaining South Vietnam’s approval for an electoral formula,” but he was willing to “return immediately to Saigon” if there could be agreement in Paris “to work out a proposal on the remainder of Point 4 which takes into account the views of both sides.”52 Kissinger then surrendered Thieu. He suggested that he did not want Hanoi to give up on the idea of presidential elections in South Vietnam, but he also hinted that this would not be an obstacle to the agreement: “If I could bring back a solution here next week that should conclude a complete agreement between us.”53 Kissinger went through the remaining military and political issues rather quickly, hoping that Tho understood that this was about as far as the United States could go, given its need to keep some remnant of the Saigon government in place after the signing of an agreement. What happened after that was purely up to the parties inside South Vietnam,
including the North Vietnamese army.
Kissinger expected that Tho would once again raise serious objections to the US position. Instead, Tho asked for a lunch recess and then after lunch asked for a longer intermission to study Kissinger’s proposals. When the meeting resumed at four p.m., Kissinger was stunned when Tho presented a new proposal “regarding the content as well as the way to conduct negotiations, a very realistic and very simple proposal.”54 Hanoi’s new proposal included an immediate standstill cease-fire, a prisoner exchange, a complete US troop withdrawal, and the creation of an Administration of National Concord (ANC) composed of the three parties. The newly proposed political commission would resolve all political matters in the south, but it would not have any police powers. There would also be a standstill cease-fire in South Vietnam, allowing the Saigon government and the PRG/NLF to control the areas that they now occupied. The question of North Vietnamese troops’ operating inside South Vietnam was not to be addressed, only that the “question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam will be settled by the South Vietnamese parties themselves.”55 This provision gave Kissinger some political cover with conservatives back home and in Saigon, but it still left Hanoi’s troops in South Vietnam. Surprisingly, Tho now dropped his demand that the United States stop replacement of armaments to South Vietnam. But this stipulation also meant that Hanoi could resupply the PAVN in South Vietnam. There was also a vague commitment to a cease-fire in Laos and Cambodia. Finally, the new proposal again insisted on postwar reconstruction aid for Vietnam, though it need not be specified in the language of the agreement.
Reckless: Henry Kissinger and the Tragedy of Vietnam Page 23