Castles
While battles could exert a decisive influence on Frankish power, the key to holding on to territory was the control of castles and fortified sites, which included towns and rural manor houses. The armies of the First Crusade, while possessed of some experience of sieges in the West, had to learn how to invest and subdue such formidable sites as Antioch and Jerusalem and the duration of these struggles (ten months in the case of the former) and the strength of the defences they faced were of a new order of difficulty. The knowledge gained in the course of the crusade proved invaluable in taking the other castles and fortifications of the Levant, as the Franks established their rule. It was then the settlers who had to refortify, develop and construct their own defences in order to preserve their hold on the Holy Land and to provide centres of authority. Castles, as in the West, were multi-functional buildings and their roles might be defensive, offensive (threatening the enemy), administrative, judicial, for accommodation, as a demonstration of power, and as a place of refuge. The diversity of shapes and styles of Frankish castles bear testimony to the variety of functions they needed to perform, yet they all shared the same basic process during construction. In other words, a site had to be chosen to reflect a balance of defence and practicality. Water supplies had to be secured; money had to be spent to hire workmen, masons and tools; stone needed to be quarried, oxen procured to move the stones, building cranes and scaffolding had to be made and the protection of the site ensured. Such problems were less acute where existing fortifications stood, but the complex and expensive process of building a castle should not be forgotten when we look at the results of these labours.
As the overall strategic situation changed, the emphasis on the function of a fortified place might change. Document 18 shows how a castle might fulfil a number of these roles: the series of fortifications constructed around Ascalon (Castrum Arnaldi, 1132-33; Bethgibelin, 1136; Ibelin, 1141; Blanchegarde, 1142; Gaza, 1150) helped to protect the southern reaches of the kingdom of Jerusalem from raids, they put pressure on the Egyptians in the city and they provided bases to administer an area of increasing prosperity. As the military situation became more precarious during the 1160s, castles of increasing size and complexity (Kerak, Montreal, Belvoir, Jacob’s Ford, Darum) were constructed or developed along the borders of the kingdom of Jerusalem. The forms of Frankish fortifications varied according to their position and needs and the following categorisation compiled by Boas (Boas, 1999: 93-118) outlines the main types, with the proviso that some castles could fall into more than one category.
Fortified towers: The most simple form of defensive structure was the tower, a common sight in rural areas (over seventy-five have been identified in the kingdom of Jerusalem alone). Most were two floors of vaulted rooms that could act as administrative centres for rural estates, storehouses and places of safety during enemy raids.
4. The castle of Montreal, Transjordan. Sonia Halliday Photographs/Photo by Jane Taylor
5. The castle of Belvoir in the kingdom of Jerusalem. Sonia Halliday Photographs/Photo by Bryan Knox
Enclosure castles: These were simple walled compounds with towers on each corner and sometimes along the walls. These forms were familiar from the Roman, Byzantine and Ummayad periods and could be constructed swiftly and easily. Examples can be found at Blanchegarde and Darum.
Enclosure and keep: This was a tower within an enclosure, or a development of one of the corner towers into a larger building with bigger defences and more complex entrances, such as Jubail in the county of Tripoli.
Concentric enclosures: These comprised two enclosures, one within the other, with towers on all corners and along some walls. The higher inner wall provided a second line of fire as well as defence. The only surviving example — albeit the earliest known model — is at Belvoir on the borders of the kingdom of Jerusalem overlooking the Jordan valley and the important road between Jerusalem and Damascus. Boas comments that it ‘represents a landmark in castle design and became the prototype of some of the finest castles built in the West’ (Boas, 1999: 106). It was constructed by the Hospitallers after they purchased the site in 1168 and, as well as its concentric walls, it featured a ditch on three sides (the fourth looked out over the Jordan valley). Kennedy has described the inner court as cloister-like, reminding us of the monastic vocation of the Hospitallers (Kennedy, 1994: 61). A bathhouse, two large cisterns, a forge and a smithy indicate the accommodation functions of a castle. Such was Belvoir’s strength that it held out for over a year against Saladin’s forces after the defeat at Hattin until the Muslims mined the barbican. Spur castles: These fortresses often offer the most spectacular examples of Frankish military architecture. They were built on ridges of land with (usually) steep cliffs on three sides and a strong line of defences facing the tongue of land that connected the spur to the main body of land. The most dramatic of these is at Saone in northern Syria. It was based on a tenth-century Byzantine castle and was developed by the Franks during the second quarter of the twelfth century. It features a rock-cut ditch of 128 metres in length, 26 metres deep and 18 metres wide, with a pinnacle of rock left standing to help carry a bridge across the chasm. With rising land overlooking the ditch, the Franks had to construct extremely powerful defences (featuring towers and a huge keep) on this side. Saone stretched out for 700 metres behind these walls and included enormous cisterns and, half-way along, a second ditch to separate off a lower bailey which was, essentially, a walled village complete with churches. In spite of the great ditch the castle succumbed to Saladin in only three days. An intense bombardment with enormous stones (up to 300 kilograms each) and the exploitation of the weaker defences at the second ditch enabled the Muslims to break into the upper bailey and to compel the garrison to surrender. Two other spur castles of note are Kerak in Transjordan and Krak des Chevaliers in southern Syria. The former was crucial in supervising the pilgrim and trade routes between Damascus and Egypt, while the latter overlooked the Homs valley and guarded against incursions from the Muslim lands into the Frankish-controlled coastal plain.
Hilltop castles: These could vary in form and included the formidable Montreal in Transjordan (again, constructed to monitor trade routes) which, by the 1170s, featured concentric walls and was strong enough to resist Saladin for a year and a half before capitulating.
Towns: Of course, towns were also walled and the Franks inherited most of these from their existing inhabitants although this did not prevent them from developing and extending the walls and gatehouses. The walls of Jerusalem, for example, were strengthened in 1116 and 1177.
Muslim fortifications tended to be urban in form and featured impressive walls, gatehouses and citadels, as at Aleppo and Damascus, while sometimes, as at Shaizar, a castle stood adjacent to a settlement to protect it. The main castle-builders in the Muslim world were the Assassins whose enclave in northern Tripoli was based around a series of fortifications, the largest of which was Masyaf, a keep and enclosure castle of some complexity.
Siege warfare
All of the developments in castle-building meant that it became increasingly difficult to subdue enemy fortifications. One reason behind the growing complexity of castles may have been advances in siege technology, an area in which the urbanised Muslim world led the way. The basic weapons were mangonels — a sort of large-scale crossbow — and the trebuchet a counterweight machine that could hurl large stones up to 200 metres (well beyond the range of archers) and inflict serious damage on walls and towers. The bombardment from such machinery could be relentless; the Franks fired c. 500 stones an hour at the siege of Lisbon in 1147. Defenders could, of course, construct their own siege machinery to help resist attack. Such was the importance of these machines that armies often kept them in kit form so that they could be transported and used repeatedly. Particularly large engines were even named: the armies of the Third Crusade used ‘Bad Neighbour’ and ‘God’s Stonethrower’ to great effect at the siege of Acre in 1191.
Greek fire w
as a favourite weapon of the Muslims, although it seems to have been little used by the Franks. Ceramic vessels containing a highly flammable mixture of boiled sulphur, pitch, nitre and petroleum were fired at the Christians, who employed hides soaked in vinegar as a method of trying to prevent the fire taking hold.
Once the walls had been reached, mines, siege towers and battering rams might be employed to gain access to the site. The construction and deployment of these devices was a matter of great skill and specialist siege engineers were often employed. In the course of the attack on Lisbon during the Second Crusade, sources make a point of identifying a Pisan brought in purposely to direct operations. Some siege towers seem to have been extremely precarious devices (one at Lisbon was 28 metres high) and they were always subject to intense enemy harassment, usually in the form of fire. Many siege engines (including battering rams, or ‘cats’ as they were sometimes known) were destroyed in this way, sometimes with their unfortunate operatives inside. Wider and deeper moats were one way of resisting siege towers, although the attackers would, if possible, try to fill the moat with rubble and debris to enable them to bring ladders and towers up to the wall. Mining skills were evident on both sides, with Zengi’s successful operation at Edessa in 1144 being one outstanding example and the 200-metre long shaft dug at Lisbon in 1147 being also worthy of note. Mines were probably the most difficult form of siege warfare to resist. The talus of a castle (a sloping section of wall) offered some defence and if the line of the opponents’ dig was known, then a counter-mine might be an option. Nonetheless, topography and time permitting, a mine was a most effective form of siege warfare.
The full range of these techniques was employed by Saladin during his post-Hattin campaigns of 1187-88, where he utilised numerous siege engines at castles such as Saone in July 1188 and mines at Belvoir in January 1189. Once a city or a castle fell the fate of its defenders could vary according to circumstance: an offer of freedom was often an opening gambit to try to persuade a place to surrender quickly, but as a siege became longer and if the attackers held a strong hand, the consequences for the defenders grew ever more serious. Loss of freedom and ransom demands were likely, hostages might be handed over, or, if the siege was particularly arduous or the tension especially high, then a sack and massacre might occur. The fall of Jerusalem in 1099 is the obvious example of this and is usually contrasted with Saladin’s relatively bloodless taking of the city in 1187 when he ransomed many inhabitants and allowed some of the others to leave freely. The threat of a massacre might inspire terror in places contemplating resistance, although equally it might stiffen resolve. It was a convention of medieval warfare that terms of surrender, once agreed, were adhered to. In 1139, when fighting Muslim opponents at Baalbek, Zengi attracted heavy criticism when he slaughtered his enemies after promising to release all prisoners if the citadel capitulated. All military forces, whether armies on the move, besiegers or besieged, needed supplies of food and water and it was the maintenance of these, rather than any overt military activity, that often decided the outcome of a military engagement. The Frankish predicament at Hattin is the most obvious example for an army in the field. With regard to a castle, if, as at Montreal in Transjordan in 1187-88, the attackers (in this case the Muslims) could keep their troops in place, then starving out this isolated garrison was the surest, if the slowest, way of achieving success; the defenders were eventually reputed to have gone blind through lack of salt and were compelled to surrender.
Naval warfare
Control of the sea was one respect in which the Franks established a clear superiority over their Muslim opponents and during the capture of the many coastal towns of the Levant, control of the sea was vital in preventing the defenders from receiving supplies and reinforcements. Given the crucial role of the sea as a lifeline to the West for trade, pilgrim traffic and crusades, it is perhaps strange that the settlers never built up a fleet of their own. There is evidence for a small fleet for the kingdom of Jerusalem in the 1160s, but generally the Franks approached outside sources for naval support. At times, such as the invasions of Egypt in 1169 and 1177, this was supplied by the Byzantine Empire, but usually it was the Italian trading cities of Pisa, Genoa and Venice who provided a fleet. As we have seen (Document 8), the Italians extracted a high price for their support, but it was a crucial economic and strategic investment for the settlers and one that paid substantial dividends. The major Muslim seapower in the region was Egypt and in the eleventh century the Fatimids had possessed a very strong navy, but by the period of the crusades this was in decline. Nonetheless, as long as the Egyptians held a base on the Levantine coast their shipping could harass the pilgrim and trading fleets of the West. The capture of Tyre (1124) and Ascalon (1153) were essential to ensure a safer passage for Christian shipping because the need to have a base to secure water supplies limited the range of the Egyptian boats, and with no port open on the coast the security of Christian shipping was much improved. The Syrian Muslims were little interested in naval matters. As Hillenbrand indicates, most were from a landlocked equestrian culture in which seafaring was regarded as a dangerous activity best undertaken by common criminals. The Arab proverb, ‘It is preferable to hear the flatulence of camels than the prayers of fishes’, expresses this attitude concisely (Hillenbrand, 1999: 557). Saladin, however, appreciated that a strong navy might still have an effect on Frankish strategy and he tried hard to revitalise the Egyptian navy, although lack of resources and poor seamanship rendered his plan largely useless.
Conclusion
During the twelfth century the Franks learned much about military tactics, siege warfare and castle-building, and at times showed themselves to be thoughtful and skilful warriors. Innovations such as the concentric castle were observed by visiting crusaders and copied back in the West; Richard the Lionheart’s fortress at Chateau Gaillard in Northern France is one such example. The perpetual problem of limited manpower, coupled with some calamitous errors of judgement and the military skills of their Muslim opponents, proved to be insurmountable in the struggle to hold on to the holy city of Jerusalem. The military orders emerged as a partial solution to the question of military resources, but large-scale crusades and even stronger castles would be required to sustain, let alone expand, the Latin East in future.
8
The aftermath of the Second Crusade: Recovery and expansion
The start of closer relations with Byzantium and advances for both the Christians and the Muslims
The failure of the Second Crusade in 1148 was an enormous blow to the morale of the Franks in the Levant. Equally, of course, it was a boost to the Muslims because it consolidated the conquest of Edessa and, more importantly, it proved that the might of Christian Europe could be humbled. For Prince Raymond of Antioch the crusade had represented an opportunity to expand his lands in northern Syria and to challenge the power of Aleppo. After the departure of the westerners, however, he was exposed to even greater pressure from Nur ad-Din and in June 1149 at the Battle of Inab, the prince was defeated and killed. His head was cut off and sent to the caliph of Baghdad (the spiritual leader of the Sunni Muslims) to emphasise Nur ad-Din’s achievement.
Raymond’s death left the Franks of northern Syria deeply vulnerable and King Baldwin III marched north, as kings of Jerusalem had done in the past (1119, 1130), to restore order. The disaster at Inab prompted appeals to the West for a new crusade and senior ecclesiastical figures, including Abbot Suger of Saint Denis, Bernard of Clairvaux and Pope Eugenius set up a series of meetings to plan a new expedition. The prospects of Louis of France or Conrad of Germany leaving their lands again so quickly was remote, and in the atmosphere of bitterness and despondency generated by the defeat at Damascus — not to mention the exhaustion of men and resources — no response was forthcoming. One consequence of this lack of reaction in the West may have been Baldwin’s decision to sell the remaining Frankish castles in the county of Edessa to the Byzantines. Given the poor relations between the Greeks
and Latins over recent decades this may seem strange. But, it is important to indicate that this tension had not involved the kingdom of Jerusalem; rather, it had formed between Byzantium and the western crusaders and Byzantium and Antioch. In any case, Baldwin probably felt he could not defend the isolated Edessan castles and, in light of the lack of help from western Europe, it was worth trying to build a more positive relationship with Manuel Comnenus. This move, however small, can be seen as signalling the early stages of closer collaboration between the Greeks and the Latin settlers. As a fellow-Christian possessed of the resources and strategic interest in northern Syria, Manuel was an appropriate ally to work with against the Muslims. As we shall see, a closer relationship with the Greeks was a key aim of the rulers of Jerusalem over the next 30 years.
The Crusades 1095-1197 Page 13