It was on Saturday 27 July, shortly after 3.00 p.m., that Pat Hughes and his Blue Section found another Ju 88. His wingmen this time were Flying Officer Frank Conner and Sergeant George Bailey. Pat was flying Spitfire N3280. The Spitfires had been ordered to patrol the coastal area off Land’s End at 10,000 feet but when radar picked up a ‘bogey’ they were then instructed to climb to 23,000 feet. Hauling their Spitfires up to that height and heading south-east, they soon spotted the Junkers still higher up twenty-five miles south-east of Land’s End. Apparently the German crew saw the three British fighters coming. Inexplicably, the enemy pilot decided to leave the safer high altitude and dive vertically, possibly hoping that his built-up speed would keep them safe from harm. He was wrong.
Pat was after the Ju 88 quickly, closing to 200 yards in a screaming dive, and he clearly noticed its brown and green camouflage patterns. His Spitfire was severely buffeted about by the slipstream. The German rear-gunner began to fire at the Spitfire as Pat opened up with a two-second burst from dead astern. Tracer bullets zipped back at him from the Ju 88’s top and ventral gun positions. As in his first encounter back on the 8th, his fighter was hit by a single bullet, this time in its mainplane.
I attacked from astern using deflection and followed the enemy aircraft down onto water. I fired three bursts – both rear guns were put out of action. Glass perspex was seen to fly off the top cockpit and parts of aircraft fell from both engines. I finished all my ammunition and broke away to port. Estimated speed of enemy aircraft 300 mph.10
Just after Pat ran out of ammunition and broke to the left, the Ju 88 was observed still diving. They were only fifty feet up by then. In his combat report, Pat claimed the destruction of ‘one Ju 88 (unconfirmed)’. Confirmation came later that the German machine had gone into the sea, twenty-five miles off Land’s End.11
It was ‘B’ Flight’s turn at dawn readiness the following Sunday morning. At the ungodly hour of 4.25 a.m., Blue Section was scrambled to investigate an enemy aircraft over Plymouth Harbour.
As Pat and his wingmen, Pilot Officers Ken Dewhurst and Pat Horton, another Kiwi, arrived over the harbour town they saw a ‘large amount of AA fire’ bursting in the morning sky and then spotted yet another Ju 88. It was diving steeply towards an object on the land. Like the previous Junkers, this one was camouflaged green and brown and the forefront of its nose section was painted red. Pat went down after it.
I waited till the enemy aircraft pulled up and opened fire at 100 yards, closing to 50 yards and holding this position, firing off short bursts. The enemy aircraft carried out slight turns to either side. Smoke as from oil, and grey-yellow in colour, started to pour from the starboard engine, and then a red-hot object appeared to fall from this engine. Aircraft continued course at low altitude where it was attacked in turn by Blue 3 and 2. Aircraft finally climbed slightly, then starboard engine caught fire and the aircraft slowly turned to starboard and hit the water. The aircraft sank in 10 secs, but no crew were seen to escape. Rear gun fire was experienced throughout the engagement – tracer bullets were used.12
Fire from the German rear-gunner had hit Pat’s Spitfire (N3239) with a single bullet yet again. This one punched a hole in the radiator fairing.
This Ju 88 came from II/LG1 and had been flown by Leutnant Pfanf and his crew. Although the Spitfire pilots did not see anyone escape before the plane sank, there actually was one survivor. One NCO who had been wounded was rescued from the water, but Pfanf and his two other companions, both NCOs, were lost.13
Three Ju 88s had been claimed destroyed for 234 Squadron in three weeks and Pat had led all three attacks. He had gone in close. That was definitely the answer.
George Bailey would recall years later,
Amongst some of his [Pat’s] efforts towards the war effort – frowned upon and stopped by higher authority [Squadron Leader Barnett?] – painting of the spinners of our Spitfires bright colours in competition to the yellow nosed 109’s. Use of incendiary bullets in all guns and bringing the concentration of fire power from the eight guns down to the minimum distance that could be obtained from the mountings … about 50 yds less than that recommended by the A.M.14
Pat would do it again and again.
8
THE IDES OF AUGUST
Despite three successful combats, all without loss, and the enthusiasm they generated, 234 Squadron was a long way from being a happy unit. Something was not quite right and, in fact, seemed to be getting worse. The commander of ‘A’ flight, John Theilmann, gave the impression to the others of being ‘remote’ and having some difficulties. He was flying less often than usual, perhaps blaming asthma, and as for the CO – Barnett hardly flew at all! In effect, it was Pat who was leading the squadron – the young pilots looked to him for guidance rather than anyone else. It was his squadron! Bob Doe recalled: ‘Hughes was the one who taught me everything in the air. We respected him, listened to him. But he was not a remote figure like the other two; he was one of the lads as well. He was the real power behind the squadron.’1
Meanwhile, during the latter part of July a flight of Gloster Gladiators was installed at Roborough to create the nucleus of a new squadron. Roborough’s two grass strips that formed a ‘T’ shape had been deemed too small for 234 Squadron’s high-performance Spitfires, so another alternative was worked out. Formerly the Fighter Flight, Sumburgh, it was ordered to move from Sumburgh as it was being replaced by Hurricanes from 3 Squadron, the Flight’s five Gladiators left for Roborough on 21 July and assembled in Devon, where on 1 August it became 247 Squadron.
The airstrip was suitable for the Gladiators but there was still no accommodation and facilities remained very limited. Pilots and personnel were continuing to be billeted out. The new squadron’s parent station was Mount Batten, Coastal Command, home of 10 Squadron RAAF. A few tents and some transport vehicles were obtained from Mount Batten and a small amount of hangar space was made available there for major inspections on the aircraft by the officer commanding Roborough.
247 was passed for day operations immediately but was allowed a fortnight to settle in properly and become conversant with its new sector and patrol lines. For operational flying it was a unit of 10 Group under the direct control of Headquarters Fighter Sector St Eval. As all R/T communications came from St Eval, and night operations were to be made from there as well, it was arranged for an officer from 234 Squadron to assist with the organisation on a temporary posting from 1 August – Flight Lieutenant Pat Hughes.2
It was the opportunity Pat and Kay had been waiting for. As soon as Kay had gained her mother’s approval to be married, Pat went ahead with the necessary arrangements as there was much to do in the days beforehand. This meant a break from operations, and the Register Office at Fore Street, Bodmin, was en route to his appointment. Married, they could set up house nearby before his temporary posting came to an end. They stopped at Bodmin on 1 August and were married with strangers as witnesses on the same day that 247 Squadron became a reality.
According to Francis K. Mason in his book, Battle Over Britain, published in 1969, during this period one of 247’s Gladiators, N5585, became emblazoned with an emblem below its cockpit consisting of a map of Australia with a standing kangaroo superimposed upon it. Printed alongside were the words ‘ANZAC ANSWER’. Below these, there was a victory emblem in the shape of a miniature swastika. The origin of the motif has been a puzzle over the years. There was no Australian shown in squadron records as a pilot in either the Fighter Flight or 247 Squadron at this time.3 A tenuous possibility comes out of the fact that 247’s task was to provide air cover for the naval base at Plymouth and this was also the home of 10 (Sunderland) Squadron RAAF at Mount Batten. Roborough, in fact, was a satellite airfield for Mount Batten and was often used by landplanes coming to and from the flying boat base. Australian personnel therefore frequently used the field and Australian ground crews may have been ‘borrowed’ to assist in setting things up in the early stages. As well, 10 Squadron had played a ma
jor part in successfully sinking a German submarine, the U-26 on 1 July, only the second submarine victory of the war for Coastal Command. It was a matter of pride for the squadron – pride which might have manifested itself in the painting of a symbol of defiance on the side of one of 247 Squadron’s Gladiators. Could it be that the ‘ANZAC ANSWER’ swastika referred to a submarine kill, not to an aircraft kill?4 Most unlikely.5
Far more likely was Pat’s temporary attachment to 247 Squadron. Pat’s Record of Service shows him to be in the right place at the right time and such was his imposing, outgoing character that it does not stretch credibility to see him as being responsible for an emblem like this – if the aircraft was allocated to him. The swastika on the ‘ANZAC ANSWER’ can be linked to 234 Squadron’s gratifying first victory, the Ju 88 on 8 July in which Pat played the major role. In the middle of July when Pat visited Roborough with Blue Section, 234 Squadron had only this confirmed success to its credit at the time. Pat’s wingman was Keith Lawrence, a New Zealander who had actually made the initial attack in the encounter before Pat closed in to ‘finish it off’. It really was an ‘Anzac Answer’!
Pat was apparently with 247 Squadron for around a week, but if he believed that his temporary stay was actually to be longer, or even permanent to go with his promotion from ‘acting flight lieutenant’ to ‘flight lieutenant’ (to be gazetted on 3 August), then he may have arranged to reserve Gladiator N5585 for his own use. To have an aircraft set aside and decorated in this fashion does suggest that someone at least thought his stay would be for some time, otherwise why go to the trouble of doing it? It certainly would have been a grand welcoming gesture – perhaps worthy of the Flight’s new commanding officer? The person who did take over the Flight was of flight lieutenant rank, Flight Lieutenant George Chater, an experienced flying instructor at Cranwell. Perhaps someone mistakenly thought it was going to be Pat. Were there mixed messages, conflicting orders? Pat and Kay may have thought so. They did start to set up house at Treyarronn Bay in Cornwall. Perhaps the ‘Temporary Duties’ shown in Pat’s record of service were actually going to be ‘Flying Duties’ and the orders were altered. If so, and the orders were changed, something may have been happening to draw him back to 234 Squadron again. With the realisation that someone other than the Australian would be using the plane, the motif was undoubtedly quickly removed.
Because of the state of Roborough, 247 Squadron initially had only day ‘stand-by’ there and was held at ‘night readiness’ at St Eval, although it was recognised that its patrols would be at a disadvantage against the enemy’s faster bombers. The Gladiators also flew regular convoy patrols off the coast covering the approaches to Plymouth.
247 Squadron expanded to twelve Gladiators for day and night fighting, and became fully operational as part of 10 Group on 13 August – the same day as Adler Tag.
*
In Germany on the first day of August, Adolf Hitler had issued his Directive No. 17 dealing with the conduct of air and sea warfare against England. An invasion, code named Seelöwe (Sea Lion), was to be prepared ready to launch on 15 September.
On the 6th, Reichsmarschall Göring instructed his commanders to be ready by 10 August for the main assault on the RAF – Adler Tag (Eagle Day). The main assault would be spearheaded by Luftflotte 2 and Luftflotte 3 operating from bases in France, Belgium, Holland and Germany, and Luftflotte 5 would fly from Norway and Denmark to threaten north-eastern England and Scotland. From the 10th, all that was required to start was a forecast of three or four days of suitable weather.
Two days later German bombers and E-boats ambushed Convoy Peewit. The convoy was decimated. Out of twenty-three ships, seven were sunk and six – plus six escort vessels - were heavily damaged. Pilot Officer John Curchin, an Australian in 609 (Spitfire) Squadron operating from Middle Wallop, destroyed one Me 110 and damaged another.6
Because of unfavourable weather forecasts on 10 August, Göring postponed Adler Tag, but the following day his Luftwaffe struck at Portland, the Royal Navy’s principal base near the proposed invasion area. Heavy fighting ensued.
On the 12th, the Luftwaffe attacked RDF stations, forward airfields and two small convoys in the Thames Estuary. German radio announced later that heavy damage had been caused on the British mainland and claimed the destruction of seventy-one RAF aircraft. The day’s aerial battles were obviously a foretaste of what was to come, although German claims for the day were optimistic. Of the fighter airfields attacked, all were operational again in a matter of hours with the exception of Manston which was out of action for twenty-four hours, and Ventnor RDF station which was out of action for several days. Then with predictions of fine weather, Göring ordered Adler Tag for the 13th.
Next morning, the weather on this fateful day was mainly fair but with widespread early mist and drizzle. A last-minute signal from Göring’s Headquarters postponed the main attack until the afternoon in the hope that the weather would clear. There was some fighting in the morning because some units did not receive the signal in time. After a lull until just beyond midday, Adler Tag’s planned attacks took place between 3.45 and 5.00 p.m. with raids on Portland, Southampton, Kent and the Thames Estuary. The last German aircraft disappeared off British RDF screens around 6 p.m. Luftwaffe claims were for eighty-four RAF fighters destroyed and the British claimed sixty-four German aircraft shot down. In fact, both of these were exaggerated but on the ground the RAF had a further forty-seven aircraft destroyed, only one a fighter.
Widespread dive-bombing attacks had tragic results. At Detling, the messes and cookhouses were all destroyed and all the hangars set on fire. Twenty-two aircraft were destroyed and sixty-seven people killed. However, the Luftwaffe had made a mistake with this particular target because Detling was not a Fighter Command airfield so none of the planes destroyed were fighters. Fighter Command’s loss of thirteen fighters in the air was bad enough.
The main assault was only beginning, and the situation could only get worse.
Pat seems to have arrived back at 234 Squadron during the 6th as he flew a night patrol late that night and another very early the following morning. Much had happened in his absence. A Coastal Command Blenheim squadron, 236 Squadron, had started to arrive from Thorney Island, its first flight landing on the 3rd. The acting CO was familiar – Dick Power from Pat’s old Point Cook days! It was a chance to catch up again but some of the news Dick had was harrowing. Dick’s CO was missing and so too was Bryan McDonough, another Australian. Bryan McDonough was Peter McDonough’s cousin – Peter who had lived in the room next door to Pat at Point Cook early in 1936.7
Power explained what happened. At the beginning of the month, PRU Spitfires had reported a large concentration of German aircraft at Cherbourg. Grasping the opportunity to strike first, the RAF ordered a bombing raid for thirteen Blenheim IV bombers from 59 Squadron with an escort of ten Blenheim long-range fighters from 236 Squadron.
The escort was divided into three parts. First off was Dick Power leading a section of three. Five minutes later two more Blenheims took off, the first flown by the CO, Squadron Leader Peter Drew, and the second with Bryan McDonough at the controls. There was supposed to be three planes in this section but one was late taking off. These two sections were to follow 59 Squadron in and strafe the aerodrome after the bombs were dropped. The last section was to wait one or two miles off Cherbourg to cover the withdrawal.
Low cloud blanketed the French coast causing Power and his section to miss Cherbourg completely but shortly afterwards a break in the clouds appeared and the bombers attacked. Following this, Drew led McDonough and a third Blenheim in for the low-level strafing but only the last machine emerged and it was heavily damaged. Missing after the expensive raid were Peter Drew and Bryan McDonough and their crews as well as the CO of 59 Squadron, Wing Commander Weld-Smith and his crew.
It was recorded in 236 Squadron’s ORB that:
Squadron Leader Drew commanded the squadron from the time it was reformed on 31st October 1
939 and the loss of such a much loved leader is a bitter blow to the entire squadron. P/O McDonough who is an Australian was also another original member of the squadron, a pilot of great dependability and the utmost determination.
Dick Power was placed in temporary command to bring the squadron to St Eval.
Meanwhile, 234 Squadron was having its own internal problems as Luftwaffe activity heightened over the Channel and south-east England. On 31 July, Flight Lieutenant Cyril Page, who had been with 234 since early July, was posted out to 145 Squadron and Sergeant William Thompson had crashed into a stone wall on landing after a routine night patrol. He was badly injured and was currently in the Royal Cornish Infirmary. He would not fly again.
It was becoming apparent that, as the intensity of fighting increased, 234 Squadron could be shifted to relieve one of those squadrons that had suffered heavy losses. As it was, AVM Keith Park’s No. 11 Group was bearing the brunt of it in the south-east, but AVM Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory’s 12 Group in the Midlands and Sir Quintin Brand’s new 10 Group had to provide essential support. Park’s tactics were born out of necessity. He had to get his squadrons up quickly, singly or in pairs, to intercept the incoming raids as early as possible rather than lose precious time forming them up into larger numbers. On the 5th, Brand relieved some of the pressure on 11 Group by taking over one of its bases, Middle Wallop in Hampshire.
234’s problems reached a crisis point on 7 August when two pilots were removed from flying duty. One was Flight Officer Charles Igglesden, but what triggered his departure remains uncertain. He had been one of the few experienced pilots to join the squadron. He had come from 41 Squadron, where he had flown Spitfires with John Theilmann. (He would resign his commission in the RAF in September 1941 and afterwards join the Royal Navy.) The second man to go was Flight Lieutenant John Theilmann himself. He relinquished command of ‘A’ Flight and was categorised as non-effective ‘because of sickness’. Theilmann was diagnosed as suffering from asthma, but despite such a health problem he had regularly led his section in the air throughout June and July, until the beginning of August. His last recorded flight was for just twenty minutes. Perhaps the increasing exposure to cold and pressure at high altitude, dry air, smoke and fumes were causing him to wave breathing difficulties and an increasing number of asthma attacks. Clearly he could not continue.
A Spitfire Pilot's Story: Pat Hughes: Battle of Britain Top Gun Page 14