Prevention required more effort and more resources. Planting trees for windbreaks to protect crops and prevent soil erosion was a widespread practice in Ward’s day. “Frost-fighting” involved regular observations, forecasts for agricultural regions, and cooperative arrangements among farmers and fruit growers—for example, by flooding the cranberry bogs or lighting smudge pots in orchards. Overall, however, Ward had very few successful examples of prevention on which to draw. Fog dispersal worked on only a very small scale. The electrified sand experiments of L. Francis Warren indicated that clouds could be modified somewhat but not controlled, given the vast scale of the atmosphere.
For Ward the third stage, production, was “the most active and aggressive” and also the least possible. Best known to him was the history of artificial rainmaking—a history of promise and hype. James Espy’s theory of lighting huge fires was theoretically sound and demonstrable on a small scale, yet impossible to implement operationally. Ward called Robert Dyrenforth’s experiments a “national disgrace” and thought it “highly important that no such occasion should arise again” (13). He called the production of rain for profit to “hoodwink” desperate farmers the work of “pure fakirs.” He claimed, perhaps too hastily, that “the speculations of former times have been discarded,” and now we know the facts. How could he have known that speculation would increase over the next eight decades? Asking “How far can man control his climate?” Ward replied that we can protect against and prevent unwanted weather damage, but “we can not produce rain or change the order of nature.” He saw “no hope ... of our ever being able to bring about any but local modifications of the weather and climate” (18). Citing the opinion of Sir Napier Shaw, Ward concluded, “We are lords of every specimen of air which we can bottle up or imprison in our laboratories [but] in the open air we are practically powerless” (6). These words were written in 1930, before the dawn of cloud physics as a field, before the General Electric Corporation’s cloud-seeding experiments, before the fantasies of ultimate control, and before the rise of serious fears of weather and climate warfare in the 1950s and 1960s.
Climate Leverage
The noted Soviet geoscientist Mikhail Ivanovitch Budyko (1920–2001) was deeply concerned about both the enhanced greenhouse effect and the growing problem of waste heat. At a 1961 conference in Leningrad on “problems of climate control,” he pointed out that at current and projected rates of growth, the waste heat produced by human energy generation could, in two hundred years, rival that of the Earth’s radiation balance, rendering life on Earth “impossible.”30 Cities already generated more than five times more energy than the natural radiation balance, and if thermonuclear power was harnessed, he warned, dangerous temperature levels could be reached within a few decades. The threat of such excessive heat led him to become a strong advocate for learning to control and regulate climate. His colleague, academician M. Ye. Shvets, advanced a proposal to inject 36 million tons of 1-micron dust particles into the stratosphere, which would blanket the Northern Hemisphere within six months. His calculations indicated that such a dust screen would reduce solar radiation by 10 percent and temperatures by 2 to 3°C (3.6 to 5.4°F). Such an intervention was also expected to reduce evaporative losses, increase precipitation, and thus increase water supply.31
Budyko found this scheme preferable to other ideas of the time, such as the one to create thermal mountains. In James Black and Barry Tarmy’s article “The Use of Asphalt Coatings to Increase Rainfall” (1963), two workers for the Esso Research and Engineering Company in New Jersey argue that “useful amounts of rainfall might be produced economically in arid regions near seas and lakes” by “coating a large area with asphalt to produce thermal updrafts which increase the sea breeze circulation and promote condensation.”32 One acre of petrochemical paving materials, conveniently supplied by Esso, would be needed for every 2 to 3 acres of enhanced rainfall area. The authors cited the ancient Babylonian practice of burning their fields after harvest, supposedly to create a blackened area that would produce extra rainfall for the next crop (but possibly for other reasons), and the early work of Espy on producing rain by large conflagrations. Turning to the recent literature, they cited papers on “man-made tornadoes” by Jean Dessens, who burned an acre-size pool of fuel oil at the rate of 1 ton a minute to create artificial clouds and even a small tornado, and suggested that the weather could be controlled artificially if an inexpensive means could be developed “to paint the Earth black” (emphasis added).33 This sounds very much like the Sherwin Williams paint slogan “Cover the Earth” or perhaps the irreverent bumper sticker “Earth First! We’ll Pave the Other Planets Later.”
In 1962 Harry Wexler was the first to use the new methods of computer climate modeling and satellite heat budget measurements to warn of the possibilities, dangers, and excesses of “climate control,” including ways to destroy the ozone layer either inadvertently or with possible harmful intent. The following year, the Conservation Foundation report Implications of Rising Carbon Dioxide Content of the Atmosphere, based largely on the work of Charles David Keeling and Gilbert Plass, predicted climate problems ahead and noted: “As long as we continue to rely heavily on fossil fuels for our increasing power needs, atmospheric CO2 will continue to rise and the Earth will be changed, more than likely for the worse.”34
Gordon J. F. MacDonald, professor of geophysics at UCLA, was of the opinion that weather control, even of severe storms such as hurricanes and typhoons, was just the beginning step in an escalating game of environmental and geophysical warfare using climate engineering. He thought that belligerents might, for example, cut a hole in the ozone layer over a target area to let in lethal doses of ultraviolet radiation, manipulate the Arctic ice sheet to cause climatic changes or massive tidal waves, trigger earthquakes from a distance, and in general manipulate or “wreck” the planetary environment and its geophysics on a strategic scale. MacDonald developed his perspective as a high-level government adviser, Pentagon confidant, chair of the National Academy of Sciences Panel on Weather and Climate Modification, and member of the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) in the Johnson administration.35
In 1965 the PSAC issued a report titled Restoring the Quality of Our Environment , which contained 104 recommendations about pollution of air, soil, and waters. Appendix Y of this report, the work of a subcommittee on atmospheric carbon dioxide chaired by Roger Revelle, is now widely cited as the first official government statement on global warming. It pointed out that “carbon dioxide is being added to the earth’s atmosphere by the burning of coal, oil, and natural gas at the rate of 6 billion tons a year. By the year 2000 there will be about 25 percent more carbon dioxide in our atmosphere than at present.” Increases in atmospheric CO2 resulting from the burning of fossil fuels could modify the Earth’s heat balance to such an extent that harmful changes in climate could occur. The subcommittee also explored the possibilities of deliberately bringing about “countervailing climatic changes.” One ill-conceived suggestion involved increasing the Earth’s solar reflectivity by dispersing buoyant reflective particles over large areas of the tropical sea at an annual cost of about $500 million. The subcommittee pointed out that this technology, which was not excessively costly, might also inhibit hurricane formation. No one thought to consider the side effects of particles washing up on tropical beaches or choking marine life or the negative consequences of intervening in hurricanes. And no one thought to ask if the local inhabitants would be in favor of such schemes. Another speculation involved modifying high-altitude cirrus clouds to counteract the effects of increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide. The subcommittee failed to mention the most obvious option: reducing fossil fuel use.36
In 1968 Joseph O. Fletcher (b. 1920) of the RAND Corporation published a review of the known patterns and causes of global climate change. In addition to natural causes, the main influencing factors seemed to be the side effects of industrial civilization: carbon dioxide emissions, smog and dust pol
lution, and waste heat. As Wexler had argued in 1962, purposeful climate modification was also a theoretical possibility, but Fletcher was beginning to argue that it was now becoming a necessity. He reported on recent activities in the Soviet Union aimed at climate control, none of them very promising, and asked: “What can be done to speed progress” in this field?37 Fletcher’s prescription was that climate science must follow what he considered an inevitable four-stage progression: observation, understanding, prediction, and control. Global observations were being conducted or planned at the time using new satellite platforms and large-scale field research campaigns, while theoretical groups were forming around increased computing resources and new mathematical models of atmospheric and oceanic circulation. Fletcher thought that “an inevitable result” of all this would be “the development of a more sophisticated theory to explain climatic change which, in turn will trigger an avalanche of ‘climatic experiments’ testing the predictions of the improved theory of climate” (22). Is scientific progress linear? Can it be managed?
The following year, Fletcher issued a report on “managing climatic resources” in which he came to the “inescapable conclusion” that due to rising population, greater vulnerabilities, and the irreversible damage being done to the climate system, “purposeful management of global climatic resources and control of the planet’s climate would eventually become necessary to prevent undesirable changes.”38 Citing a recent upsurge of research in weather modification and climate control, he thought that humanity had reached a technological threshold at which it was already “within man’s engineering capacity” to influence the global system by altering patterns of thermal forcing. He considered it feasible to carry out climate-influencing schemes such as creating large inland seas, deflecting ocean currents, seeding clouds extensively, and (the reverse of today’s sentiment) even removing the Arctic pack ice. Then, as now, he left unresolved the huge and complex economic, sociological, legal, and political problems that such intervention would generate.
Fletcher stated, in no uncertain terms, that “an increase in CO2 causes global warming” (2). Referring to the work of Guy Stewart Callendar and Gilbert Plass, who attributed the warming of the previous century of approximately 0.5°C (0.9°F) to this cause, he warned that a future warming of three times this amount or even more could be possible by the year 2000 (this did not happen) and could bring about “important changes of global climate during the next few decades” (this might yet happen) (3). Another, longer-term problem that he highlighted, echoing Budyko, was that heat pollution from energy generation could grow to rival the energy provided by the Sun. Still, Fletcher hedged his bets by pointing to the strong negative feedback of increased low-level cloudiness; the assumed enormous capacity of colder ocean water to absorb carbon dioxide; the 30 percent increase in turbidity, or “global dimming,” due to air pollution and aircraft condensation trails; and the overall complexity of the climate system, which renders specific cause-and-effect estimates very uncertain.
After reviewing the complex patterns of past climate change and the workings of the global climate “machine,” Fletcher concluded that the most important outstanding problem was developing a quantitative understanding of the general circulation, especially oceanic heat transport and ocean–atmosphere heat exchange. (Note that computer modeling was still in its infancy in 1969 and the El Niño–Southern Oscillation [ENSO] had not yet been identified, although aspects of the El Niño–La Niña system were known.) Fletcher also discussed feedbacks that acted as “triggers” of climate change and provided the example of the dramatic warming of the Arctic, identified and measured by 1940, which, had it continued, could have resulted in “a new and stable climatic regime” in which the Arctic Ocean became ice-free.
From climate “triggers,” Fletcher moved on to a discussion of the possibilities of deliberately influencing climate. Here he followed the theoretical lead of Russian scientist M. I. Yudin, who sought to identify critical “instability points” for intervening in the development of cyclones, by changing either their winds or steering currents or their heat budget.39 Using back-of-the-envelope calculations that have become de rigueur among geoengineers, Fletcher estimated that it would take only sixty C-5 aircraft to conduct cloud-seeding operations over the entire Arctic Basin and to exert “enormous thermal leverage” by creating or dissipating clouds, influencing the reflectivity of the Arctic pack ice with soot or carbon black, or even changing the course of ocean currents with macro-engineering projects.
Fletcher again presented his four-stage model of what he called “progress toward climate control”: “We must observe how nature behaves before we can understand why, we must understand before we can predict, and we must be able to predict the outcome before we undertake measures for control.”40 He warned, however, that while modern technology was already capable of influencing the global climate system or “heat engine” by altering patterns of thermal forcing, the consequences of such acts could not be adequately predicted. The situation was pretty much the same then as it is now. Geoengineers tend to argue linearly, in a mythical orderly series from science, to engineering, to a public discussion with other “citizens,” who can then be educated on the wonders of science and the possibilities of engineering. Prefiguring later optimism, Fletcher thought that an improved observational system, combining ground stations and satellite surveillance, paleoclimatic reconstructions, much faster computers, and better models, would resolve the problems and allow simulations to be performed in enough detail “to evaluate the consequences of specific climate modification acts.” He estimated that this capability would be available by 1973, but close to four decades later it is still a desideratum (for some).
Having spent most of his time on technical speculations, Fletcher turned briefly to what he called “international cooperation” for the management of global climatic resources, basing his comments on his assumption that purposeful climate modification deserved the attention of scientific and government leaders. Repeating the opening lines of Wexler’s lecture (could Fletcher have been in the audience in 1962?), he invoked John F. Kennedy’s statement to the United Nations regarding “further co-operative efforts between all nations in weather prediction and eventually in weather control” (21). Fletcher also cited a joint congressional resolution of April 1, 1968, to the effect that the United States would be a full participant in the World Weather Watch, which certainly involved observation and prediction, if not understanding and control, and would take steps to support “the theoretical study and evaluation of inadvertent climate modification and the feasibility of intentional climate modification” (22). While the W W W is still functioning and there have been numerous integrated assessments of climate change, recall that even as Fletcher was writing this piece, Project Popeye and Operation Motorpool were under way in the jungles of Southeast Asia, giving a black eye to schemes for the intentional modification of the environment.
Budyko included a section on climate modification in his book Climatic Changes (1974). Noting how difficult it had been to control urban air pollution, he predicted that it would be even more difficult to prevent an increase in the carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere and a growth in waste heat release. Agreeing with Fletcher, he concluded that “in the near future climate modification will become necessary in order to maintain current climatic conditions.”41 Budyko was quite skeptical of plans to remove the polar ice, rehydrate Africa, or redirect ocean currents, commenting that it remained “quite unclear how they may influence climate” (239). He was more favorable, however, toward the possibility of triggering instabilities in large-scale atmospheric flows.
Budyko’s preferred technique—one discussed by the National Academy of Sciences in 1992 and still under discussion—involved increasing the aerosol content of the lower stratosphere using aircraft or rocket delivery systems. In a back-of-the-envelope calculation, he estimated that a 2 percent reduction in direct solar radiation and a 0.3 percent decrease in total rad
iation were needed to cool the Earth by several degrees. This could be accomplished by generating an artificial cloud of 600,000 tons of sulfuric acid, the result, under favorable circumstances and assumptions, of burning some 100,000 tons of sulfur per year. Budyko considered this to be a “negligible” quantity compared with other anthropogenic and natural sources. He wrote that “such amounts [of sulfur] are not at all important in environmental pollution” (240), with the important exceptions of the unfavorable effects of such injections on the ozone layer and on agricultural activity, which required further study. Budyko was aware that current simplified theories were inadequate to specify all the possible changes in weather conditions resulting from modifications of the aerosol layer of the stratosphere. Obviously, he believed then, and it holds true today, that deliberate climate modification would be premature before the consequences could be calculated with confidence.
Fixing the Sky Page 32