108 General Waitt quote: Major General Alden H. Waitt, “Why Germany Didn’t Try Gas,” Saturday Evening Post, vol. 218, no. 36 (March 9, 1946), p. 138.
108 Chemical weapons experimental station at Suffield, Canada: Eggleston, Scientists at War, pp. 103–109; Hersh, Chemical and Biological Warfare, pp. 293–294; Paul A. D’Agostino and Cam A. Boulet, “Celebrating 60 Years of CB Research at Defense Research Establishment Suffield (1941–2001),” The ASA Newsletter, vol. 01-4, issue no. 85 (2001).
108 Tripartite Agreement: G. B. Carter and Graham S. Pearson, “Past British Chemical Warfare Capabilities,” RUSI Journal, February 1996, p. 63.
109 Royal Air Force report of September 6, 1947: Air Staff, Royal Air Force, “Note on the Potential Value of Nerve Gases as C.W. Agents,” September 6, 1947 [PRO, AIR 20/8730].
109 Research at Porton Down: Chemical Defence Experimental Establishment, Porton Down, “Provisional Appreciation of the C.W. Value of Nerve Gases” (Restricted), Porton Memorandum, no. 32, December 10, 1946 [PRO WO 189/252]; Porton Memorandum no. 15, Addendum II, “Classified List of Compounds Examined Physiologically Since 1945, Part IV—Nerve Gases—(G Agents)” (Secret) [PRO WO 189/233]; Porton Memorandum no. 34, “Appreciation of the Potential CW Value of Nerve Gases Based on Information Available Up to 30.06.49,” serial no. 149, June 30, 1949 (Restricted) [PRO WO 189/254]; Gradon Carter and Brian Balmer, “Chemical and Biological Warfare and Defence, 1945–90,” in Bud and Gummet, Cold War, Hot Science, pp. 296–297.
109 Edgewood report on human testing with Tabun: L. Wilson Greene, “Psychochemical Warfare: A New Concept of War,” Army Chemical Center, August 1949, cited in Hunt, Secret Agenda, p. 162.
110-11 Pharmacology of nerve agents (muscarinic and nicotinic effects): Frederick R. Sidell, “Nerve Agents,” in Sidell, Takafuji, and Franz, eds., Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, pp. 129–179.
111 Syrettes containing atropine: Jeffrey K. Smart, “History of Chemical and Biological Warfare: An American Perspective,” in Sidell, Takafuji, and Franz, eds., Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, p. 54.
111 U.S. development of Sarin pilot plant: U.S. Army Chemical Corps, Chemical Corps R&E Periodic Progress Report, “GB Plant, Process Development” (Secret), Project No. A1.13-2.1, 4-92-03-02, October 1, 1947 [FOIA]; U.S. Army Chemical Corps, R&E Periodic Project Progress Report, “Agents of the G-SERIES” (Secret), Project No. A1.13, 4-08-03-05, October 1, 1947 [FOIA].
112–15 Colonel Loucks recruitment of Walther Schieber: U.S. Army Military History Institute, Senior Officer Military History Program, “Major General Charles E. Loucks, USA, Retired, interviewed by Mr. Morris C. Johnson, 1984,” Project 84-8, transcript [MHI].
115 Loucks meetings with Schieber and Falkenhagen scientists: Papers of General Charles E. Loucks, Desk Diary 1948 [MHI].
116 Project Paperclip and German scientists: Oral History, “Conversations Between Lieutenant General Andrew J. Boyle and Lieutenant Colonel Frank Walton,” vol. 1, 1971, U.S. Army Military History Research Collection, Senior Officers Debriefing Program [MHI].
116 Operation Matchbox: David Williams and Tom Rawstorne, “British Nerve Gas Deaths ‘Had Nazi Scientists,’ ” Daily Mail (London), October 25, 1999, p. 17.
116–17 Fritz Ho fmann: Hunt, Secret Agenda, pp. 160–161; Russell, War and Nature, p. 178.
117 Australian involvement in Operation Matchbox: Roger Maynard, “Australia ‘Hired Nazi Scientists After War,’ ” The Times (London), August 17, 1999.
117 German chemists in United States: Hunt, Secret Agenda, pp. 159–162; author’s interview with William C. Dee.
117 Schieber work for U.S. European Command (EUCOM): Hunt, Secret Agenda, p. 169.
117 French chemical weapons program after World War II: Lepick, Les armes chimiques, pp. 97–98.
118 French Experimental Station at Beni Ounif: Vincent Jauvert, “Quand la France testait des armes chimiques en Algérie,” Le Nouvel Observateur, October 23–29, 1997, pp. 10–22; Meyer, L’arme chimique, pp. 154–161.
118–20 Loucks visit to French chemical weapons testing site in Algeria: Major General Charles E. Loucks, USA, Retired, interviewed by Mr. Morris C. Johnson, 1984, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Senior Officer Military History Program, Project 84-8, transcript [MHI]; Papers of General Charles E. Loucks, Desk Diary 1949 [MHI].
120 British interest in Sarin production capability: Chemical Defence Experimental Establishment, Porton Down, “Note on the Potential Value of Nerve Gases as C.W. Agents,” September 6, 1947 [PRO, AIR 20/8730].
120 British decision to build Sarin pilot plant: (U.K.) Combined Chiefs of Staff, “Biological and Chemical Warfare Research and Development Policy (Draft),” undated [PRO WO 188/705].
120 British Research Establishment at Sutton Oak: G. B. Carter and Graham S. Pearson, “Past British Chemical Warfare Capabilities,” RUSI Journal, February 1996, pp. 60, 62–63; United Kingdom, “Declaration of Past Activities Relating to Its Former Offensive Chemical Weapons Program,” submitted to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, May 27, 1997.
121 Selection of location for U.K. Sarin pilot plant: Author’s interview with Ron Manley.
121 Sarin pilot plant at Nancekuke: G. B. Carter and Graham S. Pearson, “Past British Chemical Warfare Capabilities,” RUSI Journal, February 1996, pp. 59–68; (UK) Chiefs of Staff Committee, Chemical Warfare Sub-Committee, “First Requirements for Nerve Gas Weapons: Memorandum by Ministry of Supply,” CW(52) 13 (Secret), October 23, 1952 [PRO DEFE 41/157]; C. A. H. Pidcock, (U.K.) Ministry of Defence, “Estimation of Quantity of New Gases Required for Operational Purposes in 1957” (Top Secret), June 14, 1949 [PRO AIR 20/8731].
CHAPTER SEVEN: BUILDING THE STOCKPILE
122 Cut in Chemical Corps budget, plan to move to Camp Siebert: Jeffrey K. Smart, Command Historian, U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., “Oral History Interview: Elmer H. Engquist, February 26, 1993,” transcript, pp. 4–5.
122 Research at Edgewood on G-series agents: U.S. Army Chemical Corps, Research and Development Project Card (New Projects), “Agents of the G Series” (Secret), A1.13, Project No. 4-08-03-05, March 26, 1948 [FOIA].
122–23 Debate over Sarin versus Soman: Wise, Cassidy’s Run, pp. 65–66.
123 Selection of Sarin as the standard agent: U.S. Army Chemical Corps, Office of the Chief, Memorandum to the Chairman, Chemical Corps Technical Committee, Subcommittee Report “V,” Subject: “Classification of Quick-Acting, Nonpersistent Agent, GB, as a Substitute Standard Type” (Secret), revised May 18, 1948, p. V5.
123 Top secret assessment by Joint Chiefs (January 1949): JCS, Joint Intelligence Group, Memorandum for the Joint Strategic Plans Group, Subject: “Estimate of Soviet Capabilities for Employing Biological and Chemical Weapons” (Top Secret), J.I.G. 297/3, January 27, 1949.
124 President Roosevelt pledge of no first use: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, pp. 10–11.
124 NSC meeting on February 1, 1950: Fredericks, “The Evolution of Post–World War II United States Chemical Warfare Policy,” p. 11–19.
124 Memorandum by General Bradley: Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, JCS, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: “Chemical Warfare Policy,” January 18, 1950 [NSA].
124 NSC-62: “Chemical Warfare, NSC 62,” in National Security Council, Current Policies of the Government of the United States of America Relating to the National Security, vol. 2: Functional Policies, Part XI: “Warfare, Chemical Warfare” (Top Secret) [NSA].
124 Retention of Tabun as an emergency war reserve: U.S. Army Chemical Corps, Office of the Chief, Chemical Corps Technical Committee, Army Chemical Center, Md., Subject: “Classification of GA as a Limited Standard Type” (Secret), September 30, 1949 [FOIA].
125 General McAuli fe memorandum: U.S. Army Chemical Corps, Office of the Chief (Major General A. C. McAuliffe), “Acceleration of G Agent Program” (Se
cret), April 14, 1950 [FOIA].
125 McAuli fe speech to American Chemical Society: “War of Nerves,” Time, vol. 55, no. 18 (May 1, 1950), p. 44.
125 May 1950 article in Time magazine: Ibid.
125 Outbreak of Korean War: www.korean-war.com.
126 Stevenson committee report: “Letter of Transmittal,” Report of the Secretary of Defense’s Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Warfare, June 30, 1950, pp. iii–iv [NSA].
127 Joint Chiefs recommendation: JCS, 1837/14, September 7, 1950 [NARA, RG 218], cited in Fredericks, “The Evolution of Post–World War II United States Chemical Warfare Policy,” p. 11–25.
127 R&D budget of Chemical Corps tripled in size: Fredericks, “The Evolution of Post–World War II United States Chemical Warfare Policy,” p. 11–26.
127 Reactivation of Dugway Proving Ground: Hersh, Chemical and Biological Warfare, pp. 137–143.
128 Selection of DMHP process: U.S. Army Chemical Corps, Research and Development Project Card, “GB Unit Plant Design” (Secret), December 1950 [FOIA].
128 Secret allocation of $50 million: Fredericks, “The Evolution of Post–World War II United States Chemical Warfare Policy,” p. 11–26.
128 Code name “Gibbett” for Sarin plant: Tab C, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: “Chemical, Biological and Radiological Warfare,” December 15, 1951 [NSA].
128 Major Levy quote on technical challenges: Major Stanley Levy, Chairman, Industrial Mobilization Review Committee, Memorandum to Commanding Officer, Chemical Corps Procurement Agency, Subject: “Proposed Contract for G Agent Manufacturing and Munitions Loading Plant” (Secret), CMLWD-PP, July 6, 1950 [FOIA].
128 M34 Sarin cluster bomb: U.S. Army Chemical Corps, Office of the Chief, Chemical Corps Technical Committee, Subject: “Military Characteristics for a Clusterable G-Series Bomb” (Secret), May 16, 1949 [FOIA].
129 Selection of Site A and Site B: Hylton, The History of Chemical Warfare Plants and Facilities in the United States, p. 2.
129 National Intelligence Estimate: DCI, National Intelligence Estimate no. 18, The Probability of Soviet Employment of BW and CW in the Event of Attacks Upon the US (Top Secret), December 15, 1950 [NARA].
130 Construction of Site A: “Muscle Shoals Makes G-Gas Basics,” Chemical and Engineering News, vol. 32 (July 19, 1954).
130–32 Technical problems at Site A: Major Serge Tonetti, “Chemical Corps Phosphate Development Works,” Armed Forces Chemical Journal, vol. 10, no. 5 (1956), pp. 32–33, 36; Hylton, The History of Chemical Warfare Plants and Facilities in the United States, pp. 4–58.
133 Final two steps in Sarin production: Stephen Black, Benoit Morel, and Peter Zapf, Technical Aspects of Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Internal Technical Report, Program on International Peace and Security, Carnegie Mellon University, January 1991, pp. 39–41.
133 Construction of Sarin plant at Site B: “Vitro Builds Nerve Gas Plants,” Chemical and Engineering News, vol. 32, no. 36 (September 5, 1954), pp. 3292–3493; “Army Permits Peak at Nerve Gas Facilities,” Chemical Engineering, vol. 65, no. 19 (September 22, 1958), pp. 74–78; Hylton, The History of Chemical Warfare Plants and Facilities in the United States, pp. 59–75.
133 Special materials used in Sarin plant: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum for the Chairman, Munitions Board, Subject: “Priority for Chemical and Biological Warfare Facilities” (Top Secret), J.C.S. 1837/31, February 29, 1952 [NARA, RG 218].
133–34 Delays in operating Site A: JCS, Joint Strategic Plans Committee, Report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on “Chemical (Toxic) and Biological Warfare Readiness” (Top Secret), J.S.P.C. 954/29, August 13, 1953 [NARA, RG 385].
134 Delays in production of M34 bomb: Memorandum from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 Logistics, Department of the Army, to the Chief Chemical Officer, Subject: “Production of E101 Cluster, Bomb, GB-Filled” (Top Secret), G4/F3-392(SF), January 14, 1954 [FOIA].
134 Purchase of dichlor from Shell Chemical Company: Chemical Corps Advisory Council, “Ad Hoc Committee Meeting of Engineering & Production Committee, Muscle Shoals, Alabama, 5–6 April 1954” (Secret), AC-988, 1954, p. 7 [FOIA].
134 APC process: Black, Morel, and Zapf, Technical Aspects of Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, pp. 42–43.
134 Ambros release, recruitment by Army Chemical Corps: Hunt, Secret Agenda, p. 132.
134–35 Deployment of U.S. chemical weapons on Okinawa: Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: “Overseas Deployment of Toxic Chemical Agents,” JCS 1837/46 (Top Secret), March 12, 1953 [NARA, RG 218].
135 Request to use chemical weapons in Korean War: McCarthy, The Ultimate Folly, p. 11.
135 Chemical Corps public relations campaign: J. H. Rothschild, “Germs and Gas: The Weapons Nobody Dares Talk About,” Harper’s, June 1959.
135 Article on G agents by Cornelius Ryan: Cornelius Ryan, “G-Gas: A New Weapon of Chilling Terror; We Have It—So Does Russia,” Collier’s Magazine, vol. 132, no. 13 (November 27, 1953), pp. 89–95.
136 Transport of dichlor in railroad tank cars: Author’s interview with Sigmund R. Eckhaus.
136–37 Ventilation system at Site B: “Vitro Builds Nerve Gas Plants.”
138 Accidents in Sarin plant: Hersh, Chemical and Biological Warfare, p. 107.
138–39 Munitions filling line: Author’s interview with Sigmund R. Eckhaus.
139 M5 detectors measured Sarin vapor in air: “Vitro Builds Nerve Gas Plants.”
139 Pollution abatement system: Author’s interview with Sigmund R. Eckhaus.
139 Cost overruns: Hylton, The History of Chemical Warfare Plants and Facilities in the United States, pp. 95.
140 Advisory Committee on New Agents: U.S. Army Chemical Corps, Chemical and Radiological Laboratories, Army Chemical Center, Md., Significant Accomplishments, Fiscal Year 1953 (Secret), CRLR 225, August 24, 1953, p. 5 [FOIA].
140 Project Big Ben: Author’s interview with David M. Falk, Arlington, Va., April 21, 2004.
140–41 Field trials of M34 cluster bomb: U.S. Army Chemical Corps, “Minutes of the Meeting of the Chemical Corps Technical Committee” (Secret), Meeting No. 3, December 9, 1954, pp. 99–100, 108–109, 118–124 [NARA].
141 Military antipathy to chemical weapons: Gordon M. Burck, personal communication, June 27, 2004.
142 JCS assessment of Soviet nerve-agent capability: JCS, Joint Strategic Plans Committee, “Appendix to Enclosure J.S.P.C. 887/27: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Warfare Annex” (Top Secret), May 1956 [NARA, RG 218].
CHAPTER EIGHT: CHEMICAL ARMS RACE
143 Boris Libman biography: Author’s interview with Boris Libman.
144 USSR Council of Ministers resolution (1952): Derek Averre, “Chemical Weapons in Russia: After the CWC,” European Security, vol. 8, no. 4 (Winter 1999), pp. 130–164.
144 Soviet development of Sarin production process: Author’s interview with Boris Libman.
144 Difficulty of obtaining special construction materials: Boris Libman, “How Former Soviet Union Chemical Weapons Production Facilities Were Supplied with Chemical Equipment,” Communiqué No. 14 (prepared for the U.S. Army Chemical Corps), handwritten manuscript, undated.
145 Sarin production plant in Stalingrad: Sonia Ben Ouagrham, “Conversion of Russian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities: Conflicts with the CWC,” The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 7, no. 2 (Summer 2000), p. 52.
145 Recruitment of male engineers: Boris Libman, “How Chemical Weapons Production Facilities Were Supplied with Raw Materials, Precursors and Hardware.”
146 Central Chemical Testing Site: SIPRI, The Rise of CB Weapons, pp. 279–280, 285.
146 Ghosh development of Amiton: Ibid., pp. 74–75.
147 Schrader’s related patent: Benjamin Garrett, “The CW Almanac,” ASA Newsletter, no. 60, June 23, 1997, p. 15.
147 Discovery of Tammelin esters: Lars-Erik Tammelin, “Choline Esters: Substrates and Inhibitors of
Cholinesterases,” Svensk Kemisk Tidskrift, vol. 70, no. 4 (1958), pp. 157–181; Sten-Magnus Aquilonius, Torsten Fredriksson, and Anders Sundwall, “Studies on Phosphorylated Thiocholine and Choline Derivatives: I. General Toxicology and Pharmacology,” Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology, vol. 6 (1964), pp. 269–279.
147 Testing of nerve agents on volunteers at Porton: United Kingdom, Ministry of Supply, Advisory Council on Scientific Research and Technical Development, Chemical Defense Advisory Board, “Annual Review of the Work of the Board for 1957” (Secret), A.C.14176 CDB.237, November 4, 1957 [NSA]; Rob Evans, “The Past Porton Down Can’t Hide,” The Guardian, May 6, 2004.
148–49 Ronald Maddison: David Williams and Tom Rawstorne, “British Nerve Gas Deaths ‘Had Nazi Scientists,’ ” Daily Mail (London), October 25, 1999, p. 17; Sean Rayment, “Porton Nerve Gas Scientists Escape Criminal Charges,” Daily Telegraph (London), June 8, 2003; BBC News, “Nerve Gas Death Was ‘Unlawful,’ ” November 15, 2003.
148 Maddison hoped to buy engagement ring: Sally Pook, “Porton Down Unlawful Killing Verdict Opens Gates to Claims,” The Telegraph, November 16, 2004.
149 Twenty drops of 10 milligrams of Sarin: Richard Smith, “Airman Used as Sarin Test Guinea Pig by MOD,” The Daily Mirror, November 16, 2004.
149 After twenty minutes, Maddison complained of feeling ill: Rob Evans and Sandra Laville, “Porton Down Unlawfully Killed Airman in Sarin Tests,” The Guardian, November 16, 2004.
149–50 Alfred Thornhill story: Antony Barnett, “Final Agony of RAF Volunteer Killed by Sarin—in Britain,” The Observer , September 28, 2003.
151 Memorandum by British Chiefs of Sta f: Chiefs of Staff, “Biological and Chemical Warfare Research and Development Policy: Annex (Draft)” [PRO, WO 188/705].
151 British plan for war reserve of Sarin weapons: U.K., Chiefs of Staff Committee, Chemical Warfare Sub-Committee, “First Requirements for Nerve Gas Weapons: Memorandum by Ministry of Supply” (Secret), CW(52) 13, October 23, 1952 [PRO, DEFE 41/157].
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