War of Nerves

by Jonathan Tucker

  151 Number of munitions needed to deliver one ton of Sarin: Matthew Meselson, “The Myth of Chemical Superweapons,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 47, no. 3 (April 1991), p. 13.

  151–52 U.S. o fer to sell Sarin stockpile to United Kingdom: JCS, Joint Logistics Plans Committee, Directive, “Provision of Nerve Gas to the U.K.” (Top Secret), J.L.P.C. 470/D, April 7, 1953 [NARA, RG 385]; United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, “Text of U.S. Reply to British Aide-Memoire on the Production of Nerve Gas Weapons” (Top Secret), April 20, 1953 [NSA].

  152 Memorandum by Crawford: K. N. Crawford, Chairman, Chemical Warfare Sub-Committee, Draft of letter to Lieutenant General Sir Nevill Brownjohn, Chief Staff Officer, Ministry of Defence (Top Secret), September 21, 1953 [PRO, WO 286/77].

  153 British decision to drop plan to buy U.S. weapons: Royal Air Force, Vice Chief of the Air Staff, Memorandum to the Vice Chiefs of Staff, “Policy for Chemical Warfare” (Top Secret), D.D.Ops(B), April 23, 1953 [PRO, AIR 20/8734]; A. F. Boyd, Squadron Leader, Royal Air Force, Loose Minute, “Chemical Weapons,” COS 1055/D.D.Ops.(B) (Top Secret), April 14, 1954 [PRO, AIR 20/8734].

  153 French chemical weapons program: Author’s interview with Olivier Lepick.

  154 Excessive toxicity of Amiton: SIPRI, The Rise of CB Weapons, p. 75.

  154 Termed V agents for “venomous”: Harris and Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing, p. 184.

  154 Production halt at Nancekuke in 1955: War Office, “CDE, Nancekuke (Process Research Division)” (Secret), DBCD/IL.1026/1687 A, undated [PRO, WO 32/21686]; Robert Mendick, “Nerve Gas Dump Cover-Up Exposed,” The Independent on Sunday, February 6, 2000, p. 10.

  154 British decision to renounce active chemical stockpile: Gradon Carter and Brian Balmer, “Chemical and Biological Warfare and Defence, 1945–90,” in Bud and Gummett, Cold War, Hot Science, p. 298.

  155 NSC-5602⁄1: “Basic National Security Policy,” March 15, 1956, in Glennon, et al. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, vol. XIX, National Security Policy, p. 246.

  155 Implementation of Stevenson committee report: Report of the Secretary of Defense’s Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Warfare, June 30, 1950, pp. 11–14; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: “Chemical, Biological and Radiological Warfare” (Confidential), December 15, 1951.

  155–56 Miller report: Hersh, Chemical and Biological Warfare, p. 23.

  156 Department of Defense directive (October 6, 1956): Reuben B. Robertson, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Directive, Subject: “Chemical (Toxic) and Biological Warfare Readiness” (Top Secret), TS-3145.1, October 6, 1956 [NSA].

  156 Field Manual on Law of Land Warfare: SIPRI, CB Weapons Today, pp. 195–196.

  156 Shutdown of Sarin production lines: U.S. Army Chemical Corps Historical Office, Army Chemical Center, Maryland, Summary of Major Events and Prob lems, U.S. Army Chemical Corps, Fiscal Year 1958 (Secret), March 1959, pp. 153, 155 [NSA].

  156–57 Environmental pollution at Rocky Mountain Arsenal: Peter Pringle, “Lest We Forget the Days of Gas and Poison,” Independent, April 13, 1989, p. 12; Penelope Purdy, “What Is Really Buried at the Arsenal? Sarin Saga Will Haunt Metro Denver,” Denver Post, January 14, 2001, p. I-1.

  157 Underground injection of toxic wastes at Rocky Mountain Arsenal: Jonathan Eberhart, “Geology: To Pump or Un-Pump,” Science News, vol. 93, May 4, 1968, pp. 434–435; McCarthy, The Ultimate Folly, pp. 99–101.

  CHAPTER NINE: AGENT VENOMOUS

  158 Synthesis of V-agents, selection of VX: U.S. Army Chemical Corps Historical Office, Army Chemical Center, Md., Summary of Major Events and Problems, United States Army Chemical Corps, Fiscal Year 1957 (Secret), October 1957, p. 94 [FOIA].

  158–59 Characteristics of VX: U.S. Army Chemical Corps Historical Office, Army Chemical Center, Maryland, Summary of Major Events and Problems, United States Army Chemical Corps, Fiscal Year 1958 (Secret), March 1959, p. 98 [FOIA].

  159 Development of transester process: Author’s interview with Sigmund R. Eckhaus.

  159 VX pilot plants at Edgewood: U.S. Army Chemical Corps Historical Office, Army Chemical Center, Maryland, Summary of Major Events and Problems, U.S. Army Chemical Corps, Fiscal Year 1958 (Secret), March 1959, p. 99 [NSA].

  160 V-Agent Team at Dugway Proving Ground: U.S. Army Chemical Corps Historical Office, Army Chemical Center, Maryland, Summary of Major Events and Problems, United States Army Chemical Corps, Fiscal Year 1957 (Secret), October 1957, p. 95 [FOIA].

  160 Concept of binary weapons: SIPRI, CB Weapons Today, pp. 306–308.

  160 Attempt to produce binary explosive shell: Brauch, Der chemische Alptraum, p. 121.

  160 Development of binary VX bomb: Author’s interview with William C. Dee.

  161–62 Nachmansohn research on cholinesterase from electric eels: John Kobler, “The Terrible Threat of Nerve Gas,” Saturday Evening Post, vol. 230, no. 4 (July 27, 1957), pp. 28–29, 75–77.

  162 Synergistic effects of PAM and atropine: U.K., Ministry of Supply, Chemical Defence Advisory Board, Advisory Council on Scientific Research and Technical Development, “Annual Review of the Work of the Board for 1957” (Secret), A.C. 14176, CDB.237, November 4, 1957 [NSA].

  163 Development of British “Autoject”: U.K. Ministry of Defence, A Brief History of the Chemical Defence Establishment Porton, March 1961 (Restricted), p. 36 [SPRU].

  163 Development of “Ace autoinjector”: Cornelius Ryan, “G-Gas: A New Weapon of Chilling Terror: We Have It—So Does Russia,” Collier’s Magazine, vol. 132, no. 13 (November 27, 1953), p. 92.

  164 Automatic field detectors for nerve agents: U.K. Ministry of Defence, A Brief History of the Chemical Defence Establishment Porton, March 1961 (Restricted), p. 34; John Kobler, “The Terrible Threat of Nerve Gas,” Saturday Evening Post, vol. 230, no. 4 (July 27, 1957), p. 76; U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, History of Chemical and Biological Detectors, Alarms, and Warning Systems (Aberdeen, Md.: SBCCOM, undated), p. 20.

  164 Tripartite research on V agents: U.K., Ministry of Defence, CDEE Porton Down, Offensive Evaluation Committee, “11th Tripartite Conference on Toxicological Warfare, Conclusions and Recommendations” (Secret), Ptn./IT.4222/2099/57, May 15, 1957; U.K., Ministry of Defence, CDEE Porton Down, Offensive Evaluation Committee, “Conclusion and Recommendations of the 12th Tripartite Conference—BW/CW Applications” (Secret), Ptn./IT.4222/4141/57, October 1, 1957.

  165 British VX pilot plant at Nancekuke: Author’s interview with Ron Manley.

  165 Selection of Newport site for V-agent production: Harris and Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing, p. 185.

  165 Solicitation of proposals from industry: U.S. Army Chemical Corps Historical Office, Army Chemical Center, Maryland, Summary of Major Events and Problems, United States Army Chemical Corps, Fiscal Year 1958 (Secret), March 1959, p. 158.

  165–66 Selection of FMC Corporation: Hersh, Chemical and Biological Warfare, p. 102.

  166 Newport Army Chemical Plant: Hylton, The History of Chemical Warfare Plants and Facilities in the United States, pp. 78–93.

  166 Development of M55 rocket: Clarke, The Silent Weapons, p. 48; U.S. Army Chemical Corps Historical Office, Army Chemical Center, Maryland, Summary of Major Events and Problems, United States Army Chemical Corps, Fiscal Year 1960 (Secret), April 1961, pp. 108, 154.

  167 Development of Sarin rockets: James Baar, “Army Seeks Poison Gas Missiles,” Missiles and Rockets, May 16, 1960, pp. 10–11.

  167 Honest John missile warhead: U.S. Army Chemical Corps Historical Office, Army Chemical Center, Maryland, Summary of Major Events and Problems, United States Army Chemical Corps, Fiscal Year 1960 (Secret), April 1961, p. 110 [NSA].

  169 U.S. release of VX information to France: U.K., Minister of War, “Release by the United States of Information on Toxic Munitions to France” (Secret), R.H.S./428/62, July 5, 1962 [PRO, DEFE 13/440].

  169 French production and testi
ng of Sarin and VX: Lepick, Les armes chimiques, p. 98; author’s interview with Olivier Lepick.

  170 Project 112 Task Group: U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD Releases Project SHAD Fact Sheets,” News Release 264-02, May 23, 2003.

  170 Tripling of Chemical Corps budget: Harris and Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing, p. 186.

  170–71 Six recommendations in Project 112 report: General L. L. Lemnitzer, Chairman, JCS, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: “Biological and Chemical Weapons and Defense Programs” (Top Secret), CM-551-62, February 14, 1962 [NARA, RG 218].

  171 General Taylor memorandum to Secretary McNamara: General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman, JCS, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: “Negotiations for Storage Rights in USEUCOM” (Secret), December 17, 1962 [NARA, RG 218].

  171 Founding of Deseret Test Center: Jeffrey K. Smart, “History of Chemical and Biological Warfare: An American Perspective,” in Sidell, Takafuji, and Franz, eds., Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, p. 55.

  171–72 Other U.S. chemical weapons test sites: McCarthy, The Ultimate Folly, pp. 36–38.

  172 First public mention of VX production: “Lethal Nerve Gas Is Now Being Made at Newport Ordnance Plant,” Terre Haute Star, May 16, 1952, p. 1.

  172–77 Description of VX production at Newport: James R. Polk, “U.S. Assembly Line Turns Out Deadly Nerve Gas for Military,” Washington Post, April 22, 1964, p. 1; Hersh, Chemical and Biological Warfare, pp. 102–104; author’s interview with Sigmund R. Eckhaus.

  177 VX stored in tanks and one-ton containers: Author’s interview with Sigmund R. Eckhaus.

  177–80 Dee development of binary VX bomb: Author’s interview with William C. Dee.

  180 Marshal Zhukov warning: Harris and Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing, p. 145.

  181 Soviet synthesis of novel agents: Author’s interview with Boris Libman; U.K., MI-3, “Soviet Tactical Chemical Warfare” (Secret), April 26, 1963 [PRO, DEFE 24/31]; U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Washington, D.C., Intelligence Staff Study, “Soviet Research and Development Capabilities for New Toxic Agents” (Secret), Project No. A-1735, July 28, 1958, pp. 4–8 [MHI].

  181 Soviets obtained the secret formula for VX: Author’s interview with Vil S. Mirzayanov.

  181 Soviet synthesis of R-33: Wise, Cassidy’s Run, p. 193.

  181–82 Structural di differences between VX and R-33: Author’s interview with Ron Manley.

  182 Soviet decision to mass-produce Soman: Wise, Cassidy’s Run, p. 66.

  182 Production method developed by Tomilov: Author’s interview with Vil S. Mirzayanov.

  182–83 Problems with the production of pinacolyl alcohol: Boris Libman, “How Former Soviet Union Chemical Weapons Production Facilities Were Supplied with Chemical Equipment,” Communiqué no. 14 (prepared for U.S. Army Chemical Corps), handwritten manuscript, undated.

  183 Soviet manufacture of silver-lined reactors: Ibid.

  183 Guskov sent to Volgograd: Author’s interview with Vil S. Mirzayanov.

  183 Soviet delivery systems for nerve agents: Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate no. 11-10-63, Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Chemical Warfare (Secret), December 27, 1963, pp. 8–10 [NARA].

  183 Soviet chemical weapons deployed in Warsaw Pact states: Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, “Chemical Weapons, Chronology 1989: 18 October,” Arms Control Reporter, December 1989, p. 704.B.408.

  183 Soviet chemical warfare doctrine: U.K., Ministry of Defence, “Soviet Tactical Chemical Warfare” (Secret), MI-3 (d)/13/9, April 26, 1963 [PRO, DEFE 24/31].

  184 CBIC assessment process, Kerlin report: Author’s interview with Garrett Cochran; Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), National Intelligence Estimate No. 11-10-63, Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Chemical Warfare (Secret), December 27, 1963 [NARA]; DCI, National Intelligence Estimate No. 11-11-69, Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Capabilities (Secret), February 13, 1969 [NARA].

  185 NORAD sabotage scenario: Greeman and Roberts, Der kälteste Krieg.

  185 NORAD requirement for chemical detector: Major General W. H. Hennig, Chief of Staff, Headquarters North American Air Defense Command, Memorandum to Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, Attn: Chief Chemical Officer, Subject: “Biological and Chemical Warfare” (Confidential), JCS 1837/118, August 22, 1960 [NARA, RG 218].

  185 Soviet covert chemical attack in Rothschild book: Rothschild, Tomorrow’s Weapons, p. 26.

  185–86 British chemical rearmament R&D program in 1963: Gradon Carter and Brian Balmer, “Chemical and Biological Warfare and Defence, 1945–90,” in Bud and Gummet, Cold War, Hot Science, p. 299.

  186 British chemical rearmament plans: United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, “CW—Retaliatory Capability” (Top Secret), 86/CHEMICAL/960, August 25, 1965 [PRO, DEFE 24/31]; Memorandum from the Chief of the Defence Staff to the Secretary of State, “Chemical and Biological Warfare” (Top Secret/UK Eyes Only), October 28, 1965 [PRO, DEFE 24/31]; Memorandum from DAEP to DCGS, Loose Minute, “Chemical Warfare” (Top Secret), November 29, 1965 [PRO, DEFE 24/31].

  186 Australia joined Tripartite Program: G. B. Carter and Graham S. Pearson, “Past British Chemical Warfare Capabilities,” RUSI Journal, February 1996, p. 63; Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C., “Some Historical Comments and Background on TTCP,” prepared for the 25th Anniversary Meeting of the NAMRAD Principals, Washington, D.C., October 12–13, 1983.

  187 Fish kill on Volga River, punishment of Libman: Wise, Cassidy’s Run, p. 67; author’s interview with Vil S. Mirzayanov.

  187–88 French-Algerian agreement on B2-Namous: Mayer, L’arme chimique, pp. 157–158.

  188 French testing with “maquettes”: Ibid., pp. 159, 408.

  188–89 Operation Shocker: Wise, Cassidy’s Run.

  CHAPTER TEN: YEMEN AND AFTER

  190 Egyptian “Izlis” program: Dany Shoham, “Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt,” The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 5, no. 3 (Spring–Summer 1998), p. 48.

  190 Egyptian military officers trained in Moscow: Ibid., p. 49.

  190 Recruitment of West German scientists: Ibid.

  190 Outbreak of civil war in Yemen: W. Andrew Terrill, “The Chemical Warfare Legacy of the Yemen War,” Comparative Strategy, vol. 10 (1991), pp. 109–119.

  191 Egyptian attack at Al-Kawma: Hersh, Chemical and Biological Warfare, p. 283.

  191 Saudia Arabia filed a complaint with the U.N. Secretary-General: Terrill, “The Chemical Warfare Legacy of the Yemen War,” p. 111.

  191 U.N. observer group asked to investigate: “U.N. Will Weigh Gas-Bomb Charge: Yemen Team Told to Check Reports About U.A.R.,” New York Times, July 10, 1963, p. 3.

  191 Article by journalist Marquis Childs: Marquis W. Childs, “Egypt Stored Nerve Gas Before War,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 18, 1967, p. 1.

  191 Prime Minister Wilson statement: Harris and Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing, p. 234.

  191–92 Classified cable from U.S. Embassy in Beirut: Hersh, Chemical and Biological Warfare, p. 285.

  192 Saudi Arabia submitted medical reports to United Nations: Hersh, Chemical and Biological Warfare, pp. 283–284.

  192 Analysis showed V agent in contaminated sand: Childs, “Egypt Stored Nerve Gas Before War.”

  192 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) investigation: Terrill, “The Chemical Warfare Legacy of the Yemen War,” p. 114.

  193 Evidence Egyptian munitions furnished by Soviets: “Yemen—A Testing Ground for Soviet Poison Gases,” Elseviers Weekblad (Amsterdam), November 25, 1967; “How Nasser Used Poison Gas,” U.S. News & World Report, July 3, 1967, p. 60.

  193 Military Plant No. 801 at Abu Za’abal: Shoham, “Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt,” p. 48.

  193 Meselson testimony: Testimony of Matthew S. Meselson, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing, Chemical and Biological Warfare, 91st Congress, 1st
session, April 30, 1969 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 47.

  193 U.S. diplomatic protest: Terrill, “The Chemical Warfare Legacy of the Yemen War,” p. 114.

  194 Talking points for Johnson-Kosygin meeting: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (drafter: Herbert Scoville), “President’s Meeting with Chairman Kosygin, June 1967, Background Paper and Contingency Talking Points: Use of Chemical Warfare Agents in Middle East” (Secret), AKV/B-11, June 16, 1967 [NARA].

  194 Statement by State Department spokesman: Hersh, Chemical and Biological Warfare, p. 284.

  194 Unnamed U.S. official quoted by Hersh: Ibid., p. 285.

  194 Johnson administration muted its criticism: Terrill, “The Chemical Warfare Legacy of the Yemen War,” p. 114.

  195 Egyptian troop buildup in Sinai Peninsula: Israel Defense Forces, “The Six Day War,” available online at www.idf.il/english/history/sixday.stm.

  195 Israeli reconnaissance mission found chemical shells: Jack Anderson, “The Growing Chemical Club,” Washington Post, August 26, 1984, p. C7.

  195 Frantic efforts by Israeli government to procure gas masks: “Bonn to Sell Israel 20,000 Gas Masks,” New York Times, June 2, 1967, p. 14. (Note: Gerhard Schröder was a Christian Democratic politician during the 1960s, not to be confused with the Social Democratic chancellor of the same name.)

  196 Israel returned the gas masks to West Germany unused: “West Germans to Take Back Gas Masks Unused by Israel,” New York Times, July 1, 1967, p. 5.

  196 Egypt’s last use of chemical weapons in Yemen: Terrill, “The Chemical Warfare Legacy of the Yemen War,” p. 114.

  196 U.S. shortage of conventional munitions for Vietnam: Gordon M. Burck, personal communication, June 27, 2004.

  197 Leakage of M55 rockets: Army Materiel Command, Deputy Chief of Staff for Nuclear & Chemical Matters, M55 Functional Task Group, “M55 GB/VX Rocket: Stockpile Assessment Plan,” March 18, 1985; U.S. Army Material Systems Analysis Activity, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., “Independent Evaluation/Assessment of Rocket, 115mm: Chemical Agent (GB or VX) M55,” October 1985, p. 40.

  197 Lots of Sarin used in M55 rockets: Author’s interview with Sigmund R. Eckhaus.