In time there would be a vestige of a billiard parlor, a coffeehouse, and a few shops, but the structures were never more than rough-hewn and crude.50 The number of men grew, too, and a few more women arrived. There was even a married couple or two in the establishment, like newlywed Irishman James Campbell and his wife, Mary.51 People like Mary Campbell found Laffite to be "of polite and easy manners, generous disposition and exceedingly winning address."52 He occasionally dressed in a nondescript green uniform and an otter skin hat, but just as often in plain civilian garb. He wore no arms day to day. Those who met him most of all remembered his good proportions, dark complexion, small hands, and the brilliant white teeth characteristic of both brothers. 53
Laffite did not waste time in solidifying the island's primary basis in privateering. After a disillusioned Herrera followed Picornell and Toledo in giving up on the revolution and returning to Mexico to make his peace with the Spaniards, Humbert was about all that remained of the pretense of representation from the junta except for Iturribarria, who now distrusted the whole Galveston crowd. Despite this and the fact that the insurgent congress had disintegrated and was on the run, when Humbert and Pierre's "son" reached Galveston late in February, the old general began issuing privateering commissions, the first going to Lameson and William Mitchell, and another soon after to Gambi.54 Three vessels had been in port when Jones visited that spring, but the number coming in steadily grew.55 As privateer Alexandre Danges of the Vengeance put it, there was "no other port to which the independent privateers can resort on the Coast of Mexico except Galveztown."56
From New Orleans, the authorities looked on the burgeoning Galveston enterprise with dismay. Vessels laden with arms were leaving the port and Dick could do little to stop them since they were being shipped not to the Louisiana coast for outfitting corsairs in violation of the law but outside the country, which was legitimate business, even if he knew that the guns would wind up on privateers.
Meanwhile the slaving system the Laffites had evolved was difficult to thwart. In response to the challenge to selling slaves out of Galveston posed by Chew's practice of sending parties after buyers, the brothers had decided to build a barracks on the west side of the Sabine, where the Atascosita Trace coming from La Bahia crossed the river about twenty-five miles above the Sabine Lake separating the river from the Gulf. 57 The site, near a Coushatta village, was outside what they took to be United States jurisdiction. Henceforward they required buyers to come to them, do business on the Texas side, and then take the responsibility and risk of getting the blacks back through Louisiana. When a cargo of slaves was ready to be sold, privateers put into New Orleans with the legitimate goods that Chew could not impede. Laffite associates then placed signs on trees, crossroads, and other prominent places, with cryptic expressions such as SABINA 28, which meant that on the twenty eighth of the current month a sale would be held at the Sabine barracon outside United States jurisdiction on the Texas side of the river. Agents might also spread the word that for a particular sale Laffite wanted wagonloads of provisions, or cash in hand.
Well before the actual sale, Sauvinet or Gambi or another agent in New Orleans produced false bills of sale made out to buyers living in the so-called Neutral Strip between the Sabine and Calcasieu rivers. They then passed the bills of sale to another intermediary—no slave yet having changed hands—and at the Sabine the bill of sale was finally endorsed over to the actual buyer. Thus the paper trail had been established and the slave rather effectively "laundered."58 Unlike the sales in the Barataria days, these were not auctions. The agents simply weighed the slaves and charged one dollar a pound.59 Even the occasional loss could not deter the trade, with prime blacks selling on the revitalized New Orleans market at $1,500.60
As for other goods, the Laffites made arrangements with a man named Parker, who ran a trading post at Natchitoches called Halfway House, to provide a snuggery for some of the goods they smuggled into Louisiana by the back door.61 Under the new protective tariff, the rates of duty charged ran as high as 20 and 30 percent on most items, and on some items even higher. A gallon of whisky might have a base cost of twenty-five cents, yet the duty was up to three times that. 62 With such potential savings before them, many consumers could swallow any hesitation at buying smuggled merchandise, especially if they could buy a $1,500 slave for $150 to carry the goods back to New Orleans. One prize alone, the 450-ton Campeche, was brought in with a cargo estimated at a value of $360,000.63
All the while Pierre continued to incur more debts to build up the island, unaware that as early as October 1, 1817, Apodaca had decided to halt employment of the Laffites. Valuable as their information appeared to be, it was little that he could not learn otherwise, and Havana did not entirely trust the brothers. Moreover, after Aury slipped away, Apodaca doubted the need for them. Pierre apparently stripped himself of assets, however, even selling a woman who cooked and washed for Marie.64 And on April 1 Marie sold the Bourbon and St. Philip house to Pierre's associate Antoine Abat, who had assumed the unpaid mortgage on the place, netting only $1,185 after closing the loan.65 Pierre and Marie and the children probably continued to live in the house, but as renters.
Meanwhile Fatio did pay Pierre some amounts, enough to keep Laffite anxious to please.66 On January 19, 1818, Cienfuegos finally sent an order canceling the employment of the Numbers 13, but Fatio did not get the news until Onís sent a representative to New Orleans in late June.67 In May Pierre was still sending proposals to Havana through Fatio, but Cienfuegos simply recommended that they be ignored.68
Curiously enough, the Spaniards in Texas knew that the Laffites were no longer to be tolerated well before Fatio got the news. Shortly after Lallemand's arrival at Galveston, Spanish authorities warned the governor of Texas that the Frenchman might have a passport and letters of safe conduct from high officials, but these documents were to be taken from him if possible, and he to be told he was not welcome in the province. 69 The opportunity did not arise in time to stop the move to Champ d'Asile, but thereafter Spanish surveillance was almost constant from May through October. Antonio Martinez may never have known that the Laffites were agents, but Fatio gave him a hint in May when he told the commander in Texas of the Laffite presence at Galveston, even while sending information on Lallemand gleaned from the Laffites. Clearly Fatio intended that Martinez not confuse the two establishments when he took action.70 But at the same time Martinez received Apodaca's order of April 24 to destroy the Galveston commune. The commander in Texas protested late in May, however, that he could not match Lallemand's four cannon, nor the firepower at Galveston.71 One ploy he could try, however, was to incite the Coushatta and Karankawa Indians to attack the privateers, and that he would attempt.72
At the end of May, still thinking he was a Spanish agent, Pierre left for Galveston aboard the Intrepide, now renamed the New Enterprise, and arrived early in June.73 When he came ashore he learned the current state of play at Champ d'Asile from Jean. The community was developing. Their stockade, shaped as a pentagon with a ditch outside, was connected by a parapet to a square redoubt overlooking the river. Inside the men erected a barracks and powder magazine for the cannon they mounted, and Jean may have given them a few other old pieces to add to their defense, but nothing they could use in the field. They cast their own ammunition from bar lead brought from New Orleans.74 Some distance back from the fort was a village of twenty-eight log houses with loopholes cut in the walls for defense.75 Prying eyes could see blacksmiths making picks, shovels, crowbars, and adzes, as well as repairing muskets, making wheels for cannon, and forging lances. Cobblers could be seen turning bearskin into dragoon military shakos with brass star insignia on their front, and deerskin into belts. The infantrymen wore blue helmets with tassels. Tinkers manufactured canteens from tin plates, and tailors turned out uniforms from green fabric, with red ruffles, for Lallemand's "farmers." Lallemand engaged a hunter to catch wild horses in order to create a cavalry as soon as a mounted commander arrived.
Lallemand had perhaps 120 men at Champ d'Asile, divided into corps or cohorts of infantry, artillery, and cavalry.76 There were also at one time a number of prisoners. One spy gleaned that Laffite and Lallemand intended to enlist as many white prisoners as possible into Lallemand's command, and that those who refused would be taken to New Orleans. About fifty blacks also chose to follow Lallemand, while all other slaves and captured black crewmen would be sold. Every afternoon Lallemand's officers paraded and drilled their men. Conscious of security, Laffite and Lallemand halted trade with the local Indians for fear the natives would take information to the Spaniards.77 By May Lallemand's command was at the point of starvation and had no horses for his "cavalry," no fleet, an artillery "corps" of two four-pounder iron cannon in poor repair, and to all appearances more officers than soldiers. The men did have new American muskets and bayonets, and one hundred kegs of powder filled the magazine.78
As soon as Pierre reached the island, Jean left for New Orleans to make his report to Fatio, arriving early in July. When they met at Sedella's house Laffite proposed a quick and—typically—bloodless coup to rid Texas of the intruders. Since shortages of supplies had held up Lallemand thus far, Jean suggested that they starve Lallemand out by hiding the canoes Indians used to bring goods to the colonists. He also wanted to cut off supply from his fellow privateers on Galveston Island, but for that he would need a pair of schooners and one maneuverable warship equipped with light draft launches in order to go up the Trinity with troops.
Fatio believed Laffites account of affairs. "He has always transacted with us in the greatest sincerity and shows us now that he desires to cooperate in the destruction of that gang of adventurers," the agent reported to his superiors. Fatio thought Lallemand lied to Laffite when he said he had no support from the United States government, but that was not Laffite's fault. Now Jean was leaving again immediately on June 27 to rejoin Pierre, and promised to sow disaffection in Lallemand's ranks just as Pierre had with Aury's. Once he had a few defectors in his service, Jean thought he could execute his plan in a month to six weeks unless the coming of the September hurricanes delayed the arrival of the anticipated warship. Before he left Fatio, Jean Laffite added his concern that the roles he and his brother were playing not be exposed, nor that Fatio and Spain abandon them to what he called "the greatest dangers that threaten them more and more each day." Discovery could be death, whether from Lallemand's people, or their own.79
EIGHTEEN
Winds of Change 1818
The fourth day roll'd along, and with the night
Came storm and darkness in their mingling might.
Oh! how he listen'd to the rushing deep,
That ne'er till now so broke upon his sleep.
IN FARAWAY WASHINGTON, authorities also tried to keep abreast of Champ d Asile. In June John Quincy Adams spoke of "the landing at Galveston, of a number of adventurers, understood to be chiefly Frenchmen," and of the mystery surrounding recent events that "suggested to the President the expediency of obtaining by the means of a confidential person upon the spot such further information, as it may be useful to the public interest."
It was known that "projects of a wild and extravagant character" were dreamed up by some of those with Lallemand. "They were all marked by features of absurdity & of desperation," said Adams. Joseph Bonaparte was implicated. Onís had remonstrated against them. At a May 13 cabinet meeting the president posed the question of sending military forces to Florida and elsewhere, and asked whether the administration should send a confidential agent to Galveston to look into Lallemand and Laffite and warn them away. Three days later he asked Adams to send the agent. On May 19 Adams summoned to his office the Virginian George Mason Graham, a good friend of both Madison and Monroe, chief clerk of the War Department, and for a time in 1817 acting secretary of war. 1 Monroe had requested him for the mission.2 Adams told Graham that he was to go to Lallemand to express Monroe's surprise that Lallemand had settled without permission in territory claimed by the United States. The agent should demand to know under what national authority, if any, Lallemand came there, and warn that the United States would not allow permanent settlement to be made. On June 2 Adams told Graham to leave as soon as possible.3
By the time Graham was ready to leave, however, Champ d Asile was already in serious trouble. A few of Lallemand's men ran away in May when they realized that they had been tricked into joining a military expedition rather than a settlement.4 Defectors complained of Lallemand's "mysterious expedition," one saying, "since our gathering in Philadelphia with Lallemand and as many destinations as we have had, we have never been able to learn the true purposes that we propose for ourselves, since we were always being deceived."5 In July spies saw men who came from New Orleans to join the settlers turn around after seeing the conditions in which the colony lived.
By the end of July the colonists had no choice but to give up on Champ d'Asile, worn out and starved out, worried alike by the menace of the Indians and the Spanish. Weeks earlier, in fact, Apodaca in Havana had given orders that the "factious men" at Champ d'Asile must be driven away, and no further reinforcements from Galveston allowed to come ashore.6 Jean Laffite left New Orleans July 7, and soon after his arrival, on July 20 or 21, he sent notice to Lallemand of the Spanish expedition ordered out to destroy them.7 Lallemand knew that his people did not stand a chance in their little stockade, especially if the Indians assisted the Spaniards. He ordered an evacuation, and by July 24 the refugees had returned to Galveston Bay, ready to row to the island.8 They established themselves not far from Laffite's village, and commenced building a small protective earthwork about ninety feet square on a slight three-foot rise near the bay, about four hundred yards from the water's edge. 9 The more high-toned colonists complained that the privateers "gave themselves up to the most shameless debauchery and disgusting immorality," as Just Girard declared.10 By late July even the Spanish spies detected the hostility between the two camps.11 It was only Jean Laffite, said Girard, "with his extraordinary strength of limb and his indomitable resolution," who was able to control his men. "Thanks to him the pirates became harmless neighbors to the exiles, with whom they often exchanged words of political sympathy, crying amicably, 'Long live Liberty!'"12
The Laffites especially won the gratitude of many of the exiles thanks to the brothers repeatedly saving them from starvation. Thereafter Jean Laffite was the main support of the Champ d Asile colonists, using his own resources to feed them, in hopes of reimbursement from Spain.13 The brothers also promised Lallemand to bring further volunteers at their own expense as they assembled in New Orleans, and did deliver three hundred San Domingue exiles that month.14 That they were concentrating in one place as many of Lallemand's people as possible to hand over to Spain could not be known to the colonists, just as Jean and Pierre did not yet know that Spain was no longer interested in their schemes. All the while, Jean subtly promoted dissent within the French camp.
Pierre left Galveston for New Orleans in mid-July with Laméson, who had been there since May outfitting the Panchita for privateering under the name the Lameson. On July 16 Lamé- son received his commission from Humbert, and soon took her out under American colors, armed with ten cannon and bound for Grand Terre.15 Limping with a broken mast, she was taken within days off the Balize by Cunningham and the Firebrand!16 Pierre was there to suffer the irony of being taken by his former ship.17 When Cunningham brought in the Lameson, observers also saw a boat from the Surprise escorting the little sailboat on which one New Orleans denizen saw "the noted Peter Lafitte."18 Lameson would hire Edward Livingston and argue he was legitimately commissioned by the Mexican government, but Livingston was unable to establish even that there was a functioning government in Mexico in 1818, and in the end Lameson lost. An appeal to the Supreme Court in Washington proved to be of no avail.19 Pierre was not held, however, and soon ran up more debt sending succor to his brother.
Fatio now received definitive news that he was to cut the
Laffites loose when Onís's secretary Luis Noeli arrived from Washington and dressed him down for authorizing "such extraordinary expenses" for the brothers, especially after the Laffites' initial insistence that they were willing to "serve for free and did not require any prize or remuneration until the conclusion of this business."20 It hurt Fatio to find himself thus criticized, especially because he believed that Pierre had dealt faithfully with him throughout. When Noeli complained that nothing had been accomplished from the brothers' schemes, Fatio protested that it was not Pierre's fault that the naval forces necessary to take Galveston had not been available. "Laffite's plan was a splendid one and offered the most brilliant results," he argued.
As for the Laffites' expenses, Fatio complained that they had not received a dollar of payment for their services, which may have been true technically. He then disingenuously exaggerated the brothers' fealty to Spain by telling Noeli that "the Numbers 13 never have solicited any recompense," though he did admit that they had expected more "participation" from Spain. "In all their conduct, they have shown gracefulness which honors them," argued the consul, "but surely it could not be expected that these brothers should keep an establishment, make the trips and give all the dispositions they gave which were convenient to have a happy result of our projects, under their own expenses." When it came to the apparently imaginary Cuban insurrection plot, he could not provide an explanation, but refused to believe that he had been gulled. Investigation and containment of the supposed slave insurrection had been Latour's assignment, given by Cienfuegos, and not the responsibility of Fatio or the Laffites. Noeli even complained over the expense of maps of Galveston that would have been vital had Spanish warships ever come to take the island. He actually got one of them to the Almirante, for all the good that did. And to Noeli's complaint of Fatio s obstinacy in not acknowledging the order to shut down the Commission Reservada, the code name for the Laffite operation, the consul answered with understandable smugness that "it was impossible for me to produce or to answer an Official Document that never reached my hands."21
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