67. Mark Mazzetti, “On the Ground: How Special Ops Forces Are Hunting al Qaeda,” U.S. News &World Report, February 17, 2002.
68. Bergen, “War of Error.”
13: A Mountain out of a Molehill
1. Bradley Graham, “Unfinished Business in Proxy War,” Washington Post, January 6, 2002; Tony Karon, “Why the Bad Guys Get Away in Afghanistan,” Time, January 8, 2002; Rory McCarthy, “Fighters Who Slipped Through the Net,” U.K. Guardian, February 13, 2002; William R. Hawkins, “What Not to Learn from Afghanistan,” Parameters, vol. 32, no. 2 (Summer 2002): p. 30.
2. Confidential interviews with NSA and U.S. military intelligence officials; Battalion Landing Team 3/6, 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Command Chronology for Period 1 July 2001–28 February 2002, sec. 2, March 1, 2002, p. 16, Marine Corps Historical Center, Quantico, VA. For confirmation by Defense Department officials that the U.S. military was continuing to detect Taliban usage of satellite telephones, see also Jim Garamone, “Central Command Can Call More Troops If Needed,” American Forces Press Ser vice, January 25, 2002. For resumption of Taliban attacks in southern Afghanistan, see “Afghan Fighters Seal Border Crossing,” Associated Press, January 11, 2002; Richard Lacayo, “The Deadly Hunt,” Time, January 14, 2002; Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Says Tribal Leaders Balk at Aiding Search for Taliban,” New York Times, January 17, 2002; Tim McGirk, “Where Danger Lurks,” Time, January 27, 2002; Philip Smucker, “After Tora Bora, US Hunts Alone,” Christian Science Monitor, January 28, 2002.
3. Barton Gellman and Dafna Linzer, “Afghanistan, Iraq: Two Wars Collide,” Washington Post, October 22, 2004. For withdrawal of the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade and its SIGINT units, see John F. Berry, “The 513th Military Intelligence Brigade in Support of Operation Enduring Freedom,” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, April–June 2002; Spc. Leslie Pearson, “Longtime Reservist Recalls Two-Year Activation,” Mirage, vol. 1, 4th Quarter ed. (2003): p. 17; “513th Military Intelligence Brigade,” Mirage, vol. 1, 4th Quarter ed. (2003): p. 20; confidential interviews.
4. Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: Berkley Books, 2005), pp. 41–42.
5. Naylor, Not a Good Day, p. 75; Rowan Scarborough, “Military Officers Criticize Rush to Use Ground Troops,” Washington Times, March 7, 2002; Richard T. Cooper, Geoffrey Mohan, and Rone Tempest, “Fierce Fight in Afghan Valley Tests U.S. Soldiers and Strategy,” Los Angeles Times, March 24, 2002; confidential interview.
6. The best single description of Operation Anaconda and its aftermath can be found in Naylor, Not a Good Day.
7. Bruce D. MacLachlan, Lt. Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, Operational Art in the Counter-Terror War in Afghanistan (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2002), p. 17; Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002), pp. 20, 31; oral history, Interview with Major Jason Warner, third interview, August 21, 2007, p. 8, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
8. Accounts of Operation Anaconda differ markedly as to whether the operation was a success or a failure. For a generally rosy assessment see Dr. Richard Kugler, Operation Anaconda in Af-ghanistan: A Case Study of Adaptation in Battle (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2007). Critical assessments of U.S. military per for mance during Operation Anaconda can be found in Naylor, Not a Good Day; Bradley J. Armstrong, Rebuilding Afghanistan: Counterinsurgency and Reconstruction in Operation Enduring Freedom (Monterey, CA: U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 2003), p. 7; Lt. Commander Todd Marzano, USN, Criticisms Associated with Operation Anaconda: Can Long-Distance Leadership Be Effective? (Newport, RI: Naval War College, October 23, 2006); Scarborough, “Military Officers Criticize Rush”; Elaine Grossman, “Was Operation Anaconda Ill-Fated from the Start? Army Analyst Blames Afghan Battle Failings on Bad Command Set-up,” Inside the Pentagon, July 29, 2004, p. 1; Elaine Grossman, “Anaconda: Object Lesson in Poor Planning or Triumph of Improvisation?,” Inside the Pentagon, August 12, 2004, p. 1.
9. “Prepared Statement of General Tommy R. Franks, Commander, U.S. Central Command Before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee,” July 31, 2002, p. 6; General Tommy Franks (USA, Ret.), American Soldier (New York: Regan Books, 2004), p. 379.
10. Confidential interviews with U.S. Army officers involved in the operation. See also Paul Haven, “Top General in Afghanistan Says al-Qaida and Taliban Forces Are Trying to Regroup in East,” Associated Press, March 20, 2002; Anthony Lloyd, “Marines Start Sub-Zero Hunt for al-Qaeda,” U.K. Times, April 17, 2002; Rick Scavetta, “Military Interrogators in Afghanistan Use Detective Work in Mental Chess Game,” Stars and Stripes, April 30, 2002.
11. Confidential interviews.
12. Ibid.
13. Karl Vick and Kamran Khan, “Raid Netted Top Al Qaeda Leader,” Washington Post, April 2, 2002; Aftab Ahmad, “Osama in Faisalabad?,” The Nation (Lahore ed.), April 8, 2002, FBIS-NEW-2002-0408; Ijaz Hashmat, “US Intercepted Satellite Phone Message That Led to Raid in Faisalabad,” Khabrain, April 9, 2002, FBIS-NES-2002-0409.
14. Jonathan Fowler, “Al-Zarqawi Used Swiss Cell Phone,” Associated Press, November 25, 2004.
15. Rory McCarthy and Julian Borger, “Secret Arrest of Leading al-Qaida Fugitive,” U.K. Guardian, September 4, 2002.
16. Jason Burke, “Brutal Gun Battle That Crushed 9/11 Terrorists,” U.K. Observer, September 15, 2002; Nick Fielding, “Phone Call Gave Away Al Qaida Hideout,” U.K. Sunday Times, September 15, 2001; Rory McCarthy, “Investigators Question Key September 11 Suspect,” U.K. Guardian, September 16, 2002; Nick Fielding, “War on Terror: Knocking on Al-Qaeda’s Door,” U.K. Sunday Times, September 22, 2002.
17. Confidential interview. See also James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, “Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,” New York Times, December 16, 2005.
18. For killing of al-Harethi, see “U.S. Kills al-Qaeda Suspects in Yemen,” Associated Press, November 5, 2002. For Hayden-Rumsfeld interchange, see Dana Priest and Ann Scott Tyson, “Bin Laden Trail ‘Stone Cold,’ ” Washington Post, September 10, 2006.
19. Colum Lynch, “US Used UN to Spy on Iraq, Aides Say,” Boston Globe, January 6, 1999; Barton Gellman, “Annan Suspicious of UNSCOM Probe,” Washington Post, January 6, 1999; Bruce W. Nelan, “Bugging Saddam,” Time, January 18, 1999; Seymour M. Hersh, “Saddam’s Best Friend,” New Yorker, April 5, 1999, pp. 32, 35; David Wise, “Fall Guy,” Washingtonian, July 1999, pp. 42–43.
20. Charles Duelfer, Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraqi WMD, vol. 1, chap. 2, September 30, 2004, pp. 108–09, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0001156395, http://www.foia.cia.gov; Bill Gertz, “China Fortifying Iraq’s Air-Defense System,” Washington Times, February 20, 2001.
21. Charles Aldinger, “Western Warplanes Hit Iraqi Defenses,” Reuters, August 8, 2001.
22. Mohammed Hayder Sadeq and Sabah al-Anbaki, “Cell Phone Service Is Spotty, But Reception Is Great,” USA Today, March 3, 2005; Yaroslav Trofimov and Sarmad Ali, “Iraq’s Cellphone Battle,” Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2005.
23. Kevin M. Woods et al., Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam Hussein’s Senior Leadership (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2006), p. 129.
24. Confidential interviews.
25. Joe Trento, “Pakistan & Iran’s Scary Alliance,” National Security News Service, August 15, 2003, http://www.storiesthatmatter.org/index.php?option’com_content&task’view& id’48&Itemid’29.
26. “Sanction Busting,” Newsweek, December 31, 1990, p. 4. See also Director of Central Intelligence, Annual Report on Intelligence Community Activities, August 22, 1997, http:// www.cia.gov.
27. Bill Gertz, “French Connection Armed Saddam,” Washington Times, September 8, 2004.
28. Bill Gertz, Betrayal (Washington, DC: Regnery Pub
lishing, 1999), p. 283.
29. Memorandum, Intelligence and Analysis on Iraq: Issues for the Intelligence Community, July 29, 2004, p. 5, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0001245667, http://www.foia.cia.gov.; Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States (Washington, DC: GPO, March 31, 2005), p. 15. Woodward quote from Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), p. 217.
30. Rowan Scarborough, “U.S. Rushed Post-Saddam Planning,” Washington Times, September 3, 2003.
31. President George W. Bush “President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly,” New York City, September 12, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov.
32. NIE 2002-16HC, Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002, p. 7, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0001075566, http://www.foia.cia.gov.
33. U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Nomination of Lt. General Michael V. Hayden, USAF, to Be Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, 109th Congress, 1st session, April 14, 2005, p. 17.
34. U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Nomination of General Michael V. Hayden, USAF, to Be the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 109th Congress, 2nd session, May 18, 2006, p. 103.
35. Confidential interviews.
36. U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, 108th Congress, 2nd session, July 7, 2004, p. 20; confidential interviews.
37. Colin L. Powell, “Remarks to the United Nations Security Council,” New York City, February 5, 2003, http://www.state.gov/ secretary/ former/powell/ remarks/2003/17300.htm.
38. U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, 108th Congress, 2nd session, July 7, 2004, p. 139; Charles Duelfer, Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraqi WMD, vol. 1, Nuclear Section, September 30, 2004, p. 36, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0001156442, http://www.foia.cia.gov.
39. U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, 108th Congress, 2nd session, July 7, 2004, p. 203; confidential interviews.
40. Confidential interviews.
41. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States (Washington, DC: GPO, March 31, 2005), pp. 113, 130.
42. U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, 108th Congress, 2nd session, July 7, 2004, pp. 227–29; Charles Duelfer, Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraqi WMD, vol. 2, September 30, 2004, pp. 49–50, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0001156442, http://www.foia.cia.gov.
43. NIE 2002-16HC, Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002, p. 7, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0001075566, http://www.foia.cia.gov.
44. U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, 108th Congress, 2nd session, July 7, 2004, p. 139; U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments, 109th Congress, 2nd session, September 8, 2006, p. 59. See also Dafna Linzer and John J. Lumpkin, “Experts Doubt U.S. Claim on Iraqi Drones,” Associated Press, August 24, 2003; Bradley Graham, “Air Force Analysts Feel Vindicated on Iraqi Drones,” Washington Post, September 26, 2003.
45. U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, 108th Congress, 2nd session, July 7, 2004, p. 219 and appendix B, p. 430; U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments, 109th Congress, 2nd session, September 8, 2006, p. 58.
46. Confidential interviews. Hayden comment from U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Nomination of General Michael V. Hayden, USAF, to Be the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 109th Congress, 2nd session, May 18, 2006, pp. 110, 119.
47. Joe Trento, “The Price of Cooking the CIA Books,” National Security News Service, June 2, 2003, http:// www.storiesthatmatter.org/index.php?option =com_content& task=view& id =53&Itemid =29.
48. Transcript of interview of Hayden by C-SPAN’s Brian Lamb, April 15, 2007, https:// www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/press_release/2007/pr041707.htm.
49. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States (Washington, DC: GPO, March 31, 2005), p. 157.
50. Confidential interview.
51. A transcript of Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html.
52. Ibid.
53. Confidential interview.
54. U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Nomination of General Michael V. Hayden, USAF, to Be the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 109th Congress, 2nd session, May 18, 2006, p. 32; Senator Carl Levin, “Nomination of General Michael V. Hayden,” Congressional Record, May 25, 2006 (Senate), pp. S5298–S5301; U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With Prewar Assessments, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, September 8, 2006, pp. 86–87, 109.
55. Warren P. Strobel, Jonathan S. Landay, and John Walcott, “Dissent over Going to War Grows Among U.S. Government Officials,” Miami Herald, October 7, 2002; Dana Milbank, “For Bush, Facts Are Malleable,” Washington Post, October 22, 2002. For telephone intercepts, see Julian Borger, “White House Exaggerating Iraqi Threat,” U.K. Guardian, October 9, 2002.
56. Woodward, Plan of Attack, p. 214.
57. Confidential interviews. For the twenty-nine-man section concentrating on Iraqi WMD, confidential interviews and Capt. Mark Choate, “Knowing Is Half the Battle,” INSCOM Journal, vol. 26, no. 2 (2003 Almanac): p. 13.
58. Confidential interviews.
59. Michael Hirsh and Michael Isikoff, “No More Hide and Seek,” Newsweek, February 10, 2003, p. 44.
60. Confidential interview.
61. Powell’s presentation and accompanying graphics, including the Iraqi intercepts, can be found in “U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N. Security Council,” February 5, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/ 2003/ 02/20030205-1.html.
62. U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, 108th Congress, 2nd session, July 7, 2004, p. 429, appendix B.
63. U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, 108th Congress, July 7, 2004, p. 423, appendix A, and p. 429, appendix B.
64. See also Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus, “U.S. Hedges on Finding Iraqi Weapons,” Washington Post, May 29, 2003; Barton Gellman, “Iraq’s Arsenal Was Only on Paper,” Washington Post, January 7, 2004.
65. Dana Priest and Walter Pincus, “Bin Laden–Hussein Link Hazy,” Washington Post, February 13, 2003.
66. Confidential interview with former State Department official.
67. Woods et al., Iraqi Perspectives Project, pp. 93–94.
68. Fowler, “Al-Zarqawi.”
69. “Iraq Shuts Down Phone Network to Thwart CIA Eavesdropping,” Associated Press, March 19, 2003.
70. Max Hastings, “The Iraq Intelligence Fiasco Exposes Us to Terrible Danger,” U.K. Guardian, September 20, 2004.
71. Information concerning NSA’s per for mance in the Iraqi WMD scandal was deleted in toto from the final report of the Senate intelligence committee on the U.S. intelligence community’s per for mance prior to the invasion of Iraq, for which see U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, 108th Congress, 2nd session, July 7, 2004, pp. 264–65.
14: The Dark Victory
1. NSA/CSS, Office of the Director, “Director’s Intent,” February 11, 2003, partially declassified and on file at the National Security Archive, Washington, DC.
2. Bob Woodward, “The Foreign Policy Questions John Kerry Would Not Answer,” Manchester Union Leader, October 26, 2004. For sixty thousand military and civilian personnel belonging to NSA, National Guard Bureau, National Guard Assistant Program (NGAP) Position Description: Mobilization Assistant to the Deputy Chief, Central Security Ser vice, National Security Agency, September 1, 2003. This document has since been removed from the National Guard Bureau Web site, from which it was downloaded in 2003.
3. Confidential interview.
4. Director of Central Intelligence, The 2003 Annual Report of the United States Intelligence Community, July 2004, sec. Support to Operation Iraqi Freedom.
5. Confidential interview.
6. Capt. Mark Choate, “Knowing Is Half the Battle,” INSCOM Journal, vol. 26, no. 2 (2003 Almanac): pp. 13–15.
7. Amatzia Baram, “The Republican Guard: Outgunned and Outnumbered, but They Never Surrender,” U.K. Guardian, March 25, 2003.
8. For the order of battle of the Second Republican Guard Corps, see NIE 99-04, National Intelligence Council, Iraqi Military Capabilities Through 2003, April 1999, p. 4, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0001261421, http://www.foia.cia.gov; Charles Duelfer, Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraqi WMD, vol. 1, September 30, 2004, p. 94, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0001156395, http://www.foia.cia.gov.
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