Floridi, L. 2002. Sextus Empiricus: The Transmission and Recovery of Pyrrhonism. New York.
Hankinson, R. J. 2010. “Aenesidemus and the Rebirth of Pyrrhonism.” In The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism, edited by R. Bett, 105–229. Cambridge.
Holford-Strevens, L. 1997. “Favorinus: The Man of Paradoxes.” In Philosophia Togata II: Plato and Aristotle at Rome, edited by J. Barnes and M. Griffin, 188–217. Oxford.
House, D. K. 1980. “The Life of Sextus Empiricus.” CQ 30: 227–238.
Ioppolo, A. M. 1993. “The Academic Position of Favorinus of Arelate.” Phronesis 38: 183–213.
Lévy, C. 2010. “The Sceptical Academy: Decline and Afterlife.” In The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism, edited by R. Bett, 81–104. Cambridge.
Machuca, D., ed. 2011a. New Essays on Ancient Pyrrrhonism. Leiden and Boston.
Machuca, D., ed. 2011b. Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London, and New York.
Perin, C. 2010. The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism. Oxford and New York.
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Sedley, D. 2003. “Philodemus and the Decentralisation of Philosophy.” Cronache ercolanesi 33: 31–41.
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CHAPTER 36
PLATONISM
RYAN C. FOWLER
THE extensive literary output spanning the time period of the Second Sophistic is rife with direct references to Plato and also quotations from and allusions to his dialogues. In terms of the number of references and the variety of contexts in which these references occur, Plato himself or his dialogues or ideas remains second only to Homer during the first and second centuries CE.1 In texts written during this period we see that Plato’s work inspired methodological approaches, as, for example, Galen’s and Maximus of Tyre’s “methods of division.”2 His ideas and his literary style were sources of both ideological engagement and imitation: he inspired Lucian to utilize the dialogue form and Aelius Aristides to defend a type of rhetoric against Plato’s attacks.3 Allusions to Plato and the dialogues comprised a philosophical mantle one could don at will, as in the case of Dio and Fronto.4 Plato’s vocabulary and syntax were linguistic touchstones in Lucian, guides for proper Attic Greek style for Hermogenes, and given as evidence of proper grammar by first- and second-century CE lexicographers and rhetoricians.5 And Plato’s metaphysics was a source of expression and argumentation for Christian authors from the second century on.6
Evidence for academic and scholastic Platonism during the first and second centuries CE, however, is, in comparison, slim. In general, we have evidence of informal teaching (as opposed to a formal Academy, which only existed up until perhaps the first century BCE7) by instructors who lectured on Plato and Platonic themes in various places around the empire.8 However, our knowledge of the literary activities of these teachers and other authors is fragmentary, often consisting of no more than the title of a work.
THE START OF PLATONISM
Around the turn of the second and first centuries BCE, we start to see a shift toward the instruction and interpretation of a positive dogmatic philosophy of Plato, away from the types of Academic skepticism that had been prevalent from the time of the third-century scholarch Arcesilaus (even if there would still be some authors who continue to discuss skeptical approaches during the Second Sophistic; see chapter 35 in this volume). As we will see, the general variation of emphases and approaches that were all contained under the umbrella of the “Academy” continued into the Platonism of the Second Sophistic; this variance changes significantly only with Plotinus in the third century CE.
As a result of this shift toward dogmatism and regardless of its cause, the story of Platonism during the Second Sophistic, as well as what we come to understand as Platonism itself, begins with Plutarch in the first century CE. In a number of ways, he connects these earlier authors, including the various Academics, to the authors of the second century CE, when the term “Platonic” (Πλατωνικός) itself would only really begin to be used.9
As Plutarch was a Platonist, his work reflects a desire to clarify Plato’s philosophy, understood by him to contain positive teachings. At the same time, reflecting the type of so-called eclecticism (although a misleading term) we see throughout the history of the Academy, he is influenced by other quarters, including Academic skepticism and Stoicism.
For Plutarch, Plato’s philosophy contains both an aporetic and a doctrinal element, and he argues against the distinction that Antiochus seems to have suggested between Socratic (or aporetic) dialogues and Platonic (or doctrinal) dialogues (Cic., Acad. post. 1.15–17). According to Plutarch, the aporetic element in Plato reflects a way of searching for the truth without prejudices, which, in effect, amounts to a dialectical inquiry. This dialectical method in which one might argue both sides of a discussion, however, does not for him deny either the possibility of reaching firm conclusions or even the possibility of achieving knowledge. Plato had reached such conclusions, which Plutarch works to identify and clarify as his doctrines; at the same time, Plato allowed for ongoing inquiry, which can be seen in the dialogue form itself. In this way, then, Plutarch is able to advocate a theory of knowledge that integrates both the suspension of judgment—the initial rejection of dogmatism—and, at the same time, a defense of the possibility of acquiring true knowledge.
Plutarch was known by later Platonists to have upheld a literal approach to interpreting Plato. In De Iside et Osiride (370f) he differentiates the Plato who “obscures and veils his opinion” from the older Plato who asserted things not in circumlocution or symbolically, but “in ordinary words” (κυρίοις ὀνόμασιν). An important example of this type of reading is found in his literal interpretation of the Timaeus, which holds that the world had a temporal beginning.10 As he himself tells us (On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus 1013e), Plutarch argues against the interpretation of a number of Platonists of his time who refuse to understand creation in terms of an actual generation. But if the universe is actually ungenerated, he contends, that would be the end of Plato’s contention that the soul, being senior to the body (cf. Ti. 34c), initiates all change and motion (On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus 1012e and 1013d–f; cf. Phdr. 245c, Leg. 896a–c, 892a–c), is installed in her position as chief (cf. On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus 1016c) and, as he tells us Plato himself writes, as “primary agent” (πρωτουργόν; a reminiscence of πρωτουργοὶ κινήσεις from Leg. 897a). This literal interpretation of the Timaeus also aims to understand how, as Plutarch says (On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus 1016a), the soul in Plato is said to be both uncreated (cf. Phdr. 245c–246a) and created (cf. Ti. 34b–35a), and, as he says (1014d–e), how the soul is said to be a mixed entity composed of indivisible being (i.e., intellect) and divisible being (i.e., the nonrational precosmic soul; cf. Ti. 35a and 53a8–b4; On the Generatio
n of the Soul in the Timaeus 1024a).
Plutarch’s literal interpretation of the Timaeus was a target for debate among later Platonists: it was adopted by Atticus, but was resisted by most others, including Taurus and, later, Porphyry and Proclus. Nevertheless, Plutarch’s view that the world soul is created, in the sense that it partakes of reason and intelligence imparted to it by the demiurge, is found in Alcinous (Handbook 169.33–42) and, it is thought, also in Numenius (fr. 45; cf. Dillon 1993, 127). But regardless of subsequent evaluations of his interpretations, Plutarch’s importance lies at least in part in, first, directing the attention of later Platonists and Christians to the Timaeus in order to understand Plato (regarding both his cosmology and his theology), and, second, treating Plato’s work as comprising a coherent system of philosophy that warranted further articulation. Just before he begins his interpretation of the temporal creation of the world that we have been discussing, Plutarch describes his approach to Plato when he says that he will set down what he thinks about these matters, “confirming and vindicating as far as may be by probability what is unusual and paradoxical” about his account; he will then “apply the interpretation and the demonstration to the texts [of Plato], at the same time bringing them into accord with one another” (De Animae 1014a). The focus here is not bringing into accordance Plutarch’s demonstration of his interpretation, but rather the reconciliation of apparently incompatible passages of Plato (cf. On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus 1016a and e). His proofs of such reconciliations are themselves demonstrations (cf. ἀπόδειξις, 1015f).
PLATONIC TEACHING
Regarding the teaching of Platonism during the Second Sophistic, we have evidence of independent teachers not associated with any particular formal Platonic Academy (as before), if perhaps sometimes thought to be associated with an Academy.11
The first solid date we have for the instruction of Plato in the first century CE is from Plutarch, who tells us (De E 385e) that he attended lectures of Ammonius in Athens in 66 or 67 CE (when Nero was in Greece), not, it seems, at a formal school.12 In Quaestiones convivales, Plutarch records a conversation at Ammonius’s house in Athens after a demonstration that included “successful teachers,” “men of letters,” and “some of his circle of friends” (736a); and he describes Ammonius as a personal teacher (καθηγητής).13
After Plutarch’s time, we have a few anecdotes about the Platonic classroom of Calvenus Taurus (fl. 145 CE) left by the philosophical journalist Aulus Gellius (ca. 125 to after 180 CE). Taurus was, Gellius tells us, “a man celebrated in my time for his Platonic teaching” (vir memoria nostra in disciplina Platonica celebratus; NA 7.10). He taught in a lecture-hall or school (in diatriba; NA 1.26) and had disciples or followers (sectatores) who traveled with him (NA 18.10). Taurus is reported as well to have been the teacher “for the doctrines of Plato” of the politician and prominent sophist Herodes Atticus (Philostr. VS 564).
Apuleius (born ca. 125) is best known for the Golden Ass or Metamorphoses (see chapter 22 in this volume). The philosophical works we have by him are: On Plato and His Doctrines (On Plato); perhaps a Latin translation of On the Cosmos of the Pseudo-Aristotelean On the Universe (περίΚόσμου); and possibly On Interpretation, a Latin work on logic that may, however, be the third book of On Plato. 14 The Asclepius, a Latin translation of a Hermetic treatise, is also sometimes attributed to him. Other works, like the Florida, On the God of Socrates, and his Apology, read more like speeches with Platonic references. So, we might ask: given the various types of genre he worked in, was he a Platonist in the vein of Albinus or Alcinous? Was Platonism a mantle he took on for the sake of authority and status, which seems to be the case with a figure like Maximus of Tyre? On the one hand, Apuleius, qua transmitter, translator, and representative of Platonic ideas in and after the second century, was a Platonist, who had an interest in questions and interpretations of Plato and Platonic questions, perhaps with varying degrees of success. (In particular, we might take his relatively confusing attempt to harmonize the Platonic vices and virtues and the Aristotelean idea of the mean at On Plato 2.4: e.g., how might we understand “propriety” and “cowardice” to be the two relative means between “courage” and “fear”?). Further, there are numerous similarities between On Plato and Alcinous’s Handbook, which may point to his being earnestly engaged with Platonism at the time; at the same time, however, this might provide further support for his being a philosophical translator. On the other hand, Apuleius, qua sophist, clearly drops Platonic references in a way that might cause us to think of him a Platonic rhetor. For example, in his Apology (64), he writes, rather poetically, that “in its zeal to reach the heights of wisdom, the Platonic school has explored regions higher than heaven itself and has stood triumphant on the outer circumference of our universe.” It is in Plato where his addressee previously read of “the place above the heavens . . . on heaven’s back” (τὸν ὑπερουράνιοντόπον . . . οὐρανοῦ νῶτον), which are two small quotations from Phaedrus 247b and c.
Yet in his On the God of Socrates, in particular, he engages with true-blue Platonic issues (i.e., the daimones), but with strong rhetorical flair, along the lines of the orators and writers we find working with the more literary style of the Second Sophistic (here especially invoking the important connection with the classical past). Emphasizing this interest in rhetoric, we might note Apuleius’s discussion of it in his On Plato (chapters 2.8–2.9), which interrupts what would be a more common turn to politics just after a discussion of ethics, for example, as in Alcinous’s Handbook (though Apuleius does eventually end with a discussion of political structures). Perhaps some support for his Platonic authority is found in Augustine’s engagement with the work of “the Platonist Apuleius” in his City of God (9.3, 6, 7, 8, 13, 16) who represents “the opinion of the Platonists” (9.6). With an author like Apuleius, who wore a number of literary hats, it seems that treating him at least as a creative Platonist is not without warrant.15
As further evidence of the teaching of Plato during this time period, the medical writer Galen (129–216/217; see chapter 24 in this volume), who as we will see below was himself interested in Plato’s dialogues, writes that he took lectures at fourteen years old in Pergamum from “citizen philosophers” (φιλόσοφοιπολῖται): primarily from a Stoic, a student of a certain Philopator, as well as, for a short time, from a Platonist (Πλατωνικός), a student of Gaius. The reason for the short time, it seems, is that this student of Gaius was himself busy with political affairs.16 Some time in the early 150s, Galen also attended lectures of the Platonist Albinus in Smyrna.17 If it is the same Albinus of the Introduction to Plato, then we might be able to gather some sense of his approach to teaching Plato from that work, where Albinus writes that “the instructional type [of dialogue] is appropriate for the teaching, practice, and demonstration of the truth” (chap. 3).18 Further, based on the evidence we have, Albinus himself seems to have attended lectures by Gaius.19
Perhaps one last indication of Platonist teaching during the Second Sophistic might be gleaned from Apuleius’s On Plato, where there is, interestingly, an emphasis on the moral teaching of the young: the teachers of boys should “imbue them with habits and manners toward virtue . . . so that their students may learn to rule and be ruled with justice as their teacher” (2.3).
PLATONIC TEXTS
Of the work written by Platonists during the Second Sophistic, we have some in the form of complete texts, some are fragmentary, and some we know only by title or reputation. The texts can be divided generally into expository works, handbooks and summaries, polemical works, and commentaries, with the understanding that elements of one can be found in another, and that in some basic sense all of these texts attempt to expose something (e.g., the falseness of another school’s position). As we will see, a number of authors wrote (or are reported to have written) more than one type of work.
Platonic Expository Works
We have the most evidence for expository works that seek to explain some Platonic problem or expand on a particular topic but that are not attached to a particular dialogue nor attack a specific target.
Two works we have in which Plutarch interprets Platonic themes or questions are his Platonic Questions and On the Daemon of Socrates (on which see chapter 19 in this volume), but more relevant here are the titles of a number of his lost works. Some of these include (the numbers correspond to the Lamprias catalog): On the Fifth Substance (no. 44), On the World’s Having Come into Beginning According to Plato (no. 66), Where are the Forms? (no. 67), How Matter Participates in the Forms: It Constitutes the Primary Bodies (no. 68), What Is Understanding? (no. 146), That Understanding Is Impossible (no. 146), On Matter (no. 185), Whether He Who Reserves Judgment on Everything Is Involved in Action (no. 210) (which may defend an Academic stance), and What Is the Telos According to Plato? (no. 221). In addition, in true Platonic form (if not always containing Platonic material), he also wrote dialogues: some dramatic, such as On Control of Anger and The Dinner of the Seven Wise Men, and some narrated, such as On the Delays of Divine Vengeance, the three “Delphic dialogues,” and Table Talk.
Theon (fl. 100 CE) has been connected with a statue set up by “the priest Theon, for his father, Theon the Platonic philosopher” that has been dated to the reign of Hadrian (117–138 CE). He left us one reference work: his surviving On Mathematics Useful for the Understanding of Plato is an introductory survey of Greek mathematics. It makes no claim to originality, quoting swaths of text by Adrastus of Aphrodisias on mathematics and harmonics, and Thrasyllus on harmonics and astronomy (as well as a short summary of a work by the mysterious Dercyllides). We also have a report in Arabic of a work on the correct order of reading of the dialogues, in which he accepts Thrasyllus’s arrangement: this reflects an interest during the Second Sophistic in establishing a reading order for Plato’s dialogues (we will see it again when we discuss Albinus’s Introduction, below).
The Oxford Handbook of the Second Sophistic Page 90