Surviving works in Greek, Syriac, and Arabic range from commentaries on Aristotle’s metaphysics, physics, works on the senses, meteorology, providence, logic, and Coming-to-be and Passing-Away.34 Alexander is an Aristotelian defending Aristotle’s worldview, but some of his elaborations and clarifications fall under the broader description of “creative and expansive interpretation.”35 His attempt to show Aristotle as presenting a coherent and comprehensive system sometimes leads to interpretations which elaborate on what is in Aristotle or even go beyond it. Like commentators before him, his interpretation is based on the text, but he may offer a “creative interpretation,” stretching its meaning and surmising what Aristotle “intended” to write. He also diverges from Aristotle in subtle ways, most famously in his views on the soul, determinism, universals, and intellect. Since these represent his views on the source of life, the order of the universe, and how we can acquire knowledge of these, they concern topics of great interest to the contemporary philosophical debate. A few examples of his discussion of Aristotle’s ideas will illustrate these aspects of his approach.
His treatment of the works on nature has been characterized as having naturalistic tendencies, in that he takes the un-Aristotelian position that “universals do not exist apart from particulars.”36 That is, he distinguishes between intelligible forms embodied in matter and those that are not. He agrees with Aristotle that “the soul is the first actuality of a body which is natural and complex [organikon]” (Alex. De anima 16.10f. = Sharples 2010a, text 24H), but adds elsewhere that the soul is “not a certain mixture of bodies, that is an arrangement [harmonia], but the power that is supervening on a certain sort of mixture” (24.21 = Sharples 2010a, text 24Ac). As is clear, the debate was focused on the question what Aristotle’s soul was made of, and whether it consisted of elements, or supervened on them. There is, however, some suspicion that Aristotle’s definition was not well known and therefore misunderstood.37
The last point is closely connected to his theory on intellect, considered his most influential. Over the course of two accounts which are not completely in harmony (his own De anima 80–92 and De intellectu mantissa 2), he argues with Aristotle that our intellect receives the forms of its objects without the matter; the result is that intellect and objects become identical with regard to the form (Alex. De anima 84.22–24). Alexander diverges from Aristotle in a way that is presented as extending (rather than contradicting) his ideas. For instance, when he comes to talk about the active and passive intellect (Arist. De an. 3.5), he identifies active intellect with pure form (i.e., “not embodied in matter”), but he fails to clarify how the active intellect operates as a cause. However this may be, the position seems to imply that Alexander does not believe in a personal survival of a part of the individual soul.38
Alexander’s critical studies include a polemic against contemporary schools, in particular the Stoics. He appears to have focused more on the school’s founders (the “Old Stoa”), not contemporary Stoics. But in De fato, for instance, his peculiar concern is with the general thesis of determinism more than the specific Stoic discussion within their philosophical position:39
That deliberating is in vain if everything comes to be of necessity can easily be realized by those who know the use of deliberating. It is agreed by everyone that man has the advantage from nature over other living creatures, that he does not follow appearances in the same way as them, but has reason from her as a judge of the appearances that impinge on him concerning certain things as deserving to be chosen. (De fato 2.178.15–28).40
In this passage, Alexander evaluates the assumption of a deterministic universe (“if everything comes to be of necessity”) and how it might influence our behavior. He argues that human beings can use reason to deliberate about the appearances, which might induce them to make a choice. He thus distances himself from full determinism, even if this argument incorporates the Stoic notion of assent into the account of Aristotelian deliberation.41
But Alexander also directs criticism at others, for example, against Galen, in a work preserved in Arabic entitled “Refutation against Galen’s Attack on Aristotle’s Doctrine that Everything that Moves Is Set in Motion by a Mover,” a work that concerns the old chestnut of souls as self-movers.42
Alexander’s influence as a writer is most felt as commentator, starting with Plotinus (203–275 CE) who read the commentaries while studying Aristotle with his students (Porph. Plot. 14.4), reaching up to the Platonist commentators of the fifth and sixth centuries (esp. Ammonius and Simplicius).43 His commentaries helped to interpret the works of Aristotle, but also functioned as a template for the running commentary.
37.3 AN ARISTOTELIANIZING AUTHOR IN THE SECOND SOPHISTIC
In contrast to the poorly attested reactions to Aristotle’s ideas in the Hellenistic period, other intellectuals outside the circle of self-declared Peripatetics can be seen to engage actively with his ideas during the Second Sophistic. One important example is the prolific philosopher-physician Galen, who was also heavily influenced by the approaches to knowledge and literary production of this time. It is no coincidence that Galen was also a writer of commentaries (see chapter 24 in this volume). His interest in Aristotle illustrates the eclectic attitude of the era regarding philosophy. “Eclecticism” should not, however, be taken as a negative label, but as a term which describes Galen’s sensible selectiveness and “penchant for systematic synthesis.”44
Plato and Aristotle were major influences on Galen. In his youth, Galen had sampled all major philosophical schools in his own city: this was customary for the well-educated class (his father was an architect, as was his grandfather45). This gave him a broad education and made him aware of the different schools and a range of arguments in the main branches of philosophy (epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, logic). The experience strongly influenced his view of the medical profession.46 Aristotle famously declared that the philosopher has to have knowledge of medical matters and a physician should also be a philosopher (Sens. 436a19–22; Resp. 480b26–30).
Galen’s concern with education and pedagogy is clear from the way in which he echoes certain views of Aristotle (and Plato). Galen often noted the characteristics he expected students to have: “he [who wants to study medicine and philosophy] has to be quick-witted, have a good memory and be hardworking” (De Ord. Libr. prop. 19.59.2). In another passage (in a work preserved only in Arabic entitled On How to Recognize the Best Doctor), Galen sums up what kind of student will become a good doctor, emphasizing that a student with the right instruction “will be able to describe the doctrines of each of these [i.e., the Ancients].” The perfect student can also add “those of their successors, outlining the differences and agreements,” and add “his own judgment on their differences, justifying correct doctrines and exposing those that are erroneous.” Galen insists that this requires training in demonstrative science.47
These requirements express the importance of education at the time and are very familiar from discussions of knowledge acquisition in Plato (e.g., Resp. 485–6; Tht. 143) and Aristotle (Eth. Nic. 6.9; An. post. 1.33).48 More specifically, this view (partly) echoes an often overlooked remark made by Aristotle in the last book of the Nicomachean Ethics.49 Here Aristotle states in passing:
We do not see men becoming expert physicians from a study of medical handbooks [ek tôn suggrammatôn]. Yet medical writers attempt to describe not only general courses of treatment, but also methods of cure and modes of treatment for particular sorts of patients, classified according to their various habits of body; and their treatises appear to be of value for men who have had practical experience [tois empeirois], though they are useless for the novice [tois anepistêmosi]. (Eth. Nic. 10.9, 1181b21ff. Loeb)
Aristotle clearly expresses the same view about the limited value of books in relation to practical knowledge as Galen did—especially relevant because it concerns the art of medicine.50 Both authors imply that learning from books alone is rather ineffective because it is li
ke learning to swim on dry land: the knowledge will have no referent in one’s understanding of the actions and things described; that is, a gap will remain between theory and practice, between knowing and applying. Aristotle’s point is of course more limited in that he emphasizes the aspect of the general versus the particular (he just spoke of legislation, arguing that a mere collection of laws written down still does not amount to knowledge of justice or a just society). Galen never tired of stating that his understanding of medicine was of a higher level, because he knew philosophy and was trained in logic (in his view most of his medical colleagues were not). He admired Aristotle mostly for his logical doctrine and scientific methodology and seems to have aimed to live up to Aristotle’s injunction: to be a physician-philosopher.
37.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
During the so-called Second Sophistic, philosophy was as much backward-looking as most other branches of literary production. But it also incorporated several new trends which had arisen out of the consolidation of its intellectual heritage in written form. And these trends, mostly characterized by close textual study of the writings of the early founders, their successors, and students, contributed to forging new ways forward.
The text-based method of philosophizing necessitated philosophical as well as scholarly skills to acquire a full understanding of the base text and its interpretations accumulated over time. The focus was on recapturing the founder’s ideas from the books that became more widely available and for a new audience in Rome. The scholarly nature of the exegetical method grew initially out of an attempt to clarify the text of the difficult Aristotelian writings, and out of the pedagogical context, where teachers discussed the original writings with their students. Rather than diminish it, commentary was there to enrich philosophy. A well-educated doctor like Galen saw the benefit of Aristotelian ideas for his own medical science. A scholarly approach implicitly appealed to the authority of the master (and his successors) and would try to reveal the true nature of his thought by way of sophisticated exegesis. Those who identified with Aristotelian thought could be self-declared, or perceived as, Peripatetics, but it is clear that they would still be free to engage critically with the writings of their master.51 Like many earlier Peripatetics (Theophrastus, Eudemus, Xenarchus, Boethus), Alexander is seen to disagree with Aristotle on important issues—a fact which does not jeopardize their allegiance. (It does complicate how we are to understand that notion, and with it, the coherence of a “school” built on a narrowly defined corpus of texts.)
This attitude to the founder’s writings implicitly acknowledged that his work was not an unambiguously revealed truth, but an interpretation of the world which itself allowed for different interpretations. As a result, the philosophical commentary became the mainstay of philosophical activity, as the intellectual workspace for interpreting and developing ideas. Alexander of Aphrodisias was the highlight of this type of learned interpretation for the Aristotelian tradition up to 200 CE. His appointment to the Peripatetic chair placed him among the elite of his times, as a man of letters linked to power—which is especially clear from the dedication to Septimius Severus and Caracalla of his work On Fate (1.164.3–15).52 He was probably the last significant Peripatetic thinker writing philosophical commentary, but his intellectual authority lived on beyond the classroom, influencing Platonist, Arabic, and Christian philosophers in their reading of Aristotle.53
FURTHER READING
The ancient evidence on the Peripatetics for the period 200 BCE–200 CE is limited, uneven and of a rather technical nature, which is why a synthetic account of the Aristotelians in relation to the Second Sophistic remains difficult (see Baltussen 2016). For discussion of some Aristotelians of this period, see Moraux 1973, 1984, and Gottschalk 1987. Important primary material of the period is now conveniently translated in Sharples 2010a (for discussion, see also Sharples and Sorabji 2007). Useful comments on Peripatetic views on ethics in Trapp 2007 (esp. 30–36, 76–78, 144–147, with further literature).
For Alexander of Aphrodisias, Sharples’s books and translations are fundamental; for a convenient set of important short passages in translation see also Sorabji 2004.
The most useful (and only) book on Aspasius is the collection of essays edited by Alberti and Sharples 1999. Translations of parts of his Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics by Konstan 2006, 2010.
Good general treatments of Galen and his relation to Aristotle as well as the Second Sophistic are Swain 1996, chap. 11; von Staden 1997; and Van der Eijk 2009.
Appendix Peripatetics 100 BCE to 250 CE
The chronological list is based on Sharples in Sharples and Sorabji 2007, 503–504 and Sharples 2010a, with additions by myself (*) and from Schorn 2003. I have included those Peripatetics who are given that label in the sources.
Andronicus of Rhodes (first century BCE): called “the Peripatetic” by Galen (e.g., Quod animi mores 4.782 K).
Boethus of Sidon: student of Andronicus; wrote comments on the Categories (Simpl. in Cat. 1.18; 13.15–17; 30.2; Philoponus, in Cat. 5.18–19).
Staseas of Naples: called “a Peripatetic” by Cicero (De orat. 1.104) (see Moraux 1973, 217; Schorn 2003, 43).
Xenarchus of Seleucia: teacher of Strabo (64 BCE to 24 CE); fragments preserved in later Platonists (collected and clarified by Falcon 2012).
Kratippus of Pergamum: according to Cicero (Tim. 1), “easily the best among Peripatetics I have heard” (Schorn 2003, 43).
(Areus) Didymus: court philosopher of Emperor Augustus(?); second half of first century BCE (if he is the same as Arius/Areus Didymus, he may be a Stoic; see Sharples 2010a, 21–22).
Nicolaus of Damascus (second half of first century BCE): court philosopher of Herod the Great (FGrH 90F135 Jacoby); wrote a Study of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (noted in some MSS at end of Theophr. Metaph. 12a4–b4) (see Sharples 2010a, 15–16).
Adrastus of Aphrodisias (first half of second century CE): perhaps the same person as Adrastus of Philippi mentioned by Stephanus of Byzantium (FGrH 7, 1999, 51).
Alexander of Aegae (mid-first century CE): Peripatetic philosopher at the court of Nero (Suda s.v. = A 1128).
Aristotle of Mytilene: perhaps teacher of Alexander (Galen, On Habits 11.4–12 Müller = fr. 1.Z Sharples).
Aspasius the Peripatetic (first half of second century CE): “among the exegetes of Aristotle” (Simpl. in Phys. 131.14); wrote commentaries on ethics, metaphysics, physics, physiology, the heavens, logic (Categories, On Interpr.). One of his students taught Galen ca. 144 CE (see On the Affections of the Soul 8; Barnes 1999, 1–3). Mentioned twenty-eight times in the commentaries on Aristotle by the Platonist Simplicius (ca. 480–540 CE) [source: TLG-E at http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu.au/].
Sosigenes (ca. 120–180/190 CE): teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias.
Herminus (ca. 120–180/190 CE): teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias.
Ptolemy (third quarter of second century CE).
*Aristocles of Pergamum (150–180 CE): “though from boyhood to early manhood he had devoted himself to the teachings of the Peripatetic school, he went over entirely to the sophists” (Philostr. VS 2.2 [566]).
*Anon. (late second century CE) wrote a Commentary on Nicomachean Ethics 2–5.
Eudemus (late second century CE): teacher of Flavius Boethus; mentioned by Galen (De praenotione 14.612.12) as a Peripatetic in Rome.
Alexander of Damascus (late second century CE): teacher of Flavius Boethus; mentioned by Galen (De anat. admin. 2.218 K.); confused with Alexander of Aphrodisias by Galen himself (Sharples 1987, 1179 with n21).
Flavius Boethus (late second century CE): mentioned by Galen (e.g., De anatom. administr. 2.215.5 K) as an important Roman aristocrat with great interest in Aristotle (De praenotione 14.626.1 K; 627.1 K). See also Johnson 2010, 78–79.
*Claudius Severus (late second century CE): teacher of Marcus Aurelius (Med. 1.14)
Aristotle of Mytilene (mid to late second century CE [died between 165 and 180 CE]): teacher of Alexander of A
phrodisias.
Alexander of Aphrodisias (late second to early third century CE): referred to as “the commentator”; appointed to chair (thronos) of Peripatetic philosophy at Athens between 198 and 211 CE, Alexander is the dominant commentator in this era; many of his works were used by subsequent philosophical commentators at least until Simplicius (ca. 480–540 CE).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alberti, A. and R. W. Sharples, eds. 1999. Aspasius: The Earliest Extant Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics. Berlin.
Baltussen, H. 2007. “From Polemic to Exegesis: The Ancient Philosophical Commentary.” In “Genres in Philosophy.” Special issue, Poetics Today, edited by J. Lavery, 28: 247–281.
Baltussen, H. 2008. Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius: The Methodology of a Commentator. London.
Baltussen, H. 2013. “The Peripatetics after Aristotle.” In The Routledge Companion to Ancient Philosophy, edited by J. Warren and F. Sheffield, 511–525. New York and Abingdon.
Baltussen, H. 2016. The Peripatetics: Aristotle’s Heirs, 322BCE–200CE. London.
Barker, A. 1984. Greek Musical Writings. Cambridge.
Barnes, J., S. Bozien, K. Flannery, and K. Ierodiakonou, trans. 1991. Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.1–7. London.
The Oxford Handbook of the Second Sophistic Page 94