47 Petrie to T. L. Rowan (No. 10), 23 Jan. 1946, Security Service Archives.
48 ‘Report on Activities of Security Service’, n.d. [March 1943], TNA KV 4/83, s. 7a.
49 Duff Cooper to Guy Liddell, 2 April 1943, TNA KV 4/83, s. 8a.
50 ‘The HARLEQUIN case’, enclosed with Petrie to Duff Cooper, 16 April 1943, TNA KV 4/83, s. 10a.
51 Third Report on Activities of Security Service, 1 June 1943, TNA KV 4/83, s. 16a. Since HARLEQUIN had been captured by the Americans in North Africa, he became a US POW. H. P. Milmo (B1B) to SIS, 6 May 1943, TNA KV 2/268, s. 46a.
52 V. B. Carol (B1H) to ADB1 (through B1B, H. P. Milmo), 22 April 1943, TNA KV 2/268, s. 43b; H. P. Milmo to Major Stopford-Adams, 4 May 1943, TNA KV 2/268, s. 45a.
53 Second Report on Activities of Security Service, 1 May 1943, TNA KV 4/83, s. 13a.
54 Macintyre, Agent Zigzag, ch. 20.
55 Duff Cooper to Dick White, 5 May 1943, TNA KV 2/459; Macintyre, Agent Zigzag, p. 223.
56 Macintyre, Agent Zigzag, pp. 147–8, 176.
57 ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during June, 1944’, 3 July 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 42a.
58 Apart from HARLEQUIN, GARBO was the only agent to be the subject of a special MI5 report to the Prime Minister in addition to being mentioned in some of the monthly reports. The fact that a copy of ZIGZAG’s file was sent for by Duff Cooper suggests that he aroused a roughly comparable level of interest in the Prime Minister.
59 Security Service, p. 254.
60 ‘GARBO’ (described in MI5 note of 5 Nov. 1943 as a ‘report which Mr Duff Cooper prepared to show to the Prime Minister’, based on information from the Security Service), TNA KV 4/83, s. 21a.
61 Guy Liddell diary, 22, 23, 24 June 1943.
62 Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 5, pp. 106–7.
63 Stafford, Ten Days to D-Day, pp. 48–50.
64 Masterman, Double-Cross System, pp. 152–4.
65 Stafford, Ten Days to D-Day, pp. 157–8.
66 ‘Tenth Report on Activities of Security Service’, 7 March 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 29a.
67 Guy Liddell noted in his diary on 16 April 1944, ‘ARTIST has made it clear that he knows all about the GARBO set up and believes it to be a blind.’
68 Reile, Geheime Westfront, pp. 194–205.
69 Masterman, Double-Cross System, pp. 140–41. Hinsley and Simkins, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 4, pp. 117–18.
70 Christopher Harmer to Hugh Astor, 28 Oct. 1992, Security Service Archives.
71 Reile, Geheime Westfront, pp. 194–205.
72 Masterman, Double-Cross System, p. 142.
73 Hugh Astor to Roger Fleetwood-Hesketh, 10 July 1984, Security Service Archives.
74 Guy Liddell diary, 4 July 1944.
75 Willan, D-Day to Berlin, ch. 1.
76 Mary Sherer (B1A), ‘Nathalie Sergueiew’, 4 July 1944, TNA KV 2/466, s. 377a.
77 Masterman, Double-Cross System, pp. 143, 149, 161.
78 Security Service Archives. On the wartime bar on officer rank for female staff, see above, p. 220.
79 Sergueiev, Secret Service Rendered.
80 Mary Sherer (B1A), ‘Nathalie Sergueiew’, 4 July 1944, TNA KV 2/466, s. 377a.
81 Ibid.
82 ‘Tenth Report on Activities of Security Service’, 7 March 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 29a. SIS transported the transmitter back to London on TREASURE’s behalf; Mary Sherer (B1A), ‘Nathalie Sergueiew’, 4 July 1944, TNA KV 2/466, s. 377a.
83 Mary Sherer (B1A), ‘Nathalie Sergueiew’, 4 July 1944, TNA KV 2/466, s. 377a.
84 Masterman, Double-Cross System, p. 161.
85 ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during May, 1944’, 3 June 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 41a.
86 ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during April, 1944’, May 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 38a.
87 ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during May, 1944’, 3 June 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 41a.
88 Mary Sherer (B1A), ‘Nathalie Sergueiew’, 4 July 1944, TNA KV 2/466, s. 377a.
89 Henceforth, however, Robertson considered it ‘out of the question’ to include disinformation in TREASURE’s radio messages to Lisbon which thus made no further contribution to FORTITUDE deceptions. Ibid.
90 ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during May, 1944’, 3 June 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 41a. Stafford, Ten Days to D-Day, p. 204.
91 See above, pp. 297–8.
92 ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during May, 1944’, 3 June 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 41a. Stafford, Ten Days to D-Day, p. 204.
93 Masterman, Double-Cross System, p. 154. ARTIST is believed to have died in the Oranienburg concentration camp. Hinsley and Simkins, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 4, pp. 224–5.
94 Holt, Deceivers, pp. 565–7.
95 Ibid., p. 577. Stafford, Ten Days to D-Day, p. 307.
96 According to the official history of strategic deception (usually the most authoritative account), GARBO did not get through to Madrid until 6.08 a.m.; Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 5, p. 185. Some other accounts claim that GARBO did not make contact until 8 a.m.
97 Stafford, Ten Days to D-Day, pp. 306–8. Eisenhower’s appeal to the French not to rise against the German occupiers until ‘the proper time’ could also have been interpreted as a veiled reference to the fact that further landings were planned – and for that reason, GARBO told the Abwehr, it was deplored by the PWE Director.
98 See above, p. 293.
99 Stafford, Ten Days to D-Day, pp. 308–9.
100 The Abwehr case officer claimed more speciously that, because GARBO’s reports had left the high command ‘completely forewarned and prepared’, the arrival of his warning that the Allied invasion forces were on their way to the Normandy beaches would have had little greater impact ‘had it arrived three or four hours earlier’. Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 5, p. 185.
101 ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during June, 1944’, 3 July 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 42a.
102 Holt, Deceivers, p. 581.
103 Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 5, pp. 189–91.
104 ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during June, 1944’, 3 July 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 42a.
105 Holt, Deceivers, p. 586.
106 Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 5, pp. 193–4.
107 T. E. Bromley (Foreign Office) to DG/Sec, 13 March 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 30a. For unexplained reasons, the Security Service produced a consolidated report for November 1943, December 1943 and January 1944, issued on 1 February 1944. This was the first report to be sent to Eden. The PUS, Sir Alexander Cadogan, seems to have read them with greater attention than the Foreign Secretary.
108 Eden had been made minister responsible for MI5 (not a responsibility he appears to have exercised very actively) at the suggestion of Duff Cooper when he gave up his post as chairman of the Security Executive late in 1943. Security Service, p. 400.
109 TNA KV 4/87. On D-Day plus 10, 16 June, the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Lieutenant General (Sir) Archibald Nye, informed Petrie that there was clear evidence that the timing of the Normandy landings had taken the Germans completely by surprise, and congratulated the Security Service, ‘who contributed so much to the initial success of the operation’, for its ‘remarkable achievement’. Nye to Petrie, 16 June 1944, TNA KV 4/130.
110 TNA KV 4/130.
111 ‘Summary of the Activities of the Security Service up to September, 1944’, 5 Oct. 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 51a. This was the first of the monthly reports to be signed by Petrie. The captured German map is reproduced in Holt, Deceivers, p. 569.
112 ‘Summary of the Activities of the Security Service up to September, 1944’, 5 Oct. 1944, with minute by Churchill of 7 Oct. 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 51a.
113
Guy Liddell diary, 21 Dec. 1944.
114 Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 5, p. 169.
115 Dear and Foot (eds), Oxford Companion to the Second World War, pp. 1249–53.
116 Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 5, pp. 171–2.
117 Ibid., p. 174. B1A followed with some amusement subsequent German wrangles over the award of an Iron Cross to a non-combatant foreigner.
118 See above, p. 304.
119 T. A. Robertson, ‘TREASURE’, 15 June 1944, TNA KV 2/466, s. 367a. Mary Sherer (B1A), ‘TREASURE’, 17 June 1944, TNA KV 2/466, s. 368a.
120 ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during June, 1944’, 3 July 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 42a.
121 See above, p. 288.
122 ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during June, 1944’, 3 July 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 42a. For details of ZIGZAG’s return, see Macintyre, Agent Zigzag, ch. 25.
123 Report by Michael Ryde, 26 July 1944, TNA KV 2/460. Macintyre, Agent Zigzag, p. 282. Most of ZIGZAG’s messages to the Abwehr do not survive.
124 Michael Ryde to Tar Robertson, 13 Sept. 1944, TNA KV 2/460; Macintyre, Agent Zigzag, p. 282.
125 Macintyre, Agent Zigzag, p. 282. Masterman, Double-Cross System, p. 179.
126 ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during June, 1944’, 3 July 1944, TNA KV 4/83, s. 42a.
127 Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 5, pp. 176–7.
128 Ibid., p. 177.
129 Ibid., pp. 180–81.
130 Guy Liddell diary, vol. 10, 25 Aug. 1944, TNA KV 4/194.
131 Ibid., 9, 11 Sept. 1944.
132 Ibid., 15 Sept. 1944.
133 Masterman, Double-Cross System, p. 181.
134 Macintyre, Agent Zigzag, pp. 295–6.
135 None of the messages transmitted and received by TATE during this period survive. However, later evidence shows that he was central to the V-2 deception. See below, pp. 314–16.
136 Hoare (ed.), Camp 020, pp. 217–25.
137 Macintyre, Agent Zigzag, chs 26–8.
138 Guy Liddell diary, 31 Oct. 1944. Oddly, this episode does not appear in Macintyre’s excellent biography, Agent Zigzag.
139 Report by Michael Ryde, 24 Oct. 1944, TNA KV 2/460. Macintyre, Agent Zigzag, p. 305.
140 ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service, March 1946’, 4 April 1946, Security Service Archives. This episode too does not appear in Macintyre’s biography.
141 The Security Service later informed Churchill: ‘In the second half of 1944 there is no known case of the enemy sending an agent with a mission to the United Kingdom.’ ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during January, 1945’, 19 Feb. 1945, TNA KV 4/83, s. 56a.
142 Masterman, Double-Cross System, pp. 170–71.
143 ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during January, 1945’, 19 Feb. 1945, TNA KV 4/83, s. 56a.
144 Masterman, Double-Cross System, p. 181.
145 TATE’s German case officer gave him a week’s advance warning of a renewed V-1 attack in March when 275 were fired at British targets. ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during February, 1945’, 13 March 1945, TNA KV 4/83, s. 57a.
146 Dear and Foot (eds), Oxford Companion to the Second World War, pp. 1249–53.
147 Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 5, pp. 182–3.
148 The device was known to the Americans as ‘snorkel’ and to the British as ‘snork’. Dear and Foot (eds), Oxford Companion to the Second War, pp. 981, 1080.
149 Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 5, p. 228.
150 ‘Report on the Activities of the Security Service during January, 1945’, 19 Feb. 1945, TNA KV 4/83, s. 56a.
151 Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 5, pp. 228–30.
152 Masterman, Double-Cross System, p. 184.
153 Ibid., pp. 184–5.
154 Because of the decline in the B1A case-load, Astor had been earmarked for the Delhi Intelligence Bureau but instead asked for a transfer to SOE in the hope of being transferred to South-East Asia. Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
155 Guy Liddell diary, 4 May 1945.
156 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
157 Gilbert, Road to Victory, ch. 69.
158 Security Service Archives.
159 Wilson, ‘War in the Dark’, p. 2.
160 LCS (44) 3, TNA CAB 81/78.
161 ‘Historical Record of Deception in the War against Germany and Italy’, TNA CAB 154/100–101.
162 HC (49) 3, TNA CAB 81/80. The LCS, which had lapsed after the Second World War, was reconstituted early in 1947.
163 TNA CAB 154/104. Wilson, ‘War in the Dark’, pp. 221–6.
164 See below, p. 426.
SECTION D: THE EARLY COLD WAR
Introduction: The Security Service and its Staff in the Early Cold War
1 See above, pp. 148–52.
2 Recollections of former Security Service officers.
3 Aldrich, Hidden Hand, pp. 94–5. From 1932 to 1936 Strong had been seconded to the Security Service as DSO first in Malta, then in Gibraltar.
4 During the 1945 election campaign Churchill had warned, absurdly, of the danger that a Labour victory would result in the introduction of a British Gestapo.
5 Guy Liddell diary, 17 Dec. 1945, Security Service Archives. In transcribing Liddell’s dictated diary, his secretary mistakenly called the DG designate ‘Shillito’. Possibly in an attempt to spare Guy Liddell’s feelings, Petrie told him that the Whitehall committee might have passed him over because it preferred him to have his hands ‘free to deal with the intelligence side of things’.
6 Andrew, Secret Service, pp. 682–3. Charles Butler, Director A (administration), and Reginald Horrocks, head of Registry (with the rank of assistant director), seem to have sided with Sillitoe. Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
7 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
8 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
9 Security Service Archives. Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
10 Security Service Archives.
11 Report of the Committee appointed to inquire into the Interception of Communications, 1957 (Cmnd 283). Williams, Not in the Public Interest, pp. 134–5.
12 Security Service Archives.
13 Security Service Archives.
14 Guy Liddell diary, 26 Feb. 1946, Security Service Archives.
15 Security Service Archives.
16 Guy Liddell diary, 19 Nov 1946, Security Service Archives. Though Liddell’s comments apply specifically to his meeting with Attlee on 19 November 1946, he noted: ‘I had the same impression on the other occasions when I spoke to him, and, from what I can gather from others who have seen him, it is his usual form.’
17 Guy Liddell diary, 4 March 1950, Security Service Archives.
18 Ibid., 27 July 1950. Brook’s initial judgement was perceptive. For the first half of the Cold War, the balance was arguably tilted too far in favour of counter-espionage.
19 ‘Norman Craven Brook’, Oxford DNB.
20 Security Service Archives.
21 Security Service Archives.
22 The Security Service Act of 1989 did not alter this important distinction between the Security Service and the other intelligence agencies. Security Service Archives.
23 Bower, Perfect English Spy, pp. 137–8.
24 Security Service Archives.
25 Sir David Maxwell Fyfe to the Prime Minister, 25 June 1953, Home Office Archives. The other members of the committee were Sir Frank Newsam, Sir William Strang, Sir Norman Brook, Sir Harold Parker, General Sir Nevil Brownjohn and Sir Thomas Padmore.
26 Home Office Archives.
27 Home Office Archives.
28 Bower, Perfect English Spy, p. 138.
29 Trevor-Ro
per, ‘The man who put intelligence into spying’, Sunday Telegraph (Review section), 9 April 1995.
30 J. L. Garbutt to Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, 15 July 1953, Home Office Archives.
31 Security Service Archives. On the D-Notice Committee, see the official history by Nicholas Wilkinson, Secrecy and the Media.
32 After leaving Blenheim Palace in the autumn of 1945, a majority of the Service had moved to unsuitable temporary accommodation in Princes Gate. The DG, A and B Divisions remained in St James’s Street.
33 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
34 These figures do not include Security Control personnel at the ports, whose numbers continued to increase throughout the war: from 357 in September 1939 to 942 in May 1943 to 621 (plus 39 ATS) in April 1945. Security Service, pp. 323–4, 373.
35 Security Service Archives.
36 Security Service Archives.
37 Security Service Archives.
38 Security Service Archives.
39 Home Office Archives.
40 See above, pp. 281–2.
41 Home Office Archives.
42 Home Office Archives.
43 Home Office Archives.
44 Home Office Archives.
45 Home Office Archives.
46 Home Office Archives.
47 Home Office Archives.
48 Security Service Archives.
49 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
50 Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 292–6.
51 Recollections of former Security Service officers.
52 Security Service Archives.
53 Ministry of Defence War Book, Appendix D, Aug. 1963, TNA DEFE 2/225; cited by Hennessy, Secret State, pp. 177–80. Christopher Andrew visited the bunker on 10 September 2008.
54 Hennessy, Secret State, ch. 5.
55 See below, p. 493.
56 See below, Section D, ch. 10.
57 The Legal Adviser, Bernard Sheldon, among others, considered FJ ‘much the clearest brain of the whole lot’. Recollections of former Security Service officers.
58 Home Office Archives.
59 Security Service Archives.
60 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
61 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
62 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
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