78 Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘MI5 criticised for role in case of torture, rendition and secrecy’, Guardian, 22 Aug. 2008. Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Evidence of torture “buried by ministers” ’, Guardian, 5 Feb. 2009. Richard Ford and Francis Elliott, ‘US threatens to stop sharing intelligence if “torture” of British detainee is revealed’, The Times, 5 Feb. 2009.
79 Lord Neuberger’s final judgment, made public on 26 February, though somewhat less sweeping and more clearly focused on the Binyam Mohamed case than his first draft, was still the most devastating judicial judgment on MI5 in its history. Neuberger concluded in his first draft: ‘Not only is there an obvious reason for distrusting any UK Government assurance, based on S[ecurit]y S[ervice] advice and information because of previous “form”, but the Foreign Office and the S[ecurit]y S[ervice] have an interest in the suppression of such information.’ In the final judgment this became: ‘Not only is there some reason for distrusting such a statement [‘concerning the mistreatment of Mr Mohamed’], given that it is based on Security Services’ advice and information, because of previous, albeit general, assurances in 2005, but also the Security Services have an interest in the suppression of such information.’ EWCA Civ 158. Case No: T1/2009/2331. 26 February 2009.
80 Jonathan Evans, ‘Conspiracy theories aid Britain’s enemies’, Daily Telegraph, 12 Feb. 2010.
81 Richard Norton-Taylor. ‘Ml5’s propaganda own-goal:’, Guardian, 12 Feb. 2010.
82 I find it difficult to believe, on the basis of my own experience in talking to induction courses, that recruits would feel inhibited from taking ethical concerns to the counsellor.
83 Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2006–2007 (Cm 7299), Jan. 2008.
84 Intelligence and Security Committee, Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005 (Cm 6785), May 2006, p. 38
85 Ibid., p. 39.
86 Security Service Archives.
87 Transcript of Ali’s suicide video.
88 Security Service Archives.
89 Security Service Archives.
90 Security Service Archives.
91 Security Service Archives.
92 Security Service Archives.
93 A conversation on 9 August about ‘HP’ (hydrogen peroxide) between Ali and his chief lieutenant, Tanveer Hussain, recorded by MI5, said of Sarwar: ‘he’s got to boil it down’. Security Service Archives.
94 Press reports of Sarwar’s trial.
95 Security Service Archives.
96 Security Service Archives.
97 Security Service Archives.
98 Interview by Christopher Andrew with Jonathan Evans, 26 Jan. 2010. On the surveillance and arrest of Fryers, see above, p. 784.
99 Security Service Archives.
100 Press reports of trial evidence.
101 Andy Hayman. ‘Why I suspect jittery Americans nearly ruined efforts to foil plot’, The Times, 8 Sept. 2009.
102 MI5 listening devices picked up the recording of only one of the martyrdom videos. Security Service Archives.
103 Transcript of Ali’s martyrdom video. Before being broadcast, editing of the video by those Ali called Al Qaida’s ‘media brothers’ would probably have made it more coherent.
104 Transcript of Tanvir Hussain’s martyrdom video.
105 Press reports of trial evidence.
106 Interview by Christopher Andrew with Jonathan Evans, 26 Jan. 2010.
107 Ibid.
108 Security Service Archives.
109 ‘Hunt for Rashid Rauf that ended with hellfire’, Sunday Times, 23 Nov. 2008.
110 Security Service Archives.
111 ‘A terror plot, 24 arrests and the day when chaos reigned’, Independent, 11 Aug. 2006. Interview by Christopher Andrew with Jonathan Evans, 26 Jan. 2010.
112 ‘A terror plot, 24 arrests and the day when chaos reigned’, Independent, 11 Aug. 2006. Andy Hayman, ‘Why I suspect jittery Americans nearly ruined efforts to foil plot’, The Times, 8 Sept. 2009. On 14 August, as a result of the arrests, JTAC lowered the threat level to severe – indicating that a terrorist threat was still highly likely but was no longer thought to be imminent.
113 ‘ “Airlines terror plot” disrupted’, BBC News, 10 Aug. 2009.
114 Interview by Christopher Andrew with Jonathan Evans, 26 Jan. 2010.
115 Among them Christopher Andrew.
116 At the end of the first OVERT trial, which concluded in September 2008, the three ringleaders – Ali, Sarwar and Hussein – were found guilty of conspiracy to murder persons known and conspiracy to cause explosions. The jury, however, failed to agree a verdict on charges that they and four other defendants – Ibrahim Svant, Umar Islam, Waheed Zaman and Arafat Khan had conspired to commit murder by detonating bombs aboard transatlantic airliners. All seven pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit a public nuisance. The eighth defendant, Mohammed Yasar Gulzar, was acquitted on all charges.
At a retrial which concluded a year later in September 2009 Ali, Sarwar and Hussein were found guilty of conspiracy to murder by causing explosions on aircraft. The jury failed to agree a verdict on the same charge against Umar Islam but found him guilty of conspiracy to murder. The jury found Savant, Zaman and Arafat Khan not guilty of conspiracy to murder by causing explosions on aircraft and failed to reach a verdict on the charge of conspiracy to murder. Donald Stewart-White, who had not featured in the first trial, was acquitted on all charges.
At a further trial which ended in December 2009 Adam Khatib was convicted of conspiracy to murder persons unknown, Nabeel Hussain of engaging in preparation of terrorist acts and Shamin Uddin of possessing documents/information which might be useful to terrorists. In March 2010 Ali’s wife, Cossor Ali, was found not guilty of failing to pass on information to prevent terrorism.
117 Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2007–2008 (Cm 7542), March 2009, p. 39.
118 Suzanne Breen, ‘Exclusive Real IRA: We will take campaign to Britain’, Sunday Tribune, 12 April 2009.
119 The services also expected to devote 75 per cent of its resources to countering Islanist terrorism in 2009–10. Intelligence and Security Commitee, Annual Report 2008–2009 (Cm 7807), p. 13, Intelligence and Security Commitee Annual Report 2009–2010 (Cm 7844), p. 11.
120 Security Service Archives.
121 MI5 also reported an increasing number of British-based Islamist Extremists visiting Somalia ‘for training purposes’. By 2009 15 per cent of its investigations involved Islamist extremist links with East Africa, especially Somalia. Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2008–2009 (Cm 7807), p. 13.
122 Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2008–2009 (Cm 7807), p. 13.
123 ‘Operation Pathway Report following Review’ by Lord Carlile of Berriew QC, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Oct. 2009.
124 ‘Manchester terror suspects cleared to work as guards, Sunday Times, 13 Dec. 2009.
125 Interview by Christopher Andrew with Jonathan Evans, 26 Jan. 2010. Close-up images of the documents also appeared in the following day’s Daily Telegraph. Evans ordered his own office to get rid of all folders with transparent covers.
126 ‘Operation Pathway Report following Review’ by Lord Carlile of Berriew QC, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Oct. 2009. On Oake’s murder, see above, p. 816.
127 All initially appealed against deportation. By the end of 2009, however, all but two had returned to Pakistan.
128 Declan Walsh, ‘Interviews with Pakistani students: “I’d figured this was all a big mistake” ’, Guardian, 3 Dec. 2009.
129 ‘Operation Pathway Report following Review’ by Lord Carlile of Berriew QC, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Oct. 2009.
130 Early in 2010 the Service was investigating around 200 Islamist terrorist cases, about the same number as in the previous year. Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2008–2009 (Cm 7807), March 2010, p. 13. Intelligence and Security Committee,
Annual Report 2009–2010 (Cm 7844), March 2010, p. 11.
CONCLUSION
1 Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2007–2008 (Cm 7542), March 2009, p. 18. Most espionage investigated by the Security Service in 2007–8 was conducted by China and Russia.
2 The memories of the minority without happy memories of the Service are, of course, less likely to be recorded than those of the majority. Even the disaffected Peter Wright, however, recalls in his memoirs ‘years of fun’ and ‘infectious laughter’ before he became obsessed by his hunt for imaginary traitors.
3 Andrew, First World War, pp. 42, 106–7.
4 See above, pp. 198–205.
5 See above, p. 185.
6 Andrew, Secret Service, p. 631.
7 Norman Holmes Pearson, foreword to Masterman, Double-Cross System.
8 Security Service Archives.
9 Guy Liddell diary, 1 Nov. 1942.
10 See above, pp. 394, 411–12.
11 See above, pp. 412–15.
12 Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 383.
13 Sandbrook, Never Had It So Good, pp. 218, 261.
14 A memorandum of 14 December 1962 noted, ‘The Security Service has no primary responsibility for any of the measures in the existing Government War Book’. Security Service Archives.
15 Security Service Archives.
16 Kent, ‘Need for an Intelligence Literature’.
17 Andrew, ‘Reflections on Intelligence Historiography’. MI5 staff had, however, some awareness of their own history. Curry wrote a history (since declassified) of the period 1909 to 1945; another MI5 officer later wrote a still classified history of the next quarter-century. Anthony Simkins collaborated with Sir Harry Hinsley on the official history of security and intelligence in the Second World War published in 1990. A historical pamphlet was produced in 1959 to mark the Service’s fiftieth anniversary.
18 Andrew and Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archive, pp. 45–6. The best biography of Reilly is Cook, On His Majesty’s Secret Service.
19 Wright, Spycatcher, p. 206.
20 See above, p. 520.
21 Wright, Spycatcher, p. 206.
22 Andrew and Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archive II, pp. 21–3. On improvements in Soviet intelligence collection during the Gorbachev era, see Andrew and Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archive, p. 722.
23 The surprise would have been somewhat less had British and US intelligence analysts realized that in the early 1960s the KGB had also reported to the Politburo – with horrendous inaccuracy that the United States was planning a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union. Andrew and Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archive, pp. 235–8.
24 Andrew, Secret Service, ch. 8.
25 Security Service Archives.
26 See above, p. 466.
27 See above, pp. 621, 684–5.
28 Security Service Archives. Though British Communists could not have provided a capacity crowd at Wembley or Old Trafford, the CPGB at its peak could have filled many smaller stadiums.
29 See above, p. 659.
30 Security Service Archives.
31 See above, p. 845.
32 Taylor, Brits, p. 351.
33 Stephen Lander, ‘Terrorism: The Genie out of the Bottle’, closed lecture to Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, Staff College, Camberley, October 1996.
34 Hoffman,‘ “Holy Terror” ’. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (first published in 1998), ch. 4.
35 Early in 1998 I argued in a talk at Thames House that the long-term threat to UK security came from Holy Terror. I claim no credit for my foresight, which was based on long-term trends identified not by me but by Bruce Hoffman.
36 The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism (Cm 7547), March 2009, pp. 26–7.
37 Security Service, pp. 174–5, 328–31. When setting up the new regional offices, the Service was mindful of the Second World War precedent. The History team were asked to prepare a report on the RSLOs.
38 Andrew, ‘Historical Attention Span Deficit Disorder’.
39 Security Service Archives.
40 Andrew, ‘Reflections on Intelligence Historiography’.
41 Andrew and Dilks (eds), Missing Dimension.
42 The importance of these research opportunities is well illustrated by Dr Calder Walton’s forthcoming history of intelligence and decolonization.
43 Andrew, introduction to Security Service, pp. 3, 10–11.
44 Andrew, ‘Historical Attention Span Deficit Disorder’.
45 Andrew, ‘Future of European Security and the Role of Intelligence’.
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