Of special importance is a well-researched work by Balázs Szalontai, who used Eastern European documents to carefully trace the formation of Kim Il Sung’s peculiar version of “national Stalinism.” See Balázs Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953–1964 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).
10. Research on the educational background of the Manchurian guerrillas was done by Wada Haruki. Wada Haruki, Kim Il Sŏng-wa Manchu hangil chŏnchaeng [Kim Il Sung and anti-Japanese resistance in Manchuria] (Seoul: Ch’angjak-kwa pip’yŏngsa, 1992), 303.
11. Bernd Schaefer, North Korean “Adventurism” and China’s Long Shadow, 1966–1972 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2004), 9.
This working paper by Bernd Schaefer provides a wealth of new information on the tense relations between China and North Korea in the era of China’s “Cultural revolution.”
12. Ibid., 5.
13. Ibid., 2.
14. Ibid., 7–9.
15. Not much is written about the debt debacle of the 1970s. For some basic information, see Sophie Roell, “For North Korean Exposure Try Buying Its Debt,” Dow Jones Newswires, Pyongyang, May 7, 2001.
16. For a comprehensive review of the nonclassified material in regard to North Korea’s involvement with smuggling, see Sheena Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks,” International Security vol. 32, iss.1 (2007): 80–111.
17. There are a large number of publications on the abductions of Japanese citizens. For example, see Patricia Steinhoff, “Kidnapped Japanese in North Korea: The New Left Connection,” Journal of Japanese Studies, vol. 30, (Winter 2004): 123–142.
18. For a detailed study of the politics behind the transfer of the ethnic Koreans to the DPRK, see Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Exodus to North Korea: Shadows from Japan’s Cold War (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).
19. In 1969 Chad and Central African Republic became the first two states to maintain full diplomatic relations with both Koreas. See Barry Gills, Korea Versus Korea: A Case of Contested Legitimacy (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 132.
20. Mitchell Lerner, Kim Il Sung, the Juche Ideology, and the Second Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011).
21. For a comprehensive overview of the PDS since its inception and until its collapse in the 1990s, see No Yong Hwan and Yŏn Ha Ch’ŏng, Pukhan-ŭi chumin saenghwal pochang chŏngch’aek p’yŏngka [Evaluation of the welfare policies in North Korea] (Seoul: Hankuk pokŏnsahoeyŏnkuwŏn, 1997), 47–62.
22. For more information, see Viola Lynne (ed.), Contending with Stalinism: Soviet Power and Popular Resistance in the 1930s (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002), 173; Alex Dowlah, and John Elliot, The Life and Times of Soviet Socialism (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 168.
23. Chad Raymond, “No Responsibility and No Rice: The Rise and Fall of Agricultural Collectivization in Vietnam,” Agricultural History 1 (2008), iss. 1: 49.
24. Michael Nelson, War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1997), 163.
25. Yonhap news report, January 18, 2011.
26. For the most detailed description of the North Korean prison system in English, see David Hawk, Hidden Gulag, Second Edition (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012).
27. Ibid., 30.
28. See prison memoirs by Kang Ch’ŏl-hwan: Kang Chol-hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums of Pyongyang: Ten Years in a North Korean Gulag (New York: Basic Books, 2001).
29. Kang Ch’ŏl-hwan. “Pukhan kyogwasŏ sok-ŭi Namhan” [South Korea in North Korean textbooks], Chosŏn ilbo, December 7, 2001, 54.
30. Yi Hyo-bŏm and Ch’oe Hyŏn-ho, “Pukhan kyokwasŏ-rŭl t’onghan ch’ŏngsonyŏn kach’igwan yŏngu: Kodŭng chunghakkyo kongsanjujŭi todok 3,4 haknyŏn chungsim-ŭro. Pukhan yŏngu hakhoebo. [A study of the youth value system through North Korean textbooks: centered around the textbooks for “Communist Morality” for years 3 and 4 in high school],” Pukhan yŏngu hakhoebo, 2000, iss. 2, 250.
31. DPR Korea 2008 Population Census. National Report (Pyongyang: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009).
32. World Health Statistics 2011 (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2011), 116–122.
33. Brian Myers, “The Watershed That Wasn’t: Re-evaluating Kim Il Sung’s ‘Juche speech’ of 1955,” Acta Koreana, 2006, iss. 9: 89–115.
34. Kim Jong Il, On the Juche Idea of Our Party (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1985), 7.
35. The life story of Kim Jong Il has been a topic of many works, but due to the nature of his regime it is often difficult to distinguish between facts and unsubstantiated rumors. So far, the most comprehensive Kim Jong Il biography in English is Michael Breen, Kim Jong-il: North Korea’s Dear Leader (Singapore and Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2004).
36. George McCune, Korea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950), 56–57.
37. Historical statistics compiled by Angus Maddison and his research team. Available for download at: www.ggdc.net/maddison/Historical_Statistics/horizontal-file_02-2010.xls.
38. On the scale of the North Korean military, see Nicholas Eberstadt, Korea Approaches Reunification (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 51–72.
CHAPTER 2
1. For trade statistics, see Kongdan Oh and Ralph Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking Glass (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 44–45.
2. Daniel Goodkind and Loraine West, “The North Korean Famine and Its Demographic Impact,” Population and Development Review, vol. 27 (2001), iss. 2: 219–238.
3. Pak Keong-Suk, “Economic Hardship and Famines since the 1990s and Their Impact on Population Dynamics in North Korea,” Presentation at the 51 Asia Seminar at Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan, December 2010.
4. Daniel Goodkind, Loraine West, and Peter Johnson, “A Reassessment of Mortality in North Korea, 1993–2008,” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America March 31–April 2, 2011, Washington, D.C.
5. Kim Byung-Yeon and Song Dongho, “The Participation of North Korean Households in the Informal Economy: Size, Determinants, and Effect,” Seoul Journal of Economics, vol. 21 (2008), iss. 2, 373.
6. Kim Pyŏn Yŏn and Yang Mun Su, Pukhan kyŏngche-esŏŭi sichangkwa chŏngpu [The government and market in North Korean economy] (Seoul, Sŏul taehakkyo ch’ulp’anmunhwawŏn, 2012), 124.
7. Ibid., 124.
8. The decrease in official-sponsored drug production was reported by the AFP (Agence France-Presse), which cited the US State Department. See “US says N. Korea’s State Drug Trafficking on Wane,” Asiaone News, March 4, 2011, accessed at news.asiaone.com. This agrees quite well with the observations of the present author.
9. Yi Yŏng-guk told his own story in a recently published book: Yi Yŏng-guk, Na-nŭn Kim Chŏng-il kyŏnghowon iŏssta [I was the bodyguard of Kim Jong I]) (Seoul: Sidae chŏngsin, 2004).
10. P Tumankang-ŭl kŏnnŏon saramtŭl [People who have crossed the Tumen River] (Seoul: Chŏngdo ch’ulp’an, 1999), 27.
11. For a review of the existent research on the number of North Korean refugees in China, see Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights Into North Korea (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2011), 2.
12. For a description of such VIP defection (arranged for an aged woman by her daughter), see Barbara Demick, Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea (New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2010), 239–247. In her informative and highly recommended book, Demick also provides detailed descriptions of far more common, cheap defections.
13. Some rough estimates of the scale of remittances have been made in 2009–11 by a number of people, including the present author. These estimates lay in the $5–20 million range.
14. International
Crisis Group, Strangers At Home: North Koreans in the South Report N°208 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2011), 14–15. This report is the latest (and arguably the best) of a small number of English-language materials dealing with the refugee problem in South Korea. There is a large number of Korean-language material, however.
15. The spread of videos was widely reported by refugees and the media. For a detailed account of the North Korean “video revolution,” see Yi Chu-chol, “Pukhan chuminui oepu chongpo suyong taeto pyonhwa” [The Research of Changes in North Koreans’ Attitudes toward the Outside World Information], Hankuk tongpuka nonchong, vol. 46 (2008): 245–248.
16. InterMedia, “International Broadcasting in North Korea: North Korean Refugee/Traveler Survey Report,” April–August 2009.
17. Remarks about the role of the computer as a status symbol: Kim Po-kŏn. “The 5 storages and 6 contraptions which serve as symbols of prosperity in North Korea,” T’ongil Hankuk [Unified Korea] vol. 27 (2009), iss. 1: 80. I would add that in my own talks with defectors this new symbolic significance of the computer was mentioned frequently.
CHAPTER 3
1. Surjit Bhalla, Imagine There’s No Country: Poverty, Inequality, and Growth in the Era of Globalization (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2002), 16.
2. According to the calculations of Angus Maddison, the most respected economic historian of our days, in 1960 the per capita GDP was: $1,226 for South Korea, $1,277 for Somalia, $1,353 for Taiwan, $1,445 for Senegal (measured in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars).
3. Chad Raymond, “No Responsibility and No Rice: The Rise and Fall of Agricultural Collectivization in Vietnam,” Agricultural History, vol.82 (2008), iss.1: 54–55.
4. Sang T. Choe, “North Korea Moving from Isolation to an Open Market Economy: Is It time to Invest or to Continue Observing?” Competitiveness Review, vol. 13 (2003), iss.2: 60–69.
5. Terence Roehrig, “Creating the Conditions for Peace in Korea: Promoting Incremental Change in North Korea,” Korea Observer, vol. 40 (2009), iss.1: 222.
6. For details on the ongoing argument over the actual size of the North Korean GDP, see I Chong-sok, “Pukhan kukmin sotuk chaepyongka” [Reassessment of the National Income of North Korea], Chongsewa chongchaek 3 (2008): 1–4.
For the most recent estimates of the North Korean GDP see: 2011 Pukhan-ŭi chuyo t’onggye chip’yo [Major Statistical Indicators for North Korea, 2011] (Seoul: National Statistics Office, 2012).
7. Richard Vinen, History in Fragments: Europe in the Twentieth Century (London: Abacus, 2002), 513.
8. There is, actually, an ongoing debate on the reasons behind this relative success of the former nomenklatura and, more broadly speaking, Communist Party members in the post-Communist societies. Majority opinion is that it was brought about by the survival of institutions and networks, while the minority believes it is due to their personal qualities—opportunism, ambitions, organizational skills. There is no need, however, to go into excessive details: the continuing domination of the former elite is an undisputable and widely recognized fact. See Akos Rona-Tas and Alya Guseva, “The Privileges of Past Communist Party Membership in Russia and Endogenous Switching Regression,” Social Science Research 30 (2001): 641–652.
9. Tokyo Shimbun, February 2, 2011.
10. Nicholas Eberstadt once aptly described North Korean diplomacy as a “chain of aid-seeking stratagems.”
11. For a detailed study of the “food diversion problem,” see Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid and Reform (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 108–125.
12. Seen as the beginning of a long-awaited Chinese-style reform program, the 7.1 measures have been treated at great length by numerous scholars. For the best summary in English, see Young Chul Chung, “North Korean Reform and Opening: Dual Strategy and ‘Silli (Practical) Socialism,’” Pacific Affairs, vol. 77 (2004), iss. 2: 283–305. For Korean, see Kang Il-chon and Kong Son-yong, “7.1 kyongche kwanri kaeson chochi 1 nyonui pyongkawa chaehaesok” [The First Anniversary of the 7.1 Economy Management Improvement Measures: The Analysis and Appraisal], Tongil munche yonku, vol. 15 (2003): 131–146.
13. See, respectively, Wall Street Journal, June 20, 2004; Victor Cha and Chris Hoffmeister, “North Korea’s Drug Habit,” New York Times, June 3, 2004; Howard W. French, “North Korea Experiments, with China As Its Model,” New York Times, March 28, 2005.
14. Yim Kyong-hun, “Pukhansik kyongche kaehyok-e taehan pyongka-wa chonmang: 7.1 kyongche kwanri kaeson chochirul chungsim-uro” [The Appraisal and Prospects of an Economic Reform, North Korean Style; Centered around 7.1 Economy Management Improvement Measures], Hankuk chongchi yonku, vol. 16 (2007): 290, 295–391.
15. Nam Song-uk, “Nongop punyaui kaehyok tanhaengkwa paekupche chaekae” [Execution of Reforms in Agriculture and Revival of the Rationing System], Pukhan 2005, iss.12: 81.
16. Between May and June of 2005 rice at Hamhung market cost 950 won per kilo. See Kim Yong-chin, “Hampuk Musan chiyok ssalkaps sopok harak” [Rice Prices in Dramatic Decline in Musan and North Hamgyong], Daily NK, July 17, 2007.
17. Kim Yong-chin, “Paekŭp 700g taesangŭn motu chikchang chulkŭnhara” [Those Who Are Eligible for 700g Rations Must Go to the Workplace], Daily NK, December 7, 2006.
18. The coming of this ban was reported in October when rumors began to spread. The ban went into effect on December 1, 2007. See Onŭl-ŭi Pukhan sosik, December 6, 2007, 2.
19. Onŭl-ŭi Pukhan sosik, March 12, 2008, 2–3.
20. Onŭl-ŭi Pukhan sosik, November 6, 2008, 1–2.
21. Regarding the number of North Korean defectors hiding in China from 2006 to 2008, there are still large estimates, but the author tends to agree with Yun Yo-sang. See Yun Yo-sang, “Haeoe talpukcha siltaewa taechaek” [The Current Situation of North Korean Defectors Overseas and Policy toward Them], Pukhan 2008, iss.5: 70. Yun concludes that in 2007 there were between 30,000 and 50,000 North Koreans hiding in China. In May 2007 NGO representatives operating in China also agreed that the number of refugees was close to 30,000. See “Talpuk haengryol 10 nyon … suscha chulko kyechung tayang” [Ten Years of Defections from the North … Numbers Go Down, Social Variety Increases], Daily NK, May 14, 2007. These estimates agree with what the present author himself heard on trips in 2007 and 2008 to the borderland areas both from Chinese officials and from independent researchers.
22. The interview was widely reported in the media. For example, see “Kim Jong Il’s Son Talks Succession,” CNN World, October 12, 2010.
23. As quoted by Yonhap Agency report, January 28, 2011.
CHAPTER 4
1. Gregory Schulte, “Stopping Proliferation Before It Starts,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2010): 83.
2. On Syria—North Korea nuclear cooperation, see, for example: Gregory Schulte, Uncovering Syria’s Covert Reactor (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010).
3. For a description of South Korea’s short-lived nuclear weapons program, see Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 68–74.
4. Walter Clemens, “North Korea’s Quest for Nuclear Weapons: New Historical Evidence,” Journal of East Asian Studies, vol.10 (2010), iss.1: 127.
5. The United States’ near obsession with the nuclear program produced an impressive volume of literature dealing with the topic—dozens of books, hundreds of research papers. For a short and document-based introduction into the early history of the North Korean nuclear project, see a collection of articles edited by James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov: The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia (New York: Routledge, 2000). For more up-to-date information, a report by the Congressional Research Service might be of great help: Larry Niksch, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2010). For a short and highly professional review of the North Korean nuclear program, see an artic
le by Siegfried Hecker, the former director of the Los Alamos Laboratories: Siegfried Hecker, “Lessons Learned from the North Korean Nuclear Crises,” Daedalus 139 (2010): 44–56.
B00BY4HXME EBOK Page 32