In the next week he was put under severe pressure from his colleagues and, indirectly, from Germany. For Tisza the alliance with Germany, ‘the cornerstone of our entire policy’, was essential for maintaining Austria-Hungary’s great-power status and, to him, even more important, the status of Hungary itself. Nor was he any less hostile to Serbia than his colleagues; he disagreed rather on tactics. He also seems to have persuaded himself that Rumania would stay neutral (King Carol had sent an anodyne letter of reassurance to Franz Joseph) and Bulgaria could be drawn into the Triple Alliance now that Berlin had promised it a loan. On 14 July at a meeting with Berchtold he gave way and agreed that a severe ultimatum should be sent to Serbia with a deadline of forty-eight hours. If Serbia failed to comply with the conditions war would follow. The one concession he managed to get was that Austria-Hungary should make it clear that it did not intend to take Serbia’s territory after the war was over.61
Later that afternoon he had a conversation with the German ambassador which Tschirschky reported back to Berlin. Tisza claimed that, although he had argued for caution in the past, each passing day had strengthened his conviction that the Dual Monarchy now must take action to show that it was still vital and, in Tschirschky’s italics, ‘to put an end to the intolerable conditions in the southeast’. Austria-Hungary could no longer tolerate the insolent tone coming from Serbia. The time, Tisza now felt, had come for action. ‘The note is being composed so that the possibility of its acceptance is practically excluded.’ Austria-Hungary’s mobilisation against Serbia would follow as soon as the deadline was reached. As he left, Tisza clasped Tschirschky’s hand and said, ‘Together we shall now look the future calmly and firmly in the face.’ Wilhelm noted approvingly in the margins of the report, ‘Well, a real man at last!’62
The main outlines of the ultimatum were already set by the second week of July. It would include a demand that nationalist officers be dismissed from the Serbian army and nationalist societies be dissolved. The Serbian king would have to issue a public declaration that his country would no longer promote a Greater Serbia. To ensure that Serbia fulfilled these and any other demands, Austria-Hungary would establish a special agency in Belgrade. The terms were already exceedingly difficult for an independent nation to accept and they were going to become more stringent still as Austria-Hungary’s officials worked on them as well as on a dossier that was meant to prove that Serbia had been plotting against Austria-Hungary for years. To bolster its case the Foreign Ministry sent its legal adviser to Sarajevo to investigate the assassination; unfortunately he was unable to find evidence that the Serbian government was behind it. The dossier in the end proved to be full of errors and was not finished in time to be handed over to the powers along with a copy of the ultimatum. As a result Russia continued to believe the Serbian government when it claimed that it was completely innocent while France and Great Britain found Austria-Hungary had not proved its case.63
While there was intense activity behind the scenes in Vienna, the government did its best to give the impression that it was business as usual. Newspapers in both Vienna and Budapest were asked to tone down their comments on Serbia. Tschirschky reported to Berlin that Berchtold had sent Conrad and the War Minister off for their summer holidays to prevent any unease. (‘Childish!’ noted the Kaiser from his yacht to which he had returned, not suspecting that his own government wanted him out of the way in part for the same reason.)64 Nevertheless rumours started to circulate that Austria-Hungary was planning something unpleasant for Serbia. The German ambassador in Rome told the Italian Foreign Minister about, among other things, the blank cheque and San Giuliano alerted his ambassadors in St Petersburg and Belgrade, not knowing that the Russians had broken Italy’s diplomatic codes.65 In Vienna the Russian ambassador asked what Austria-Hungary intended to do but was sufficiently reassured, being told that it would wait until its investigation was complete, that he left on his own holidays two days before the ultimatum was presented to Serbia.66 On 17 July the British ambassador reported to London: ‘There is only one topic in the Vienna press, even Albania in its throes being almost crowded out – namely, when will the protest against Serbia be put in, and what will it contain? That there will be a protest nobody doubts, and it will probably be coupled with demands intended to humiliate Serbia.’ There was an ‘ominous silence’ from the Foreign Ministry but he had it on good authority that, if Serbia did not cave in at once, Austria-Hungary would use force and, moreover, that it was sure of Germany’s support. He then added a postscript: ‘I have just had a talk with Berchtold. He was charming, announced himself for a visit to our place in the country next Sunday, invited us to stay with him at Buchlau, the place of the famous interview between Aehrenthal and Izvolsky, told me he had some horses running in some races shortly, but never mentioned general politics or the Serbians.’67
The German government also presented a picture of summer calm, possibly deliberately as historians have later charged in order to lull any suspicions that it was contemplating a war. Jagow returned to Berlin from his honeymoon in the first week of July but the Kaiser toured the North Sea on his usual cruise and most senior civilians and military remained on holiday. The general staff kept to its usual peacetime routine. Waldersee, who was on his father-in-law’s estate, wrote to Jagow on 17 July: ‘I shall remain here, ready to jump; we are all prepared at the General Staff; in the meantime there is nothing to do.’ Nevertheless the main leaders made sure that they were in contact with Berlin. Bethmann in fact had a special telegraph line run through to Hohenfinow.68 The German government also kept a close eye on what was happening in Vienna. Arthur Zimmermann, the tough Deputy Foreign Secretary who felt the time was right for Austria-Hungary to take its revenge on Serbia, remained at his post in Berlin and repeatedly urged Vienna to speed up its slow pace. He had a pretty good idea of what terms Austria-Hungary intended to present to Serbia by 13 July although the German government claimed then and later that it knew nothing about the contents of any ultimatum.69
In Serbia, where the news of the assassination had initially been received with, according to the British chargé d’affaires, ‘a sensation rather of stupefaction than of regret’, the more rabid of the nationalist press hastened to justify the murders. Pašić, who was in the middle of a difficult election campaign, apparently said on hearing the news, ‘It is very bad. It will mean war.’ He ordered all hotels and cafés to close by 10 p.m. as a sign of mourning and sent his condolences to Vienna. In spite of pressure from Austria-Hungary, he refused, however, to hold an investigation and gave a defiant interview to a German newspaper denying that his government had anything to do with the assassination.70
Apprehension about Austria-Hungary’s intentions nevertheless mounted in Serbia and on 10 July was further fuelled by a curious incident in Belgrade. Hartwig, the highly influential Russian ambassador who had done much over the years to fan Serbian ambitions, called in the evening on his counterpart from Austria-Hungary, Baron Wladimir Giesl von Gieslingen. The Russian, who was grossly overweight, was puffing from his exertion. He refused an offer of coffee but pulled out his favourite Russian cigarettes. He wanted to clear up, he said, the unfortunate rumour that he had held a bridge party the night of the assassination and refused to fly the legation’s flags at half-mast. Giesl said he considered the matter settled. Hartwig then turned to the main purpose of his visit. ‘I ask you’, he said, ‘in the name of our earnest friendship to answer as fully as you can: what will Austria-Hungary do with Serbia and what has been decided in Vienna?’ Giesl followed his government’s line: ‘I can definitely assure you that the sovereignty of Serbia will not be infringed and that with the good will of the Serbian government, this crisis can find a solution that will please both parties.’ Hartwig thanked him profusely and was struggling to his feet when he suddenly collapsed on to the floor and a few moments later died. His family at once blamed Giesl for poisoning him and even wilder rumours went around Belgrade that the Austrians had brought a spec
ial electrified chair from Vienna which could kill without leaving a trace. The matter did little to improve relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, which were already deteriorating. More seriously still, Hartwig’s death removed the one man who might have prevailed on the Serbian government to accept even the most outrageous of the demands in the ultimatum.71
Although he was by now very worried about what was likely to come, Pašić sent a message on 18 July to all Serbian embassies to say that Serbia would resist any demands from Austria-Hungary which infringed on its sovereignty.72
His worries would have become still more acute if he had been aware of a secret meeting that took place in Vienna the following day. Arriving in unmarked cars at Berchtold’s house, Austria-Hungary’s most powerful men took the decision they knew could lead to a general European war. Berchtold distributed a copy of the ultimatum which he and his officials in the Foreign Ministry had drawn up. Later that year when most of Europe was at war, Berchtold’s wife apparently told a friend ‘poor Leopold could not sleep on the day when he wrote his ultimatum to the Serbs, as he was so worried that they might accept it. Several times during the night he got up and altered or added some clause, to reduce the risk.’73 Those present assumed that Serbia would reject the terms and most of the discussion was about Austria-Hungary’s mobilisation and other necessary military measures. Conrad said the sooner action came the better and showed no concern at the prospect of Russia’s intervention. Tisza insisted, as he had always done, that there should be no annexation of Serbian territory. The meeting agreed but Conrad said cynically to Krobatin, the War Minister, as they left, ‘We will see.’74 Tisza wrote shortly afterwards to his niece that he still hoped war could be avoided but he now put his trust in God. His own mood, he told her, was ‘serious but not anxious or restless, because I am like the man on the street corner who could be hit over the head at any moment, but who is always prepared to make the big journey’.75
On 20 July, the day following the meeting, Berchtold sent copies of the ultimatum and a covering note to his embassies throughout Europe. The ambassador in Belgrade was to deliver his copy to the Serbian government on the evening of Thursday 23 July while the rest waited until the morning of 24 July. To the annoyance of the Germans, their ally did not get round to giving them a copy of the ultimatum until 22 July.76 Nevertheless they were prepared to keep their promise of support. On 19 July the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, which was generally seen as representing the views of the government, published a brief notice to the effect that Austria-Hungary was justified in wanting to set its relations with Serbia in order. Serbia, it went on, should give way and the other European powers should stay out so that any conflict between the two antagonists could remain localised. On 21 July Bethmann sent a telegram to his ambassadors in London, Paris, and St Petersburg asking them to make the same points to their host governments. The following day Jules Cambon, the French ambassador in Berlin, asked Jagow for details of what was in the ultimatum. Jagow replied that he had no idea. ‘I was all the more astonished at this’, Cambon reported mordantly to Paris, ‘since Germany is about to take her stand at Austria’s side with particular vigour.’77
Berchtold still needed formal approval from the old emperor and so on the morning of 20 July, accompanied by Hoyos, he travelled out to Ischl. Franz Joseph read the document through and commented that some of the conditions it contained were very harsh. He was right. The ultimatum accused the Serbian government of tolerating criminal activities on its soil and demanded that it take immediate steps to end them, including dismissing any civilian or military officials Austria-Hungary chose to name, closing down nationalist newspapers and reforming the education curriculum to get rid of anything that could be construed as propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary. More, the ultimatum infringed Serbia’s sovereignty. In two clauses, which in the end were to be the sticking point for Serbia, it was ordered to accept the participation of the Dual Monarchy in suppressing subversion within Serbia’s borders and in the investigation and trial of any Serbian conspirators responsible for the assassinations. The Serbian government was to be given forty-eight hours to respond. The emperor nevertheless approved the ultimatum as it stood. Berchtold and Hoyos stayed to lunch and returned to Vienna that evening.78
On 23 July Giesl, Austria-Hungary’s ambassador in Belgrade, made an appointment to visit the Foreign Ministry late that afternoon. Pašić was away campaigning so Giesl was received by Laza Paĉu, the Finance Minister, who was chain-smoking. Giesl started to read out the ultimatum but the Serbian interrupted him after the first sentence, saying he did not have authority to receive such a document in Pašić’s absence. Giesl was adamant; Serbia had until 6 p.m. on 25 July to make its response. He laid the ultimatum on a table and left. There was a deathly silence as the Serbian officials absorbed the contents. Finally, the Minister of the Interior spoke: ‘We have no other choice than to fight it out.’ Paĉu rushed to the Russian chargé d’affaires and begged him for Russia’s support. The regent Prince Alexander said that Austria-Hungary would meet ‘an iron fist’ if it attacked Serbia and the Serbian Defence Minister took preliminary steps to prepare for the country’s defence. For all the defiant rhetoric, however, Serbia was in a poor condition to fight. It was still recovering from the Balkan wars and a large part of its army was in the south holding down the unruly new territories it had acquired. Over the next two days its government desperately sought to escape the doom that hung over Serbia. It had faced Austria-Hungary’s anger before in the Bosnian crisis and in the First and Second Balkan Wars yet it had always managed to survive through a combination of its own concessions and pressure on Austria-Hungary from the Concert of Europe.79
Pašić arrived back in Belgrade at 5 a.m. the next morning, ‘very anxious and dejected’ according to the British chargé d’affaires. Plans were being made for the government to leave the capital and to mine the bridges over the Sava which marked the border with Austria-Hungary. The Russian ambassador reported that funds from the national bank and government files were being shipped out and that the Serbian army had started to mobilise. The Serbian cabinet met for hours on 24 July trying to draft a response to the ultimatum; it ended by accepting all the demands except the two which gave Austria-Hungary the right to interfere in Serbia’s internal affairs. The Serbians tried to buy time by asking Vienna to extend the deadline but Berchtold curtly told their ambassador that he expected a satisfactory reply – or else. Pašić also sent out urgent requests to Europe’s capitals for support. He seems to have hoped that the other great powers, France, Britain, Italy and Russia but possibly even Germany, would come together as they had before in crises in the Balkans to impose a settlement. The responses, if they came at all, were discouraging. In Serbia’s immediate neighbourhood, Greece and Rumania made it clear that they were unlikely to come its aid in a war with Austria-Hungary while Montenegro, true to form, made vague promises which could not be relied upon. Britain, Italy and France advised that Serbia do its best to compromise and in those early days showed little inclination to mediate.
The only power which offered anything stronger was Russia and even there the message it sent was mixed. On 24 July Sazonov told the Serbian ambassador in St Petersburg that he found the ultimatum disgusting and promised Russia’s help, but said that he would have to consult with the tsar and with the French before he could offer anything concrete. If Serbia decided to fight, the Russian Foreign Minister added helpfully, it would be wise to go on the defensive and retreat southwards. On 25 July, as the deadline approached, Sazonov had a more robust message for the ambassador. Russia’s key ministers had now met with the tsar and decided, so it was reported to Belgrade, ‘to go to the limit in defense of Serbia’. While this still did not constitute a firm promise of military support, it may well have encouraged the Serbian government as it prepared its final reply to Austria-Hungary. Belgrade was very hot that day and the city reverberated with the sound of drums beating to call up the conscripts.80<
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Among the Entente nations, whose leaders had not really focussed up to this point on the developing crisis in the Balkans, the reaction to the ultimatum was one of shock and dismay and they scrambled to work out their own positions. Poincaré and his Prime Minister Viviani were by now on board a ship in the Baltic and were having difficulties in communicating with Paris and with their allies. Separately Grey in London and Sazonov in Russia asked Austria-Hungary to extend the deadline. Berchtold refused to budge.
Reactions were different in Germany and Austria-Hungary, where nationalist and military circles greeted the news with enthusiasm. The German military attaché in Vienna reported, ‘Today, a heightened mood dominates the war ministry. Finally a sign of awakening energy in the monarchy even if for now only on paper.’ The main fear was that, yet again, Serbia would wriggle out of its punishment. From Sarajevo on the day the deadline was to expire the military commander wrote to a friend: ‘With what pleasure and bliss would I sacrifice my old bones and my life, if it will successfully humble the assassin-state and put an end to this harbour for murderous children – God grant us only that we stay resolute and that today at 6 p.m. in Belgrade the die rolls in our favour!’81
The Serbian reply which Pašić brought to Giesl shortly before the deadline granted this wish. While its tone was conciliatory, the Serbian government refused to concede on the crucial points of Austria-Hungary’s interference in Serbia’s internal affairs. Saying, ‘we place our hopes on your loyalty and chivalry as an Austrian general’, Pašić shook Giesl’s hand and left. The ambassador, who had already assumed the reply would be unsatisfactory, gave the document a cursory glance. His instructions from Berchtold were clear: if Serbia did not accept all the conditions, he must break off diplomatic relations. In fact he had already prepared the note doing so. While a messenger took it to Pašić, Giesl burned the embassy code books in his garden. He, his wife and his staff, with one small piece of hand luggage each, made their way by car to the railway station through streets jammed with crowds. A large part of the diplomatic corps had come to see them off. Serbian troops guarded the train and as it puffed out one shouted to the departing military attaché: ‘Au revoir à Budapest.’ At the first stop in Austria-Hungary, Giesl was called to the platform to take a phone call from Tisza. ‘Must it really be like this?’ the Hungarian asked. ‘Yes’, replied Giesl. In Ischl far to the north Franz Joseph and Berchtold were anxiously waiting for news. Just after 6 p.m. the War Ministry in Vienna phoned to say that relations with Serbia had been ruptured. The emperor’s first reaction was ‘So after all!’ but after a silence he mused that breaking off relations need not necessarily lead to war. Berchtold also clutched briefly at that straw but he had now set in motion forces which he did not have the strength of character to resist.82
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