Of Ships 'below the line', those with 50-60 guns were classed as fourth rates, those with 32-44 as fifth rates, and those with 20-28 as sixth rates. Fourth and fifth rates with 44 or more guns were two-deckers; the rest mounted all their armament on one deck, needing no gunports cut in their sides. Fifth and sixth rates included a design evolved by the French, and so termed frigates (such as Nelson's Boreas), whose lighter scantlings and finer lines enabled them to outsail other Ships, which improved their chances of avoiding an unequal fight with a ship-of-the-line. Ships 'below the line' were chiefly employed capturing enemy merchant vessels and escorting convoys, but some worked with the battle fleet, as scouts and for repeating signals.
A description of one of these instruments of maritime power, which Ruskin classed as 'take it all in all . . . the most honourable thing that man, as a gregarious animal, has ever produced', would serve little purpose. Far better to visit HMS Victory, restored to her Trafalgar glory in Portsmouth (England) Dockyard, or the USS Constitution, which is likewise preserved in the Charlestown Navy Yard at Boston (Massachussetts), where she was built in 1797. (This 44-gunned frigate compelled the British Guerrière and Java to surrender during the War of 1812, in the worthy tradition established by John Paul Jones and the crew of the Bonhomme Richard in their action with HMS Serapis in 1779.)
Compared with HMS Victory, a 32-gun frigate had a slighter hull as well as a smaller armament. But her sails were common to all six rates: two flying jibs stayed to a jib-boom which in the Victory extended for 110 feet; spritsail and spritsail course spread from spritsail yards on the bowsprit; course, topsail and topgallant sail, each set square from their own yards on the foremast; three similar but larger sails on the mainmast, whose cap or truck was 205 feet above the waterline in HMS Victory; driver, topsail and topgallantsail on the mizenmast. A Ship carrying this canvas was said to be 'under all plain sail'. When running before a fair wind, square studding sails, which gave wings to the fore and main courses and fore and main topsails, were also set from studding sail booms which extended the arms of the main and topsail yards. Contrariwise, in winds of force four and more, sail was progressively shortened, first by reefing, then by clewing up and furling to the yards, until in a full gale a Ship was reduce to topsails alone or, exceptionally, to bare poles. The Victory's rigging required more than 90 tons of hemp ropes, of which the largest, the cables for the four-ton bower anchors, had a circumference of 24 inches, and 1,430 elm and lignum vitae blocks. (4)
'She had just tacked, and was close aboard on our lee quarter, within musket-shot at the farthest, bowling along upon a wind, with the green sea surging along her sides. The press of canvas laid her over, until her copper sheathing was high above the water. Above it rose the jet black bands and chrome yellow streaks of her sides, broken at regular intervals by ports from which cannon grinned, open-mouthed. Clean, well-stowed hammocks filled the nettings, from taffrail to cat-head. Aloft a cloud of white sail swelled to the breeze, bending the masts like willow-wands, straining shrouds and backstays as taut as the strings of a violin, and tearing her bows out of the long swell until ten yards of her keel were clear of the sea, into which she plunged again burying everything up to the hawse holes. We were so near that I could see the faces of the men at their quarters in their clean white frocks and trousers, the officers and the marines clearly distinguishable by their blue or red coats. High overhead, the red cross of St George blew out from the peak, like a sheet of flickering flame, while from the main truck her captain's pendant streamed into the azure heavens like a ray of silver light.' (Abridged from Tom Cringle's Log, by Michael Scott.)
This vivid description is well followed by one of a battle fleet:
'England's oaken walls never looked stronger or grander than they did that evening, as the great ships came towards us. The low sunlight glowing upon the piled up canvas made them look like moving thunder clouds. Signals were rapidly exchanged from one to another until, in a moment, the heavy topsail yards came down to the caps of each mast, while flying jibs and wing after wing of studding sails fell in, and were folded away among the confused tangle of rigging, which in an instant swarmed with men reefing topsails, or stowing jibs; while the great topgallant sails, clewed up, belled out before the wind, ready to be reset over reefed topsails for the night. So, as the fleet went on its way to the westward, did the ships change from clouds of light into picturesque variety of line and form showing dark against the orange glow left by the sun.' (Abridged from A Sea-Painter's Log, by R. C. Leslie.)
Under the best conditions of wind and sea a ship-of-the-line might make seven knots, a frigate two knots more. But in Nelson's time speed depended so much on the prevailing wind and sea that it had little of the tactical importance which it acquired after sail gave way to steam. (5) What mattered was a Ship's ability to sail as close as possible, about 50° to the wind, for this enabled her, or a fleet, to gain the weather gage, i.e. to get to windward of an enemy. Of second importance was the facility with which a Ship could tack (alter course head to wind) or wear (alter course stern to wind) since on this depended the rapidity with which she could bring her broadsides to bear. So it was with these features that eighteenth century warship designers were chiefly concerned. (6)
Of other types of vessel - those armed with fewer than twenty guns, some with none - which were included in the Navies of Nelson's time, the sloop (such as Nelson's Badger) was the most common, some being large enough to be ship-rigged, the rest stepping two masts and brig-rigged. They were employed as 'cruisers', on such tasks as patrol and escort in areas where the risk of meeting larger enemy vessels was slight. A plethora of smaller vessels, some brig- or ketch-rigged, others stepping only a single mast, included shallow draught gun vessels and bomb vessels (usually known as bombs) intended for inshore operations, (7) cutters for mundane tasks like the prevention of smuggling and carrying dispatches, and transports for men and stores.
In 1793 the French Fleet was about two thirds the size of the British, headed by ninety ships-of-the-line; but when Spain (with seventy-six ships-of-the-line), Holland and Denmark were, in turn, allied to France their combined Fleets would have exceeded the numerical strength of the Royal Navy but for the net increase in the latter during the period 1797-1805. This was due to the large number of enemy Ships and Vessels captured and taken into British service as well as to new construction, as against the small numbers lost, more to hazards of the sea than by enemy action. (8) The net reductions in the other Fleets were likewise due chiefly to the numbers captured or destroyed by the British.
But although the British Fleet was not, until after Trafalgar, superior in quantitative terms to the Navies of Napoleon and his allies, mere numbers are seldom all. For one thing, both France and Spain built a larger number of first and second rates, i.e. more powerfully gunned ships. (The Spanish Fleet included a first rate armed with as many as 140 guns, the only four-decker in the world.) For another, French frigates were likewise larger and more heavily armed, often with as many as 44 guns (e.g. the Melpomène which engaged Nelson's Agamemnon on 21 October 1793), when the British favoured 32, 36 and 38. As important however, is the extent to which British ships were inferior in another respect. The French and Spanish were not, as is sometimes stated, better built; on the contrary, the Commerce de Marseille, captured at Toulon in 1793, was found to be so badly built, and of such poor material, that she was unfit to bear her 120 guns, and, after two voyages as a troopship, had to be scrapped. They were, however, of better design.
Gun for gun they were larger, broader in the beam and of deeper draught, which made them steadier gun platforms and placed their lower gunports higher above the waterline, as Admiral Mathews recognized in 1744: 'I have now but two ships of 90 and three of 80 that can make use of the lower tiers of guns if it blow a cap-full of wind.' In a sea that prevented most of his ships-of-the-line using their lower-deck batteries, the French experienced no such handicap, so that in the words of Admiral Knowles, 'one of their ships of
52 guns is near as good as ours of 70'. But the British were slow to recognize and remedy this deficiency. Not, for example, until 1798, when Nelson captured the new French 80-gun Franklin and she was taken into service as HMS Canopus, was it accepted that she was so admirably designed that British dockyards were ordered to build eight more on the same lines. As much is true of the Spanish Fleet; in 1740 three British 70-gun ships experienced the greatest difficulty in capturing a single Spanish vessel of the same armament because she was so much more strongly built. For contrast, the Dutch had to accept the handicap of lighter built ships so that they would have the shallower draught needed to enter the shoal waters off the coast of Holland.
2. Guns and other Weapons
The principal weapon in the navies of Nelson's time was the gun, or cannon, as it had been since the Tudor kings. Of iron - exceptionally of bronze - this was cast solid, then bored smooth; in Britain chiefly at the Government arsenal at Woolwich. The pressure of the propellent on firing required a greater circumference at the breech than at the muzzle. A trunnion on each side allowed for securing in an elm truck carriage which was fitted with four wheels so that the gun could recoil inboard. This was checked by a stout breeching-rope passed through a ring at the rear of the gun, tackles secured to the carriage serving to run the gun out again after reloading, an easy task for the lee battery of a heeling ship, a slow and uphill one for the weather battery.
All guns were muzzle-loading. (The advantages of breech-loading had been recognized as early as the fifteenth century, but attempts to produce satisfactory weapons of this type had been abandoned because no reliable method of closing the breech could be devised.) The maximum range was limited to 2,500 yards - one and a quarter nautical miles - by the inefficiency of the only available propellent, gunpowder, of which the Victory carried 35 tons in her magazine, sited for protection below the water-line. Solid round shot were normally used: a three-decker carried 120 tons of them in her shot locker. Being heavier than fused powder-filled shot, these had a longer range and struck with greater force, causing more damage to an enemy's hull: at 'point blank' range, 400 yards (i.e. the maximum range at which the trajectory of the shot was believed, erroneously, to be a straight line) the heaviest could penetrate three feet of timber from which the splinters were lethal to any man in their path. Powder-filled shot were also believed to be too dangerous to be carried by ships-of-the-line - not without reason; their introduction by the French towards the end of the eighteenth century helped destroy their flagship at the Nile. Other types were sometimes employed: for example, chain shot (two half-balls) against rigging, and canister or grape shot against exposed personnel.
The fleet with which Lord Howard of Effingham drove the Spanish Armada to destruction was handicapped by the difficulty of providing the large variety of shot required for the numerous sizes of gun with which ships were then armed. In the sixteenth century, the cannon royal, cannon serpentine, culverin, basilisk, raker, minion, falcon, robinet, and many more, were replaced by a smaller range of standard sizes, known by the weight of the ball which they fired. By Nelson's time, these were the 6, 9, 12, 18, 24, 32 and 42-pounders; but the last, mounted only in first rates, were found to be too large to be fought effectively, and in ships armed with them, like the Victory when first built, they were replaced by 32-pounders.
Because of the limitation on the size and weight of naval guns - a 32-pounder was 8.5 feet long, had a calibre of 6.5 inches, and weighed 2 tons - which were necessarily worked entirely by hand, a large number had to be mounted, the great majority on the broadside. The requirement to be able to fire at an enemy lying ahead could only be met by mounting guns on the forecastle where the available space restricted their number, and where for stability reasons they could only be small ones. For the latter reason also, the largest guns had to be mounted on the lower deck where, as mentioned above, they could not be fired if 'it blow a cap-full of wind'. The similar requirement, to be able to fire at an enemy lying astern, could likewise only be met by stern-chasers, in the Victory two 32-pounders firing through ports cut in her square stern.
A 32-pounder was manned by a crew of fifteen, including powder monkeys who brought the powder up from the main magazine to one of two hanging magazines, where they measured it into flannel cartridge bags, then carried these to the guns. To load, the run-in gun, held inboard by the train tackle, was first cleaned of the burning embers of the last shot with the sponge. Every tenth round or so it had also to be cleared with the worm. A cartridge was then placed in the muzzle, followed by the shot (at close range two, a practice known as double-shotting), each in turn being driven down to the breech end with the rammer, and a wad inserted to keep both in place. Meantime the gunner rimed the vent (or touch) hole with a vent bit, pierced the cartridge bag through the vent hole with a priming iron, and inserted a goose quill tube filled with fine powder. The gun was then run-out and slewed to the right or left by levering the rear wheels of the carriage across the deck with handspikes, a method so rough and ready, and limited to so small an arc, that a gun's training depended chiefly on the ship's heading, and the effect of her fire on the skill with which she was handled. Finally, the gun was elevated or depressed by handspikes inserted under the breech, the required elevation being kept by the quoin (a large wooden wedge).
The only sight was the dispart, a small raised portion of the muzzle ring which was aligned with a notch on the breech. (9) The range was adjusted by varying the weight of the charge - up to ten pounds with a 32-pounder - and by the point of aim, e.g. the main truck to hit the waterline at 1,200 yards, the main top to hit it at 800. The gunner had to wait until the ship's helm brought his gun on to the target for line, and until her roll brought it on for elevation. He then fired by igniting the powder in the quill, either by pulling on the lanyard attached to the flint lock, (10) or by applying a smouldering slow match held in a linstock.
All this sounds very clumsy and slow, as indeed it was. Nonetheless a good gun's crew could, in favourable conditions, fire three rounds in as little as two minutes. (With such efficiency did the British frigate Shannon compel the US frigate Chesapeake to strike in 1813 in an action that lasted for only twelve minutes.) But otherwise, as when using the weather battery of a heeling ship, or when it was necessary to wear, or 'bout ship, to bring the other broadside to bear, the interval was much longer. Even so, British guns' crews achieved a rate of fire three times faster than the French.
One point needs to be stressed. By comparison with the fused TNT-filled, cylindrical shell of a later age, solid round shot did little damage. It was virtually impossible to sink a ship by holing her below the waterline; the aperture was so small that the carpenter had no great difficulty in plugging it. It was as difficult to destroy an enemy by detonating the magazine. In sharp contrast to the turret-gunned ironclads of a later age, the Ships of Nelson's time were only destroyed in action when, exceptionally, enemy gunfire set them ablaze - always a possibility when slow matches had to be kept burning, and candle lanterns used to light the lower decks. A Ship might then burn down to the waterline, or the blaze might reach the magazine. This was, nonetheless, a rare event. At Trafalgar none were sunk and only one destroyed by gunfire. Normally, a Ship was only so far damaged - for example, by bringing down her masts and yards - that she could no longer be fought. Then - and contrary to the example set by Sir Richard Grenville, who scuttled his 'little Revenge' rather than let her fall into Spanish hands after she had been reduced to a wreck by the gunfire of fifty of their vessels - it was customary for a captain to avoid further bloodshed by hauling down his colours. Not until after the Napoleonic Wars was it realized how much the victor gained from this practice, and surrender made an offence against naval discipline.
Battering a Ship into surrender by gunfire alone could take many hours. For this reason, whilst the French were content to rely on it, the British attempted to close and board, for which small arms were needed. The marines used smooth-bore muskets and hand grenades, wh
ilst the seamen were armed with pistols, pikes and cutlasses for hand-to-hand fighting. As a defence against boarders the French stationed skilled marksmen with rifled muskets in fore-, main-, and mizen-tops, from where they could look down and pick off individuals on an enemy vessel's weather decks. Since Nelson had so little faith in this measure that he would not allow his own marines to be thus employed, there is a tragic irony in his untimely death from a wound inflicted by a French sharpshooter.
Guns of various calibres were supplemented by two special types. In 1774 General Robert Melville conceived, and Charles Gascoigne designed a light, short-barrelled, large bore weapon which could fire a ball as heavy as 68 pounds using a charge of only five-and-a-half pounds. Produced by the still extant Carron Ironworks, near Stirling (Scotland), carronades, which were of less than half the length and weight of a gun firing a ball of the same size, caused such devastating damage at close range - about 500 yards - that the Royal Navy welcomed them as supplementary to their Ships' normal armament. By 1800 most British ships-of-the-line mounted two or four of these 'smashers' on their forecastles. The French Navy, with its preference for long range action, was slow to adopt them. The Spanish and Dutch Navies rejected them.
The other special type was the mortar, likewise short-barrelled and large-bored (12 or 18 inches), but given a sufficient elevation for the high trajectory needed when bombarding a shore target, against which they used time-fused, powder-filled shot. These formed the armament of bomb vessels in which, since size limited their number to two or three, these weapons were mounted on the centre-line on revolving platforms.
One more very different type of weapon remains to be mentioned, the fireship, a vessel carrying a large quantity of tar and other combustible material. These were of use against an anchored enemy fleet, when the wind was favourable. But suitable opportunities arose so seldom that, despite their proven value against the Armada in Calais Roads, and against the French after the battle of Barfleur in 1692, there were only eighteen in the British Fleet in 1793, so that Nelson was unable to use them at the Nile or at Copenhagen.
Nelson the Commander Page 7