Gettysburg

  Some time during the morning in front of my home on West Middle Street... I was in conversation with one of the Confederate soldiers, whose regiment lay along the street in line of battle, when he asked me if I had ever seen General Lee. I replied that I had not. “Well,” he said, “here he comes up the street on horseback.” The general rode quietly by unattended and without any apparent recognition from the Confederate soldiers along the street. He reached Baltimore Street, about a square away at the court house, and turned into it going up to High Street.

  LEE PLANS TO ATTACK MEADE’S LEFT FLANK

  The peacefulness of the summer morning could not hide the fear of what the Union soldiers knew would come. Lee, having won the first day of battle, would certainly order an attack.

  Map by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com.

  At the close of the first day, Lee met with Longstreet, who advised his commander not to attack the Union defenses. He told his commanding general, “If we could have chosen a point to meet our plans of operation, I do not think we could have found a better one than that upon which they are now concentrating. All we have to do is to throw our army around by their left, and we shall interpose between the Federal army and Washington . . . the Federals will be sure to attack us. When they attack, we shall beat them . . . and the probabilities are that the fruits of our success will be great.”

  Lee disagreed: “No, the enemy is there, and I am going to attack him there.”

  Longstreet knew that the Union position was strong and that any attack the following day could only succeed at a very great cost to the South. He pushed Lee to reconsider, but the general answered, “No; they are there in position, and I am going to whip them or they are going to whip me.”

  The night of July 1, Lee conferred with his corps commanders. Could they attack in the morning on the left against Culp’s Hill? Ewell and Hill argued against it. Culp’s Hill would be heavily fortified by morning. Their troops had marched and fought hard all day. Hill’s troops, in particular, had suffered heavy casualties. Nor did the two generals advocate maneuvering away from Gettysburg to fight elsewhere—to order the men away from their hard won victory would be a devastating blow to the morale of Lee’s army. And then there were the wounded to consider. With thousands of wounded men it would be impossible to withdraw and maneuver to a new position in the face of the enemy.

  By morning it was clear to Lee that if he was to fight it would have to be with Longstreet’s First Corps, with his two divisions under Generals John Bell Hood and Lafayette McLaws. Lee planned to attack the Union left flank with a surprise assault up the Emmitsburg Road, supported by a third division under General Richard H. Anderson of Hill’s corps to attack the Union center along Cemetery Ridge. Ewell’s corps would make a diversionary assault against Culp’s Hill to prevent those defenders from reinforcing the Union left. If the element of surprise could be achieved by Longstreet’s corps, it could be as decisive a victory as Lee had won at Chancel-lorsville.

  That morning, Longstreet still hoped to convince Lee to make a flanking movement and avoid a costly attack against the Union lines. Yet Lee would have none of it. A flanking movement would expose his army to attack. The Confederates had won the first day of the battle. If he attacked now he still had a chance to destroy part of the Army of the Potomac before all of its seven infantry corps could assemble. Longstreet was ordered to advance without waiting for Major General George Pickett’s division, which was still marching toward Gettysburg.

  General Hood arrived just after dawn that morning with his division’s advance brigades. He saw Lee “with coat buttoned to the throat, saber-belt buckled round the waist, and field glasses pending at his side—walking up and down in the shade of the large trees near us, halting now and then to observe the enemy. He seemed full of hope, yet, at time, buried in deep thought. Colonel Freemantle, of England, was ensconced in the forks of a tree not far off, with glass in constant use, examining the lofty position of the Federal Army.”

  Decision at Dawn—July 2, 1863. General Robert E. Lee surveys the Union position from a tree line along Seminary Ridge. While in quiet thought as to his next move, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Marshall, Major John W. Fairfax, and Lieutenant General A. P. Hill await his decision. Illustrated by Don Troiani.

  Longstreet sat next to Hood against a tree and remarked, “The General is a little nervous this morning; he wishes me to attack; I do not wish to do so without Pickett. I never like to go into battle with one boot off.”

  Just after midday the troops began marching south toward their starting line across the Em-mitsburg Road. The Confederates maneuvered behind Seminary Ridge to screen their movements from Union observers. It would take them several hours to reach their destination and deploy for battle. Longstreet would send the three divisions forward en echelon one after the other, like waves crashing along a beach, in an all-out attack to break the Union line.

  GENERAL SICKLES MOVES THE THIRD CORPS

  Just as the Confederates began moving into their attack positions, Meade’s defensive plan began to unravel. A report arrived at Meade’s headquarters that Sickles’s Third Corps had not deployed to their positions along Cemetery Ridge as ordered, as Sickles was apparently confused. His troops had been ordered to defend the southern third of Cemetery Ridge, linking in with Hancock’s Fifth Corps to the right and anchoring the left on Little Round Top.

  Sickles arrived at Meade’s headquarters to complain that the position he was ordered to defend was poor ground for his men. Did he have the authority to adjust his lines to find ground better suited for artillery? Meade replied that he could, within the limits of his instructions. Sickles returned to his corps and hatched a plan that would surprise everyone, North and South, by the time he was done. At 2:00 PM, without informing Meade, Sickles ordered the Third Corps to advance 1,500 yards and to occupy a small ridgeline that ran along the Emmitsburg Road. His new extended line ran through a farmer’s land, forever known afterward as the Peach Orchard and the Wheatfield.

  Major General Daniel Sickles. Photo credit: Library of Congress.

  Lieutenant Frank Haskell witnessed the advance of the Third Corps: “It was magnificent to see those ten or twelve thousand men—they were good men—with their batteries, and some squadrons of cavalry upon the left flank, all in battle order, in several lines, with flags streaming, sweep steadily down the slope, across the valley, and up the next ascent, toward their destined position! From our position we could see it all. In advance, Sickles pushed forward his heavy line of skirmishers, who drove back those of the enemy, across the Emmetsburg road [sic], and thus cleared the way for the main body. The Third Corps now became the absorbing object of interest of all eyes.”

  By moving the 10,00 (soldiers in his corps so far in advance of the main Union line, Sickles broke with the units to his right and formed a salient, or advance, position. The ground he chose, running through a peach orchard and wheat field, was open to attack on either flank. Meade rode out to confront Sickles, who then offered to pull his corps back into the line. Meade responded, “I wish to God you could, but the enemy won’t let you.” Within moments, the Confederate artillery opened fire on the exposed Third Corps, pinning it in place.

  Major General John Bell Hood.

  Photo credit: The Photographic History

  of The Civil War in Ten Volumes.

  LONGSTREET ORDERS THE ADVANCE ON THE UNION LEFT

  The Third Corps’ advance into the peach orchard also came as a surprise to the Confederates. As they arrayed for battle across the Emmitsburg Road around 3:00 PM, Longstreet discovered the Union lines had changed. Lee’s plan had been to launch a flank attack against the Union’s left. But Longstreet’s two divisions now faced a heavily defended line of infantry and guns directly in their path. Worse still, the terrain over which this assault would be made was blocked by wood-and-stone fences, a meandering stream called Plum Run, and a valley of huge boulders and broken stone that locals called the Devil’s Den. It would be impo
ssible to keep the units together moving through such terrain under heavy enemy fire.

  Hood knew what would happen if he sent his division forward under those conditions: “I knew that if the feat was accomplished, it must be at a most fearful sacrifice of as brave and gallant soldiers as ever engaged in battle.”

  “I was introduced to General Hood this morning; he is a tall, thin, wiry-looking man, with a grave face and a light-colored beard, thirty-three years old, and is accounted one of the best and most promising officers in the army... His troops are accused of being a wild set, and difficult to manage; and it is the great object of the chiefs to check their innate plundering propensities by every means in their power.”

  —Colonel Arthur James Lyon Fremantle

  Therefore, Hood sent his Texan scouts ahead to find a better line of attack. They quickly reported that east of Big Round Top there were no Union defenders at all. Even more tantalizing, the Federal army’s wagon trains were sighted along the Taneytown Road. If Hood was allowed to shift his division to the right he could flank the Union army and attack from behind. He sent Longstreet repeated messages for permission to move his men to the east, but each time Longstreet replied, “General Lee’s orders are to attack up the Emmitsburg road.”

  It was 4:30 pm and time was running short. Hood recalled the moment: “After this urgent protest against entering the battle at Gettysburg, according to instructions—which in protest is the first and only one I ever made during my entire military career—I ordered my line to advance and make the assault.” Just as the order to advance was being given, Longstreet rode up to Hood, who made a last attempt to gain permission to move his men to the east. Long-street made it clear, “We must obey the orders of General Lee.” Hood turned in his saddle and led his men into action: “Fix bayonets, my brave Texans! Forward and take those heights!” Twenty minutes later he was hit by a shell fragment to the left arm and carried from the field.

  HOOD ATTACKS THE DEVIL’S DEN

  When Meade learned that Sickles had advanced his corps into the Peach Orchard in advance of the Union line, he made two critical decisions: He ordered his only infantry reserve, Sykes’s Fifth Corps, to advance into line in support of Sickles on the left; and he also ordered Gouverneur Warren up to Little Round Top to inspect its defenses after Sickles’s unauthorized advance of his corps.

  Just as the Fifth Corps began to arrive on the field Meade’s army came under attack. Hood’s division was advancing on Sickles’s exposed Third Corps in the valley below Cemetery Ridge. As the armies met in battle, the ground at Devil’s Den, the Wheatfield, and Peach Orchard soaked up the blood of Americans flowing into the soil. Lieutenant Haskell witnessed the assault from atop Cemetery Ridge:

  First we hear more artillery firing upon Sickles’ left—the enemy seems to be opening again, and as we watch the Rebel batteries seem to be advancing there... The position of the Third Corps becomes at once one of great peril...

  All was astir now on our crest. Generals and their Staffs were galloping hither and thither—the men were all in their places, and you might have heard the rattle of ten thousand ramrods as they drove home and “thugged” upon the little globes and cones of lead.

  Now came the dreadful battle picture ... upon the front and right flank of Sickles came sweeping the infantry of Longstreet and Hill... the battle began; for amid the heavier smoke and larger tongues of flame of the batteries, now began to appear the countless flashes, and the long fiery sheets of the muskets, and the rattle of the volleys, mingled with the thunder of the guns. We see the long gray lines come sweeping down upon Sickles’ front, and mix with the battle smoke; now the same colors emerge from the bushes and orchards upon his right, and envelope his flank in the confusion of the conflict.

  Major General George Sykes. Photo credit: Matthew Brady, Library of Congress.

  O, the din and the roar, and these thirty thousand Rebel wolf cries! What a hell is there down that valley!

  Tillie Pierce and the Weikerts were busy baking bread to hand out to the thousands of Union soldiers passing by their farm that afternoon. The farmstead was dangerously close to the Little Round Top and they all heard the opening of the cannonade against the Union lines. Tillie recalled:

  Toward the middle of the afternoon heavy cannonading began on the two Round Tops just back of the house. This was so terrible and severe that it was with great difficulty we could hear ourselves speak. It began very unexpectedly; so much so, that we were all terror-stricken, and hardly knew what to do.

  Some of the soldiers suggested that we had better go to a farm house about one-half a mile across the fields to the east; and acting on their advice we ran thither as fast as we could.

  Daniel Skelly was near his father’s home in Gettysburg, talking to a Confederate soldier, when artillery fire erupted from the vicinity of the Round Tops. He recalled years later the confusion and terror for those civilians trapped in town:

  About 4 o’clock an interruption was caused in our conversation by a terrible cannonading off to the southwest of town and we separated, he joining his regiment in the street and I going to my father’s house near the Fahnestock store. Our town being in the hands of the Confederates and cut off from all communications with the outside world, we knew nothing about our army and were completely in the dark as to how it was located and how much of it had arrived on the field.

  A Confederate sharpshooter killed at the Devil’s Den. Photo credit: Timothy H. O’Sullivan, Library of Congress.

  The Confederates maintained a clam-like silence on all matters concerning the battle, hence we did not know the significance of this tremendous cannonading until after the battle was over .. . But for the present it sent everyone to the cellars as a matter of protection.

  The field glasses General Warren used at Little Round Top. Photo credit: West Point Military Museum.

  Major General Gouverneur Warren

  THE LITTLE ROUND TOP

  Gouverneur Warren arrived on Little Round Top and discovered, to his horror, that Sickles had left the hill completely undefended. The only Union troops on Little Round Top were a squad of flag men of the Signal Corps. And less than a mile away he could see Hood’s brigade advancing straight toward this spot. Warren immediately sent a message to Meade as staff officers raced in every direction seeking reinforcements to defend the heights. Warren knew that if the rebels were to seize control of Little Round Top, their artillery would be able to fire down on Cemetery Ridge and the battle would be lost for the Union.

  Brigadier General Strong Vincent

  Fifth Corps commander Sykes responded to Warren’s call and ordered his First Division to occupy Little Round Top. His messenger was intercepted by Brigadier General Strong Vincent, commander of the Third Brigade, and hearing of the impending attack, Strong knew there was no time to lose. He took it upon himself to lead his own brigade up to Little Round Top to prevent its capture. He successfully deployed his four regiments only ten minutes before the Confederates arrived.

  Map Little Round Top July 2 1863. Map by HalJespersen, www.cwmaps.com.

  On the far left of Vincent’s line was the 20th Maine Regiment under the command of Colonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, a college-professor-turned-volunteer-soldier. Under his command were 385 soldiers—veterans of the battle at Fredericksburg seven months earlier—who were all determined to make a stand. Chamberlain remembered the fateful hour:

  Reaching the southern face of Little Round Top, I found Vincent there, with intense poise and look. He said with a voice of awe... “I place you here! This is the left of the Union line. You understand. You are to hold this ground at all costs!” I did understand—full well; but had more to learn about costs... This was the last word I heard from him.

  The other regiments of the brigade were forming on our right; the Eighty-third Pennsylvania, the 54th New York, and the 16th Michigan ... The enemy had already turned the Third Corps left, the Devil’s Den was a smoking crater, the Plum Run gorge was a whirling m
aelstrom; one force was charging our advanced batteries near the Wheat-field; the flanking force was pressing past the base of the Round Tops; all rolling towards us in tumultuous waves.

  In a minute more came the roll of musketry. It struck the exposed right center of our brigade.

  Colonel William Calvin Oates, 15th Alabama

  Colonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain. Photo credit: Matthew Brady, Library of Congress.

  Promptly answered, repulsed, and renewed again and again, it soon reached us, still extending. Two brigades of Hood’s Division had attacked—Texas and Alabama. The 4th Alabama reached our right, the 47th Alabama joined and crowded in ... Soon seven companies of this regiment were in our front. We had all we could stand.

  Little Round Top—July 2, 1863. On a hot July 2, 1863, the men of the 5th Texas advanced up the rocky slope to the climax of their ill-fated assault on Little Round Top. Illustrated by Don Troiani.

  To the right of the 47th Alabama was the 15th Alabama under Colonel William C. Oates. When the initial Federal volley halted the Confederate advance, Oates moved his regiment to the right, seeking to flank the Federal position. In doing so they came face-to-face with Chamberlain’s 20th Maine. Oates recalled, “I ordered my regiment to drive the Federals from the ledge of rocks, gain the enemy’s rear, and drive him from the hill. My men obeyed and advanced about half way to the enemy’s position, but the fire was so destructive that my line wavered like a man trying to walk against a strong wind, and then slowly, doggedly, gave back a little.”