No one, including Howe, had anticipated this turn of events, and even those members of the House who harbored serious doubts about his management of His Majesty’s troops now called for an end to the deliberations, which had become a freewheeling critique of the British government. But Howe insisted on continuing the proceedings, arguing that nothing less than his reputation was at stake, and he did not yet feel fully vindicated. Fox, who was having a field day at the expense of Germain’s reputation, heartily concurred that, by all means, the debate should continue, for Sir William had become the agent for the emergence of truth in the House of Commons after years of obfuscation and denial.
Germain had said nothing up to this point, but he now felt obliged to respond to those criticizing his conduct of the war. He was at pains to express his abiding respect for Howe and his deep disapproval of the way Sir William’s reputation had been bandied about by “runners and whisperers, and coffee house politicians.” But he was also resolute in his conviction that he had provided the Howe brothers with overwhelming military superiority. He had no doubts or second thoughts about this: “The force sent out from this country was fully competent to the attainment of its objective, by the total reduction of the rebellion and the consequent recovery of the colonies.” Germain did not say it outright, but the clear implication of his remarks was that for whatever reason, the Howes had failed to accomplish their mission.15
He was especially distressed to hear Howe and other British officers misrepresent the level of popular support for the rebellion as “almost unanimous.” His own sources, mostly loyalists-in-exile, assured him that only between one-fourth and one-third of the colonists were committed rebels; the rest were either loyalists or neutrals. To document his case, Germain presented evidence that there were “more Americans regimented in our service than were to be found under the rebel commander in chief.” He also cited the recruitment problems afflicting the Continental Army, “which wanted 60,000 but had never been able to muster more than 20,000 in one army.”16
Howe requested the opportunity to contest Germain’s figures but was blocked when the House voted to end the proceedings on June 29. It is clear in retrospect that Germain’s estimate of loyalist sentiment was vastly inflated. We now know that approximately 20 percent of the American populace was loyalist, but the claim of Howe’s supporters that almost the entire American population embraced the rebellion was also an exaggeration.
From Howe’s point of view, the results of the inquiry were equivocal. On the one hand, his critics had been answered, and no one had suggested that he be stripped of his knighthood or receive any official reprimand. On the other hand, his conduct had become a political prize in a larger argument about the wisdom and winnability of the war. And his defenders had rallied behind him on the grounds that he had been given an impossible mission that no display of military competence could have overcome. For long-standing opponents of the war in Parliament, he was a victim. For supporters of an imperial agenda toward the American colonies, he was the convenient one-word answer to the awkward question: How could we possibly have lost the war?
WHAT WE MIGHT CALL the Howe interpretation of the British defeat never received official status. For that matter, the British government never saw fit to conduct an official inquiry into the reasons for the rather monumental debacle, preferring instead to draw a curtain of silence around the entire episode, treating it like a wound that would heal itself over time.
One exception to this policy of enforced amnesia was Henry Clinton, who saw fit to begin writing his own memoirs soon after returning from America in 1782. Clinton had inherited command of the British Army from Howe in 1778, so his primary motive was to justify his own decisions during the latter stages of the war, arguing that once the French entered the conflict, he faced insuperable obstacles and that the surrender of Cornwallis’s army at Yorktown was not his fault. But in the early pages of his memoir, Clinton went back to the New York campaign and, after bowing to Howe’s status as commander in chief, proceeded to tell a story that insinuated that Howe had missed a golden opportunity to win the war at its very inception.17
Clinton described three occasions when Howe had rejected his advice. Claiming that he was motivated “by no other principle than to contribute my utmost toward the speedy extinction of the rebellion,” he had initially proposed an attack on the northern tip of Manhattan, which would have sealed the Continental Army on the New York archipelago without hope of escape. He had also argued for pursuing the Continentals at Brooklyn Heights, when they had still been reeling from the defeat on Gowanus Heights. And he had recommended an assault at King’s Bridge rather than Kip’s Bay, which would have trapped the Continental Army on Manhattan. In each instance, Howe had rejected his advice, and although Clinton went out of his way to defend Howe’s authority as commander in chief, he nevertheless created the distinct impression that the Continental Army could have been destroyed several times over in the New York campaign, and if that had happened, the war might very well have ended then and there.18
Clinton’s memoirs probably reflected the critical appraisal of Howe’s decisions within certain segments of the officer corps of the British Army, but they had no impact on the ongoing if surreptitious debate about who to blame for the British defeat, because Clinton died before completing them, and they were not published until the middle of the twentieth century. It does seem clear, however, that Clinton went to his maker believing that the American war for independence might very well have ended differently if he, rather than Howe, had been in command in New York.
Clinton’s account was obviously self-serving, but it was reinforced by the first comprehensive history of the war from the British side, published in two volumes in 1794. Its author was Charles Stedman, a British staff officer throughout the war who wanted to strike an upbeat note despite the British defeat. “Although the issue of the war was unfortunate,” Stedman explained, “neither martial ardor was wanting, among our countrymen, nor patriotic zeal.” Stedman’s main argument was that the British Army had done its duty, fought bravely, and should not suffer criticisms or blame for the eventual outcome of the war.19
The only exception was William Howe. Stedman’s account of the New York campaign followed the same line as Clinton’s critique, describing Howe’s decisions on Long Island and Manhattan as “inexplicable.” Since Stedman had served on Richard Howe’s staff, he was surely aware that the military decisions of both Howe brothers were considerably influenced by their hopes for a peaceful reconciliation, but he did not mention that fact, preferring instead to characterize Howe’s decisions as “tactical blunders.” He was especially critical of Howe’s failure to pursue Washington’s depleted troops as they retreated through New Jersey in November 1776, citing that as the final and most opportune occasion to destroy the Continental Army.20
According to Stedman’s account, once that vulnerable moment passed, the likelihood of a British victory diminished for three reasons: first, Washington adopted a more defensive strategy, what was called “a war of posts,” that made decisive engagement highly improbable; second, the Continental Army got better with experience, especially in the development of a more professional officer corps; and third, the Franco-American treaty of 1778 threw money and men into the American side. Taken together, these developments made the war unwinnable for the British, despite heroic efforts by the army and navy.21
Stedman’s version of history provided an attractive story line for both the British government and the British Army, as it contradicted the claim of opposition leaders like Burke, Fox, and Pitt that the war had been, from the start, a misguided venture. But it had to be won quickly, with one smashing blow, which was precisely what Germain had proposed and orchestrated in the summer of 1776. When that effort failed, the British military had performed heroically in support of what had become a lost cause.
The beauty of this interpretation was that it sidestepped the question of whether the policies of the British ministry
that had caused the war were sensible, which they clearly were not, and it located the source of the British failure in one discreet moment, the summer of 1776, and one British officer, William Howe, who missed the chance to destroy the Continental Army. This meant that fundamental questions about the core assumptions underlying Britain’s imperial agenda need not be raised. It assumed that if the Howes had acted more aggressively, the Continental Army would have ceased to exist, which is almost certainly correct, but also that the destruction of the Continental Army would have ended the war. While we can never know for sure, the balance of historical scholarship over the last forty years has made that a highly problematic assumption.22
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The chronological terrain over which this story moves is highly contested ground, littered with the dead bodies of historians who have preceded me. My effort to offer a fresh interpretation that brings together the political and military sides of the story has been aided by several distinguished historians who have scouted the same terrain and laid down their markers on the trail.
Five historians read all or most of the book in manuscript form and saved me from multiple blunders, but they are in no sense responsible for those that remain: Edmund S. Morgan, the acknowledged dean of early American historians, my mentor and friend for nearly fifty years; Gordon Wood, the reigning scholarly expert on the American Revolution and early republic; Pauline Maier, the leading scholar on the drafting of the Declaration of Independence, whose marginal comments (e.g., “Joe, you can’t say that!”) could not be ignored; Edward Lengel, editor in chief of the Washington Papers and ranking expert on Washington as commander in chief; and Robert Dalzell, that wise man of Williams College, who moves across great patches of the American past with such easy erudition.
Stephen Smith, editor of the Washington Examiner, is my long-standing critical eye in that crucial junction where substance meets style, a genius at noticing where a phrase, sentence, or paragraph does not quite say what it wants to say.
Dan Frank of Random House came aboard as editor of this book and ushered it through the corridors of power with an impressive combination of wisdom and grace. His able assistant, Jill Verrillo, never put my calls on hold.
Paul Staiti, my colleague at Mount Holyoke and one of the leading historians of the art and architecture of revolutionary America, helped with the selection of illustrations. Jeffrey Ward did a masterful job of making the maps both depict the battles and fit the text.
Ike Williams, my agent, handled all the contractual niceties, made sure the people at Knopf were paying attention, and routinely brought me back from the eighteenth century with gossip about the Celtics, Patriots, and Red Sox.
Linda Chesky Fernandes, my assistant, did not do any of the research, but she did just about everything else, to include deciphering my scrawl, compensating for my technological incompetence, balancing my mood swings, and kissing me on the cheek.
My wife, Ellen Wilkins Ellis, did not edit my writing, but she did edit my psyche. I have a strong suspicion that this made a huge difference.
Most of the writing was done in longhand in my study at Amherst, surrounded by a feisty Jack Russell terrier, an earnest Labradoodle, and a very brave cat.
This book is dedicated to Ashbel Green, my editor at Knopf for twenty years and six books. Ash passed away just as I was finishing the manuscript. We always argued over adverbs, semicolons, and subtitles, conversations that invariably drifted to the pathetic state of his beloved Cleveland Indians. Ash was a legend in his own time at Knopf, the essence of editorial integrity, a dour Presbyterian with an aristocratic sense of honor. We shall not see his likes again.
JOSEPH J. ELLIS
Amherst, Massachusetts
NOTES
KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS
Titles
AA Peter Force, ed., American Archives, 9 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1833–53)
AFC Lyman H. Butterfield et al., eds., Adams Family Correspondence, 9 vols. to date (Cambridge, Mass., 1963–)
AP Robert J. Taylor et al., eds., The Papers of John Adams, 11 vols. to date (Cambridge, Mass., 1983–)
DA Lyman H. Butterfield et al., eds., The Diary and Autobiography of John Adams, 4 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1961)
FP William B. Willcox et al., eds., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 28 vols. to date (New Haven, 1959–)
GP Richard K. Showman et al., eds., The Papers of General Nathanael Greene, 7 vols. to date (Chapel Hill, 1976–)
JCC Worthington C. Ford, ed., The Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, 34 vols. (Washington, D.C. 1904–37)
JP Julian Boyd et al., eds., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 28 vols. to date (Princeton, 1950–)
LA Library of America, The American Revolution: Writings from the War of Independence (New York, 2001), selections and notes by John Rhodehamel
LDC Paul H. Smith et al., eds., Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774–1789, 26 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1976–2000)
PH T. C. Hammond, ed., The Parliamentary History of England, 30 vols. (London, 1806–20)
PWR W. W. Abbott, Dorothy Twohig, and Philander Chase, eds., The Papers of George Washington: Revolutionary War Series, 12 vols. to date (Charlottesville, 1985–)
WMQ William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series
Persons
AA Abigail Adams
BF Benjamin Franklin
GW George Washington
JA John Adams
NG Nathanael Greene
TJ Thomas Jefferson
PREFACE
1. See my American Creation: Triumphs and Tragedies at the Founding of the Republic (New York, 2007), 38–44, for the argument that delaying the full promise of republican principles was essential in achieving independence.
2. See Don Higginbotham, War and Society in Revolutionary America: The Wider Dimensions of the Conflict (Columbia, 1988), 153–73, for the impact of the Vietnam War on our understanding of the dilemma facing the British Army in 1776.
1. PRUDENCE DICTATES
1. This synthesis of the early months of the war is taken from multiple accounts, especially from the following: Ron Chernow, Washington: A Life (New York, 2010), 181–205; Joseph J. Ellis, His Excellency: George Washington (New York, 2004), 73–92; David McCullough, 1776 (New York, 2005), 3–92; and Michael Stephenson, Patriot Battles: How the War of Independence Was Fought (New York, 2007), 211–29. The quotation is from AA to JA, 16 March 1776, AFC 1:358.
2. Jack N. Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretive History of the Continental Congress (New York, 1979), 91–92.
3. Merrill D. Peterson, ed., The Portable Jefferson (New York, 1977), 235–36.
4. GW to John Augustine Washington, 31 May 1776, PWR 4:412–13.
5. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford, 1765), 1:49. For a synthesis of the constitutional argument, see Gordon S. Wood, “The Problem of Sovereignty,” WMQ 68 (October 2011), 572–77.
6. PH 18:149–59, for Pitt’s speech on 20 January 1775.
7. Ibid., 18:233, 263, 304, 335.
8. The best analysis of the moderate mentality in the middle colonies is Jack Rakove, Revolutionaries: A New History of the Invention of America (Boston and New York, 2010), 71–111.
9. On Dickinson’s life and thoughts, see Jane Calvert, Quaker Constitutionalism and the Political Thought of John Dickinson (New York, 2009).
10. John Dickinson, Notes for a Speech in Congress, 23–25 May 1775, LDC 1:378.
11. The clearest expression of the Dickinsonian solution came in an address that Dickinson coauthored with Thomas Jefferson in the summer of 1775 titled Declaration of the Causes and Necessity for Taking Up Arms, available in JP 1:213–19.
12. See, for example, Robert G. Parkinson, “War and the Imperative of Union,” WMQ 68 (October 2011), 631–34.
13. JA to James Warren, 24 July 1775, AP 3:89–93.
14. For Adams’s latter-day recollections on who deserved credit for producing the break with the B
ritish Empire, see Joseph J. Ellis, Passionate Sage: The Character and Legacy of John Adams (New York, 1993), 53–83.
15. McCullough, 1776, 3–12; JA to John Trumbull, 13 February 1776, AP 4:22. For George III’s crucial role in forcing a military response to the American protests, see Alexander Jackson O’Shaughnessy, “ ‘If Others Will Not Be Active, I Must Drive’: George III and the American Revolution,” Early American Studies 3 (Spring 2004), 1–46.
16. Eric Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America (New York, 1976). See also Harvey J. Kaye, Thomas Paine and the Promise of America (New York, 2005).
17. The authoritative biography of Paine is John Keane, Tom Paine: A Political Life (Boston, 1995). The Adams quotation is from JA to William Tudor, 12 April 1776, AP 4:118.
18. JA to AA, 19 March 1776, AFC 1:363.
19. For the “raging bulls” reference, see DA 1:33. I am drawing here and below on my own work on Adams, chiefly Passionate Sage: The Character and Legacy of John Adams (New York, 1993) and First Family: Abigail and John Adams (New York, 2010). There are also four distinguished biographies: Page Smith, John Adams, 2 vols. (New York, 1962); Peter Shaw, The Character of John Adams: A Life (Chapel Hill, 1976); John Ferling, John Adams: A Life (Knoxville, 1995); and David McCullough, John Adams (New York, 2001).
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