The majority of the Luftwaffe units in southern France came under the direction of Fliegerdivision 2. This had its headquarters at Montfrin, about 17.5km east-north-east of Nîmes, and like all Luftwaffe forces in France was subordinated to Luftflotte 3. Most of the formations had an anti-shipping role. Jagdfliegerführer Süd controlled the fighter defence of southern France. Its headquarters had been located at Chateau La Nerthe (near Chateauneuf-du-Pape, about 10km south-east of Orange and 11km north of Avignon) since 1 May 1944.
Nahaufklärungsgruppe 13 (NAG 13) with Fw 190 and Bf 109 fighters had been deployed in France since 1942, initially at Avignon and then on the Atlantic Coast. In April 1944 it was redeployed to the Riviera and the 2. Staffel was tasked with maritime reconnaissance between the Spanish border and Corsica. By mid-1944 NAG 13 was equipped with a mixed unit of Fw 190 A-3/U4s and Bf 109 G-8s, their armament reduced to two machine-guns and a single cannon respectively. By 1944 the anti-shipping Stab and III/Kampfgeschwader 100 were based on the airfields of Blagnac and Francazal, both near Toulouse.
Luftflotte 3 issued orders on 8 August that in the event of an Allied landing in southern France Stab and III/KG 100 would be placed under Fliegerdivision 2’s control. In the event of a landing, Luftflotte 3/Fliegerdivision 2 planned to bomb the invasion fleet at first light with all available aircraft. However, the Allies had mastery of the air and all Blaskowitz could do was stand back and watch. On 25 June he may have witnessed 250 USAAF B-17 bombers attack the airfields near Toulouse with impunity.
The Kriegsmarine Admiral Commanding, France was dissolved to form part of the Marinegruppenkommando West command in Paris at the end of 1942 (the former had been based in Wilhelmshaven). This controlled all naval units in France and Belgium, and a final change took place with the addition of the Mediterranean sector in September 1943. This new command was integrated into two others to form Admiral Commanding, Southern French Coast; previously, since June 1943, only the western part (Languedoc region) had been under German control under the Admiral, Southern French Coast.
The Impact of Overlord
Around 0330–0400 on 6 June 1944 staff at Army Group G’s headquarters at Rouffiac, outside Toulouse, were roused with the news that the Allies were invading Normandy and all coastal defence sectors were put on high alert. It was not long before the fighting in Normandy started drawing in the German forces stationed in occupied France. However, Hitler ordered that the majority of the 15th Army’s formations north of the Seine remain in place as he feared a secondary invasion was about to be launched at the Pas de Calais. This meant that the burden of providing reinforcements in Normandy soon fell on Blaskowitz’s already inadequate Army Group G.
At the same time French resistance groups stepped up their efforts and many of Blaskowitz’s units were urgently ordered north. Just one day after D-Day the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division received orders to depart from its marshalling area and head for Normandy. Under Operation Mimose the division redeployed from the area of General Chevallerie’s 1st Army south of the Loire to the sector of General Dollmann’s 7th Army facing Lieutenant-General Omar N. Bradley’s US 1st Army at the base of the Cotentin peninsula. General Heinz Lammerding, commanding the 2nd SS Panzer Division, was also ordered to Normandy, but his forces were bogged down fighting the Maquis or local resistance. Large areas were under the control of the Resistance fighters, leaving local German forces surrounded and cut off. Lammerding was soon signalling his corps commander General Krüger in Toulouse with his catalogue of woes; he was understandably annoyed that his panzer division was wasting valuable time fighting the Maquis, which was a role that should be handled by the local security divisions.
Chaos reigned. On top of the Maquis problem, only 40 per cent of Lammerding’s panzers were serviceable and 70 per cent of his half-tracks and heavy trucks. Repeated calls for spare parts fell on deaf ears, which meant broken-down vehicles could not be moved and then required infantry to guard them. Six depots had to be set up for the stragglers and breakdowns, and efforts to commandeer local civilian vehicles produced few results. This was to be typical of the experiences of many of the units moved northwards to join the fighting.
In response to his dwindling forces, Blaskowitz asked the German High Command to provide him with troops to replace the 2nd SS Panzer Division once it had left Corrèze and the Dordogne. A Kampfgruppe from the 11th Panzer Division, comprising two infantry battalions, an artillery battalion and an anti-tank company, was duly assembled with instructions to contact the 2nd SS Division in Tulle. These forces arrived on 11 June and the panzers of the 2nd SS duly rolled north to Limoges. The following day Blaskowitz took personal control of the anti-partisan operations and requested that the German High Command formally declare the south-west a battle zone. The French Resistance now found itself at war with Army Group G.
General Krüger’s 58th Reserve Panzer Corps staff were then ordered to Le Mans to help direct the fight against the Americans. Krüger was an experienced tank commander, having been in command of the 1st Panzer Division from mid-July 1941 to the beginning of January 1944. His corps dropped its reserve designation on 6 July and departed on the 27th, joining Panzergruppe West two days later, though it was subsequently subordinated to the 7th Army and Panzergruppe Eberbach.
By the second week of July German divisions from the Calais area were also finally arriving in Normandy. In order to keep them in the Caen sector and to avoid them gaining any sort of initiative that could dislodge the British and Canadians, the British 2nd Army attacked north of the city. On 7 July some 460 bombers flattened Caen, dropping 2,560 tons of bombs in an area 3.6km long by 1.3km deep. Then, at 0420 hours on the following day, three Allied divisions thrust hard into northern Caen, but the Germans held on grimly to the south and southeast of the city. From 10 to 15 July the British launched a series of attacks both west and east of Caen in order to keep the Germans tied down.
In the meantime, the Americans were battling to reach their start line ready for the break-out, Operation Cobra. On 17 July they had taken St Lo and reached the St Lo-Periers road, having advanced only 11 km in seventeen days at the cost of 40,000 casualties. The break-out could not be launched before 20 July because of the necessary build-up of supplies.
In order to gain Lieutenant-General Bradley more time, Montgomery decided to punch east of Caen. Operation Goodwood, launched on 18 July, made good initial progress until it ran into the in-depth defensive positions of infantry and armour. The punch soon became bogged down and degenerated into a slogging match, which succeeded in slowly grinding down the German panzer units. Two days later the offensive was called off, having gained the Americans time and prevented the transfer of any panzer units further west, at a cost of 4,000 British casualties and 500 tanks.
Three US infantry divisions of General Collins’ VII Corps were assigned the task of spearheading the break-out, and they drew up on the Lessay-Periers-St Lo line. Initially scheduled for 24 July, the breakout had to be called off due to the bad weather. The following day the Americans withdrew 1.1km, while 2,500 bombers dropped over 4,000 tons of bombs on the German defences, in an area 6.5km long by 2.4km wide, just south of the St Lo-Periers highway. At 0230 hours the assault troops moved off again, only to be slowed up by determined German resistance.
On 27 July the 9th Panzer Division was put on notice to be ready to march north from the Avignon area. By 1 August it and six infantry divisions of varying quality were heading for the Normandy battlefield, now that it was clear to the Germans that Operation Cobra represented a very real threat. As they rumbled north, the panzers were set upon by the Maquis and by Allied ground-attack aircraft. Nonetheless, despite numerous air attacks, the division seemed to escape largely unscathed as it moved towards Normandy. In fact, this division never got to fight as a whole, owing to the belated destruction of the bridges over the Loire and the Allied landings in southern France. Elements of the support services never reached the division in Normandy and were not reunited with the pare
nt formation until it had retreated to Metz following the defeat. However, it was clear that Army Group G was haemorrhaging units it could ill afford to lose.
While Lieutenant-General Patton waited for the US 3rd Army to become operational, he took over VIII Corps and drove southwards. By 29 July he had taken Coutances and Avranches. On 1 August the 3rd Army became combat operational, and, ignoring Bradley’s orders to secure a wide corridor, Patton squeezed his seven divisions along the coast in 22 hours. He was now ready to sweep south-eastwards towards the Seine in order to trap the German armed forces in north-western France. The following day the Allies could see that their plans were almost complete. The Canadians drove through the south of Caen and headed for Falaise, while the Americans sped eastwards; the trap was rapidly forming. Montgomery ordered the Americans to make a long hook, in order to trap as many Germans as possible and prevent any crossing the Seine. The developing pocket could not be properly closed, because the Germans dug in north of Falaise and the Canadian advance was slower than expected due to determined German resistance.
The US 3rd Army and the British I Corps slowly headed for each other. The Falaise Pocket was steadily squeezed from all sides as the Germans fought valiantly to keep open the ‘neck’. The pocket was only 32 km wide by 16 km deep by 17 August, but it contained about 100,000 Germans, remnants of fifteen divisions with elements from twelve others. The panzer divisions managed to hold the Americans and Canadians at bay, but the vast columns of retreating Germans were decimated by Allied fighter-bombers and artillery, the roads becoming choked with burnt-out vehicles, which only added to the chaos.
Blaskowitz’s lost divisions
In early June Blaskowitz’s army group totalled less than twenty divisions, including all those formations under its two panzer corps and in its area of responsibility. The rot had set in way before D-Day, though, with Blaskowitz losing units to Army Group B. For example, the 326th Infantry Division, raised in November 1942, was initially stationed in southern France, but in February 1944 was reassigned to the 15th Army. In total, Army Group G saw elements of thirteen of its divisions redeployed before Operation Dragoon commenced.
Critically, as the deadline for Dragoon loomed, Blaskowitz had very few panzers remaining in southern France. Most of his armoured formations – the 2nd SS, 9th and 17th SS Panzergrenadier Divisions, along with elements of the 271st, 272nd, 276th, 338th and 708th Infantry Divisions, as well as the 341st Assault Gun Brigade and all his anti-tank companies – had been drawn north to the bitter fighting in Normandy. Only the 11th Panzer Division remained in the south, refitting north-east of Bordeaux after being mauled on the Eastern Front.
On 1 August Blaskowitz’s operations officer Colonel Horst Wilutzky was briefed by Field Marshal Günther von Kluge at the Commander-in-Chief, West’s headquarters. Wilutzky and General von Gyldenfeldt, Blaskowitz’s Chief of Staff, decided that ‘there was no military justification for holding German units in southern France any longer’. Blaskowitz and von Kluge agreed, but Hitler insisted that Army Group G stay put for another two weeks, by which time it was almost too late.
Three days later Blaskowitz put his cards on the table about Army Group G’s weaknesses and informed von Kluge that because of the ‘release of men and weapons its defensive power has become considerably smaller and … a successful defence of the coast is no longer guaranteed’. On 8 August Kluge and his Chief of Staff, General Hans Speidel, decided it was imperative that Blaskowitz be saved. ‘It’s time to abandon the south of France,’ Kluge argued. ‘Why leave the 1st Army on the Atlantic now we know the outcome of the war is at stake. Let us put Army Group G on the line Seine-Loire-Gien-Evers-Gex. Let’s abandon Provence.’ But Hitler would have none of it; his policy was never to give ground.
On Sunday, 13 August General Weise received a rare bit of good news, though it did little to alleviate his concern over Luftwaffe reports of up to 100 troopships in the area off Corsica. Major-General Walter Botsch, his Chief of Staff, announced that Army Group G headquarters had just phoned to say that Hitler had authorised the release of the 11th Panzer Division. The only problem was how to get it to the Riviera in time and unscathed by Allied air attacks. Most of the bridges over the Rhône were already down.
As well as losing elements of his fighting strength, Blaskowitz also found that his command staff structure had been severely weakened by the requirement to send a steady stream of reinforcements north. He had to give up one army headquarters, two corps headquarters and one panzer corps headquarters. Chevallerie’s 1st Army was left with a single corps and Wiese’s 19th Army was left with the 11th Panzer Division and some second-rate static infantry divisions. By mid-August Blaskowitz’s army group consisted of just seven divisions (six infantry and one panzer), and four of his infantry units were not really combat ready. At the end of the month Wiese’s 19th Army, the formation that would have to resist Dragoon, could only field four infantry divisions and one panzer division. Two weeks later, even with reinforcements, the 19th Army mustered just five infantry divisions, elements of two panzer divisions and a panzergrenadier division. This lack of manpower ultimately showed what little priority Hitler gave to defending the south of France.
The panzer units sent north suffered around 35,000–40,000 killed, wounded or missing during the Normandy campaign and none was reassigned to Blaskowitz. The 2nd SS Panzer Division fought doggedly during the battles in Normandy. Although it was not surrounded at Falaise, it lost upwards of 7,000 men, though many of these went missing and were subsequently able to rejoin the division. The farfrom-complete 9th Panzer Division suffered about 3,500 casualties and the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division some 8,000. The infantry divisions sent north endured comparable losses. The 271st Division moved to the Montpellier area in southern France after being created in the Netherlands in late 1943. It had 11,617 men on its roster by mid1944 but they were not fully trained nor properly equipped. At the end of June the division was shipped to Normandy via Lyons and Rouen. In the subsequent fighting it lost up to 4,000 casualties, but also avoided being trapped in the Falaise Pocket. The 272nd Infantry Division fared slightly better. Having fought on the Eastern Front, it was shipped west in late 1943 and in April the following year joined the 19th Army. By mid-June it could field 12,725 men and in early July was shipped by rail from the Mediterranean to Normandy via the Le Mans area. Likewise avoiding the Falaise Pocket, it suffered about 1,000–2,000 casualties.
Formed in south-western France in 1943, the 276th Infantry Division totalled 13,362 men in early June, but again they were not combat ready. This division too was freighted to the Le Mans area, but in contrast was caught at Falaise, losing up to 6,000 men. The 277th Infantry Division, which came into being in Croatia in late 1943, arrived in southern France early in the New Year; it had a reported strength of 10,649 men by mid-June and was committed to the fighting in Normandy the following month. About half of the troops were caught at Falaise, sustaining losses of 4,000–5,000. The 708th Infantry Division was sent to defend the Bay of Biscay after being raised in May 1941. By early August 1944 it had a strength of 8,123 men; deployed to Normandy, it was caught up in the American Army’s break-out and lost some 4,000 troops, most of whom were taken prisoner.
All Blaskowitz got in return was the 198th and 716th Infantry Divisions. The former was being organised and the latter was recuperating from Normandy. Raised in December 1939 from reserve troops in the Protektorat Böhmen-Mähren (Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia), the 198th Infantry Division first saw action in Denmark and France, then served on the Eastern Front for three years until being transferred to France in June 1944. It consisted of three infantry regiments (Grenadier-Regiments 305, 308 and 326, containing two battalions each), an artillery regiment (Artillerie-Regiment 235), plus Fusilier-Bataillon 235 and Feldersatz-Bataillon 198, and a panzerjäger battalion. Generalmajor Alfred Kuhnert assumed command on 5 August 1944 and the division reportedly mustered just 3,800 infantrymen at the start of the campaign.
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p; Blaskowitz faced a similar problem in terms of Luftwaffe support; by 1944 southern France had been drained of Luftwaffe units that were desperately needed elsewhere. At most he was backed by 200 aircraft in the region, but they would have to fend off 4,056 Allied planes. Likewise, the German Navy had just 75 small craft to confront 2,250 Allied vessels.
Chapter Six
Dragoon Hots Up
At the end of 1943 an Anvil planning group known as Force 163, headed by Brigadier-General Garrison H. Davidson, the US 7th Army Engineer, was established at the école Normal at Bouzareah just outside Algiers. Force 163 included a French component under Colonel Jean L. Petit. Toulon became their focus, along with the coast to the east of the port. The Alps Maritimes presented a challenge, though the valley of the Argens river formed a path through the mountains between the Massif de Maures and the Provence Alps. Allied headquarters sent a message to the US 7th Army’s headquarters at Palermo, which showed that Eisenhower was determined to go through with Anvil. The telegram stated: ‘An estimate is required as a matter of some urgency as to the accommodations which you would require for your planning staffs should you be asked to undertake the planning of an operation of similar size to Husky …’.
Following the Sicilian campaign, the US 7th Army had shrunk from six divisions to little more than the headquarters staff. They were now instructed that landings were to take place in the south of France in conjunction with Overlord, with early objectives of Lyons and Vichy, the location of the French government, and that the assault would be conducted by American and Free French Forces.
Patch takes over
The planning gathered pace in early January 1944 when Lieutenant-General Mark W. Clark replaced General Patton as the 7th Army’s commander. While Overlord continued to slip behind schedule, owing to the enormous shipping requirements, and the fighting dragged on in Italy following Anzio, it became apparent that Clark could not cope with controlling the US 5th Army as well as directing Anvil. On 2 March Lieutenant-General Alexander M. Patch, a veteran of the Pacific campaign and Guadalcanal, took over the 7th Army.
Operation Dragoon Page 11