If the sectarian clashes in Iraq provided an opening for ISI to regroup, the violence in Syria gave Baghdadi a pretext to expand. The border between Syria and Iraq had long been porous. Long-standing smuggling routes that were used to move fighters and supplies from Syria during the war in Iraq were now reversed to bring fighters and supplies back into Syria.
In support of this effort, Baghdadi sent a number of operatives into Syria with the task of setting up a new jihadist organization to operate there. Among them was Abu Mohammed al Jawlani, a Syrian-born member of al Qaeda in Iraq who had spent time in Camp Bucca with Baghdadi and had more recently served as the regional leader of ISI in Mosul.35 Jawlani quickly established himself as leader of a group that came to be known as Jabhat al Nusra, which at first positioned itself as an independent entity with no ties to either al Qaeda Central or the ISI.36
Within a year, al Nusra was a recognized leader among insurgent groups in Syria.37 Moderate opposition groups gradually found themselves struggling to acquire funding and weapons, while al Nusra and other Islamist groups were funded externally by donations and internally by the seizure of equipment and resources on the battlefield. Islamist groups soon had the upper hand over the secular opposition.38
For the first six months after the announcement of its creation, Nusra engaged in the same kinds of brutal attacks that had been the favorites of AQI and ISI: it bombed urban areas, killing civilians by the dozen, and targeted alleged government sympathizers and cooperators.39 These tactics alienated both the civilian population and the local Syrian revolutionaries.
In late summer 2012, al Nusra changed its approach. It started to cooperate with Syrian nationalist groups such as the Free Syrian Army, but it also reached out to forge relationships with groups with widely divergent ideologies, as long as they shared Nusra’s commitment to ousting the Assad regime.40
The new strategy worked. By late 2012, Aaron Zelin described Nusra as “one of the opposition’s best fighting forces, and locals viewed its members as fair arbiters when dealing with corruption and social services.”41
At the same time, Baghdadi and ISI remained busy in Iraq. The two groups were expanding in different countries, but via markedly different strategies. Each was also growing in influence, setting the stage for the rivalry and confrontation that would ultimately end in al Qaeda Central’s disavowal of ISIS.
On April 9, 2013, Baghdadi announced a merger of ISI and al Nusra, calling the new group the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). In effect Baghdadi was unilaterally establishing himself as the leader of both organizations (ISI and al Nusra), now merged into one. The announcement surprised both Zawahiri and Jawlani. Neither of them had signed off on the decision, and neither was enthusiastic about it. Al Nusra immediately announced its allegiance to Zawahiri and al Qaeda Central, placing al Nusra and ISIS in direct confrontation.42
Zawahiri scrambled to solve the crisis between the groups and to assert AQC’s dominance over its affiliates. In a private letter that leaked to the press, he declared the merger null and void, ruling that Baghdadi would continue to run operations in Iraq and Jawlani would continue in Syria.43
But Baghdadi rejected the ruling in a defiant and very public audio statement released through jihadi media outlets: “When it comes to the letter of Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri—may God protect him—we have many legal and methodological reservations,” he said. Baghdadi said he would continue to pursue a united Islamic state crossing the border between the two countries.44
Unsurprisingly, relations between ISIS, al Nusra, and al Qaeda Central continued to deteriorate as ISIS peeled off fighters from al Nusra and sent reinforcements from Iraq. Unlike al Nusra, which had forged alliances and won respect from other rebel factions, ISIS took an unyielding approach, refusing to share power in areas where it operated. Starting in mid-2013, these tensions evolved into violence, and by early 2014, a war within a war was being fought across northern Syria, with ISIS battling a number of other rebel factions, including al Nusra.45
On February 2, 2014, al Qaeda formally disavowed ISIS in a written statement: “ISIS is not a branch of the [al Qaeda] group, we have no organizational relationship with it, and [al Qaeda] is not responsible for its actions.”46
Ever since the days of Zarqawi and bin Laden, al Qaeda’s Iraqi affiliate had been troublesome, but the differences over tactics and ideology had been fought out in private and papered over in public. Baghdadi’s outright defiance and his escalating violence against other jihadists in Syria had forced Zawahiri’s hand.
If the emir of al Qaeda expected contrition, he was gravely mistaken. ISIS responded swiftly and with characteristic violence. On February 23, 2014, a suicide bomber assassinated Abu Khaled al Suri, a longtime al Qaeda member believed to be Zawahiri’s personal emissary in Syria, who had been charged with seeking a resolution to the dispute. There was little doubt who was responsible.47
In May, ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad al Adnani issued a scathing speech addressing Zawahiri, sarcastically titled, “Sorry, Emir of al Qaeda,” in which he mockingly apologized for ISIS’s failure to follow Zawahiri’s weak example.
“Sorry for this frank report,” he said, but members of al Nusra had been heard saying that the 63-year-old Zawahiri was “senile.”
“Sorry, emir of al Qaeda,” he said, but Zawahiri had made a “laughingstock” of al Qaeda. “Sorry,” he said, but ISIS had questions about why it should continue to follow al Qaeda’s losing example. “We await your wise reply.”48
ISIS had successes to back up its swagger. In a sustained campaign throughout 2014, it seized and consolidated control of Raqqa, Syria, and most of the surrounding area, driving out both the regime and other rebels. It established Raqqa as its capital in Syria, populating it with hordes of foreign fighters and implementing ISIS’s harsh interpretation of Shariah law.49 It also won significant control of Syrian city Deir ez Zour from al Nusra and other opposition forces, shifting considerable resources from al Nusra to ISIS and providing a crucial political and logistical way station near the border with Iraq.50
A CALIPHATE CLAIMED
ISIS continued to make steady gains in both Iraq and Syria, controlling ever larger swaths of territory and aggressively governing in the areas where it could consolidate control. It captured Fallujah in January and kept on going.51
To accomplish this feat, ISIS crafted a series of complex alliances with Sunni Arab tribes in Iraq, even with tribes that did not necessarily share ISIS’s extreme ideology. Many Sunni Arabs were fed up with the Maliki regime, which had continued to describe the Sunni Arab uprising against his sectarian policies as terrorism. Members of the Awakening Movement (who had sided with the U.S. military in the 2007 surge) felt particularly betrayed. Maliki had agreed to offer them a role in the military and police forces, but had not fulfilled his promise. Some angry members joined ISIS, while others chose to sit out the battle.52
Tensions were exacerbated by the regime’s reliance on Shia militias to fight ISIS in Anbar province and other areas. Many of these groups were Iranian proxies, owing more allegiance to Tehran than Baghdad, and some had returned to Iraq after fighting ISIS in Syria.53 For Iran, the growing chaos presented an opportunity to solidify its influence over Iraq and its prime minister.
More than eighty Sunni tribes reportedly fought alongside ISIS, and at times it was difficult to know who was in control of any specific area.54 But ISIS was content to take the credit, and no one else stepped up to speak for the insurgency. The coalition seemed legitimately shaky on its face, and reports of the internal tensions led many to speculate that it could tear itself apart at any moment. But somehow, it kept hanging on.55
In early June 2014, ISIS captured Mosul, a city of 1.5 million people and the site of Iraq’s largest dam.56 Because it was so dangerous for journalists and other noncombatants to operate in areas afflicted with insurgency, the victory seemed to come out of nowhere. Certainly Western governments seemed to be caught flat-footed.
&
nbsp; In addition to the unusually thick fog of war, however, there was a truly unexpected development. The United States had invested $25 billion in training and equipping the Iraqi army over the course of eight years.57 That investment evaporated in the blink of an eye as Iraqi soldiers turned tail and fled in the face of ISIS’s assault on Mosul.
According to the Los Angeles Times, which interviewed some of the soldiers who had served in Mosul, the senior commanders fled when they saw ISIS’s now-infamous black flags moving into the city. Corruption and sectarian tensions with the army itself may also have played a role; the regime had systematically driven Sunnis out of senior military positions, often in favor of less experienced Shi’a officers who had important friends.58 In a Reuters investigative report, Iraqi military commanders also detailed the breakdown and said the government had declined offers of help from powerful Kurdish fighting forces.59
Reports circulated on social media that ISIS had looted the banks in Mosul, which were later denied by the Iraqi government, but the denials—sourced to Iraqi bankers and officials whose own businesses rested on their ability to secure funds and the country’s economy—were not any more credible than the original reports.60
It hardly mattered. No one disputed that ISIS had become the richest terrorist organization in the world, and was getting richer by the day. Most agreed its cash reserves ran into hundreds of millions of dollars, perhaps even a billion, and by November, some estimated it was generating $1 million to $3 million per day, although a large number of unknowns plagued such questions.61 Unlike al Qaeda and many other terrorist groups, which rely on external sources of funding, including “charitable” donations, much of ISIS’s revenue was generated internally, from taxes on local populations, looting, the sale of antiquities, and oil smuggling, with the latter seen as one of the most important sources.62 ISIS tapped into “long-standing and deeply rooted” black markets and smuggling routes, making traditional instruments for fighting terrorist financing far less useful.63 It also raised millions by ransoming Western hostages.64 While the United States and the United Kingdom have government policies that forbid paying ransoms, many other countries, including some in Europe, have paid to have hostages released.65
Tikrit, the hometown of Saddam Hussein, fell soon after Mosul. At many stops along its march, ISIS captured U.S.-supplied military equipment from fleeing Iraqi soldiers, which they trumpeted with photos on social media.66
On June 29, ISIS made a move in the world of ideas that was as bold as its military blitzkrieg on the ground. In an audio recording from its chief spokesman, Abu Muhammad al Adnani, ISIS declared that it was reconstituting the caliphate, a historical Islamic empire with vast resonance for Muslims around the world, but especially for Salafi jihadists, whose efforts were all nominally in the service of that goal.
ISIS emir Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was announced as the new “Caliph Ibrahim,” and he showed his face in public for the first time a few days later, delivering a sermon at a Mosul mosque. The new caliphate would simply be known as the Islamic State, the announcement said, dropping “Iraq and Syria” from the organization’s name to reflect its global claim of dominion.67 Neverthless, many outside observers (and even some supporters) continued to use the acronym ISIS to refer to the group.
The announcement (discussed at more length in Chapter 5) demanded the loyalty of all Muslims around the world (a laughable concept) and specifically from other jihadist groups. It was met by wild enthusiasm from ISIS supporters and a mix of hostility and incredulity from almost everyone else.
The jihadists continued pushing south into territory controlled by ethnic Kurds under Iraq’s federal system. The Kurdish militia, known as the peshmerga, was no match for the heavily armed ISIS fighters. While they put up a better fight than the Iraqi forces, they too were forced to retreat.68
The advance created a humanitarian crisis. The area that ISIS had captured had a large population of religious and ethnic minorities, including an estimated 35,000 to 50,000 Yazidis, who practice an ancient, complex religion mixing beliefs from a number of sources. ISIS views them as devil worshippers and constructed a religious justification to kill all the men and enslave the women and children (see Chapter 9).69 The Yazidis were now defenseless against ISIS’s genocidal intentions, and ISIS hunted and then surrounded them as they fled to Iraq’s Mount Sinjar with no food and no water. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France made emergency airdrops of food and water to the Yazidi refugees to forestall what the UN referred to as a threatened genocide.70
But still, the siege continued. On August 7, President Obama announced that the United States would take military action against ISIS to help secure the safety of the refugees and American personnel in Iraq.
“I know that many of you are rightly concerned about any American military action in Iraq, even limited strikes like these,” the president said in an address. “I understand that. I ran for this office in part to end our war in Iraq and welcome our troops home, and that’s what we’ve done. As commander in chief, I will not allow the United States to be dragged into fighting another war in Iraq.”
U.S. air strikes, combined with air support from the Iraqis and ground support from the peshmerga and the Kurdish militant groups Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its Syrian offshoot, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), allowed tens of thousands of Yazidis to escape the newly rechristened Islamic State, but the continuing expansion of the insurgency put thousands more in harm’s way, leading to mass killing of the men and the institutionalized slavery of women and children, including horrific ongoing sexual abuse of captured women.71
Faced with U.S. air strikes, the group began implementing a strategy from The Management of Savagery called “paying the price,” in which it responded to any hint of aggression with extreme violence. In September, ISIS began to release videos online featuring the execution by beheading of Western hostages, which continued into the winter (see Chapter 5).
Nevertheless, ISIS continued its aggressive military campaign, even as the world slowly awakened to its depredations. Everywhere they controlled territory, ISIS instituted a harsh theocratic rule, which included at least skeletal governance, with a functioning economy and civil institutions. The initial wave of strikes in Iraq slowed ISIS’s advance but did not significantly reduce its dominion.72
The effects of U.S. engagement in Iraq rippled over into Syria. On September 9, an explosion massacred the senior leadership of Ahrar al Sham, perhaps the most important jihadist group fighting the Assad regime after the al Qaeda–linked Jabhat al Nusra, and several other leaders within the Islamic Front, a broad coalition of Islamist rebel groups. The bombing targeted a meeting in which top leaders of the group were hashing out an internal dispute over its recent alliance with a coalition that included all of the remaining U.S.-supported rebels, and the question of whether to pursue a more inclusive strategy in Syria. It was unclear whether the attack originated with the regime or with ISIS, but the dramatic assault threw the alliance of Syrian fighters not aligned with ISIS into deep turmoil.73
Despite his promise of a limited role for the United States in Iraq, President Obama faced mounting pressure to do something about the group. In an address on September 10, he announced the goal of U.S. intervention had expanded.
“Our objective is clear: We will degrade, and ultimately destroy, [ISIS] through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy,” he said, despite the fact that ISIS was far more significant as an insurgency than as a terrorist group. As part of this objective, the president said, an international coalition would strike ISIS in Syria as well as in Iraq.74
Soon afterward, the participants in the coalition grew to include the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands and—significantly—Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, Sunni-majority countries with the most to lose from ISIS’s imperial ambitions and efforts to recruit in the region.75 The United Arab Emirates sent a
female fighter pilot to lead one of its missions.
This significant expansion of the rules of engagement with ISIS became much more complicated with the first coalition strikes in Syria. During the first raid on September 22, 2014, American planes bombed not just ISIS targets but Jabhat al Nusra, which had broken away from ISIS months earlier and established itself as a leading force in the rebel alliance to overthrow Bashar al Assad.
According to the administration, and backed up to some extent by open-source reports out of the Syrian civil war, the strikes were aimed at the “Khorasan Group,” a virtually unheard-of cell of senior al Qaeda Central operatives that had been dispatched to Syria to plot attacks against the West.76
Information about the Khorasan Group was sketchy and conflicted, but the impact of the strikes was clear. Jabhat al Nusra responded by taking the offensive to the few remaining “moderate” rebels supported by the United States, dealing them a devastating blow. The future of the secular rebellion in Syria teetered on the brink of annihilation as ISIS continued to fight.77 Charles Lister of the Brookings Institution, one of the most insightful followers of jihadist movements in Syria, wrote in early December:
. . . while surprising to outsiders, the Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra is still to this day perceived by many as an invaluable actor in the fight against Damascus and as such, the strikes on its positions are seen by many as evidence of U.S. interests being contrary to the revolution [against Assad].78
However, the situation is fluid, Lister noted in an email weeks later, and al Nusra’s expanding conflict with other rebel factions may be starting to undermine its position. In late December, as this book was going to press, the largest Islamist factions in Syria announced a new coalition that excluded both al Nusra and ISIS.79
As of this writing, the advance of ISIS on the ground had been slowed by coalition air strikes and other action. While it continued to cling to the vast majority of its territory, there were signs that the coalition campaign was having some effect, for instance a protracted battle for the town of Kobane, defended by Kurdish peshmerga. The fate of Kobane was still undecided as this book went to press, but the contrast to ISIS’s swift seizure of Mosul was stark.80 The group faced other setbacks, including repeated strikes by both the coalition and the Assad regime on its strongholds in the Raqqa region (the latter killing large numbers of civilians), but it also showed signs that it was adapting to coalition strikes by hiding operatives.81
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