CHOOSING A CALIPH; SUNNI AND SHI’A COMMUNITIES EMERGE
Because God’s message indicated that Muhammad would be the last prophet, it wasn’t clear who should guide the young community after his death. By general consensus, his family and followers decided that the community should be led by a caliph. The caliphs were not seen as replacements for Muhammad or as prophets; they were simply leaders selected to rule in the tradition that he had established.2 The first four caliphs, who ruled consecutively from 632–661 and were known as the Rightly Guided Caliphs, continued the work that Muhammad had started by overseeing the compilation of the Quran, by consolidating power, and by undertaking a series of conquests. The death of the third caliph, however, precipitated a serious debate and resulted in a fracturing of the Muslim community. One group, whose members came to be known as Sunni Muslims, believed that the leader could be any male member of the Quraysh tribe chosen by the authorities of the Muslim community; thus the term Sunni is derived from the phrase Ahl al Sunnah wa’l jama’a, which means “people of the tradition and community.”3 Another group, whose members came to be known as Shi’a Muslims, believed that the leader needed to be a direct male descendant of Muhammad; thus the term Shi’a is an abbreviation of Shi‘at ‘Ali, meaning “followers of Ali” (the son-in-law and cousin of Muhammad). Ali was, in fact, chosen to be the fourth caliph (and the last of the Rightly Guided Caliphs), but he was assassinated after just five years and the caliphs that followed him were not direct descendants of Muhammad and did not have the support of the entire Muslim community.
SOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SUNNI ISLAM AND SHI’A ISLAM
Though Sunni and Shi’a Muslims agree on the core tenets of Islam, the two groups have developed unique identities and adopted distinct religious traditions. These differences crystallized not long after the assassination of Ali. Shi’a Muslims objected to the caliphs selected to follow Ali, and questioned the legitimacy of the government. The conflict came to a head when Husayn (Ali’s son, Muhammad’s grandson, and the individual that the Shi’a community recognized as the rightful leader) directly challenged the reigning caliph. In the ensuing battle at Karbala, Husayn and his family were killed by the caliph’s forces. Husayn’s death—his martyrdom—became central to the identity of the Shi’a community.
Over the next thousand years, the Shi’a identity was informed by this early experience with “martyrdom, persecution, and suffering.”4 By contrast, the Sunni identity was influenced by the political, military, and cultural successes of the Sunni caliphate.5 The two groups consequently came to different understandings of what it meant to be Muslim; moreover, their different historical experiences resulted in different religious traditions. While both Sunni and Shi’a Muslims believe that mosques in Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem are holy sites of great importance, Shi’a Muslims also identify Najaf (where Ali is buried) and Karbala (where Husayn was martyred and is buried) as holy sites. As a result, when ISIS (a Sunni group) threatens to invade Najaf and Karbala (Shi’a holy sites) the objective is more than mere military conquest; it is also a symbolic gesture likely intended to stoke sectarian violence.
Another significant difference between today’s Sunni and Shi’a communities lies in their respective approaches to authority. Within the Shi’a community, great emphasis is placed on formalized and institutionalized religious authority. Shi’a clergy are educated at sanctioned seminaries where they study for years and become proficient in subjects such as law, theology, and philosophy. At the end of this period, when a student has completed this course of study in a satisfactory manner, he is permitted to become an official member of the community of religious scholars who protect the legacy of Islam and interpret it to meet the challenges of the modern era.6 By contrast, religious authority in Sunni Islam is less centralized and hierarchical. Sunni Islam, unlike Shi’a Islam, lacks the formal titles that distinguish the rank of one scholar from another. There is also no clear institutional path to religious authority in Sunni Islam. While many Sunni clergy are highly educated in subjects such as law, theology, and philosophy, this education is not a prerequisite for leading a religious community. As a result, within Sunni Islam it is possible for individuals with little formal religious training to become both prominent and influential religious leaders.7
Though the comparison is imperfect for a number of reasons, it can be helpful to think of Shi’a Islam as being analogous to Roman Catholicism, and Sunni Islam as being analogous to Protestantism. Shi’a clergy, like Roman Catholic priests, are educated in a centralized system of seminaries. Additionally, they have formal titles designating rank and creating a clear hierarchy among their leaders. By contrast, both Sunni clergy and their Protestant counterparts are educated in a loose network of institutions. Moreover, neither Sunni Islam nor Protestantism has a formalized system of rank organizing their religious leaders into a unified and recognized hierarchy.
THE CALIPHATE
During the first few centuries of the caliphate (from approximately the seventh to ninth centuries) the Muslim world experienced significant growth and nurtured a civilization that was the most advanced of the era.8 This period saw a staggering proliferation of intellectual work: “Poetry, grammar, Quranic studies, history, biography, law, theology, philosophy, geography, the natural science—all were elaborated in Arabic and in a form that was distinctively Islamic.”9 At the same time, the Muslim world continued to grow geographically and at its peak extended its reach from Spain to India. Ultimately, a number of factors undermined the strength of the caliphate. The sheer size of the empire made administration from a single seat of power difficult, and internal tensions undermined the stability of the government. At the same time, the Shi’a community continued to challenge the authority of the caliphs. By the middle of the ninth century, the caliphate was a much-weakened institution, and those who believed that it was important were forced to justify its continued existence. In doing so, they offered a rich description of the office. The caliph, they argued, should “maintain orthodoxy, execute legal decisions, protect the frontiers of Islam, fight those who refuse to become Muslims when summoned, raise the canonical taxes, and in general, himself to supervise the administration of affairs without delegating too much authority. He must possess certain qualifications, physical, intellectual, and spiritual, as well as the extraneous qualification of belonging to the same tribe as Muhammad, that of Quraysh.”10
Despite these efforts to justify and strengthen the office, the caliphate continued to decline. Following the assassination of the reigning caliph in 1258—during the Mongol invasion of Baghdad—the Muslim world was ruled at a more local level with no overarching government uniting what had once been a vast empire. In the fifteenth century, however, a number of powerful Muslim empires emerged from the local governments that had come to control the region. The most important of these, for our purposes, was the Ottoman Empire which revived the office of caliph and lasted for over four hundred years. It was a major economic and military power that at its height controlled territory on three continents. The Ottoman Empire collapsed in the early twentieth century when its remaining territories were parceled out by the British and French following World War I, and the Turkish government that took its place abolished the office of the caliph.
Although the Muslim community was led by a caliph for much of its history—during the Umayyad dynasty (approximately 650 to 750), the Abbasid dynasty (approximately 750 to 1250), and the Ottoman Empire (approximately 1450 to 1920)—the office of the caliphate changed over time. As a result, contemporary calls for a return to the caliphate are unclear about what exactly a revived caliphate would look like. Nevertheless, the office is a potent symbol of Muslim unity and prosperity that many Muslims today hope to restore.
SOME CORE BELIEFS AND PRACTICES OF ISLAM
Though the modern Muslim world is one of staggering diversity—and includes an estimated 1.6 billion people—most Muslims turn to the same sources of authority (the Quran, the sunnah, and th
e Hadith) and embrace a core set of practices (commonly referred to as the five pillars of Islam).11 Not all Muslims engage with these beliefs and practices in the same way, however. Much as individual Christians understand the Bible and the communion in different ways, individual Muslims come to different understandings of their own scripture and practices. Despite these differences, though, it is possible to identify some central components of the faith:
Quran
The Quran is a full account of the revelations that came to Muhammad. It was collected into a single written volume just one generation after his death, and it contains more than 6,000 verses. It is understood by many Muslims to be a literal transcription of what was relayed to Muhammad in his visions, and consequently the literal word of God.12 It emphasizes the oneness of God, warns that the apocalypse is approaching, and provides broad guidelines for living a moral and upright life.13
Sunnah
The sunnah are the practices, deeds, and words of Muhammad. The Quran does not offer detailed guidance on how Muslims should behave in their daily lives. As a result, many Muslims turn to the sunnah—the example of Muhammad—in order to determine how best to conduct themselves.
Hadith
The sunnah are preserved in the Hadith, a collection of the practices, deeds, and words of Muhammad and his companions. The Hadith were transmitted orally for the first two centuries following Muhammad’s death, but were ultimately collected and standardized. Central to the collection of Hadith is the issue authoritative transmission. In the centuries following Muhammad’s death, stories of what he had done and said proliferated; in order to identify which anecdotes were reputable, scholars attempted to establish the path via which the stories were transmitted. A Hadith that is strong is one that is consistent with other scripture (that is, it doesn’t contradict the Quran, and it makes sense alongside other accepted Hadith) and well-documented (it originated with a companion of Muhammad, it was transmitted via a relatively small number of people, and there are no breaks in the chain of transmission).
The Five Pillars
The five pillars of Islam are often described as the essential practices endorsed and followed by all Muslims.14 They include the profession of faith, daily prayer, almsgiving, fasting during the holy month of Ramadan, and pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in a lifetime. Some have suggested that jihad is an unofficial sixth pillar of Islam, but this position is not widely held.
SALAFISM AND WAHHABISM
While there is considerable diversity in the Muslim world, the majority of violent jihadist organizations like al Qaeda and ISIS are Salafi. Some familiarity with Salafism is, as a result, critical to understanding a group like ISIS.
DEFINING SALAFISM
Salafism is a loosely organized movement within Sunni Islam; there are no clear requirements for being Salafi and there is no consensus over who should be considered Salafi.15 But there are core features to the movement. Salafism is a call for a return to the beliefs, practices, and sincerity of early Islam. In fact, the term “Salafism” is a direct reference to these early years, and refers to the first few generations of Muslims, known as the salaf. Salafis prefer the Islam of these early Muslims and believe that centuries of human interpretation—influenced by preexisting religious traditions, cultural biases, political agendas, and individual self-interests—have corrupted Islam and led to decline across the Muslim world. They reject this interpretation and maintain that the only sources of authority necessary to be a pious Muslim are the Quran and the sunnah (the example of Muhammad and his companions). In rejecting centuries of scholarship and interpretation, Salafis effectively argue that the sources of authority necessary to being a pious Muslim can be understood without the assistance of intellectual elites.16 One can, within this model, be a devout Muslim without understanding the intricacies of complex theological arguments.
Despite the modern nature of this movement, Salafis draw inspiration from the scholarship of famed medieval scholar Taqi al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328). Ibn Taymiyyah lived in a tumultuous time, and wrote as the Muslim community grappled with the invasion of the Mongol Empire, the destruction of Baghdad, and the assassination of the last Abbasid caliph. These events marked the end of a period of great prosperity, intellectual achievement, military success, and cultural development during which the entire region was politically united under the caliphate. Ibn Taymiyyah argued that the end of this era was the result of a corruption of Islam, and he believed that returning to the beliefs and practice of the early Muslim community would lead to a revival of the Muslim world. Like Ibn Taymiyyah, many Salafis today believe that the misfortunes of the Muslim world have been caused by a corruption of Islam, and that a revival of Islam is an essential corrective.
Another layer can now be added to the comparison of Sunni Islam and Protestantism. Specifically, a helpful comparison can be made between Salafism (a movement within Sunni Islam) and Protestant fundamentalism (a movement within Protestantism). Salafis are, in fact, frequently referred to as “Islamic fundamentalists.” Though “fundamentalism” is a term that was originally used to describe an early twentieth century American movement (and we should be careful when applying it to other groups) this label can be useful in helping to foreground a constellation of features shared by distinct religions. As Scott Appleby, a scholar of religion at the University of Notre Dame and co-director of The Fundamentalism Project, has noted, what unites fundamentalists is not a common set of beliefs or religious practices; instead, fundamentalists share an “attitude towards religion itself” in which religion is, among other things, “the best defense against the threatening encroachments of secularism.”17 In other words, both Salafis and Protestant fundamentalists turn to religion in an effort to respond to the destabilizing changes of a rapidly evolving world.
THE ORIGINS OF WAHHABISM
Ibn Taymiyyah wrote centuries before today’s jihadi Salafi movement took shape, but remains relevant in no small part due to the eighteenth century rise of Wahhabism. This movement, a type of conservative Salafism, began with Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahhab (d. 1792). Ibn Abd al Wahhab drew upon the writings of Ibn Taymiyyah and argued for a strict interpretation of Sunni Islam. He believed that Muslims who engaged in practices that he considered idolatrous—practices such as polytheism, venerating the graves of saints, mysticism, and Shi’ism in general—were not Muslims at all. Moreover, he precipitated a series of confrontations by calling on his neighbors to change their practices and embrace his interpretation of Islam. In pursuit of this goal Ibn Abd al Wahhab allied himself with Muhammad bin Saud (d. 1765), the leader of the House of Saud. Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the Wahhabis worked with the Saud family to unite the people living on the Arabian Peninsula under a single religious and political authority. This effort culminated in the creation of the modern state of Saudi Arabia, and the Saudi government continues to have a close relationship with Wahhabi religious authorities even today.
SALAFISM: FROM QUIETISM TO JIHAD
Though early Salafism and Wahhabism are typically thought of as religious movements, neither was ever apolitical. Moreover, a number of important twentieth and twenty-first century events resulted in the movements’ increased involvement with recognizably political issues. These events resulted in what Quintan Wiktorowitz, a former member of the National Security Council and expert on Islamic movements and counterterrorism, has described as three distinct waves of modern Salafism: a quietist faction, a political faction, and a jihadi faction.18
QUIETIST SALAFISM
The quietist faction is, in a sense, the strain of Salafism that has responded the least to the world events of the twentieth century. Individuals in this group understand their central project to be the purification of Islam and do not participate in politics.19 Though there are quietist Salafis across the Muslim world, the center of gravity for this movement is the existing religious establishment in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is somewhat atypical for a country in the Muslim world
, but the very things that make it unique have made it hospitable to the quietists. For most of its existence, the country has been financially independent due to its massive oil reserves, and the ruling family has consequently been insulated from pressures to moderate. Additionally, Saudi Arabia didn’t experience colonialism and so its religious scholars were never forced to grapple with the many questions that arise when two political and cultural systems attempt to occupy the same space.20 In other words, the quietists in Saudi Arabia (the most vocal and powerful of the quietists) have been sheltered. This has allowed the movement to flourish, but it has also laid the groundwork for the rise of the political faction by making the quietists vulnerable to the charge that they are out of touch and incapable of responding to the challenges of the contemporary world.
POLITICAL SALAFISM
The political faction criticizes the quietist faction for its political naiveté and rejects the idea that political activism is un-Islamic. Though this type of Salafism can be found across the Muslim world, the faction was greatly influenced by a subset of the Muslim Brotherhood, a twentieth century Egyptian movement founded by Hasan al Banna (d. 1949). Like Ibn Taymiyyah, al Banna and his contemporaries lived in a tumultuous time. By the end of World War I the Ottoman Empire had collapsed, the office of the caliph had been abolished by the secular Republic of Turkey, and much of the Muslim world was under colonial rule. Al Banna shared the Salafi concern that traditions accumulated over the centuries had corrupted Islam and he worried that the slow Westernization of the Muslim world was having a similar effect. Like his predecessors, he responded to these crises by calling for a return to the religious beliefs, practices, and sincerity of the early Muslim community. Islam, al Banna said, “does not stand helpless before life’s problems nor [before] the steps one must take to improve mankind.”21 It is an all-encompassing way of life and the best mechanism for responding to the crises brought on by modernity. Al Banna went on to emphasize the importance of education, and to highlight the ways in which individuals could be knowledgeable about Islam without relying on intellectual elites.22 At the same time, he offered a justification of militant jihad and articulated a sophisticated political program.23 He founded the Muslim Brotherhood in an effort to pursue this agenda. The group took its principal task to be a full-scale reformation of society with the utopian hope that this would result in a revitalized Muslim world.
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