J. M. Berger is a beloved scholar, and after this experience of working with him, I understand why. I could not have done this without him as coauthor, sometimes editor, sometimes antagonist, sometimes cheerleader. As is perhaps not surprising, I first noticed J.M.’s work on social media, when I started following him to observe his conversations with Omar Hammami, the now deceased member of the terrorist group Al Shabab. J.M. follows terrorists online as obsessively as I would speak to them, were that still possible. Very few people develop an intuition about terrorists. J.M. is one of them, and I feel lucky to have had the chance to work with him.
My colleague Saida Abdi brought J.M. to my attention. Thank you, Saida. And Thomas Hegghammer, you are the reason I met J.M. in the flesh.
I thank all those who were willing to read the manuscript and provide comments, including, especially, Scott Atran, Dean Atkins, Mia Bloom, Brian Fishman, Martha Kaplan, Will McCants, Charles Lister, and Aaron Zelin. I have learned so much from all of you.
John Horgan and Mia Bloom have been great friends to both of us throughout the project.
We had a team of research assistants who were vitally important, Sam Haas, my doctoral student Megan McBride (who also wrote the appendix), Jennie Spector, and Youssef Ben Ismail. I thank especially Abigail Dusseldorp, who often worked with us from early morning until late at night.
Martha Kaplan, you are the best agent in the world, always seeing the best in me, pushing me further than I imagine to be possible.
The Hoover Institution has provided me an intellectual home away from home and a set of excellent colleagues, the Members of the Task Force on National Security and Law. I thank you all for the conversations we’ve had over the years, which have taught me a great deal.
Jennifer Leaning and Jacqueline Bhabha provided me an institutional home at the FXB Center for Health and Human Rights at the Harvard School of Public Health. I cherish you both and am in awe of your good works in the world.
Ron Schouten, associate professor of psychiatry at Mass General Hospital, thank you for teaching me about psychopathy and for being such a good ally and collaborator.
Ted Flinter, an outstanding former student, announced out of the blue that he wanted to fund my research. Hassan Abbas, another remarkable former student, came to see me while I was laboring over the end of time. When the student appreciates the teacher, it means the world.
My own professors—Ash Carter, Matthew Meselson, and Richard Zeckhauser—taught me how to think about national security. You continue to inspire me.
Several anonymous Iraqi citizens were kind enough to spend time with me, both in the United States and abroad. They helped me a great deal in my efforts to make sense of the rise of ISIS.
Finally, I thank my family. I thank especially Chet and Evan. Thank you for making love possible.
This book is written with the victims of ISIS’s terrorism very much in mind and heart. My thoughts and prayers are with the citizens who are bravely fighting ISIS in their midst.
NOTES
INTRODUCTION
1.“Profile: James Foley, US Journalist Beheaded by Islamic State,” BBC World News, August 20, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-28865508.
2.Rukmini Callimachi, “The Horror Before the Beheadings: Isis Hostages Endured Torture and Dashed Hopes, Freed Cellmates Say,” New York Times, October 25, 2014.
3.“Bigley’s Wife Tells of Her Grief,” BBC World News, October 9, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3729158.stm; Joel Roberts, “Report: Japanese Hostage Killed,” CBS News, October 30, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/10/30/iraq/main652421.shtml; Toby Harnden, “South Korean Hostage Beheaded by al-Qaeda,” The Telegraph, June 23, 2004, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/1465300/South-Korean-hostage-beheaded-by-al-Qaeda.html; videos downloaded from al Qaeda in Iraq file servers, 2004 to 2006.
4.David Remnick, “Going The Distance,” New Yorker, January 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/01/27/going-the-distance-2?currentPage=all.
5.Conversation with Haidar Alaloom (Senior Policy Analyst and Strategist at Humanize Global), November 2014.
6.George W. Bush, “Speech at the National Endowent for Democracy,” October 6, 2005, http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/10.06.05.html.
7.Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (2002): 5–21. See also Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 1997.Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2003); F. Gregory Gause, “Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005.
8.David Kirkpatrick, “ISIS’ Harsh Brand on Islam Is Rooted in Austere Saudi Creed,” New York Times, September 24, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/25/world/middleeast/isis-abu-bakr-baghdadi-caliph-wahhabi.html?_r=0.
9.Ed Husain, “Saudis Must Stop Exporting Extremism,” New York Times, August 22, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/23/opinion/isis-atrocities-started-with-saudi-support-for-salafi-hate.html.
10.Section on naming adapted from J. M. Berger, “What’s in a Name?” IntelWire, August 10, 2014, http://news.intelwire.com/2014/08/whats-in-name.html.
11.Patrick Lyons and Mona El-Naggar, “What to Call Iraq Fighters? Experts Vary on S’s and L’s,” New York Times, June 18, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/19/world/middleeast/islamic-state-in-iraq-and-syria-or-islamic-state-in-iraq-and-the-levant.html?_r=0.
12.J. M. Berger, “Gambling on the Caliphate,” IntelWire, June 29, 2014, http://news.intelwire.com/2014/06/gambling-on-caliphate.html.
13.Liz Peek, “Obama’s Use of ISIL, Not ISIS, Tells Another Story,” Fox News, August 24, 2014.
14.Matt Apuzzo, Twitter post.
15.Adam Taylor, “France is ditching the ‘Islamic State’ name,” The Washington Post, September 17, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/09/17/france-is-ditching-the-islamic-state-name-and-replacing-it-with-a-label-the-group-hates/.
16.Portions of this discussion of terminology were adapted from J. M. Berger, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2011).
17.Steve Emerson, “Abdullah Assam: The Man Before Osama Bin Laden,” International Association for Counterterrorism and Security Professionals website, undated, http://www.iacsp.com/itobli3.html, accessed August 25, 2010.
18.Just war requires that two conditions be met: just cause (jus ad bellum) and just means or justice in war (jus in bello). Jus in bello requires that the belligerents’ methods be proportional to their ends, and that they do not directly target noncombatants. While terrorism may, in principle, meet the requirement of a just cause, it does not meet the second: Terrorists by definition target noncombatants, which is explicitly prohibited by both the Judeo-Christian and Islamic Just War Tradition. The double effects rule modifies this requirement to allow for acts of war that inadvertently result in loss of civilians lives, which military strategists call collateral damage. What matters here, according to philosopher Steven Lee, is intention. There is a morally relevant difference, he argues, “between merely foreseeing the deaths of noncombatants as an effect of military activity and intending to bring about those deaths; the principle of discrimination rules out the activity only in the latter case.” Steven Lee, “Is the Just War Tradition Relevant in the Nuclear Age?” Research in Philosophy and Technology 9 no. 85. But, what if the adversary knows in advance that many civilian lives will be lost in an attack that is aimed at military targets? This is a moral problem that military strategists still grapple with. The ability to aim at a particular target, with minimal damage, is what makes drones so attractive to those who aim to comply with the law of war. See also, James Turner Johnson, Modern Contemporary Warfare (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999) and John Kelsay, Arguing the Just War in Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).
19.Terrorists’ goals can be instrumental (changing
the world) and expressive (drawing attention to a cause) or both. For more on this topic, see Jessica Stern and Amit Modi, “Producing Terror: Organizational Dynamics of Survival,” in Thomas Biersteker and Sue Eckert, eds., Countering the Financing of Terrorism (Rutledge, 2007).
20.Kenneth Anderson writes frequently on this topic. See, for example, “Alan Dershowitz on Degrees of ‘Civilianality,’” Kenneth Anderson’s Law of War and Just War Theory Blog, July 22, 2006, http://kennethandersonlawofwar.blogspot.com/2006/07/alan-dershowitz-on-degrees-of.html. See also, Monika Hlavkova, “Reconstructing the Civilian/Combatant Divide: A Fresh Look at Targeting in Non-international Armed Conflict,” Journal of Conflict & Security Law 19 no. 2 (2014): 251–78.
21.Peter Singer, “Facing Saddam’s Child Soldiers,” Brookings Institution, January 14, 2003, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2003/01/14iraq-singer.
22.Tim Arango, “A Boy in ISIS. A Suicide Vest. A Hope to Live,” New York Times, December 28, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/27/world/middleeast/syria-isis-recruits-teenagers-as-suicide-bombers.html.
23.Article 26 of the Rome Statute states that: “The Court shall have no jurisdiction over any person who was under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged commission of the offence.” Matthew Happold, “The Age of Criminal Responsibilty in International Criminal Law,” in Karin Arts and Vesselin Popovski, eds., International Criminal Accountability and Children’s Rights (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007) http://www.asser.nl/Default.aspx?site_id=9&level1=13337&level2=13345. The prosecution of children under 18 is relegated to national courts, and national laws regarding the age of criminal responsibility vary. The Paris Principles, “Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups,” urges that children accused of war crimes be considered “primarily as victims,” and “not only as perpetrators,” which would seem to leave room for debate. “The Paris Principles: Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups,” United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund, February 2007, http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/ParisPrinciples310107English.pdf. For a case in which a child was treated as a war criminal, see “United States of America vs. Omar Ahmed Khadr,” available at http://media.miamiherald.com/smedia/2010/10/26/10/stip.source.prod_affiliate.56.pdf.
24.Arango, “A Boy in ISIS. A Suicide Vest. A Hope to Live.”
CHAPTER 1. THE RISE AND FALL OF AL QAEDA IN IRAQ
1.Mary Anne Weaver, “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” Atlantic, June 8, 2006, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent-life-of-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/304983/.
2.Jean-Charles Brisard, Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda (New York: Other Press, 2004).
3.Barbara Metcalf, “Traditionalist Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis and Talibs,” Social Service Research Council, November 1, 2004.
4.Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: Ecco, 2003).
5.Weaver, “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.”
6.Ibid.
7.Assaf Moghadam, “The Salafi-Jihad as a Religious Ideology,” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 3 (February 2008), https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-salafi-jihad-as-a-religious-ideology.
8.Nibras Kazim, “A Virulent Ideology in Mutation: Zarqawi Upstages Maqdisi,” Hudson Institute, http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1368/kazimi_vol2.pdf.
9.Weaver, “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.”
10.Nir Rosen, “Iraq’s Jordanian Jihadis,” New York Times Magazine, February 19, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/19/magazine/iraq.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
11.Henry Schuster, “Al-Zarqawi and al Qaeda in Jordan,” CNN.com, November 12, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/11/11/zarqawi.jordan/index.html?_s=PM:WORLD.
12.Brisard, Zarqawi.
13.Weaver, “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.”
14.Ibid.; Bruce Reidel, The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future (Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 94.
15.Craig Whitlock, “Al-Zarqawi’s Biography,” Washington Post, June 8, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/06/08/AR2006060800299_pf.html.
16.Weaver, “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.”
17.Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Postwar Findings About Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.pdf, 92; “Ansar al-Islam,” Stanford University Mapping Militant Organizations, last updated August 14, 2014.
18.R. Jeffrey Smith, “Hussein’s Prewar Ties to Al-Qaeda Discounted: Pentagon Reports Says Contacts Were Limited,” Washington Post, April 6, 2007.
19.“Full Text of Colin Powell’s Speech,” Guardian, February 5, 2003, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa.
20.U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Postwar Findings, 110; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 66; Smith, “Hussein’s Prewar Ties to Al-Qaeda Discounted.”
21.“President Bush Pledges to Rout Terrorism ‘Wherever It Exists,’” IIP Digital, February 2003, http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2003/02/[email protected]#axzz3KQBs2LRT.
22.Abu Musab al-Suri as summarized in Lawrence Wright, “The Master Plan,” New Yorker, September 11, 2006.
23.Donna Miles, “Bush Calls Iraq Central Front in Terror War, Vows Victory,” U.S. Department of Defense, press release, October 6, 2005, http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=18145.
24.Jessica Stern, “How America Created a Terrorist Haven,” New York Times, August 20, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/20/opinion/how-america-created-a-terrorist-haven.html.
25.Statistics based on data from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’s Global Terrorism Database and meet the following criteria: each event is an intentional act of violence committed or threatened by a nonstate actor; it is committed with the purpose of attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal (crit1 = 1); it is designed to coerce, intimidate, or convey a message to an audience beyond its immediate victims (crit2 = 1); it is committed outside the context of legitimate warfare and violates the conventions outlined in international humanitarian law (crit3 = 1); it is unambiguous in meeting this criteria (doubtterr = 0) but not necessarily carried out successfully (success = 0, 1). See Jessica Stern and Megan McBride, “Terrorism after the 2003 Invasion of Iraq,” http://costsofwar.org/sites/default/files/articles/47/attachments/McBride1.pdf.
26.National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database, 2012, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. See Stern and McBride, “Terrorism after the 2003 Invasion of Iraq,” accessed January 31, 2013.
27.Visions of Humanity, “Terrorism Index 2007: Global Rankings,” edited by Institute for Economics and Peace, 2007, accessed November 2014.
28.Brian Fishman, “Redefining the Islamic State,” New America Foundation, August 2011, http://security.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Fishman_Al_Qaeda_In_Iraq.pdf.
29.Brian Fishman, “Redefining the Islamic State,” New America Foundation, August 2011, http://security.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Fishman_Al_Qaeda_In_Iraq.pdf; Maamoun Yousef, “Islamic Web Sites Criticize Jordan Bombing,” Associated Press, November 15, 2005.
30.Sharon Otterman, “Iraq: Debaathification,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 7, 2005, http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-debaathification/p7853#p3.
31.Sarah Childress, Evan Wexler, and Michelle Mizner, “Iraq: How Did We Get Here?,” Frontline, PBS, July 29, 2014; Lee Hudson Teslik, “Profile: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 8, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/iraq/profile-abu
-musab-al-zarqawi/p9866#p4.
32.Bruce R. Pirnie, Edward O’Connell, Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006): RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Volume 2 (Rand Corporation, 2008), 50–51; email interview with Charles Lister, Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution Doha Center.
33.Email interview with Phillip Smyth, November 21, 2014.
34.Neil MacFarquhar, “After the War: Attack at Shrine; Car Bomb in Iraq Kills 95 at Shiite Mosque,” New York Times, August 30, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/30/world/after-the-war-attack-at-shrine-car-bomb-in-iraq-kills-95-at-shiite-mosque.html; Elizabeth Farnsworth, “Return of Shiite Leader Ayatollah Mohammad Bakr al Hakim,” PBS Newshour (radio), May 12, 2003, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east-jan-june03-basra_05-12/.
35.Murad Batal al-Shishani, “Al-Zarqawi’s Rise to Power: Analyzing Tactics and Targets,” Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, November 17, 2005.
36.Aaron Zelin, “The War Between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement,” Washington Institute, June 2014.
37.Charles Lister, “Profiling the Islamic State,” Brookings Doha Center Analysis Papers, November 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/11/profiling%20islamic%20state%20lister/en_web_lister.pdf; Joas Wagemaker, “Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi; A Counter-Terrorism Asset?” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 6 (May 2008), https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/abu-muhammad-al-maqdisi-a-counter-terrorism-asset.
38.Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, “Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records,” January 2, 2007, The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaidas-foreign-fighters-in-iraq-a-first-look-at-the-sinjar-records; Matthew Levitt, “Foreign Fighters and Their Economic Impact: a Case Study of Syria and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI),” Perspectives on Terrorism 3, no. 3, 2009, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/74/html; Phil Sands, “Syria stops insurgents on Iraq border,” The National (UAE), November 2, 2008.
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