"On the night of 11/12 February 'Stopper' Patrol off Brest was ordered on a 12 hour patrol from 19:40 to 07:00 next day.
The first aircraft took off at 18:27; when it encountered a JU-88 it switched off the radar equipment, and when it switched on again at 19:20 the radar was unserviceable. It had blown a fuse which they could not repair, so they returned to base. The crew transferred to another aircraft and the patrol resumed at 22:38 and proceeded until 23:43. A third aircraft took over between 23-3(5 and 03:10. A fourth from 02:45 to 07:01. There was nothing seen, but there was a gap of three hours in 'Stopper' from 19:40 to 22:38.
"'Line SE Patrol was between Ushant and the Ile de Bréhat. It was ordered between 19:40 and 23:40 on 11 February. The aircraft reached its starting point at 19:36, when its radar became unserviceable through an obscure fault of unusual character which is still under investigation. It remained on patrol but reported the fault at 21:13 and was ordered to return. No relief plane was sent. If it were not for the technical failure of both their patrols they had an excellent chance of sighting the German squadron.
"On 12 February morning two Spitfires over Boulogne sighted E-boats leaving harbour. Under the standing order not to use wireless telegraphy, they immediately returned to base to report.
"Two Spitfires took off at 10:20 to sweep from Boulogne to Fecamp. Fifteen miles from Le Touquet, Sq. Ldr. Oxspring sighted 20–30 vessels in convoy. He landed at Hawkinge at 10:50 and the information was passed to Dover and 11 Group. [12]
Ju-88
"Sgt. Beaumont, who was with Sq. Ldr. Oxspring, said he saw a vessel with a tripod mast and superstructure. When handed a book of German silhouettes he picked out a German capital ship.
"At 10:42, unconnected with the shipping reconnaissance, Group Captain Victor Beamish and Wing-Cdr. Boyd, when attacked by Messerschmitts, flew right over the German squadron. They observed WT silence until they landed at 11:09 and informed intelligence at 11 Group Fighter Command.
"At 10:00–10:15 surface vessels appeared on the radar detector set at Beachy Head. There were telephone delays and the line was engaged, which held up the transmission of the information which did not reach Dover until 10:40. At 10:50 enemy shipping was detected by radar at Fairlight and passed to Dover.
"The Swordfish were ordered to be airborne at 12:20 to carry out an attack at 12:45. The rendezvous for their fighter escort was 12:25 over Manston. Owing to unforeseen delays the fighters did not get there in time.
"Two squadrons from Biggin Hill Wing arrived at Manston late and proceeded towards the target. Hornchurch Wing also missed the Swordfish at Manston and they searched over Calais without success. At 12:00 six Swordfish accompanied by ten Spitfires left for the target. Ten miles off Ramsgate German fighters appeared and battled with the Spitfires.
"On the morning of 12 February there were 36 serviceable Beauforts available. There were seven planes of 217 Squadron from Leuchars in Fife, 14 of 42 Squadron at St. Eval, 15 of 86 and 217 Squadrons, except for three which were sweeping the Bay of Biscay, from Thorney Island. Four of them which were in an advanced state of readiness proceeded to Manston at 13:40 led by Pilot Officer Carson, but they arrived too late to rendezvous with the fighters. When they reached Manston, owing to the large number of aircraft circling the base, the Beaufort formation split up. [13] Having obtained a fix, Carson reached the position of the German battle-cruisers at 16:40. Visibility was bad and he dropped his torpedo at 1,500 yards but was damaged by flak. A second pilot found the Germans at 18:00 and attacked.
"The two reamining Beauforts of the original four circled the aerodrome for some time and landed at Manston and set off again. Shortly after 15:00 they found the Squadron and at 15:40 their torpedoes were observed running. The three other planes left at Thorney Island flew to Manston and at 15:00 set course for the target. The visibility was so bad they made their attack singly and one was destroyed by fighters or anti-aircraft fire.
"The Leuchars squadron was delayed because of a snowbound aerodrome but 14 serviceable Beauforts eventually arrived at Coltishall at 11:45. Three were without torpedoes and arrangements were made to send them to Coltishall but they did not arrive in time. Two had engine trouble, leaving nine which were ordered to Manston to pick up a formation of Hudsons who were to attack as a diversion. They arrived at Manston at 14:53 and accompanied by five Hudsons set off for the target at 15:34 [14]. Owing to the bad visibility they became separated and the Hudsons bombed the ships before the torpedo attacks began. Two Hudsons were lost.
"At 16:04 the Beauforts sighted the German ships and attacked in one flight of six and one of three. Seven torpedoes were dropped but heavy anti-aircraft fire prevented observation of results. [Nothing said about the near-sinking of Pizey's flagship HMS Campbell.]
"The St. Eval detachment. At 12:20 Beauforts from St. Eval were ordered to Thorney Island. Then they were ordered to rendezvous at Coltishall by 17:00 to pick up fighter escort. At 17:01 they picked up ten fighters over Coltishall and set course for the German Squadron. At 17:41 they were over the estimated position of the ships. At 18:05 they saw German mine-sweepers. Visibility was only 100 yards and it was raining heavily. The formation split up and lost sight of each other and darkness prevented their chance of effective action.
"Destroyers. The destroyers stationed at Harwich were Campbell, Vivacious, Mackay, Whitshed, Worcester and Walpole. They were all 20 years old.
"At 11:56 Captain Pizey in Campbell the flagship set off. At 15:17 Pizey saw two large ships on his radar at nine and a half miles. At 15:43 he came under heavy fire from the German ships. But they fired their torpedoes and Worcester fired her torpedoes from 2,400 yards. She was badly hit by the German shells and set on fire but managed to limp back to port.
"At 11:27 242 bombers set off and continued to fly throughout the afternoon. Thirty-nine attacked, 188 failed to find the ships and fifteen did not return. Twelve aircraft succeeded in laying mines which eventually damaged the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst. [In fact, the damage was done by mines laid much earlier.]
"Fighter Command. 11 Group had 21 Spitfire squadrons and four Hurricane squadrons. Also three squadrons from 10 Group and six squadrons from 12 Group took part in the battle. In all thirty-four fighter squadrons launched the most intensive fighter attack. Most of the attacks were launched at 14:05–15:05 to cover the Beaufort torpedo attacks. Out of a total of 398 fighter planes, 17 were missing."
The Beport then set out its conclusions.
"Co-ordination of plans. Was there any lack of proper contact between services and command? It must be remarked that there is such a thing as too much co-ordination. If the Germans came up the Channel the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff predicted it would be A simple battle — all forces should be thrown into action at the earliest possible time.'"
Then came a small note of criticism:
"Co-ordination was not entirely successful. For example, in the provision of escorts for the Swordfish. But later co-operation between the commands seems to have been complete [unfortunately, too late]. In these circumstances we have no suggestion to make for improvements of arrangements which already exist for the purpose of ensuring adequate liaison and co-operation between services and commands, which in our opinion proved on the whole to be satisfactory. There is no lack of evidence of co-operation or the will to co-operate.
"It must also be admitted that in addition to the short notice when information was received on the presence of the German ships they were to some extent caught by surprise. The general opinion of those dealing with the problem was that they would pass through the Straits at night. In addition, it must be remembered that an attack by destroyers or a handful of MTBs in broad daylight against capital ships, not themselves under heavy fire, was an adventure hitherto hardly regarded as justifiable.
"The Air Ministry, in receipt of the message that the German ships were in the Channel, sent to Fighter and Coastal commands this message: 'Scharnhorst and Gneisenau reported in Channel sixteen miles wes
t of Le Touquet at 11.05. Plus abnormal enemy air activity. Maximum available forces to be employed as early as possible to destroy the enemy ships and aircraft. 'This unique opportunity to be exploited to the utmost.'
"After spending 15 days on this inquiry this Board is impressed by the countless acts of gallantry that came to their notice and the evident determination of all our forces to press home their attacks."
The only other faint note of criticism was contained in this paragraph:
"Apart from the weakness of our forces, the main reason for our failure to do more damage to the enemy was the fact that his presence was not detected earlier and this was due to a breakdown of night patrols and the omission to send out strong morning reconnaissance. All operational orders said they would pass through in darkness."
It is a collector's piece of officialese and double talk. Nearly 700 fighters and bombers — the entire force at the disposal of the RAF — had been flung into the battle without success because they were too late and completely unco-ordinated. Thirteen young Fleet Air Arm pilots had been sent uselessly to their deaths. Twenty-seven young sailors had been killed and eighteen seriously wounded aboard the destroyer Worcester when she took on a German battleship and cruiser single-handed — a piece of pitiful heroism which need never have happened if the Navy had brought in bigger ships.
Security was so rigid that hundreds of other young RAF pilots took off with no idea what they were looking for. One RAF squadron leader had reported by radio that German battleships were in the Channel — and been ignored. Another officer, a group captain, had not even broken radio silence in spite of the great urgency. Some RAF torpedo planes, taking off in confusion, had attacked and nearly sank our own destroyers. RAF night reconnaissance patrols over the Channel returned and were not replaced, leaving a gap of three vital hours. Except for hitting three mines, the battleships reached Germany untouched under the noses of the most battle-experienced air force and navy in the world.
The unpalatable truth which Churchill dared not reveal to the angry and disturbed British public was that some of his service chiefs had proved themselves tragically incompetent. For Hitler had been right. The carefully prepared German dash uncovered a lack of liaison and organization. Looking back, it makes one apprehensively wonder what might have been the outcome if the Führer had gone ahead with his plans to invade Britain.
The break-out of the battleships was a supreme example of meticulous German planning and efficiency defeating the hasty last-minute improvisations of the British.
Perhaps the main trouble was the short-sighted arrogance on the part of the British forces. Admittedly there were disasters against the Japanese in the East. But the Army had escaped miraculously from Dunkirk and the RAF had won the Battle of Britain. The Royal Navy had a centuries-old tradition of paramountcy behind it. The Admiralty simply did not regard a German dash up the English Channel as a serious possibility. Hence their pitiful dispositions. In the case of the newer service, the RAF at this time of the war reckoned to have the Luftwaffe on the run. They were flying an increasing number of fighter sweeps over France and every night mounting an even more devastating bomber offensive over Germany.
This somewhat smug attitude in all services as well as the petty rivalries, even among commands, were the basic reasons for the disasters of the day. But how could Churchill tell the nation that — particularly as it included incompetence at his beloved Admiralty?
Fighter Command Chief Sir Sholto Douglas commented later: "At the time I was at a loss to understand the reluctance of the Royal Navy to have units of the Home Fleet ready to send out into the North Sea. The prizes to be gained in an action with ships of the importance of the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau and the Prinz Eugen would have been worth bringing some of our bigger ships into action in time to intercept the German warships while they were still at sea. As it was, the enemy warships got away with it, even though they did hit some mines which failed to do more than slight damage, and they all made the safety of their home ports."
The Germans had their complaints too. German Navy Chief, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, was equally critical of the Luftwaffe. He wrote in his report:
"The Navy opinion was that with sufficient air defence the big ships could remain stationed in Brest even if British battleships were stationed at Plymouth and Portsmouth. The Luftwaffe could have considerably eased the task of the German ships by attacking British air bases. But as was constantly shown the Navy was dependent here upon the goodwill of the Luftwaffe.
"Numerous reports about the air attacks on Brest deeply impressed the Führer. He followed them continuously with concern and did not look with any favour on the operations of the big ships. This feeling, without doubt, was reinforced by Göring, who emphasized to the Führer again and again that there was just no sensible way to protect the big ships in Brest against air attack. In fact it did not lie in Göring's power nor in his wish. He therefore robbed us of a chance to do something worthwhile in convoy raiding.
"At the end of 1941, when the question of the transfer of the ships to the North Sea came up, the Führer produced a number of arguments for stationing the ships in Norway. Many reports of landings in Norway by the British in the spring played a considerable part in his case. Added to this, the ships in Brest were being damaged and remained inactive. When the question of a break-out was looked into, the Iceland passage was deemed unfavourable because the British, noting the absence of the ships from Brest, would have enough time to bring out their Home Fleet and concentrate it in the North Sea. Therefore if it were to come to a break-out, it must be through the Channel which would bring surprise. At the beginning of 1942, when we prepared to sail through the Channel, we hoped that the break-through might not be noticed by the enemy, but we were also prepared for a short sharp battle and an exchange of shots."
XIV
BUT WHO REALLY WON?
In spite of the whitewash of the Bucknill Tribunal some officers were secretly sacked or posted away. Admiral Ramsay was not a scapegoat as he had gloomily predicted — but a lot of other people were. They were not sacked, as that would have undermined public confidence, but kicked upstairs to harmless jobs. One of them, Air Marshal Sir Philip Joubert, C-in-C of Coastal Command, was removed to Mountbatten's staff in Ceylon with the backwater job of Director of Information and Civil Affairs. Others known to be hostile to the official "whitewash," were posted away. Wing-Cdr. Constable-Roberts was exiled to Scapa Flow, but managed to get a squadron in North Africa shortly afterwards.
Gerald Kidd applied to go on the Dieppe raid, but instead had a message to report for what he regarded as a "stooge job." As he had heard a rumour that he would never get another operational job as a result of the report he had put in, he sent a letter to Air Vice-Marshal Leigh-Mallory to protest about being posted away without explanation. He said, "There is a rumour that there are orders I am not to be involved in any further operations along the south coast. I want to protest against this."
He also requested to see Leigh-Mallory. Much to Kidd's surprise, he agreed to see him one evening at 11 Group at Uxbridge. His manner was unfriendly as he said, "What do you want, Kidd?" Kidd replied, "Why have I been taken off the Dieppe raid?"
Leigh-Mallory said abruptly, "Sit down, Kidd." He then produced a copy of his report and said, "This is balderdash, bunkum and bilge. I strongly resent being ordered by the Air Council to answer a letter from a junior officer."
Kidd replied stiffly, "I am sorry, sir, that you regard it that way. But the facts are correct. I wrote it after what was to me a tremendous shock and a great sense of personal loss."
Leigh-Mallory repeated, "I want to make it quite clear that I resent a junior officer criticizing me."
Kidd answered, "It is not intended as a criticism of you. It is a general criticism."
In clipped tones, Leigh-Mallory said, "Take paragraph E., which reads, "This was the chance which Fighter Command had been waiting for for over a year… nevertheless, the effort of
our fighter squadrons was made far too late and when it came it was badly directed, in so far as many of the squadrons failed to reach their objective.'
Kidd replied by drawing his attention to the fact that his report made it clear there was "no lack of courage and desire to defeat the enemy."
Leigh-Mallory said, "I agree with everything except the paragraph that affects me. We could have won a resounding victory, but I could get no co-operation from Joubert of Coastal Command. It was as if we were fighting a different war."
Having made this astonishing confession to a junior officer, he became suddenly genial. The interview ended on friendly terms, when he introduced Kidd to his staff over a drink. He also promised to promote him — and kept his word.
There were several other echoes of the day's defeat. At Biggin Hill Fighter Base, Flt.-Lt. Cowan Douglas-Stephenson always kept a personal log giving details of every event that happened on the airfield from the condition of the runways to individual take-offs. He said, "I was posted shortly afterwards to Hornchurch. Later when I returned to Biggin, I found the pages from Saturday, 3 January, to Wednesday, 25 March, 1942 had been cut out with a razor blade. Why? Every other entry was intact."
Stephenson is still convinced this was a deliberate act by someone in authority to lose the record of what took place at one of Britain's most vital fighter airfields that February day. They cut out a much larger section so that the excision of 12 February would not appear too obvious.
Barely a month after the break-out on 17 March 1942, the London Gazette gave details of RAF awards for the action. They included a DFM (Distinguished Flying Medal) to Hudson pilot, Flight Sergeant J. W. Creedon of 407 Royal Canadian Air Force Squadron, "who made a daring low-level attack on a German destroyer escorting the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Creedon came out through cloud to 400 feet and sighted a destroyer directly below him. Diving through fierce flak to 200 feet he released his bombs which straddled the German warship. As he turned away to climb back into the clouds, he was attacked by a JU-88. But when Creedon's rear-gunner opened fire with his turret guns the German sheered off."
Breakout Page 24