For target illumination and range-finding, lasers have been in use since the 1960s. A comparatively low-powered portable laser can generate enough reflection to make a target visible to a human gunner or a missile’s target-seeking mechanism. Such lasers are rapidly becoming smaller, cheaper, more reliable and more widely distributed; they will go on doing so.
The multiplication of lasers will inevitably generate counter-measures. Passive methods include high-intensity flares to confuse light-sensitive guidance systems and smoke generators to block the beam. More active methods might include rockets homing on the heat pulse of the laser generator or shells filled with highly reflective powder.
Laser weapons will undoubtedly start off mounted on vehicles and may stay there. Even a jeep can carry a fair-sized generator or a rack of storage batteries. As energy-storage methods improve, so will laser weapons. They will probably fire in short pulses, giving the hot gases generated from the target time to disperse. Even if such lasers can’t penetrate heavy armor, they may destroy all sorts of lightly-protected targets and the external fittings and sensors of heavy vehicles.
A workable, cheap laser rifle or pistol is farther away but probably not impossible. Chemical cartridges made of hyper-explosives or high-capacity, quick-discharge batteries could solve the basic problem of storing energy. Such a weapon would fire in short pulses from a clip of the cartridges or batteries.
Lasers may also be the basis of future anti-aircraft and antimissile systems, even at the tactical level. Missiles and aircraft have fuel and electronic systems that are inherently vulnerable to heat. Their main defense has always been speed, less useful against a weapon that strikes at the speed of light.
For air-to-air combat, lasers are a high-performance weapon that could give comparatively low-performance aircraft considerable fighting power. Air-to-air lasers could be giant versions of the clip-fed ground soldiers’ laser, probably mounted externally in self-contained pods slung on wing stations to reduce structural heating.
For close-range defense of ground targets, lasers can simply be added to the guns and missiles already mounted on warships or deployed with air-defense units. With adequate detection systems and high-speed computers, close-range air-defense lasers might even become effective against smart bombs and shells.
To protect larger areas, the air-defense laser may itself have to take to the air, in aircraft with long endurance and substantial pay loads. Such planes could carry long-range lasers, a power supply and a computerized detection and tracking system. They would also carry a few short-range weapons for self-defense but would normally operate over their own rear areas or fleets, well clear of the enemy’s air-defense system. Flying above the weather and terrain obstacles, such airborne lasers could engage a wide variety of aircraft and missile targets at very respectable ranges.
5. Small Arms: Even without a laser rifle, the soldier of the year 2000 could be a distinctly formidable opponent. The use of basically off-the-shelf hardware has already produced a fully automatic 5.56 mm rifle with a laser sight. It is being used by police SWAT teams and will no doubt be appearing in the hands of their opponents before long. The Teflon-coated bullet has also received a good deal of unfortunately quite justifiable publicity for its ability to penetrate bulletproof vests and vehicles. (Antitank pistols, anyone?) There are other small-arms possibilities for the near future, each with its advantages, disadvantages and requirements.
The Caseless Cartridge. A conventional bullet with the propellant forming a hardened lump of explosive rather than contained in a metallic cartridge. This will reduce the size, weight and cost of the round. It will also allow increasing the ammunition load without decreasing the caliber of the round or using heavier and more penetrating bullets. It will require the solution of overheating problems and also some redesign of the firing mechanism.
The Rocket Bullet. The descendant of the Gyrojet round. Current rocket-propelled small-arms rounds seem to lack penetrating power at short ranges and accuracy at longer ones. A combination of hyper-explosives, heavier bullets and a rifle-length barrel should produce a more effective system. The great advantage is reduced recoil, but problems appear to remain with smoke, flash and noise.
The Electric Gun. A rifle discharging its rounds by creating mutually repelling electrical charges or activating a series of ring magnets set at intervals along the barrel—a miniature induction catapult. Such a system is probably the farthest away but would also have the least recoil, noise, flash and wear on the mechanism and the barrel. It is also likely to remain limited to solid-projectile small arms. Subjecting explosive warheads or electronic circuits to such powerful magnetic or electrical fields might not be a good idea.
The Exploding Bullet. A label for a variety of types: simple miniature shells filled with hyper-explosive; flechette rounds; discarding-sabot rounds with disintegrating plastic shells and depicted-uranium cores. The first two would be highly effective against personnel; the third would also be armor-piercing.
Making full use of these improved small arms needs a corresponding improvement in sights, using lasers and mini-computers. At a conservative estimate, the well-trained infantryman of the year 2000 could be able to hit anything he can see out to a range of about one thousand yards and penetrate most body armor and some vehicles at shorter ranges.
The basic shoulder weapon may even become capable of firing not only bullets but grenades, rockets and flares. The World War II rifle grenade was heavy, inaccurate, short-ranged and needed a high-powered cartridge, which damaged the rifle in prolonged use. Before 2000 a far more lethal grenade or high-intensity flare could be made light enough to go several hundred yards with a normally powered cartridge. A small rocket could be fired out to a safe distance, where its own motor would ignite to send it on the way. So infantry heavy weapons may disappear entirely from many types of units in favor of a soldier carrying one rifle, four different kinds of ammunition—and, it may be hoped, a bayonet.
6. Electronic Warfare: Here the sky is already nearly the limit and the rate of progress faster than in any other area.
As far as surveillance, detection and ranging techniques are concerned, we may not see any spectacular breakthroughs. Existing equipment in these areas already uses the entire electromagnetic spectrum as well as heat, sound, smells and chemicals. As with lasers, what we need is cheaper, more reliable equipment, more widely distributed and needing less skill for its operation and maintenance. Making even these improvements will be more than enough to keep alive the already frenzied race between one side’s electronic systems and the other side’s electronic counter-measures.
You use radar and the enemy begins to jam it. You fire homing rockets at his jammers and he invents a radar-negative paint. You switch to passive infrared sensors and he replies with random thermite charges to overload your sensors with heat pulses. You switch again, this time to laser rangers, which he blocks with efflorescent gases and rockets homing in on your illuminators. You abandon sophistication and use old-fashioned aluminum-foil chaff with propaganda printed on the back in three languages, none of them used by your opponent. He trains carrier pigeons to lay radio-sensitive eggs and you invent a robot chef to scramble them.
Now you decide to strike closer to home. You bug his headquarters with microphones. He returns the favor. You dig out his microphones and plant another batch of your own, including a few microminiaturized ones he misses. He plants radio transmitters in your coffee urn that clash with the microwave devices you’ve woven into his curtains and furniture. He bounces a laser off your window shades and reads the reflections while you are doing the same with sonic pulses. Meanwhile, your people have been finding cockroaches with serial numbers in Russian, Hindi and Hebrew. You replace them with microrobots with TV pickups and acetylene torches, disguised as mice, and he unleashes his robot cat that lives on your roof…And so on.
At the heart of electronic warfare lies the computer. Over the next twenty-five years the revolution in computer cap
acity and size, now underway, will affect every area of military activity.
Computers are vulnerable to faulty components, poor maintenance, inadequate data and incorrect programming. The bigger the computer, the more complex its intended functions, or the larger its data-gathering network, the more vulnerable it will be. The same principle also applies in reverse. The larger the number of activities controlled by one computer, the more vulnerable the whole system is to collapse through disruption of the central computer.
So we can expect to see the most developments among the smaller, more specialized computers. The present smart shells and bombs will multiply, with the larger ones becoming extremely sophisticated. All types and sizes of missile will become more accurate. By the year 2000 almost any weapon on the battlefield may suddenly appear with a miniature “brain.” This includes such previously science-fictional devices as the thirty-second bomb from Heinlein’s Starship Troopers, as well as a gruesome variety of booby traps and mines.
The use of electronic aids in all forms of combat vehicles will increase. Even today the SR-71 reconnaissance plane carries out most of a mission automatically, and the engines of many modem warships are controlled from the bridge. Pilots and engineers provide redundancy and discretionary judgment. We may see the automated tank with a computerized weapons system and a two-man crew; we will certainly see more electronic monitoring of vital systems for malfunctions.
We may also see what will be in all but name robot soldiers. The computerized security systems already protecting banks and luxury high-rises could substitute for human sentries in many places. Farther afield, we can expect robot command posts, linked to a variety of sensors, programmed to tell friend from foe and controlling mine fields, short-range missiles and demolition charges. Finally, there are literally hundreds of clerical and housekeeping chores that can be computerized—issuing pay, accounting for supplies, troubleshooting faulty equipment, monitoring hospital patients, etc.
These uses of computers have certain points in common. Their equipment and programming can be designed for a limited range of tasks and made comparatively immune to subsequent programming errors or changes in the environment. They also economize in manpower. This is essential in the industrial countries, where the individual enlisted man has already become the most difficult item for the armed forces to acquire and maintain. With the declining birth rate in these countries, the manpower shortage is going to become worse, and the intelligent use of computers is one of the most promising ways of meeting it.
The picture becomes more complicated when we move on to larger systems centralized around one or more computers. Such systems are indispensable for any sort of effective area defenses against aircraft and missiles, on land or at sea. They are the most effective method for coordinating tactical air strikes, amphibious landings or artillery bombardments. Finally, they are desirable backups for all command and control activities, where the ability to handle larger quantities of data faster than your enemy can often be a real advantage.
At the same time, we need to avoid making such systems more indispensable than they need to be. This is not going to be the easiest of jobs since military organizations are biased toward centralization and hierarchy. Computerized systems are invaluable for reinforcing this bias, far above and beyond what makes sense in a combat situation. If your system’s main function becomes letting the general look over the shoulder of every platoon leader without leaving his headquarters, you should hope that enemy action will save you the trouble of fragging, if not the general, at least the general’s computers.
Apart from reorienting commanders, we face problems in providing for movement and protection of the computers and their sensors. In the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Egyptian air defense system lost its effectiveness as soon as their army advanced beyond the range of the radar stations on the west bank of the Suez Canal. The system disintegrated completely when the Israelis crossed the canal and attacked the radar stations on the ground.
So we should start planning to have more of the key elements of battlefield electronics systems mounted in aircraft, hovercraft, fast patrol boats and armored vehicles. We should also develop modular or packaged electronic systems that can be shifted from place to place and from vehicle to vehicle. Finally, with the increased capacity of smaller computers, we may want to develop systems with multiple computers, each capable of acting as the central component of the system.
Ideally, any system deployed on or near the firing line ought to be compact enough so that the company clerk can grab the vital elements and run just before the enemy overruns the CP. The farther back, the less trouble you need to take; by the time the computers at your main supply dump come under fire, so much else will have gone wrong that the inability to count socks and prophylactics will be among the least of the commanding general’s worries.
Mobility, dispersal and decentralization also require reliable communications, able to carry large amounts of information and comparatively immune to either jamming or interception by the enemy. These will not always be available, although recent developments in lasers and glass-fiber optics look promising. Large computer systems face a future of continuously shifting balance points between risks and benefits, different for each type of warfare and probably for each opponent. The Egyptian air defense system might have been adequate against an opponent less aggressive and mobile than the Israelis. The only certainty we face is the need to design as much flexibility into the system and as much capacity into each element as technology and budgets permit.
7. Vehicles: Land, Sea and Air.
Land. Battlefield vehicles will be lighter, faster, better armed, better protected and carry heavier payloads. Wheeled vehicles will have more cross-country mobility. Tracked vehicles should have higher road speeds and greater reliability, thanks to improved components. We may see greater use of gas turbines, or even electrical propulsion.
Air. High-performance aircraft such as the F-15 are already approaching the limits of existing power plants and materials, not to mention human physiology. Here we are likely to see primarily improvements in detail—more armor, payload and range, more sophisticated electronics (such as “fly-by-wire” systems), more use of variable-geometry wings and other unconventional designs for the lifting surfaces, and easier maintenance.
At lower speeds and altitudes, more and more aircraft will have short or vertical take-off and landing capabilities. The vertical take-off jet, the helicopter, and possibly the revived flying boat may replace some conventional aircraft for maritime uses. Modular armament systems will give all kinds of aircraft the capacity for self-defense. Finally, we will see increasingly sophisticated drone aircraft used for battlefield surveillance, reconnaissance, maritime patrol, airborne early warning, ECM and decoys; airborne missile launching is also possible.
Increased infantry firepower and the availability of better vertical landing systems may reduce the role of the helicopter on the battlefield. It will certainly have to become better protected and easier to maintain. Current helicopters require much skilled maintenance at vulnerable fixed bases for each hour of flying time.
Sea. In the wake of the Falklands War, the future of navies no longer seems a simple linear process of the decline of the large warship. Small warships can be built cheaper, and with modern weapons and sensors, they can pack an enormous punch, including tactical aircraft. On the other hand, a larger ship can enjoy greater endurance, better sea-keeping qualities, a larger ammunition load and more ability to survive battle damage without the use of exotic and expensive materials for armor.
To make the warships of the near future more effective, we will probably see the extensive revival of armor protection and medium-caliber guns (six to eight inches), with rocket-boosted or smart shells.
Nuclear propulsion is too expensive for all except the largest ships, but there will be more gas turbines and diesels at sea. To simplify maintenance and reduce costs, more and more ships will be built with standardized modula
r weapons, fire-control systems and power plants. Large high-speed merchant ships are likely to be converted for many tasks, including ASW with VTOL aircraft and helicopters operating off portable flight decks.
The missile-armed fast patrol boat will become a major factor in naval strategy. As long as weapons and power plants for these craft are available on the open market, they can be built, manned and used by comparatively underdeveloped countries. In narrow seas, a force of FPBs can face a whole task force on dangerously even terms.
Nuclear submarines have virtually unlimited submerged endurance but are expensive, noisy and too large for use in shallow waters.
Improved electrical-power storage or the revival of the Walther hydrogen-peroxide system may give the conventional submarine a new lease on life in even the major navies.
Four types of vehicle need separate discussion:
Hovercraft today are noisy, hard to maneuver and poorly protected. As power plants, light-weight weapons and armor improve, hovercraft will become more effective. Large ones may serve as fast patrol boats; hovercraft are much less vulnerable to air attack than surface ships and nearly immune to submarines. Smaller hovercraft may replace most conventional landing craft for amphibious operations. On land they may help give high-speed ground mobility to command posts, radar stations, lasers and missile launchers.
The ducted fan, a shrouded propeller rotating horizontally to generate vertical lift, is simpler and more reliable than the helicopter. Experimental models during the 1950s had high fuel consumption, small payloads and stability problems. With better power plants and materials, as well as multiple fans giving stability, ducted-fan vehicles may replace the large and vulnerable heavy-lift helicopters.
There Will Be War Volume III Page 14