Some learning by rote continued, as children memorised such things as the Twelve Tables, the ultimate basis of Roman law In 92 BC an edict closed down schools teaching rhetoric in Latin, stating that instruction in Greek was superior, even for teaching a man to make speeches in Latin. It is possible that this measure was in part intended to prevent the oratorical skills useful in public life from becoming too common, for such schools were most likely to have taken pupils from those families outside the Senate. Some skill at public speaking was essential in the Roman political environment, so this continued the emphasis on what would be useful rather than on acquiring purely academic learning. Cicero, who was six years older than Caesar, recalled how in 91 Bc he had gone `almost every day' to listen to the finest orators speaking in the Popular Assemblies and in the courts. He also described how `I wrote, read, and declaimed all the time with great energy, but was not content to restrict myself just to rhetorical exercises' and soon began observing the activities of one of the leading jurists of the day. Caesar seems to have been particularly influenced by the oratorical style of his relative Caesar Strabo, so may well have heard him in action. 16
Physical training was directed by similarly utilitarian aims to academic education. In the Hellenistic world athletic perfection was pursued as an end in itself and was not direct preparation for the duties of an adult. In the gymnasia exercise was carried out naked and in many cities these institutions tended to celebrate homosexuality, both aspects very alien to the Romans. For them exercise was intended to promote physical fitness and had a strongly military flavour. Most usually on the Campus Martins - the plain of Mars the war god, where the army had mustered when Rome was still a small city - young aristocrats learned how to run, swim in the Tiber and fight with weapons, most particularly the sword and javelin. They were also taught to ride, and Varro, a near contemporary of Caesar's, tells us that at first he rode bareback rather than with a saddle. Much of the instruction in all these skills was supposed to be given by the father or another male relative. It was highly significant that all this occurred in public view Boys of a similar age, who would in time go on to be competitors in the scramble for political office, trained in full view of each other, and even at this early stage in life might begin to forge a reputation. Caesar was slightly built and not particularly robust, but his great determination seems to have made up for this. Plutarch tells us that he was a natural horseman and we also read that he accustomed himself to riding with his arms folded behind his back, guiding the trotting horse with his knees. In later life his skill at arms was also praised, and the Romans believed that all good commanders should handle sword, javelin and shield as well as they controlled whole legions.'7
THE LULL AND THE STORMS
After the savage suppression of Saturninus and Glaucia in the autumn of 100 BC, Roman public life had returned to something like normality. Marius' reputation had suffered through his earlier association with the pair, even though he had led the forces of the Republic against them. There were rumours that he had been tempted to join Saturninus. One of the wilder stories claimed that on the night before the final confrontation he had received both the radical leaders and a delegation from the Senate in his house at the same time. Marius is supposed to have feigned a nasty attack of diarrhoea, using this pretext to dash suddenly out of the room and leave one group whenever he wanted to talk to the others. Yet apart from his questionable role in this affair, Marius was simply not skilful enough at the political game to make the most of his wealth and military glory. The daily business of greeting friends and associates, of doing favours to as many people as possible and so placing them under an obligation without making them feel inferior, occupied a great part of a senator's time, but were not things at which Marius excelled. Plutarch tells us that few people chose to seek his assistance, even after he had constructed a new house for himself close to the Forum, declaring that visitors should not have to walk too far to see him. We do not know how much contact the young Caesar had with his famous uncle during the nineties BC, but it seems doubtful that he learned much from him about how to gain influence in the Senate.18
The legislation of the Gracchi and Saturninus had provoked much opposition, but in the end it was the fear of the power and influence that these radical tribunes would win through their actions that contributed most to their violent deaths. Ultimately, most of the Roman elite preferred to allow some of the major problems facing the Republic to go unanswered rather than see someone else gain the credit for dealing with them. Yet the issues remained, many of them connected with the fundamental question of who should benefit from the profits of empire. A magistrate proposing a new distribution of land, State-subsidised corn for the urban poor or an extension of the public role of the equestrian order as jurors could expect to find ready support. The success of the radical tribunes in the last decades had demonstrated this clearly, just as their violent ends had shown how difficult it was to maintain popularity with such disparate interest groups over the long term.
One group whose favour offered less immediate advantage to a senator were the Italian allies or socii. Tiberius Gracchus had incurred the hostility of the Italian aristocracy by his land law, since many of these men held large sections of ager publicus. Directly, such men had no power at Rome but they were able to influence sufficient important senators to oppose the tribune. Caius Gracchus had sought to win over the Italians by granting Roman citizenship to them, but in the process had alienated many of his Roman supporters. The Roman elite disliked the idea of the wealthiest new citizens adding to the competition for public office, while the poor, especially the urban poor, feared that crowds of Italians would overwhelm them at games and entertainments and make their votes of less value in the assemblies. The failure of Caius' legislation seems to have increased existing resentment of their treatment amongst Rome's Italian allies. These communities invariably supplied at least half of the soldiers in any Roman army - and it is possible that in recent decades the proportion had risen even higher - and suffered casualties accordingly. Yet they do not by this time seem to have shared the spoils of expansion to the same degree. The arrogant behaviour of some Roman magistrates in their dealings with the socii offered a further source of resentment. In 125 BC the colony of Fregellae, which possessed Latin status and so was comparatively privileged, had rebelled against Rome and been brutally suppressed. Many Italians seem to have reached the conclusion that only when they became Roman citizens would Rome's rule be made more palatable. Some drifted to Rome and somehow managed to get themselves enrolled as citizens, but during the early first century a series of especially strict censors did their best to remove the names of such men who had no real claim to be Romans.19
In 91 BC the tribune Marcus Livius Drusus once again advocated granting citizenship to the allies. This was the centrepiece of a series of reforms strongly reminiscent of those of the Gracchi - ironically, since Drusus' father had been one of Caius' chief opponents. Like the brothers, Drusus came from an extremely wealthy and influential family, which allowed him to be bolder in his legislation, while also adding to fears of what his long-term ambitions were. There was considerable opposition to the tribune, particularly to his plan to extend the franchise. However, before the citizenship law could be voted on by the Assembly, Drusus was fatally stabbed with a leather worker's knife while greeting callers in the porch of his house. The identity of the murderer was never established, but it was clear that his law would never now be passed. A large number of Italian noblemen, some of them close associates of Drusus, soon resolved to take things into their own hands. The result was the rebellion of large sections of Italy in what became known as the Social War - the name comes from socii, the Latin for allies. The rebels created their own state, with a capital at Corfinium and a constitution heavily based on the Roman system, having as its key magistrates two consuls and twelve praetors elected every year. Coins were minted showing the bull of Italy goring the Roman wolf and a large army speedily mobi
lised, its equipment, training and tactical doctrine identical to those of the legions. By the end of 91 Bc heavy fighting had broken out, with considerable losses on both sides. Allegiances in the struggle were complex and at many points it resembled more closely a civil war than rebellion. Many Italian communities, including virtually all the Latin towns, remained loyal to Rome, while numbers of captured Roman soldiers were willing to enlist in the Italian armies and fight against their fellow citizens.20
Caesar was too young to take part in the Social War, but a number of those who would play major roles in his story, notably Cicero and Pompey, had their first taste of military service during this conflict. It is quite possible that Caesar's father served in some capacity, but the sources are silent on this. If he was indeed governor of Asia in 91 BC then he would have missed the start of the war, but probably returned before it was complete. The Lucius Julius Caesar, who was consul in 90 BC and proved an uninspired commander in his operations against the rebels, was a member of the other branch of the family. Sextus Julius Caesar, who as already mentioned may or may not have been Caius' brother, had held the office in the previous year and also took part in the conflict. He died of disease while a proconsul in command of an army. The sheer scale of the fighting in the Social War, added to the deaths of several magistrates at the hands of the enemy and the incompetence shown by others, ensured that many experienced senators received commands as pro-magistrates. Marius played a major role in the first year of fighting, winning a number of small actions and, perhaps more importantly, avoiding defeat. He was now in his late sixties, which the Romans considered very old for a general in the field, and there was some criticism of his conduct as too cautious. Whether because of this, or through failing health, he does not seem to have played any active role in the war after 90 BC. Two other commanders, Lucius Cornelius Sulla and Cnaeus Pompeius Strabo, were credited with doing more than anyone else to ensure Rome's military victory. Yet the Social War was won as much through diplomacy and conciliation as by force, and from the beginning the Senate had started to grant what the Italians had unsuccessfully demanded in the first place. Allied communities who had remained loyal were given citizenship, as were those who quickly surrendered and, very quickly, those who had been defeated. The readiness with which the Romans extended the franchise to virtually the entire free population of Italy south of the River Po underlined the essential pointlessness of the conflict. The way in which it was done also illustrated the reluctance to alter the existing political balance in Rome itself, for the new citizens were concentrated in a few voting tribes to minimise their influence.21
Sulla had gained much credit for his role in suppressing the rebels and by the end of 89 Bc he returned to Rome and won election to the consulship for the following year, defeating as one of his main competitors Caius Julius Caesar Strabo. In many ways Sulla's career foreshadowed that of Caesar. Both were patricians, but ones whose families had long since fallen from prominence so that their own progress in public life was almost as hard fought as that of any `new man'. Sulla began his career rather later than was normal, but served as Marius' quaestor in Numidia and played the principal role in arranging the betrayal and capture of Jugurtha. It was an achievement that he constantly paraded, fuelling a growing jealousy in his former commander who felt that this diminished his own glory. Although during the war with the Cimbri Sulla at first served under Marius, he soon transferred to the army of his colleague and relations between the two men seem never to have been cordial after this. As consul in 88 BC the Senate gave Sulla the war with King Mithridates VI of Pontus as his province. Mithridates ruled one of the Hellenised eastern kingdoms, which had grown in power with the decline of Macedonia and the Seleucids. While the Romans were busy with the war in Italy, the king had overrun the Roman province in Asia and ordered the massacre of the Romans and Italians in the region. This success was followed by an invasion of Greece. For Sulla this command was a great opportunity to campaign amidst the famous, and extremely wealthy, cities of the east and he set about forming an army to take with him. There seems to have been little shortage of recruits, for wars in the east were renowned for the easy fighting and rich plunder.22
In ordinary circumstances Sulla would simply have gone to the war and done his best to add new lustre to his family name. However, a tribune named Sulpicius passed a bill through the Assembly giving the eastern command to Marius in place of Sulla. It was one of a series of laws in which he tried to follow in the path of the Gracchi and Saturninus by using the tribunate for a wide-ranging reform programme. Another bill was designed to spread the newly enfranchised citizens more evenly amongst the voting tribes. Marius was happy to use Sulpicius as he had once used Saturninus, and Sulpicius was equally content to benefit from association with the popular war hero. It is unlikely that either would have hesitated to break with the other if this offered more advantage, especially once their immediate objectives had been achieved. We must always remind ourselves that politics was about individual success and not parties. For the moment Marius had clearly decided that he needed once again to fight a war in order to win back the adulation he had enjoyed after defeating Jugurtha and the northern barbarians. Sulpicius as a tribune with great sway in the Assembly could provide him with the opportunity to fight another war. Marius was sixtynine and had not held an elected magistracy since 100 BC, while Sulla's own record had demonstrated his competence so that there was no reason for such a break with the traditional methods of allocating commands. However, the Gracchi had confirmed that the Popular Assembly could legislate on any matter. Sympathy and all precedents were with Sulla, but technically there was nothing illegal about this. Sulpicius backed up this legality with mob violence and one story maintained that Sulla only escaped with his life by taking refuge in Marius' house .21
Sulla had been unfairly treated, his dignitas as an aristocrat, senator and consul severely dented. If his bitterness was understandable, his response was shocking. Leaving Rome he went to his army and told the soldiers that now that he had been supplanted in the eastern command, it was inevitable that Marius would raise his own legions to fight the war. Rather than let this happen, he called upon the legionaries to follow him to Rome and free the Republic from the faction that had seized power. None of the senatorial officers, save one, responded to his appeal, but this reluctance was not shared by the remainder of the army. Whether through fear of being denied the chance of booty from the war, or even a sense of the injustice of their commander's treatment, the legions followed Sulla to Rome. It was the first time that a Roman army had marched against the city. Two praetors sent to confront the army were roughly handled, their robes were torn and the fasces, carried by their attendants to symbolise that they held imperium, were smashed by the angry legionaries. Later, other senatorial delegations asking the consul to halt and allow time for a peaceful settlement were received cordially, but ignored. When the entry into Rome of a small force was stopped by hastily organised forces loyal to Marius and Sulpicius, Sulla responded with greater force, his men fighting their way through the streets and burning down a number of houses in the process. Opposition was initially fierce but poorly equipped, and was soon crushed. Sulla outlawed twelve of the opposing leaders, including Marius and his son, as well as Sulpicius, making it legal for anyone to kill them and then claim a reward. The tribune was betrayed by one of his own slaves and killed. (Sulla gave the slave his freedom and then had the man thrown to his death from the Tarpeian Rock for disloyalty to his former master. Such a severe gesture was well in keeping with Roman traditions of respect for both law and duty.) The other fugitives avoided pursuit and escaped. Marius, after a series of picturesque adventures - no doubt much embellished by later legend - eventually reached Africa where he was welcomed by the communities of his veterans established there after the Numidian war. Sulla took some measures to restore normality and then left with his army to fight Mithridates, not returning to Italy for almost five years.24
The two co
nsuls for 87 BC swiftly fell out and one, Lucius Cornelius Cinna, was declared an enemy of the Republic and expelled from office after attempts to undo Sulla's legislation. Copying Sulla, Cinna fled to one of the armies still engaged in stamping out the last embers of the Italian revolt and persuaded the soldiers to support him. Soon he was joined by Marius who had returned from Africa with a mass of volunteers, who were little more than a rabble. Most notorious of all were the Bardyaei, a band of freed slaves who formed Marius' personal bodyguard and often acted as executioners. Near the end of the year Marius and Cinna marched on Rome and were ineffectually opposed by the consul Cnaeus Octavius, a man of high principle but very modest talent. The ambiguous behaviour of Pompeius Strabo, who was still at the head of his army and had been angling for a second consulship for several years, only made matters worse. Sulla had sent Quintus Pompeius, his fellow consul for 88 BC, to take charge of Strabo's legions. Quintus and Strabo were distant cousins, but that did not prevent the former from being murdered by the latter's legionaries, almost certainly with their commander's approval. Strabo may well have been unsure of which side to join and probably made overtures to both. In the event he joined Octavius, but failed to support him effectively and their forces were defeated. Strabo died soon afterwards, perhaps from disease or just possibly after being struck by lightning.
Caesar: Life of a Colossus Page 6