Many political and military leaders have written their own versions of the events in which they were involved, but few have matched the literary standard of Caesar's Commentaries. In recent times Churchill probably comes closest, in the sheer power of his words and the speed with which he produced his account so soon after the Second World War. Yet there is one major difference, both from Churchill and the vast majority of other famous generals, for all of them wrote for posterity, knowing that their own careers were substantially over and wishing to imprint their chosen version of events on future opinion. In contrast Caesar was far more concerned with the contemporary audience, and wrote to help further his career and gain even more opportunities for glory (which had also been true of Churchill with his earlier writings). It is not absolutely clear when the seven books of Commentaries on the Gallic War were written and released, but it is often asserted that they came out altogether in 51-50 BC. The conjecture - and it is no more than this in spite of the certainty with which it is often asserted - is that in the months of tension that would eventually culminate in the Civil War, Caesar was hoping to win as much support as possible in Rome. Yet this had been true from the moment he left for Gaul in 58 BC, for neither he, nor any other man pursuing a public career, could afford to be forgotten by the electorate and the influential groups in the city. It would have been strange for him to wait so long. Moreover, differences in the treatment of some individuals and apparent contradictions of detail between the various books make it more than likely that each was published separately.
A better case can actually be made for each book having been produced after the year of campaigning it describes, in the winter months before operations could resume. Even the advocates of the later collective release assume that Caesar sent an annual report to the Senate and that this was widely circulated, and sometimes suggest that this was similar to the form of the Commentaries as we have them. There is no reason to believe that in most cases Caesar lacked the time during the winters in Gaul to produce a book. Hirtius, one of his own senior subordinates who later added the eighth book of Gallic Commentaries, reflected Cicero's praise for Caesar as a stylist, but also noted the great speed with which he wrote these books. Another officer, Asinius Pollio, believed Caesar intended eventually to rewrite them, which could also be an indication that they were rapidly produced to fulfil an immediate political need. Neither comment proves that each book was published individually - it would obviously have been a considerable task to compose all seven books in the months at the end of the Gallic campaigns - but on the whole it does seem extremely probable.7
Another widespread assumption is that the Commentaries were aimed first and foremost at the senatorial and equestrian classes, but once again this may be questioned. In his consulship he had ordered the publication of all senatorial proceedings, which was evidently not for the benefit of senators. Levels of literacy in the Roman world are very difficult to judge, so that we do not know how many readers there were outside the wealthy elite. However, more practically we can judge that any system where each copy of a book had to be written out by hand did mean that books were a rare and expensive luxury. Yet Cicero noted the enthusiasm with which men of humble station, such as artisans, devoured history books. There are hints in our sources that the public reading of books was common and could be very well attended. It does seem probable that Caesar, the man who had always been a popularis and reliant on the support of a wide section of the community, was keen to engage this audience. It is striking that senatorial and equestrian officers do not figure very prominently in the Commentaries, and at times are shown in an unflattering light. In contrast, the ordinary soldiers of the legions consistently show courage and prowess. In most cases even when they are criticised, it is usually for excessive enthusiasm that leads the legionaries to forget their proper discipline. Even more than the ordinary rank and file soldiers, the centurions who lead them are most often painted in heroic colours. Only a few of these officers are named, but generally it is the centurions as a group who keep calm at times of crisis and fight and die for the approval of their commander. This favourable portrayal of centurions and soldiers may well have pleased patriotic aristocrats and equestrians, but it was surely even more appealing to the wider population. Caesar cultivated these Romans and did not simply speak to the elite. It is probable that some groups mattered to him more than others, for instance those citizens enrolled to vote in the First Class in the Comitia Centuriata, but we know so little of life outside the circles of the elite that it is hard to be sure.'
From the start of the campaigns in Gaul, until the very end of the Civil War, we know far more about Caesar's activities, but the overwhelming majority of this information comes from his own account in the Commentaries. For the campaigns in Gaul in particular, there is scarcely any information in other sources that does not seem to have been derived from Caesar's version. If we have reason to doubt the basic truthfulness of the Commentaries then we have nothing with which to replace them.
Napoleon was a great admirer of Caesar as a commander, placing him on the list of Great Captains whose campaigns should be studied by any aspiring general, but even so he doubted the truthfulness of some aspects of his account, and spent some time during his exile criticising them. However, given the flexible attitude to the truth in his own bulletins and memoirs, he may simply have seen this as natural. Caesar wrote for a political purpose, to build up his reputation as a great servant of the Republic and show that he deserved his pre-eminence. Therefore, the Commentaries were works of propaganda and showed everything he did in the most favourable light. According to Suetonius: `Asinius Pollio believes that they were composed without too much diligence or absolute concern for truth, since often Caesar was too willing to believe the versions which others gave of their actions, or gave a twisted version of his own, whether on purpose or merely from genuine forgetfulness. ...'9
Pollio served under Caesar in the Civil War, but was not with him in Gaul, and it is more than likely that his comments were mainly aimed at Caesar's account of that later conflict. The claim that Caesar was too ready to accept the accounts others gave of their actions, may well have had a bitterly personal note, since Pollio was one of the few survivors from a disastrous landing in Africa led by a man given favourable treatment in the Commentaries. Yet if he was right that Caesar also distorted some of his own actions, then to what extent could this have occurred? Archaeology has confirmed some of his account of operations at Gaul, but it is a clumsy tool with which to reconstruct the details of military operations, still less the motivation and thought behind them. More importantly it is clear that throughout the conflict in Gaul, the many senators and equestrians serving with Caesar's army regularly wrote to their family and friends. In later years Cicero's brother Quintus became one of Caesar's legates. The surviving correspondence includes little military detail, but it is striking that Quintus was even able to send a letter to his brother while the army was in Britain for a few months in 54 BC. There was clearly a constant flood of information going back to Rome from the army. In 56 BC Cicero attacked Caesar's fatherin-law Lucius Calpurnius Piso's record as proconsul of Macedonia in the Senate. Piso had flouted convention by not sending regular dispatches to the Senate, but nevertheless Cicero claims that he and everyone else in the House was well informed about the proconsul's activities and failures.
Most of the critics of Caesar's truthfulness employ details from his own narrative against him. Defeats are mentioned, as are a number of controversial actions. Ultimately, Caesar could not risk widespread invention or blatant distortion because these would readily have been spotted by his audience. He could, and clearly did, present everything in the most favourable light possible, passing the blame for defeats onto others, justifying his actions with apparently calm reason, and not highlighting operations that achieved little. Yet in the end he had to stick closely to facts - particularly those facts that were of most concern to a Roman audience - if the Commentaries we
re to achieve their aim of winning over public opinion. Caution must he used in dealing with Caesar's narrative, as with any other source, but there is good reason to believe that, at the very least, his account recounts the basic events accurately.'o
CAESAR'S ARMY
The army garrisoning Caesar's province in 58 BC was twice the size of the force that he had taken over in Spain, and in due course it would double and then treble in size. He had had about five years of military service, with no prior experience of warfare in this region, but, as we have seen, neither of these things were especially unusual for a Roman commander. Caesar coped well with the challenge, but it is a mistake to assume that from the very beginning he showed the sureness of touch that has led to his universal recognition as one of the greatest commanders of all time. He had to get to know his new army and learn best how to use it, and this process was not instant. However, his most senior officers were all men whom he had selected himself and brought with him to the province.
The most important were the legates - the name legatus meant representative and was used both for ambassadors and senior officers who `acted on behalf of' a governor - who were invariably senators. As far as we can tell none of these men had any more experience of soldiering than Caesar himself. He had asked Cicero to accompany him in this role, which is a good indication that useful political connections were often of greater importance than head-hunting military talent. The orator had turned Caesar down, but from the beginning of the campaigns he had at least five, and possibly six or even ten, legates on his staff. The most senior was Labienus, who was actually granted propraetorian imperium of his own and not merely delegated power. The man who as tribune in 63 BC had co-operated with Caesar and brought the prosecution against Rabirius receives more attention in the Commentaries than any other legate, and proved himself to be an exceptionally gifted soldier. However, in 58 Bc he may well have had no more prior experience of warfare than Caesar, and his talent blossomed and flourished only on arrival in Gaul. Labienus had served in Asia back in the seventies under the command of Publius Servilius Vatia Isauricus. He and Caesar may have crossed paths during these years, although it is equally possible that Labienus did not arrive in the province until after Caesar had returned to Rome. Extensive service under Pompey has been conjectured, but there is no actual evidence to support this. Similarly, many scholars have assumed that Labienus had held the praetorship in 60 or 59 BC, but again this is plausible rather than actually attested."
Balbus was another old associate of Caesar's and was once again his praefectus fabrum, but it seems that he did not spend too long in Gaul before returning to Rome to act as one of Caesar's key agents. Another man who served Caesar in the same role was Mamurra, who came from Formiae and made himself notorious for the massive fortune he acquired by dubious methods during his time in Gaul. The tribune Vatinius, who had secured the five-year command for him, seems to have been in Gaul for a while, but this may have been later in the decade. Quintus Pedius seems to have been with Caesar from the start. The identity of Caesar's other legates in 58 BC is unclear, but if they were not already with him, then several men were soon to join him. One was Aulus Hirtius, the man who would eventually add the eighth book to the Commentaries. Another was Servius Suplicius Galba, who had served under Pomptinus during the rebellion of the Allobroges and so had recent experience of warfare in Gaul. Quintus Titurius Sabinus and Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta were probably also both there from the start. (In spite of the cognomen Cotta, he is unlikely to have been a relation on Caesar's mother's side, since their nomen was Aurelius.) Cotta had written a treatise on the Roman constitution, and there was a pronounced literary feel to Caesar's staff. From 58 to 56 BC, this also included Crassus' younger son Publius, who was a keen student of literature and philosophy and an intimate of Cicero for that reason. This was an indication of the continuing closeness between Caesar and Crassus, which had not needed cementing with a marriage alliance. In his mid twenties, Publius Crassus was to prove a bold and gifted commander, but began the campaign as the commander of the army's cavalry (praefectus equitum), before being promoted to legate in the following year. Another young man of talent who served with Caesar probably from the start of the campaign was Decimus Junius Brutus, son of Sempronia who had notoriously been closely involved in Catiline's conspiracy. Finally Caesar also had the assistance of a quaestor, but his identity is unknown. 12
The most striking thing about Caesar's legates is their comparative obscurity. Crassus, and to a slightly lesser extent Brutus, belonged to distinguished families, and both their fathers had become consul. Labienus was a `new man' and had not yet held a magistracy more senior than the tribunate, as had Vatinius. Cotta's family seem not to have been prominent for many generations, while even less is known of the background of Sabinus and several other officers. On the whole the great noble families, especially those who had done well under Sulla and afterwards, chose not to accept employment with Caesar. This is in marked contrast to the very distinguished list of legates who had served under Pompey in the command against the pirates. Most of the legates in Gaul seem to have been looking to restore or improve their family's situation, and not a few were to do so. This was probably also true of many of the less senior officers. In his account of 58 BC Caesar talked of `the military tribunes, prefects, and others who had accompanied Caesar from the city to earn his friendship, but had no great military experience'. Men who were already well established did not need to tie themselves to Caesar in 58 BC. No one knew that he would prove to be such a great commander and that he would not march to defeat or his own death on some Gaulish hillside. They might guess that he would prove generous with whatever success he did have, for his reputation was already established in this respect. Seeking a closer link with Caesar was a gamble more likely to appeal to those unable to succeed any other way. As far as we can tell Caesar seems to have welcomed almost anyone, eager as he always was to do as many favours as possible and so place more men under obligation to him.13
Caesar chose his own senior officers, but the army he was to command was already in existence. Altogether, Illyricum, Transalpine and Cisalpine Gaul contained a garrison of four legions - the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth. It is not known when and by whom these had been raised, but it is quite likely that they had been formed several years before and had already seen active service. On paper a legion in this period consisted of a little under 5,000 men, but as in all armies in all periods of history, units on campaign were often seriously under strength. We hear of one of Caesar's legions during the Civil War that was only able to muster just under 1,000 effectives. A legion had no permanent commander, but its most senior officers were the six tribunes, who were usually equestrians. Some were young aristocrats who had not yet been enrolled in the Senate, while others were semi-professional officers, who sought continued appointments in successive legions. Twenty-four tribunes were elected by the Roman people each year, this traditional number being intended to supply the army of two legions, which was allocated to each consul in earlier centuries. Caesar had himself been elected in this way, but there were now usually too many legions in service at any one time to rely on this method. Most, if not all, of Caesar's tribunes were appointed by him, although some may already have been with the four legions. The Commentaries never mention a tribune actually commanding a legion, and Caesar normally gave this task to his legates and his quaestor. However, the tribunes clearly had important staff and administrative roles, and could command sizeable detachments.14
Beneath a tribune was a centurion, which is better thought of as a grade rather than a specific rank. There were sixty centurions in a legion. Each commanded a century of eighty men - the title had probably never meant anything more specific than around one hundred men - and six centuries combined to form a cohort of 480, which was the basic tactical unit of the army. Our sources are silent on the matter, but it is highly probable that the most senior of the six centurions commanded the cohort in battle. There w
ere ten cohorts in a legion, and the first cohort had greater prestige than the rest for it protected the silver or gilded eagle that was the standard of the entire legion. The centurions of the first cohort had immense prestige and they, probably along with centurions who commanded the other cohorts, formed the `centurions of the first grade' (primi ordines), who were often included in the commander's briefings. Centurions have sometimes been portrayed as `sergeant-major' types, grizzled veterans promoted only after long service in the ranks, but there is actually very little evidence to support this view. Never in the entire Commentaries does Caesar mention promoting an ordinary legionary into the centurionate, but then he says nothing at all about their origins, presumably because he assumed that his audience would know this. Many men may have been directly commissioned as centurions, something that we know was common under Rome's emperors, when we even hear of equestrians serving in this way. The administrative role that was an important part of the job evidently required a good standard of literacy and numeracy, neither of which may have been common amongst the ordinary soldiers. Once in the rank it is certain that centurions were socially and economically very distant from the ordinary legionaries, for their pay was several - perhaps as much as ten - times greater. Probably most centurions already came from the more prosperous classes and not the very poor who formed the bulk of the rank and file. If so, then the prominence they receive in the Commentaries becomes all the more interesting. It may well be that they were drawn from amongst the First Class, which played such a decisive part in the voting in the Comitia Centuriata. Appointments to this grade, and subsequent promotions, would then have taken on an importance beyond the purely military for a commander like Caesar, fitting in with the wider networks of patronage that underlay so much of Roman society. Yet unlike the more senior officers, centurions do seem to have stayed with the army for long periods, and it would not be a mistake to see them as essentially professional officers.'s
Caesar: Life of a Colossus Page 26